India and the Quest for World Order : Hegemony and Identity in India’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Discourse by Wojczewski, Thorsten Alexander
  
 
 
 
India and the Quest for World Order:  
Hegemony and Identity in India’s Post-Cold War 
Foreign Policy Discourse  
 
 
 
 
Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der Philosophischen Fakultät 
der Christian-Albrechts-Universität 
zu Kiel 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Thorsten Alexander Wojczewski 
 
 
Kiel 
 
(14. März 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erstgutacher: Prof. Dr. Dirk Nabers  
 
Zweitgutacher: Prof. Dr. Patrick Köllner   
 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 28. Juni 2016  
 
 
 
Durch den zweiten Prodekan Prof. Dr. Elmar Eggert  
 
zum Druck genehmigt: 13. Juli 2016 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
This dissertation was written during my time as a doctoral student at the University of Kiel 
and as a fellow in the doctoral programme of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
in Hamburg. I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Dirk Nabers and Professor Pat-
rick Köllner for their enduring support, help and advice. Furthermore, I would like to express 
my gratitude to the Heinrich Böll Foundation for providing me with a three-year dissertation 
scholarship and funding my field research in India. I would especially like to thank the Insti-
tute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, in particular Brig. (Rtd) Romel Dahiya, 
and the Centre for South Asian Studies at the University of Oxford, in particular Dr Kate Sul-
livan, for hosting me as a visiting fellow and supporting my research activities.  
Great thanks also go to my colleagues at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 
particularly Anne, Janina, Lisa, Martin, Medha and Vita, for making my doctoral journey de-
spite all the work and stress very pleasant and helping me to complete this thesis. A special 
thank goes to Medha for reading and commenting on parts of this doctoral thesis.           
Parts of this dissertation were presented at the International Studies Association Annual Con-
ferences, the World International Studies Committee Conference, the Oxford South Asia 
Work in Progress Roundtable and various forums at the German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies. I would like to thank the participants for their feedback and comments.  
I also owe thanks to my friends and my parents for their endless support and understanding 
over the last years. Finally, I would like to thank my partner Jagriti for your patience, help and 
love, and for proofreading and commenting on the manuscript.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents  
 
 
 
1. Introduction                 8 
 
2. Discourse, Hegemony and Postcoloniality           18 
2.1 Structuralism and Poststructuralism                 19 
2.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Discourse and Hegemony        22 
 2.2.1 Discourse                         22 
  2.2.2 Subject, Subjectivity and Agency                      25 
 2.2.3 The Emergence and Constitution of Discourses and Identities:  
              Nodal Points, Empty Signifiers and Social Antagonisms                              27 
2.2.4 Discursive Hegemony                          31 
2.3 Postcoloniality: Identity and Difference in the Colonial Encounter       34 
2.4 A Post-foundationalist and Reflexive Perspective on the Relationship  
             between ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Reality’            37 
       2.5 Summary               40 
 
3. Global Power Shifts and World Order: The Contestation of ‘Western’  
    Discursive Hegemony              42 
3.1 Discursive Hegemony and World Order                45 
3.2 The Contestation of World Order: ‘Global Power shifts’ and  
      Counter-Hegemonic Discourses            53 
3.3 Summary               62 
 
4. Studying India’s Foreign Policy Discourse: Analytical Strategy and Data Corpus      63 
4.1 Analytical Strategy              63 
4.2 Logics-Approach              67 
4.3 Data Corpus and Textual Analysis            71 
4.4 Summary               78 
 
5. The Evolution and Disruption of the Nehruvian Foreign Policy Discourse       79 
5.1 Non-alignment: An Independent Foreign Policy for an Independent India                 80   
5.2 Nehruvianism and India’s Post-Independence Foreign Policy Discourse       83 
5.3 A Moment of Dislocation: India’s Identity Crisis after the End of the Cold War      88 
5.4 Summary               93 
 
6. Post-Nehruvianism: India’s Hegemonic Foreign Policy Discourse in the  
    Post-Cold War Era              95 
6.1 From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment:    
 The Transformation of the Nehruvian Foreign Policy Discourse        97 
6.2 The Social Logics of the Post-Nehruvian Discourse: The Pillars of World Order    104 
6.2.1 State Sovereignty                    105 
6.2.2 Enlightened Self-Interest           112 
6.2.3 Non-violence            121 
6.2.4 Non-discrimination                      129 
6.2.5 International Unity in Diversity         138 
 
 
5 
 
6.3 Political Logics: The Constitutive ‘Others’ in the Post-Nehruvian Discourse    146 
6.3.1 Temporal ‘Others’: Colonialism and the Cold War       146 
6.3.2 Spatial-political ‘Others’: Pakistan and China        152 
6.4 Fantasmatic Logics: Indian Greatness and Exceptionalism      161 
6.4.1 Indian Greatness           161 
6.4.2 Indian Exceptionalism            167 
6.5 Summary             178 
 
7. Hyper-nationalist Discourse: Making India Strong        180 
7.1 Social Logic: National Strength (Shakti)           183 
7.2 Political Logics: A Uniform and Muscular National Identity       201 
7.2.1 Colonial ‘Others’: The Encounter with the Islamic and  
         Western-Christian Civilizations         201 
7.2.2 Spatial-political Others: Pakistan and China         211 
7.3 Fantasmatic Logics: Indian Greatness and Exceptionalism       223 
7.3.1. Indian Greatness            224 
7.3.2 Indian Exceptionalism            233 
7.4 Summary             241  
 
8. Conclusion              243 
 
 
9. References                         251 
 
 
 
 
German Summary / Deutsche Zusammenfassung        291 
 
 Lebenslauf              302
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
List of Abbreviations  
 
 
 
ABKM   Akhil Bhartiya Karyakarini Mandal 
 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
 
BJP   Bharatiya Janata Party  
 
BASIC  Brazil-South Africa-India-China  
 
BRICS  Brazil-India-China-South Africa 
 
CBM   Confidence-Building Measure   
 
CD   Community of Democracies 
 
CTBT   Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
 
EAM   External Affairs Minister  
 
FDI   Foreign direct investments  
 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
 
IBSA   India-Brazil-South Africa 
 
IDSA   Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses  
 
IMF   International Monetary Fund  
 
IR   International Relations  
 
ISI   Inter-Services Intelligence  
 
J&K   Jammu & Kashmir  
 
LoC   Line of Control  
 
MEA   Ministry of External Affairs 
 
MOD   Ministry of Defence  
 
NAM   Non-Alignment Movement  
 
NATO   North-Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 
NDA   National Democratic Alliance  
 
7 
 
NGO   Non-governmental organization 
 
NPT   Non-proliferation Treaty  
 
NSA   National Security Adviser  
 
NSAB   National Security Advisory Board 
 
NSC   National Security Council  
 
PM   Prime Minister  
 
RSS   Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh  
 
R2R   Responsibility to Protect 
 
SAARC  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation  
 
SATP   South Asian Terrorism Portal  
 
SLOCs  Sea Lines of Communication  
 
TFA   Trade Facilitation Agreement 
  
UN   United Nations 
 
UNDEF  United Nations Democracy Fund 
 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly  
 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council  
 
UPA   United Progressive Alliance 
 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
1. Introduction  
 
There is today a strong sense, among scholars and practitioners of international relations, that 
the 21
st
 century witnesses profound shifts in the global configuration of power. The Interna-
tional Relations (IR) discourse after the end of the cold war was shaped by the wide-spread 
conviction that the ideological and geopolitical struggles between great powers were over and 
the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy and market economy
1
 would gradually lead to 
peace, prosperity and cooperation in a complex global governance system. Only two decades 
later, the IR discourse talks of a deep crisis or even the end of the Western-liberal world order 
(see Jacques 2009, Sørensen 2011, Friedman/Oskanian/Pardo 2013, Morgan 2013, Acharya 
2014a, Stuenkel 2016). The shifts in the economic, political and military distribution of power 
from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’2 are represented by the discourse as the main embodiment of this 
crisis: While so-called emerging powers such as China, India and Russia could expand their 
power and act with a greater self-confidence on the world stage, the global leadership role of 
the U.S. and its Western allies has declined after the military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq and the recent economic and financial crisis. The global power shifts are, therefore, seen 
as a challenge or even threat to the Western-dominated order and its values such as the rule of 
law, free trade, liberal democracy and human rights (see Cox 2007, Ikenberry 2008, 
Mearsheimer 2010, Kupchan 2012, Layne 2012).  
At the same time, there is today a greater awareness in the IR discourse for the potential re-
percussions of this shift in material capabilities and resources on the level of knowledge and 
theory production in the sense that existing theories and concepts of IR are always also a re-
sult of the existing power distribution, i.e. contemporary mainstream IR theories and concepts, 
informed predominantly by ‘Western’ experiences, conditions, values and interests, are in-
creasingly challenged for their Western-centric conception of world politics and there are 
calls for ‘re-writing’ the discipline by ‘de-centering’ the West and introducing ‘non-Western’ 
ideas and theories into IR (see, inter alia, Tickner 2003, Nayak/Selbin 2010, Lizée 2011, 
Shilliam 2011, Hobson 2012, Tickner/Blaney 2012, Acharya 2014b).  
Against this backdrop, this study re-conceptualizes the phenomenon that is subsumed under 
label of ‘global power shifts’ through the lenses of poststructuralist discourse theory and 
                                                 
1
 This notion was most prominently articulated by Francis Fukuyama (1992) who coined “the end of history” 
thesis.  
2 When using binary categories such as West/non-West, this study is fully aware of the problems that these di-
chotomies entail and thus puts them in parantheses. In so doing, this study precisely wants to point out the dan-
gers of such essentialism.  
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postcolonialism as a shift of representational power that challenges ‘Western’ (discursive) 
hegemony in the political and academic domain. By understanding ‘global power shifts’ and 
world order as discursive phenomena, it argues that discourses materialize their attributes or 
effects by fixing particular meanings and establishing a field of intelligibility. ‘Global power 
shifts’ intensify the hegemonic struggle for the fixation of meanings by disrupting existing 
identities, exposing tensions or contradictions in the prevalent conceptions of world order and 
enabling ‘new’ agents, namely the emerging powers, to assert particular representations of the 
world as universal.   
Hence, the question arises what perspective on world politics those states which are seen as 
agents of this power shift have.
3
 The present study seeks to reconstruct the dominant world 
order models in India’s foreign policy discourse and examine how these interpretative frame-
works have informed India’s post-cold war foreign policy: How does India conceptualize 
world order and its place in it? What different world order concepts can be identified in the 
foreign policy discourse and what are their political and ideological underpinnings? Has a 
particular world order model reached a hegemonic status in the foreign policy discourse and, 
if so, how could this discursive dominance be achieved?   
It is widely believed today that India is emerging as an influential power pole in Asia and the 
global system (see Cohen 2002, Mohan 2004, Pant 2008a, Gordon 2014, Ogden 2014a). 
However, there is little agreement on what kind of power India is or will become. As the larg-
est democracy in the world, India is often depicted as a natural partner of the United States 
and the West in general (see Burns 2007, Zakaria 2008, Fontaine/Kilman 2013). Other schol-
ars and practitioners stress India's striving for foreign policy autonomy (see Mattoo 2005, 
Sikri 2009, Narang/Staniland 2012, Khilnani et al. 2012) and its role in ‘counter-hegemonic 
coalitions’ such as the non-alignment movement (NAM) or the BRICS group (see Koshy 
2006, Narlikar 2006, Dubey 2013), which oppose the prevalent inequality, injustice and 
‘Western’ imperialism in world politics and put India often at odds with the United States and 
European Union in international organisations. Moreover, India's foreign policy decision-
makers are occasionally reproached for thinking in moral categories instead of coming to 
terms with the ‘realities’ of world politics (Pant 2008b). At the same time, however, India is 
one of the biggest military powers in the world with steadily growing military capabilities. In 
this context, some scholars also lament the absence of foreign policy frameworks or a grand 
strategy in India (see Mazumdar 2011, Mehta [P.B.] 2009, Pant 2009, 2011a).  
                                                 
3
 As we will see later, this means that the discourse of ‘global power shifts’ constitutes these agents as emerging 
powers and allocates them privileged subject positions from which they can claim to have a legitimate voice in 
the negotiation of and struggle for world order.    
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Existing studies (see Bajpai 2002, 2003a, 2014; Sagar 2009; Ollapally/Rajagopalan 2012), 
which seek to illuminate Indian thinking on international relations, identify various different 
worldviews, strategic visions, world order conceptions or schools of thought in India’s foreign 
policy debate ranging from ‘Gandhianism’ and ‘Moralism’ to ‘Nehruvianism’ and ‘Neoliber-
alism’ to ‘Hindutva’ and ‘Hyperrealism’. While these studies – with the exception of one 
book chapter by Kanti Bajpai (2003a) – do not deal with Indian world order models, they 
share with the present study a research interest in how India ‘views’ world politics or certain 
aspects of it. Though these accounts provide some important insights, they tend to discuss 
India’s foreign policy thinking at a very general level without providing a sound theoretical 
and analytical framework for the arguments they put forward. For instance, Bajpai, whose 
work on India’s strategic culture is widely cited by scholars, does not explicate how he has 
arrived at the conclusion that there are three dominant strands of thought in India – Nehruvian, 
Neoliberal, and Hyperrealist – that guide India’s foreign policy. As a result, we neither know 
what actually constitutes a dominant school of thought nor how and why this dominance 
could be achieved. Like Rahul Sagar, Bajpai also heavily relies on the classical texts by Neh-
ru, Gandhi and the Hindu nationalist thinkers Savarkar and Golwalkar for advancing his ar-
guments without proving that this classical thought actually influences contemporary policy-
makers (e.g. by analysing Indian parliamentary debates or conducting interviews with policy-
makers). While it is, of course, fully legitimate to focus on the way how India’s nationalist 
leaders thought about international relations or strategy, both authors claim to discuss India’s 
contemporary foreign policy thought and simply assume that Indian policy-makers are today 
still heavily influenced by the thought of these nationalist leaders. Another drawback of this 
procedure is that the schools of thought or strategic visions presented by Bajpai and Sagar 
therefore appear rather static and do not take into account the possibility of evolutionary 
change. 
Problematic is also their rather careless conflation of ideas and policy practices: Bajpai’s at-
tempt to establish a causal relationship between culture and policy practices by simply search-
ing for overlaps between ideational preferences articulated in public debates and actual for-
eign policy decisions remains tautological, since culture (understood as a set of ideas) serves 
here as both a source and an expression of political structures and decisions. Sagar, by con-
trast, argues that these different strategic visions merely “represent ideas about politics that 
wax and wane with circumstances” (Sagar 2009: 802), i.e. they simply reflect the conditions 
of and changes in the political, economic and security environment. This one-dimensional 
view ignores the multiple ways in which the ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ dimensions are close-
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ly intertwined and can – as this study will show – only acquire meaning through discourses in 
the first place. 
Moreover, all works on Indian foreign policy thinking tend to place greater emphasis on In-
dia’s strategic community, i.e. scholars, journalists and retired governmental/military officials, 
than India’s actual decision-makers. This suggests that the authors assume that the strategic 
community has a substantial impact on policy-making in India. However, existing research 
points out that this impact is in fact rather limited – an assessment also shared by policy-
makers (see Markey 2009, Mohan 2009a, Sikri 2009, Chatterjee-Miller 2014, Mattoo/Medcalf 
2015). By privileging the strategic community over policy-makers, these studies thus create a 
rather distorted image. For example, Bajpai, Sagar and Ollapally/Rajagopalan all argue that a 
‘(neo)liberal’ worldview, which is characterized by a more ‘pragmatic’ approach to interna-
tional affairs, has emerged as a powerful, or even the most influential, school of thought in 
India’s foreign policy debate.4 Interestingly, however, there is no political party in India that 
has really embraced this worldview and its main proponents are almost exclusively located 
outside the political establishment. This corresponds to a certain extent with a common asser-
tion found in contemporary studies on Indian post-cold war foreign policy which argue that 
India has shifted from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ or ‘moralism’ to a foreign policy driven by ‘real-
ism’ or ‘pragmatism’ (cf. Mohan 2004, Kapur 2006, Ganguly/Pardesi 2009, Ganguly 2010, 
Malone 2012). However, often these studies neither provide a theoretically informed discus-
sion of these very broad and unspecific terms nor explore their actual significance and mean-
ing in the Indian context.  
The present study seeks to overcome these shortcomings and introduces a novel framework to 
analyse India’s foreign policy thinking and practices in the post-cold war era. It adopts a dis-
course analytical approach that explores how the ‘structures’, ‘actors’, ‘processes’ and ‘is-
sues’ of global politics are endowed with meaning in discourses and thus come into being in 
the first place: first, instead of simply taking for granted the universal applicability of ‘West-
ern’ concepts and theories, this study examines how Indian policy-makers order the world 
through discourses which confer it with significance. In doing so, it also goes beyond the cur-
rent general reading of India’s positioning in global issues with respect to the compliance to 
‘Western’ norms and looks at India as a potential norm-shaper and creator of ideas – and thus 
as a full agent in global politics. Second, the study does not only offer a descriptive account of 
                                                 
4
 One reason why Bajpai and Sagar in particular arrive at this conclusion is possibly that they draw for their 
discussion of the ‘(neo)liberal’ school of thought exclusively on contemporary sources, which makes this school 
of thought appear to be very current and topical, while their discussion of the other schools of thought is partially 
based exclusively on sources which were written around the time of Indian independence.          
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Indian world order models, but also explains how and why particular world order concepts 
have emerged and became dominant in the discourse. Thus, it provides, unlike previous re-
search, an analysis of various world order issues as well as the political and ideological un-
derpinnings of these world order concepts.  
Third, understanding foreign policy, world order and global power shifts as discursive phe-
nomena enables us to overcome the artificial dichotomy between the ‘material’ and ‘ideation-
al’ dimension of international relations prevalent in realist, liberal and constructivist ap-
proaches. Instead of believing in the possibility of separating both dimensions or privileging 
one dimension over the other, this study understands the ‘material’ and the ‘ideational’ as 
discursively constructed, i.e. neither ‘material’ phenomena (e.g. military power) nor ‘idea-
tional’ phenomena (e.g. ideas or norms) can be rendered meaningful and intelligible outside 
of discursive systems of signification. This enables us not only to comprehend the relationship 
between the global power shifts and contemporary debates on the ‘Western’-centric nature of 
IR theory, but also how world orders emerge in the first place and what kind of implications 
the current rise of ‘new’ powers has for the world order in the 21st century.  
Fourth and finally, the present study provides a novel approach to India’s contemporary for-
eign policy that questions the widespread claim that India’s foreign policy has moved from 
Nehruvian ‘idealism’ to ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’ and explicates the changes and continuities 
in Indian post-cold war foreign policy against the backdrop of a (intensified) struggle for dis-
cursive hegemony which was provoked by the ultimate disruption of the erstwhile hegemonic 
Nehruvian discourse after the end of the cold war. This disruption resulted in an Indian iden-
tity crisis and the gradual transformation of the hegemonic discourse into the Post-Nehruvian 
discourse. In other words, the changes in India’s recent foreign policy have largely taken 
place within the framework of the hegemonic Nehruvian discourse, which has informed In-
dian post-Independence foreign policy and was successfully reinterpreted and adapted to the 
‘new structural context’5 and ‘defended’ against the hyper-nationalist discourse – the main 
counter-hegemonic discourse in India. 
 
Discourse, Hegemony and Postcoloniality  
For exploring India’s world order concepts, the present study does not treat ‘world order’ and 
‘foreign policy’ and linked concepts such as state sovereignty or security as given entities but 
as discursive practices. Drawing on poststructuralist discourse theory, also referred to as Es-
                                                 
5
 As will become apparent in the course of this study, this ‘new structural context’ is no ‘objective’ condition, 
but endowed with meaning and thus (re-)produced through discourse(s).   
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sex School of Discourse Theory, and insights of postcolonialism, the subsequent analysis is 
based on a discursive, anti-essentialist ontology and thus understands reality as discursively 
constructed, i.e. the objects and subjects of the social world have no pre-given, fixed mean-
ings or identities, but are constituted by discourses that confer significance to them in the first 
place. The poststructuralist discourse theory devised by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
(1985: 105) understands a discourse as a “structured totality of articulatory practices”, that 
constitutes the meanings and identities of subjects and objects by linking together and modi-
fying contingent elements into relational and differential systems of signification. This anti-
essentialist, discursive ontology does not imply, however, that ‘reality’ can simply be reduced 
to language or that material factors do not matter. Rather, it means that the world cannot be 
accessed, understood and made meaningful independently of discursive practices, as ‘reality’ 
cannot constitute a simply given empirical referent point to which knowledge and truth could 
refer. Discourse is thus understood as the ontological horizon in the sense of being cotermi-
nous with social reality. Hence, material capabilities (e.g. military and economic) also obtain 
their meaning and relevance only through discourses (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 105ff.).  
In contrast to the largely materialist and deterministic notions of hegemony prevalent in IR, 
Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist reformulation of the concept of hegemony underscores 
the discursive character of the social world and understands hegemony as a discursive    
struggle for the fixation of particular meanings or a particular meaning system. Different dis-
courses stand for specific representations and understandings of social reality and seek to he-
gemonize the discursive space. The main objective of discourse analysis is to apprehend  the 
processes of meaning fixation and to elaborate how certain fixations of meaning could prevail 
as the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ understanding of the world and thus achieve a hegemonic status. 
If a certain particularity (of subjects, interests and demands) is represented as universal in the 
sense that the same ‘reality’ is reflected in the discursive practices of all relevant agents, then 
a hegemonic constellation has emerged (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 127ff.; Torfing 2005: 15; Na-
bers 2015: 142-143).  
Postcolonialism (see Gandhi 1998, Chakrabarty 2000, Shilliam 2011a, Seth 2013a) can pro-
vide additional insights into this hegemonic operation and is of particular relevance for under-
standing the role of the colonial encounter in the identity formations of both colonizers and 
colonized. In general, postcolonialism studies the relationship between location, knowledge 
systems and knowledge production, and contests the ‘Western’- or Eurocentric nature of the 
social sciences and humanities, particularly their parochial supposition that modern ‘Western’ 
thought is superior, progressive and universally applicable. By creating awareness for the co-
14 
 
constitution of the self (colonizer) and the other (colonized) and for the way how the self 
gains its privilege only by renouncing its dependence on the subordinated other, postcolonial-
ism sheds light on the impact of the colonial encounter on both the colonizers and the colo-
nized. This is captured by the postcolonial concepts of hybridity and mimicry (Bhabha 1994), 
which can help us in comprehending the way how postcolonial societies simultaneously 
adopted and reproduced the ideas and practices of the former oppressors, but also misappro-
priated and perverted their meanings, thereby contesting and subverting postcolonial rule as 
well as generating new – hybrid – identities that transcend the confines of one socio-cultural 
space.  
On the basis of this ontological framework, this study examines how world order is articu-
lated in India’s post-cold war foreign policy discourse. In doing so, it illuminates how com-
peting discourses seek to endow world order with meaning and to fix India’s identity in this 
order. The study argues that there is a discourse – framed in this study as Post-Nehruvianism 
– which managed to gain discursive hegemony. The Post-Nehruvian discourse is contested by 
the Hyper-nationalist discourse – the main counter-hegemonic discourse in India. It is argued 
that foreign policy and world order are key sites for the (re-)production of India’s identity, 
because they institute a political boundary between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and place India 
into a system of differences that constitutes ‘what India is’. At the same time, the study shows 
how both the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic discourse seek to defuse this difference 
by articulating a particular representation of political order as having universal significance 
and drawing on a mythical narrative that defines India as an exceptional agent which has 
demonstrated the world how diversity and difference can be managed peacefully in a polity –
and thus how a peaceful, just and stable world order could be achieved.  
 
Outline of the Chapters  
Chapter 2 “Discourse, Hegemony and Postcoloniality” outlines the study’s main ontological 
commitments and presuppositions. It discusses, in detail, the key insights and concepts of the 
Laclauian-Mouffian poststructuralist discourse theory. In particular, the chapter elaborates the 
different stages and dimensions of the struggle for discursive hegemony and thus how and 
why a discourse becomes hegemonic, dislocated, contested or transformed. Having discussed 
the main facets of discourse theory, the chapter introduces postcolonialism and outlines how 
its analytical concepts of mimicry and hybridity can supplement poststructuralism by prob-
lematizing the ethnocentrism and parochialism in knowledge production in the social sciences 
15 
 
and the implications of the colonial encounter for the identity formations of both colonizers 
and colonized. 
Chapter 3 “Global Power Shifts and World Order: The Contestation of ‘Western’ Discursive 
Hegemony” applies this theoretical framework to the phenomena of global power shifts and 
world order. It shows that world orders can be understood as the outcome of a successful 
struggle for discursive hegemony that has managed to universalize a particular representation 
of world politics and particular subjects as (privileged) agents in world politics by fixing a 
certain meaning system and concealing the radical contingency of all social relations. The 
chapter argues that the ‘West’ has obtained discursive hegemony in the prevalent international 
relations discourse in the sense that the ‘West’ as a particular historical subject with particular 
experiences, values, interests etc. managed to assert a particular representation of world poli-
tics as having universal significance and thus representing ‘reality’. Against this backdrop, the 
chapter re-conceptualizes the global power shifts in the international system as a shift of rep-
resentational power that has dislocated and contests ‘Western’ hegemony in the political and 
academic discourse of international relations by unravelling existing subject positions and 
constituting emerging powers such as India as agents of this power shift and privileged actors 
in the deliberation and struggle for world order.  
Chapter 4 “Studying India’s Foreign Policy Discourse: Analytical Strategy and Data Corpus” 
explicates the study’s analytical approach and data corpus for analysing India’s foreign policy 
and the world order models constituted therein. It introduces and discusses the logics-
approach developed by Jason Glynos and David Howarth (2007) as a promising mode to put 
the poststructuralist discourse theory into practice. Drawing on Laclau’s later work, Glynos 
and Howarth distinguish between the three different ontological dimensions: social, political 
and fantasmatic. The chapter shows that this three-fold typology can help us to guide the 
analysis in that we, first, carve out what world order means and implies in the discourse (so-
cial dimension), how these understandings of world order are constituted, contested and 
changed (political dimension) and why actors are gripped by a (hegemonic) discourse and 
take it to be ‘real’, ‘desirable’ or ‘natural’ (fantasmatic dimension). In addition, the chapter 
explicates the generation, scope and handling of the empirical data used in the discourse anal-
ysis by outlining the way how the body of textual material was processed, structured and in-
terpreted. 
Chapter 5 “The Evolution and Disruption of the Nehruvian Foreign Policy Discourse” dis-
cusses the cornerstones of India’s post-independence foreign policy which was to a great ex-
tent shaped by the state founder Jawaharlal Nehru. It outlines the main characteristics and the 
16 
 
development of the hegemonic Nehruvian discourse from independence till the end of the 
cold war. The chapter argues that the end of the cold war symbolizes a disruption – or in the 
terminology of discourse theory – a dislocation of the hegemonic discourse, i.e. there is an 
event or phenomenon
6
 that cannot be fully represented by the discourse and provokes a failed 
structural identity in the sense that actors cannot any longer (entirely) identify with the subject 
positions provided by the discourse, throwing the identities of actors into a crisis and prompt-
ing them to act in order to re-construct subject positions and thus the interpretative framework 
through which the transformation and the ‘new context’ can be understood.    
Chapter 6 “Post-Nehruvianism: India’s Hegemonic Foreign Policy Discourse in the Post-
Cold War Era” discusses the outcome of this discursive transformation. Post-Nehruvianism 
gradually emerged against the backdrop of the dislocatory moment in India’s foreign policy 
discourse and successfully transformed the traditional Nehruvian discourse by reinterpreting 
and adapting it to the changed ‘structural’ circumstances of the post-cold war world. The 
chapter shows how the nodal point of the discourse shifted from non-alignment to multi-
alignment. The main part of the chapter is devoted to a thorough investigation and discussion 
of the social logics of the Post-Nehruvian discourse – state sovereignty, enlightened self-
interest, non-violence, non-discrimination and international unity in diversity –, the political 
logics based on which the hegemonic discourse and a common identity are formed – that is, 
the temporal ‘others’ embodied by ‘Western’ colonialism and the cold war as well as the spa-
tial-political ‘others’ represented by Pakistan and China – and, finally, the fantasmatic logics 
that constitute the ideological underpinning of the discourse – namely, the meta-narratives of 
‘Indian Greatness’ and ‘Indian Exceptionalism’. The chapter also shows in what political con-
texts and issue-areas the different logics were invoked by policy-makers and thus offers an 
interpretative framework for understanding and explaining India’s foreign policy practices in 
the post-cold war period.  
Chapter 7 “The Hyper-Nationalist Discourse: Making India Strong” discusses the main 
counter-hegemonic discourse in India. The Hyper-nationalist discourse emerged and devel-
oped parallel to the mainstream Nehruvian discourse and gained in importance after the dis-
ruption of the erstwhile hegemonic discourse. The discourse consists of two overlapping sub-
discourses, the Hindutva and ultrarealist discourses, which converge in the social logic of na-
tional strength (shakti). It represents India’s foreign policy as overly idealistic and moralistic, 
deploring a lack of strategic thought, a nonchalant dealing with the country’s national security 
                                                 
6
 As will become clear in this study, this event or phenomenon is no extra-discursive entity, but endowed with 
meaning and thus (re-)produced through discourse(s), with which India’s foreign policy discourse interacts and 
which have undermined the meanings and identities articulated by the discourses.   
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and a disregard of power. Though the Hyper-nationalist discourse did not manage to gain dis-
cursive hegemony in the moment of dislocation, it contributed to the transformation of the 
Nehruvian discourse and left its mark on the transformed hegemonic discourse, as is shown 
by an analysis of the foreign policy practices during the tenure of the National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) government led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Un-
der the NDA government, however, the transformation of India’s dislocated hegemonic dis-
course was rather substantiated and accelerated, while the direction and parameters of India’s 
foreign policy remained in place. By discussing the social, political and fantasmatic logics of 
the Hyper-nationalist discourse in particular, the chapter shows when the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse shortly surfaced in India’s foreign policy and discusses some of the reasons for the 
discourse’s failure to gain discursive hegemony. 
Chapter 8 “Conclusion” summarizes the main findings of the study and reflects on the stabil-
ity of the hegemonic Post-Nehruvian discourse in light of the current BJP government under 
prime minister Narendra Modi who could unexpectedly secure an absolute majority in the last 
national elections. It concludes that the Post-Nehruvian discourse is relatively resilient and 
can integrate various social demands and interests, not the least because it has generated a 
collective foundational imaginary of India as an enduring cultural and political agent with 
exceptional virtues such as non-violence, pluralism and tolerance.  
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2. Discourse, Hegemony and Postcoloniality 
 
As the notion of ‘discourse’ in the title might already suggests, this study does not treat 
‘world order’ and ‘foreign policy’, and linked concepts such as ‘state sovereignty’ or ‘secu-
rity’, as given entities but as discursive practices. That is because every way of understanding 
the world and world politics always depends on certain categorizations, abstractions and rep-
resentations, and policy-makers or scholars engaging in these practices necessarily do so from 
particular vantage points – that is, they draw on particular systems of signification that confer 
meaning to the world. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to answer how world order is 
endowed with meaning by the different and competing foreign policy discourses in India in-
stead of studying or taking for granted the essentialist character of world order. These propo-
sitions raise a set of theoretical issues that necessitate a discussion and substantiation of the 
ontological commitments and presuppositions of this study.  
This chapter elaborates the study’s theoretical framework, which draws on poststructuralism7, 
in particular the poststructuralist discourse theory devised by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, and insights of postcolonialism. The chapter is divided into four parts: In the first 
part, the development of poststructuralism as a critique of structuralism and the main research 
theme of poststructuralist scholarship will be very briefly outlined. The second and main part 
of this chapter introduces and discusses the poststructuralist discourse theory. In particular, it 
explicates the theory’s two main concepts, discourse and hegemony, and related analytical 
categories such as antagonism, nodal point or empty signifier which are essential for under-
standing the constitution and operation of discourses and hegemony. The third part then turns 
to postcolonialism and sets out how postcolonialism and its analytical concepts of mimicry 
and hybridity can supplement poststructuralism by problematizing the ethnocentrism and pa-
rochialism in knowledge production and the implications of the colonial encounter for the 
identity formation of both colonizers and colonized. The fourth section of the chapter dis-
cusses the implications and directions of this meta-theoretical framework for the mode of in-
                                                 
7
 Poststructuralism shall not be confused or conflated with postmodernism. Postmodernism argues that we have 
entered a new era, ‘postmodernity’, which is, inter alia, characterized by a new complexity, changes in the tem-
poral and spatial organization of the world and the loss of known parameters, and has repercussions on culture, 
politics, science, economics, architecture and so on. This new era is said to have replaced ‘modernity’, a period 
that is said to have ranged from the late 19
th
 century to the mid-20
th
 century and is associated with substantial 
technological, scientific and medical innovations (Diez 2003: 450; Campbell 2010: 221). As will become clear in 
this chapter, postmodernism is only a new meta-narrative that offers a particular representation and interpretation 
of the world. Though many poststructuralists stress the differences between both approaches, the relationship 
between poststructuralism and postmodernism is often not so clear cut in some works (see, for example, 
Shapiro/Der Derian 1989 or George 1994).    
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quiry of this study and elaborates a post-foundationalist and reflexive perspective on the rela-
tionship between  ‘knowledge’ and ‘reality’.  
 
 
2.1 Structuralism and Poststructuralism  
Poststructuralism emerged from a critical engagement with structuralism, a linguistic theory 
of meaning that was pioneered by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, and shares a 
common research interest in the way how meanings and identities in the social world are con-
stituted through difference and how particular meanings and identities could become domi-
nant. Poststructuralism found its way into International Relations mainly through the works of 
R.B.J. Walker (1984, 1993), Richard Ashley (1984, 1987), James Der Derian (1987) and 
David Campbell (1998) who sought, above all, to deconstruct or denaturalize the taken-for-
granted knowledge of traditional IR theories and shed light on the way how these approaches 
generate knowledge claims about ‘the world’ through hierarchical meaning systems which are 
based on binary oppositions (for instance, order/disorder, national/international or sover-
eignty/anarchy) and privilege certain actors, perspectives and interests, while marginalizing, 
excluding or threatening others. 
Poststructuralism’s call for studying how particular entities such as the state, foreign policy or 
world order are practiced and spoken of, rather than what their essence is, is derived from a 
particular understanding of language. Language is ontologically significant and productive 
since it is primarily through language that the objects and subjects of our studies are brought 
into being and endowed with particular identities. Instead of treating language as an expres-
sive and transparent instrument for communication and indexing data from a clear and objec-
tive view on reality, poststructuralists understand language as a rule-system with specific ef-
fects and constraints on our modes of thought and expression – a system of temporarily fixed 
and contingent meanings that does not simply mirror reality (Shapiro 1981: 218; Hansen 2006: 
15-16; Mills 2007: 8). Complying with the ‘linguistic turn’ in the social sciences initiated by 
Wittgenstein
8, poststructuralists do not understand reality as “a unified, systemic whole, un-
derstandable in objectivist terms. Rather […] the objects and subjects of reality are socio-
linguistically constructed, and their meanings are not given but made and remade by people in 
different times and places, representing themselves and their world as part of discursive prac-
                                                 
8
 According to Wittgenstein’s proposition, “[t]here are no independent or objective sources of support outside of 
human thought and human action […]. There is no standard of objective reality (always fixed, never changing) 
against which to compare or measure a universe of discourse […] nothing exists outside of our language and 
actions which can be used to justify, for example, a statement’s truth or falsity” (Phillips 1977: 30). 
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tices” (George 1994: 156). Hence, there are no ‘objective’ or ‘true’ meanings behind the 
socio-linguistic representations (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 108). 
Poststructuralism’s understanding of language and discourse, which will be further explicated 
below, is derived from a critical engagement with structuralism, which is associated with the 
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and conceptualizes culture as a structure modelled on 
language that transmits cultural knowledge and values. According to Saussure (1983: 15), 
language can be understood as a closed system of signs. This system consists of specific lin-
guist rules (langue) that are a necessary presupposition for meaningful communication. 
Langue is distinguished from individual acts of speaking (parole), which only become possi-
ble in the first place through langue. The meaning of individual signs in this system is not 
determined by their relation to a pre-given external reality but their relations to other signs. A 
sign has two dimensions: the signifier (sound or visual appearance) and the signified (mean-
ing or concept). The relationship between both dimensions is, as Saussure argues, contingent 
and arbitrary in the sense that neither the signifier expresses the meaning nor the signified 
resembles the form or sound of the signifier (Saussure 1974: 68). Thus, meaning depends on 
difference and not on reference to the world or particular ideas. According to this relational 
and differential understanding of language, any element gains its significance and identity 
only through its relations with and difference from other elements in the linguistic system.  
Following the deconstructive reading of structuralism by Jacques Derrida (1976), poststruc-
turalists reject the ‘phonocentrism’ of structuralism – the privileging of spoken to written lan-
guage – and the concept of language as a stable, fixed system with a centre or origin. The the-
ory of deconstruction is premised upon the insight that Western thought is characterized by a 
reasoning in binary oppositions. This represents, as Derrida argues, a logo-centric procedure 
of identity and hierarchization that generates meaning and understanding by distinguishing a 
privileged entity (the ‘self’) from an inferior ‘other’. In other words, the binary oppositions 
(e.g., speech/text, identity/difference, man/woman or domestic/international) are conceptual-
ized as mutually exclusive and in a hierarchical order, even though the ‘other’ is necessary for 
securing the inherently instable identity of the ‘self’. Against this backdrop, a deconstructive 
reading of a ‘text’ aims to expose the propositions and dichotomies whereby meaning is pro-
duced, and unravel these propositions, dichotomies and hierarchies by drawing attention to 
co-constitution of the ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
Accordingly, it is not possible to capture, as Saussure presumes, the essential character of lan-
guage – or any other concept or object – in its entirety. By focusing on language as a product 
rather than a process, Saussure is not able to grasp the construction and historicity of struc-
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tures, which also results in an initially rigid separation of signifier and signified and then later 
re-connection through a one-to-one correspondence, thereby implying that the ‘material’ sig-
nifier can exist independently from the ‘ideal’ signified. This runs counter the very premises 
of Saussure’s theory and would suggest that it would be possible to understand a signifier 
(sound-image) without understanding the signifier (concept) or to distinguish between two 
different signifiers without recognizing differences which are themselves not solely material 
but ideational (Derrida 1981: 223ff.; Howarth 2013: 39-40). 
Derrida reworked Saussure’s structuralism by introducing the concept of différance to demon-
strate that meaning is both differential and deferred and thus that things and words are always 
co-constituted, even though this co-constitution is itself never fully complete, because words 
can never entirely saturate the meaning of things due to their relational nature, i.e. in the pro-
duction of meaning through difference, other possibilities available in the system of difference 
are deferred and thus not actualized (Zehfuss 2002: 199; Derrida 1982: 8ff.). While signs, in 
this reading, still obtain their meaning by being different from other sings, these meanings 
also depend upon the context in which the sign is used, thereby making the structure of lan-
guage changeable and recognizing that the signs from which they differ can alter with the 
context.  
These insights from Derrida have motivated poststructuralist IR scholars to deconstruct and 
criticize the binary oppositions or dualist categorizations on which International Relations is 
based upon by highlighting the processual, context-specific and contingent nature of meaning 
generation, the inherent contradictions and exclusions of the dominant representations of 
world politics and the possibility of putting the elements (of world politics) together in an-
other way. Despite the criticism of structuralism, the prefix ‘post’ in poststructuralism may not 
be interpreted as anti-structuralism, since poststructuralism shares with structuralism the cru-
cial insight that meaning is a result of linguistic structures, namely that meaning is produced 
by the constitutive differentiation of signs, and not through reference to reality or ideas 
(Münker/Roesler 2012: 29-30). Departing from structuralism, however, poststructuralists 
point out that these systems of difference are not fixed or closed.  
In sum, for poststructuralism, language is structured in patterns, i.e. there exists no single 
general system of meaning, but a series of historically contingent systems of meaning, with 
meanings being subject to change between these different patterns or systems of meaning. The 
settling of meaning is the outcome of social and political practices. Understanding language 
as social is to acknowledge that our thoughts are only becoming comprehensible to others, if 
there is a collectively shared system of codes, rules and conventions to which we must adhere 
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in order to be comprehended and participate in social life. Understanding language as political 
is to acknowledge that it is also a site for (re-)producing and denouncing specific subjectiv-
ities and identities, a site for (political) inclusion and exclusion (Hansen 2006: 15-16; Jørgen-
sen/Phillips 2002: 12). This notion of language is captured by the concept of discourse and 
also underlies the poststructuralist discourse theory by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, 
which will be discussed in detail in the next section. As Laclau (2005: 24-25) notes: “The un-
fixity of the relationship between words and images [or sounds] is the very precondition of 
any discursive operation which is politically meaningful”.       
                 
 
2.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Discourse and Hegemony  
The poststructuralist discourse theory, or so-called Essex School of Discourse Theory, builds 
upon Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s seminal work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(1985) and the further refinements and development of the theory by Laclau and other schol-
ars since then.
9
 In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe deconstruct and criti-
cize the essentialism and determinism in (post-)Marxist theory and offer a poststructuralist 
reformulation of the notion of hegemony by emphasizing the contingency and historicity of 
all social formations and the role of the political and power in the constitution of these forma-
tions. In doing so, Laclau and Mouffe carve out the particularity, the silences, hierarchies and 
exclusions in the seemingly objective and universal orders and practices (re-)produced by 
hegemonic projects. In devising their approach, Laclau and Mouffe and the other members of 
the Essex School draw on and critically engage a variety of different theoretical sources, in-
cluding poststructuralism (e.g. Derrida and Foucault), post-Marxism (e.g. Gramsci and Al-
thusser), post-analytical philosophy (e.g. Wittgenstein and Rorty), psychoanalysis (e.g. Laclan 
and Žižek) and phenomenology (e.g. Husserl and Heidegger), for elaborating a novel dis-
course theory.  
 
2.2.1 Discourse 
The core of the ontology of the Essex School of Discourse Theory is a particular (re-)       
conceptualization of discourse, which presumes that “all objects and actions are meaningful, 
and that their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules” (Howarth/    
                                                 
9
 Some important members of the Essex school are Laclau’s students David Howarth, Aletta Norval, Jason Gly-
nos and Yannis Stavrakakis. In IR, the Essex School has been introduced and further elaborated, inter alia, by  
Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996), Ty Solomon (2009), Dirk Nabers (2010, 2015), Eva Herschinger (2012), and    
Martin Nonhoff and Frank A. Stengel (2014). 
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Stavrakakis 2000: 2). In contrast to the prominent understanding of discourse that distin-
guishes between the discursive and non-discursive realm, reduces discourses to the linguist 
(or ideational) dimension of social relations or remains ambiguous about the existence of ex-
tra-discursive phenomena (such as Foucault in his work), the Essex School seeks to overcome 
these dichotomies (e.g. thought/reality, mind/matter, realism/idealism) and asserts that all 
aspects of ‘social reality’ depend on the orders of discourses which constitute their identity 
and significance. Stressing the discursive character of the social world, Laclau and Mouffe 
understand a discourse as a “structured totality of articulatory practices”, a structure of mean-
ingful practices that constitutes the meanings and identities of objects by linking together and 
modifying contingent elements (e.g. subjects, interests or demands) into relational and differ-
ential systems of signification. An articulation thus “establishes a relation among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau/Mouffe 
1985: 105). These articulations take place in the discursive field which is the “theoretical ho-
rizon within which the being of objects is constituted”; hence, “all objects are objects of dis-
course” (Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 3) in the sense that the discursive field is the structural 
context in which meanings and identities can be articulated through relational and differential 
systems of signification that relate differences to confer meaning.
10
 In other words, the dis-
course as a system of meaningful practices constructs a field of intelligibility that makes spe-
cific beings, practices and relations in the social world knowledgeable to us by attributing 
them meaning and thus generating – what John Dryzek calls – “a shared way of apprehending 
the world” (quoted in Glynos et al. 2009: 8).  
As we will see in the course of the subsequent discussion, this conceptualization of discourse 
acknowledges, first, that discourses are inherently political, because their formation depends 
on difference, an antagonist ‘other’, and thus the exclusion of certain other elements through 
the drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’; second, that discourses 
always entail the exercise of power, since their formation involves the exclusion or marginali-
zation of other possibilities and thus a hierarchical structuring of relations between different 
social forces; third and finally, that discourses are contingent constructions, i.e. the meanings 
and identities of social elements can always be constructed in different ways. As these ele-
ments have no pre-given, fixed essences or characteristics, but acquire their meanings and 
identities only through their relation and difference to other elements, discourses can fix so-
cial meanings and identities only partially and are thus always instable and vulnerable to the 
                                                 
10
 Hence, whenever this study refers to ‘structural context’, it refers to the discursive field as the horizon for the 
articulation of meanings and identities and not to an extra-discursive realm.     
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‘surplus of meaning’ located in the field of discursivity. Given the absence of any stable 
foundations underlying these meanings and identities, and the exclusion of certain other op-
tions, every discourse is dependent on and vulnerable to a ‘discursive exterior’ that threatens 
to subvert (or dislocate) the articulation of meaning, but is also the precondition for discursive 
articulations in the first place (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 110-112; Howarth 2002: 103, 2013: 11).     
This anti-essentialist, discursive ontology does not imply, however, that ‘reality’ can simply 
be reduced to language or that the world does not exist independently of thought, so that we 
can disregard material facts. Rather, it means that the world cannot be accessed, understood 
and made meaningful independently of discursive practices, as ‘reality’ cannot constitute a 
simply given empirical referent point to which knowledge and truth could or must correspond. 
Likewise, discourse is not synonymous with language, but refers to all – linguistic and non-
linguistic – practices through which meanings are produced and identities are constituted.11 
As Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 108) note in this regard: 
 
“The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there 
is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a 
brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. 
But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions 
of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such 
objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute them-
selves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence.” 
 
Hence, discourses do not simply reflect or represent a reality ‘out there’, but constitute sub-
jects and objects within particular discursive structures that delimit their ‘reality’ in the sense 
that their intelligibility depends on such placements. In other words, subjects and objects only 
become meaningful within a discursive context and we cannot draw on or act upon an extra-
discursive sphere. We are ‘thrown into’ a world of meaningful practices and significant dif-
ferences, i.e. the discursive as a horizon, and it is this discursive horizon that enables us to 
identify and engage with the objects we encounter. There is thus no presence delivered to us 
by a material reality; there are only historically contingent representations of ‘reality’ in the 
sense that they categorize, symbolize and organize the world and its objects in a particular 
way and thus produce this ‘reality’ by making it accessible, knowable and meaningful (Smith 
1998: 85; Howarth 2002: 9/104). In this sense, a foreign policy discourse, for instance, refers 
to the various representational practices that discursively (re-)produce the acting and purpose-
ful subjects of world politics such as states, diplomats or international organizations as well as 
the objects and concepts they can speak about or act upon such as war or human rights. A 
                                                 
11
 Accordingly, there is no ontological difference between linguistic and non-linguistic practices in the sense that 
both can only be comprehended through discursive practices (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 107).   
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state, for example, is (re-)produced by various discursive or representational practices that 
encompass, amongst others, border control, ceremonies, political speeches, military deploy-
ments, diplomacy and economic investments (Campbell 2010: 226). 
Ontologically, as David Howarth (2013: 10-11) argues, this understanding of discourse sub-
scribes to a “minimal realism” by acknowledging “the existence of the objects and processes 
that we think about, though our practices of reflection are never external to the lifeworlds into 
which we are thrown” and affirms “a philosophy of radical materialism, in which our concep-
tual and discursive forms can never exhaust the materiality of objects. Objects are thus con-
structed in different ways in different contexts, though no conceptual form ever captures their 
essence once and for all”. However, as we will see in the subsequent discussion of the consti-
tution of the subjectivity and the dislocation of discourses, “this does not preclude moments 
of transcendence during which human agents can ‘go beyond’ the particular discourses that 
confer identity and practical possibility by projecting new projects and discourses”.   
 
2.2.2 Subject, Subjectivity and Agency  
In poststructuralist discourse theory, the subject is no pre-discursive agent with some intrinsic 
characteristics but constituted by discourses which delimit what s/he can meaningful say and 
do. Subjects cannot act and speak within the existing (discursive) structures as they like, but 
have to organize and identify with these discursive structures to make their practices mean-
ingful. As a result, discourses set clear limits to the way how subjects and practices can possi-
bly be constructed (Laclau/Mouffe 1987: 84-85). In this sense, poststructuralism breaks with 
the post-Enlightenment notion of an autonomous, rational and centralized subject that is the 
origin and bearer of meaning and consciousness (Münker/Roesler 2012: 38). This however 
does not entail the ‘death of the subject’ or human agency.  
Given the incomplete nature of discursive constructs, the subject is also incomplete and 
emerges as a split subject that is located at the intersection of different discourses, which pro-
vide various identities and possibilities of articulation. Consequently, the subject attempts to 
identify with a subject position
12
 within a discursive structure in order to acquire a complete 
identity. A subject can have a number of different subject positions (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 115; 
Torfing 2005: 16). In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe provided a rather 
static account of ‘subject positions’ and seemed to suggest that the subject can be reduced to a 
                                                 
12
 “A subject position”, as Anna Marie Smith (1998: 58-59) explicates, “refers to the ensemble of beliefs through 
which an individual interprets and responds to her structural positions within a social formation. In this sense, an 
individual only becomes a social agent insofar as she lives her structural positions through an ensemble of sub-
ject positions that makes sense to at least one other person in one other time and space”.  
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formation of different subject positions which are imposed upon it by the respective discur-
sive structure. This structuralist view would negate agency and the possibility of (radical) 
change (e.g. establishment of new, fundamentally different discourses) by precluding the ac-
tors’ ability to act strategically in relation to the discourse (i.e. to shape and transform the dis-
cursive formation) and to assume multiple identities (ibid.: 16-17).  
For making better sense of the relationship between the subject and the structure and offering 
a more dynamic view on their interaction, Laclau (1990, 2000) drew on the Lacan’s psycho-
analytical theory (see Stavrakakis 1999, Žižek 1999). In this view, all social relations and 
identities are characterized by a fundamental ‘structural undecidability’ or ‘lack’ that can 
never be fully overcome. It results from the paradox that subjects can only constitute them-
selves as subjects through identifications with certain subject positions generated by a dis-
course, which can, due to the open, unstable and incomplete nature of discourses, never grasp 
the ‘true essence’ of the subject, but only provide partial, temporary and fragile identities. 
Identifications are thus unavailing attempts to overcome the constitutive ‘lack’ that is at the 
heart of the subject, since the subject can only constitute itself as a subject within an alien 
discursive structure which never fully grasps its ‘true’ essence (Laclau 2000: 58; Gly-
nos/Howarth 2007: 131/142f.).  
While the subject position illuminates the various forms through which subjects are produced 
as social agents, political subjectivities account for the way social actors act. The subject, as 
Laclau (1990: 39-41/92) argues, is compelled to act and can transcend particular discourses 
due to the contingency of the very discursive structures which confer identity to the subject. 
Accordingly, the contingency of the discourse opens up this possibility to subjects, provided 
that a discourse becomes dislocated. Dislocatory moments signify, in the terms of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, the presence of ‘the real’ in a symbolic order, thereby indicating certain dis-
parities and ultimately the contingency of all social relations. In other words, there is an event 
or phenomenon
13
 that the discourse cannot explain or represent systematically, leading to a 
failed structural identity of the subject and prompting it to act. Hence, the subject is neither 
simply determined by the discursive structure nor can it constitute this structure. Rather, the 
subject is compelled to take action when its identity is thrown into a crisis and the structures 
must be re-established. Within this process of identification, political subjectivities are formed 
and later become, on the condition of their stabilization, subject positions that make individu-
als to social actors with particular characteristics. As a result, by rejecting both essentialist 
                                                 
13
 These events or phenomena, however, are no extra-discursive entities with some ‘objective’ characteristics or 
implications, but their meaning and significance is exactly what is at stake in moments of dislocation and differ-
ent discourses seek to establish  (Nabers 2015: 26/117).   
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approaches to subjectivity, which assume subjects with fully constituted identities and inter-
ests, and structural determinism, which reduces the role of agency to the reproduction of pre-
constituted structures, we can dissolve the agent/structure problematique
14
 by acknowledging 
simultaneously the constitution of subjects within discursive structures and the inherent con-
tingency and instability of these structures, which occasionally necessitates and prompts 
agency to reformulate them (Howarth 2002: 109/121). 
 
2.2.3 The Emergence and Constitution of Discourses and Identities: Nodal Points, 
Empty Signifiers and Social Antagonisms   
Given the presumption that discourses are inherently contingent, instable and contested, this 
begs the question how even partial fixations can be generated and maintained by a discourse 
or, in other words, how any form of identity is possible and why the social world appears to 
be relatively rule-bound. The poststructuralist discourse theory argues that discourses are or-
ganized around so-called nodal points. These are privileged signifiers (or reference points) 
that allow to link various elements (e.g. interests and demands) in the field of discursivity 
together into a common system of meaning and thus to articulate them – as moments – within 
a discourse. In other words, an articulation is the practice of constructing nodal points which 
can partially fix meanings. An example for a nodal point is communism in which various pre-
existing and available signifiers (e.g. ‘equality’, ‘freedom’, ‘state’, ‘democracy’) were linked 
together and obtained a new meaning by being articulated around the (privileged) signifier 
‘communism’ (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 113; Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 8).  
Further refining the notion of the nodal point, Laclau later introduced the concept of the 
empty signifier to account for the impossibility of any discursive structure to reach full clo-
sure of society, but the necessity for any society to maintain the ideal of closure, fullness or 
universality. The function of empty signifiers is to embody the absent closure, fullness or uni-
versality of any discursive system by ‘emptying’ discursive difference to an extent that it can 
provisionally symbolize the identity of the discourse. Empty signifiers are thus broad and 
widely appreciated concepts such as ‘freedom’ or ‘order’, whose exact meaning or the way 
how they can be realized remain unclear and ambiguous (Laclau 1996: 36-37, 2000: 58). This 
‘emptiness’ enables a discourse to integrate various different – and even contradictory – posi-
tions, interests and demands and is, as we will see later, a crucial precondition for the forma-
tion of discursive hegemony.  
                                                 
14
 See for the structure/agency debate: Hollis 1994, Wendt 1999, Hay 2002, Stones 2005 and Wight 2006. 
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Though nodal points and empty signifiers can to a certain extent shed light on the way how 
partial fixations of meanings can be achieved, they are insufficient for explaining the emer-
gence and constitution of identities and the maintenance of the unity of a discourse. It is here 
that the Essex School of Discourse Theory underscores the primacy of the political in any 
social ontology. The political constitutes the specificity of politics and its autonomy with re-
spect to other spheres such as the social or morality. This specific criterion is, as Chantal 
Mouffe (2000: 101) explicates, “the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human rela-
tions, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. 
‘Politics’, on the other side, indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions 
which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are 
always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’”. 
Drawing on Derrida’s insight that the constitution of identities depends on the establishment 
of difference and that this difference is often constructed on the basis of hierarchy as well as 
Carl Schmitt’s emphasis on the conflictual nature of politics, the notion of the political af-
firms that discourses, and the identities (re-)produced through them, imply the drawing of 
political frontiers between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ and thus the exclusion of certain social 
forces, possibilities, interests etc., whereby the discourse becomes vulnerable to an ‘discursive 
exterior’ (Mouffe 2005: 13ff.). 
Social antagonisms point to the inherent negativity in all social formations and reveal the limit 
points or frontiers of any discourse (and society in general), where social meaning is (still) 
contested and cannot be fully stabilized. Antagonisms, however, do not symbolize the clash of 
social forces with already constituted – and oppositional – identities and interests, but emerge 
from the very process of identity formation which always presupposes that there is an ‘other’ 
which serves as the (negative) reference point for constituting identities (and interests). The 
‘other’, the discursive frontier or exterior, is thus constitutive for the formation of a discourse 
and the (re-)production of identities therein, because it defines the ‘self’. Social actors are 
unable to attain positive and full identities, and therefore they need an ‘other’ which is held 
responsible for this ‘failure’ and represented as a (potential) threat to the identity of the ‘self’. 
Social antagonisms thus account for the very ambivalent nature of the emergence and consti-
tution of identities: While the ‘other’, the antagonist, threatens the identity of the ‘self’ and 
blocks its full realization, the ‘self’ can define itself only in opposition to the antagonist (La-
clau/Mouffe 1985: 176ff.; Laclau 1990: 17-21; Stäheli 2006: 263-264).  
The antagonist nature of identity formations has far-reaching implications for the study of 
international relations and motivated poststructuralist scholars to investigate how the identity 
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of states is always constituted against a series of ‘others’ which simultaneously constitute and 
subvert this very identity. As Richard Devetak (2005: 177) notes,  
 
“[t]he geo-political creation of the external other is integral to the constitution of a political identity (self) 
which is to be made secure. But to constitute a coherent, singular political identity often demands the si-
lencing of internal dissent. There can be internal others that endanger a certain conception of the self, 
and must be necessarily expelled, disciplined, or contained. Identity, it can be surmised, is an effect 
forged, on the one hand, by disciplinary practices which attempt to normalize a population, giving it a 
sense of unity and, on the other, by exclusionary practices which attempt to secure the domestic identity 
through processes of spatial differentiation, and various diplomatic, military and defence practices.” 
 
In international relations, the drawing of political frontiers between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, 
between those who belong to the (inter)national community and those who are excluded, is 
primarily a result of the states’ foreign policies. While poststructuralists have tended to repre-
sent ‘self’/‘other’ relations in rather radical and antagonistic terms by focusing on the way 
how the state is constituted as a space of order, peace and progress in relation to the interna-
tional system as the space of difference characterized by disorder, anarchy, threats and stag-
nancy (see Ashley 1987, Walker 1993, Campbell 1998), the formation of identities, as Lene 
Hansen (2006: 33/41) rightly points out, transcends “a simple Self-Other duality”. As a result, 
we should conceive the ‘self’ as being placed in a web of relations with various – not neces-
sarily radically different and antagonistic – ‘other(s)’ and thus take into account degrees of 
‘otherness’.15 The ‘other’ also does not need to be a spatial/external entity, but can also be a 
temporal ‘other’ as in the cases of the European Union (the war-ridden Europe) and Germany 
(Nazi Regime) (Wӕver 1996; Diez 2004, 2005). 
Crucially, what the notion of an antagonism captures is that there are no universal or stable 
foundations underlying the meanings and identities in the social world. No single discourse is 
capable of imposing closure upon the world, since its formation is predicated on the construc-
tion of antagonisms and the exclusion of certain elements by drawing a political line between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and thus determining the limits of the concrete social formation. 
These antagonisms and exclusions make the historically contingent formations produced by 
the discourse vulnerable to the excluded other(s) and competing discourses that are also in-
herently incomplete, unstable and contingent and attempt to provide different structures of 
meaning, which make the world intelligible in a different way. There are thus always overlap-
ping discourses that attempt to fix meanings and identities, but only arrive at partial fixtures 
(Laclau 1990: 17-18; Mouffe 2013: 216-217).  
                                                 
15
 What characterizes an antagonist relationship is that the ‘other’ is not necessarily an enemy or a direct threat, 
but different in the sense that the ‘other’ serves as a reference point to the ‘self’ and there is the underlying pos-
sibility that the ‘other’ might become an antagonist (again).  
30 
 
The successful drawing of political frontiers and the creation of seemingly stable, neutral and 
universal foundations, which are based on the exclusion of other possibilities, is always an 
expression of particular power relations (Laclau 1990: 103). “Power is constitutive of the so-
cial”, as Mouffe (2005: 18) notes, “because the social could not exist without the power 
through which it is given shape. What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural order – 
jointly with the ‘common sense’ which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented practices; 
it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into 
being”. In other words, the emergence and constitution of particular fixations of meaning and 
foundations exposes the underlying power structure of social orders. This points to the pro-
ductive nature of power which has been elaborated by Foucault in particular. According to 
Foucault (1976: 133), power constitutes and institutionalizes a particular mode of knowledge 
to organize the world in a particular way and tells us how it should be interpreted. Thus, 
power and knowledge are very closely intertwined. As Foucault (1979: 27) notes: “power 
produces knowledge […], power and knowledge directly imply one another; […] there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowl-
edge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”. Hence, as 
Foucault (1986: 70-71) goes on: “[t]ruth is a thing of this world. […] Each society has its re-
gime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true 
and false statements”. This also implies that causality is a product of discourse in the sense 
that discourses construct and reify certain cause-and-effect relations that are however delim-
ited to the particular discourse in which they are articulated and do not signify an extra-
discursive mechanism.     
Though any fixation of meaning and any social order are inherently contingent, instable and 
changeable, a discourse is also a configuration of power which shapes and delineates the way 
how it can be organized and changed. The radical contingency that underpins the ontology of 
the poststructuralist discourse theory does thus not imply that discursive meaning systems can 
be easily changed or organized in all possible ways due to the underlying power relations of 
any discursive order (Stäheli 2006: 266). Power is here not simply understood as the com-
mand over certain ‘material’ resources, but as a relational phenomenon that imposes a particu-
lar representation or ‘order’ on the world and managed to objectify it. In short, power is the 
ability to hegemonize a discourse. The formation and functioning of hegemonic discourses is 
discussed in the following section.  
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2.2.4 Discursive Hegemony  
Hegemony can be conceptualized as a discursive struggle for the fixation of particular mean-
ings or a particular meaning system.
16
 Different discourses stand for specific representations 
and understandings of social reality and seek to hegemonize the discursive field. The main 
objective of discourse analysis is to apprehend the processes of fixing meanings and to elabo-
rate how certain fixations of meaning could prevail as the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ understanding 
of the world and thus achieve a hegemonic status (Jørgensen/Phillips 2002: 36; Torfing 2005: 
15). The very condition of hegemony, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985: x) point out, “is that a 
particular social force assumes the representation of a totality that is radically incommensur-
able with it. Such a form of ‘hegemonic universality’ is the only one that a political commu-
nity can reach”. 
Hegemony refers, on the one hand, to a political practice of coalition-building in order to con-
struct or challenge hegemonic projects, and, on the other hand, to the outcome of this hege-
monic practice: a hegemonic formation or order. Hegemonic practices organize the discursive 
space by drawing political frontiers between different social forces and creating their identi-
ties on the basis of social antagonisms. This practice is characterized by an interplay of two 
elementary and closely intertwined logics: the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. 
The logic of equivalence articulates the loose elements (demands, interests, subjects etc.) in 
the field of discursivity into a single chain of significance by linking them together in opposi-
tion to an antagonistic ‘other’, a common negation. In this drawing of political frontiers, the 
antagonistic ‘other’, simultaneously, ensures the identity of the ‘self’ (e.g. the ‘nation’ or ‘in-
ternational community’) and blocks it, because this shared identity is predicated on a common 
political, spatial or temporal other, which prevents the self from acquiring its ‘full’, ‘pure’ or 
‘true’ identity, but, at the same time, is the necessary precondition for holding the ‘self’ to-
gether. The logic of difference, by contrast, is the process, whereby political frontiers are (re-) 
constructed by breaking up chains of equivalence and exposing the plurality and differences 
between the entities/elements. Hence, the logic of difference can disrupt the creation or main-
tenance of a common identity by revealing the contingency and complexity of social relations. 
In this sense, the logic of difference can both challenge existing hegemonic orders, but also 
constrain the emergence of counter-hegemonic discourses (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 127ff.; La-
clau 1996: 38; Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 11). 
                                                 
16
 “Discursive hegemony”, as Nabers (2015: 134) explicates, “therefore resembles a battle over which signifiers 
are tied to which signified”.  
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These two political logics are of crucial importance for the emergence, institutionalization and 
transformation of social practices and orders (Glynos/Howarth 2007: 141). This struggle for 
discursive hegemony involves a political practice of coalition-building, in which different 
demands, interests, subjects etc. are linked together to create a common socio-historical pro-
ject (e.g. the democratic-capitalist state). For forging such a socio-historical project, hege-
monic articulations, first, seek to establish nodal points, i.e. privileged signifiers or reference 
points around which discourses are organised in the sense that they can fix the meaning of a 
concept and thus stabilize chains of signification. For a successful hegemonic project, these 
nodal points must be ‘empty’ signifiers, which allow the integration of various (conflicting) 
interests, demands and subjects. The purpose of the empty signifier is to symbolize the uni-
versality of a discourse qua a particular signifier that can represent and hold together a chain 
of signifiers, thereby concealing its particularity (Laclau 1996: 28; Nabers 2015: 131).  
Second, for creating these equivalent demands and interests and thus uniting different social 
forces, hegemonic practices divide the socio-discursive space by drawing political frontiers. 
In this process, captured by Laclau and Mouffe’s logic of equivalence, a common ‘other’ (e.g. 
rogue states and Islamic fundamentalism in the discourse on the ‘war on terror’ after the 9/11 
terror attacks) is identified as a problem or challenge which must be overcome (Laclau/ 
Mouffe 1985: 112/127ff.; Solomon 2009; Herschinger 2012).  
Third, hegemonic practices create and draw on specific fictional or ideological narratives, 
myths and social imaginaries. Ideologies or meta-narratives are attempts to totalize and natu-
ralize meanings and identities by obscuring the contingency, historicity and the moment of the 
political involved in the formation of these meanings and identities and offering a simplified 
story of actors and events (Torfing 2005: 15; Glynos/Howarth 2007: 117).
17
 Myths play a cru-
cial role in the construction of these ideologies or meta-narratives. They are produced by po-
litical actors to conceal the inherent contradictions and ruptures of a discourse and prevent its 
dislocation by functioning as a “surface of inscription” for numerous social demands and in-
terests (Norval 1996: 105). If a myth has successfully managed to neutralize the ruptures and 
dislocations of a discourse and incorporates a wide range of social demands, then the myth 
has been transformed into a social imaginary. A social imaginary is a general ‘horizon’ or 
                                                 
17
 A meta-narrative or ideology is thus a representation that makes universal claims to truth and attempts to con-
trol the production of meaning by imposing an ultimate interpretation that is taken to be independent of any 
standpoint and condition, thereby excluding and discriminating other perspectives (Ashley 1989: 263). In con-
trast to a discourse, a narrative can thus be understood as an assemble of interrelated texts that are (re-)produced 
and referred to by various actors in an attempt to obscure the discursive construction of reality (Müller 2008: 
328).  
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‘frame’ that structures and orders a field of intelligibility, thereby indicating the successful 
formation of a hegemonic project (Laclau 1990: 60ff.).  
Fourth, a hegemonic constellation has emerged, if a certain particularity (of interests and de-
mands) is represented as the universal in the sense that it is naturalized and the same reality is 
reflected in the discursive practices of all relevant agents (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 127ff.; 
Mouffe 2013: 216; Nabers 2015: 142-143). A hegemonic discourse has successfully institu-
tionalized and maintains a dominant interpretative framework or “horizons of intelligibility 
[that] delineate what is possible, what can be said and done, what positions may legitimately 
be taken, what actions may be engaged in, and so forth” (Norval 1996: 4).  
In contrast to the largely materialistic and deterministic concepts of hegemony prevalent in IR 
theory
18
, hegemony is here thus not equated with the dominance of a particular state or group 
of states, but refers to the hegemony of a discourse that elevates a particular representation of 
world politics and particular subjects (through generating subject positions) to a hegemonic 
and thus apparently universal status. Likewise, discursive hegemony does not mean ideational 
dominance (i.e. dominance of certain ideas or norms), but also rests on ‘material power’. This 
‘material power’, however, is embedded in discursive structures in the sense that the poten-
tials and constraints of this material capabilities are endowed with meaning through dis-
courses and do not have pre-discursive or fixed meanings (Nabers 2015: 117-118). In this 
sense, power is the ability to hegemonize a discourse. Though power cannot be reduced to the 
possession of certain resources and has no specific location, it places actors into a hierarchical 
web of relations, thereby allocating them different, i.e. more and less favourable subject posi-
tions, to act in and influence discursive practices and structures. Such privileged (subject) 
positions account partially for what Laclau calls the “unevenness of the social” (Laclau 1996: 
43). Examples for privileged subject positions in foreign policy and international relations are, 
for instance, the president or prime minister on the national level or great powers and indus-
trialized countries on the international level.      
This marginalization or exclusion of certain actors, their interests and demands through the 
drawing of political frontiers makes a hegemonic discourse vulnerable to counter-hegemonic 
discourses that seek to challenge the hegemonic project and transform or replace it. These 
counter-hegemonic discourses try to disrupt the chain of equivalence of the hegemonic dis-
course through the logic of difference, which exposes the particularity and contingency of the 
discourse, and forge a new hegemonic project that articulates different demands, interests or 
subject positions. The political dimension of social relations reveals, qua moments of disloca-
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 See Gilpin 1981, Mastanduno 1999, Wallerstein 2004, Lentner 2006, Ikenberry 2011, Prys/Robel 2011.  
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tion, the limits of any social formation or universal order (Laclau 2000: 39ff.; see also But-
ler/Laclau/Žižek 2000). A dislocation exposes, as we have seen, the disparities and contingen-
cies of a discourse and intensifies the discursive struggle for hegemony, since the hegemonic 
discourse is no longer able to (re-)produce and partially fix meanings and identities. Disloca-
tory moments could thus pave the way for the transformation or overthrow of the hegemonic 
discourse, if the social forces of the hegemonic project do not manage to ‘fix’ or ‘cover over’ 
the ruptures of the discourse. 
 
 
2.3 Postcoloniality: Identity and Difference in the Colonial Encounter      
Postcolonial studies can provide additional insights into this hegemonic operation and are, as 
this study will show, of particular relevance for analysing India’s foreign policy discourse. 
Postcolonialism has been inspired by Derrida’s deconstructive reading of ‘Western’ thought 
(see Said 1978, Spivak 1985). The mode of deconstruction is, as we have seen, interested in 
the (logo-centric) propositions and dichotomies whereby meaning is produced in a discourse. 
By drawing on the discourse’s own language, concepts and hierarchies, the mode of decon-
struction consists of unsettling the existing dichotomies. It demonstrates how the opposite, 
negative or marginal account of a privileged concept is in fact conditional for its very possi-
bility. Hence, the deconstruction reverses apparently stable concepts by exposing that their 
meaning and mode of being is merely grounded in oppositions. In a second step, the decon-
structive reading attempts to dislocate the hierarchical order by drawing attention to the ex-
cluded or marginalized. In doing so, it wants to create awareness for the co-constitution of the 
‘self’ and ‘other’ and for how the ‘self’ gains its privilege only by renouncing its dependence 
on the subordinated ‘other’ (Derrida 1976; Devatak 2005: 168). 
Postcolonial scholars have applied the mode of deconstruction to the relationship between the 
colonizer and the colonized. In particular, postcolonialism
19
 studies the relationship between 
location, knowledge systems and knowledge production, and contests the Western- or Euro-
centric nature of the social sciences and humanities, especially their parochial supposition that 
modern ‘Western’ thought is superior, progressive and universally applicable. The latter is 
achieved, as postcolonial scholars argue, by (continuing) imperialist practices that represent 
the ‘other’ (the non-‘West’) as inferior, backward or irrational (Chakrabarty 2000: 29; Shil-
liam 2011b: 13; Seth 2013b: 136/138). In this sense, postcolonialism draws attention to the 
way how the ‘East’/‘South’ is represented by the – ‘Western’-dominated – mainstream dis-
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 See for an overview of postcolonialism: Gandhi 1998, Chakrabarty 2000, Shilliam 2011a, Seth 2013a.  
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course through a logo-centric procedure that privileges ‘Western’ experiences, ideas, catego-
ries or narratives and is sustained by a still existing asymmetry of knowledge production.
20
 In 
the seminal work Orientalism, Edward Said (1978) attempted to show how the Orient was 
represented and thus (re-)produced in Western novels, travel reports or art not only in a racist 
and stereotypical way, but also in opposition to a superior, progressive and rational Occident, 
thereby enabling the ‘West’ to culturally dominate the Orient. 
In the process of colonial othering, the colonial ‘Western self’ was constituted as a homoge-
nized entity, even though it consisted of different elements, whereas the colonized ‘other’ is 
constructed as lacking the qualities of the ‘self’ and thus not only as inferior, but also as a 
legitimate object for the imposition of the colonial ‘Western self’ (Inayatullah/Blaney 2004: 
4ff.). By creating awareness for the co-constitution of the self (colonizer) and the other (colo-
nized) and for the way how the self gains its privilege only by renouncing its dependence on 
the subordinated other, postcolonialism sheds light on the impact of the colonial encounter on 
both the colonizers and the colonized. This is captured by the postcolonial concepts of hybrid-
ity and mimicry (Bhabha 1994), which can help us in comprehending the way how postcolo-
nial societies simultaneously adopted and reproduced the discourses of the former oppressors, 
but also misappropriated and perverted their meanings, thereby contesting and subverting 
colonial rule as well as generating new – hybrid – identities that transcend the confines of one 
socio-cultural space.  
Postcolonialism captures the dilemma of post-colonial societies. The encounter with the colo-
nial ‘other’ has not only led to subjugation and exploitation, but also created an awareness for 
the own backwardness compared to the colonial powers and a desire to mimic modern ‘West-
ern’ discourses of statecraft, technology and science in order to overcome this backwardness 
or ‘lack’, which made the society prone to fall under foreign rule in the first place. However, 
given the fact that this very ‘Western’ modernity has been closely intertwined with colonial-
ism and imperialism, the colonial subjects are confronted with a dilemma: they must adopt 
and use the (discursively conveyed) concepts, practices and institutions of the former oppres-
sors and exploiters in order to become free, independent and modern (Bhabha 1994: 44; 
Chakrabarty 2000: 4). As Partha Chatterjee (1993: 5) described this dilemma:  
 
“If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modu-
lar’ forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imag-
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 In the discipline of international relations, for instance, key textbooks are still largely written by ‘Western’ 
scholars and in leading IR journals often more than 60 per cent of the articles are written by scholars based in the 
U.S. or Europe. The same patterns also apply to international conferences or research funding (see Wӕver 1998, 
Smith 2000, Tickner/Wӕver 2009, Tickner 2013)     
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ine? History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual con-
sumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on 
our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-
colonial resistance and postcolonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonized.” 
    
Hence, despite having different traditions of political and social organization, post-colonial 
societies had hardly any choice to return to these traditions or pursue a different path to ‘mod-
ernity’, but had, if they aspired independence and freedom from colonial rule, to use the insti-
tutions, rules and practices of the ‘modern’ state imposed on them by the colonizers, because 
the ‘modern’ state has been and continues to be the precondition for autonomy and subjec-
thood in world politics (Gandhi 1998: 118). 
Against this backdrop, a postcolonial perspective can help us in shedding light on and being 
sensitive to the Western- or Eurocentric conception of international relations, thereby avoiding 
parochial and ethnocentric research as well as an over-determination of the identity/difference 
mechanism. For instance, the focus of poststructuralist IR researchers (see Ashley 1984, 
Walker 1984, George 1994, Campbell 1998) on ‘Western’ texts, narratives and practices such 
as the emergence of the ‘Westphalian’ state system or realist IR theory has often, as postcolo-
nial scholars noted (see Krishna 1993, Chowdhry/Nair 2002: 8/25), led to the reproduction of 
these dominant discourses and neglects the particular conditions and characteristics of state 
and national identity formation in postcolonial states, where the state and other institutions 
were imposed by external powers, and state sovereignty is still contested, thereby blurring the 
distinction between ‘internal order’ (state) and ‘external disorder’ (international system).  
Though poststructuralism focuses on the relationship between power, knowledge and repre-
sentation, it has so far paid insufficient attention to non-‘Western’ texts and agency. Therefore, 
a postcolonial perspective, and its concepts of mimicry and hybridity in particular, can be an 
important supplement to poststructuralist discourse theory. It needs to be noted, however, that 
postcolonialism is no coherent school of thought or elaborated theory, but rather draws on 
various approaches, including poststructuralism, constructivism, feminism, and (post-)   
Marxism, which are grounded on different and often conflicting ontological stances (see 
Lomba 2005). For this reason, it is important to clarify that postcolonialism is here understood 
and incorporated within the ontological framework of discourse theory laid out in this chapter. 
By placing postcolonialism within an anti-essentialist ontological framework, we can also 
avoid the tendency of postcolonial scholarship (see, for instance, Said 1978) to essentialize 
imperialism/colonialism, which can lead to an unintentional reproduction of ‘Western’ he-
gemony, or to privilege contextual/local knowledge.  
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2.4 A Post-foundationalist and Reflexive Perspective on the Relationship between 
‘Knowledge’ and ‘Reality’ 
The meta-theoretical framework of this study rests on an anti-essentialist, discursive ontology 
and thus argues that we cannot know or study the world independently of specific discourses, 
that language is no neutral medium with which we can describe and explain the world in an 
objective way, and that we cannot rely on secure foundations for making knowledge and truth 
claims. This entails a “critique of epistemology […] for the very question of what we can 
know hints at the Cartesian dilemma of drawing a distinction between knowledge and reality” 
(Nabers 2015: 74). Since there is no meaningful and intelligible extra-discursive reality 
against which we could test our theories or empirical accounts, we can only access reality and 
attain knowledge through discourses. Discourses, however, do not reflect the world ‘out 
there’, but are particular representations that enable us to make sense of the world and consti-
tute who we are. Yet, these linguistic and non-linguistic representations are no transparent, 
complete reflections of a ‘material’ reality or an ‘objective’ truth, but are the product of his-
torically contingent systems of significant differences that define what constitutes ‘truth’ and 
‘reality’ in the first place (Howarth 2002: 132-133). Thus, we cannot go beyond these repre-
sentations in order to grasp the ‘real’ essence or ‘objective’ meaning of a phenomenon, but 
have to draw on discourses as our access to knowledge, truth and reality.      
Consequently, the question of how these representational practices (or discourses) constitute 
the subjects and objects of social reality is of crucial importance. A constitutive theoretical 
approach studies how particular entities or phenomena come into being through the meanings 
and interpretations a discourse conveys. As a result, our theories, language, concepts and so 
on are not separate from the world, but actually constitute the world that they study. A consti-
tutive theory thus acknowledges that it is intrinsically connected to its object of study, and 
cannot be falsified by the representation of reality it produces, because the ‘event’ and its 
‘representation’ mutually constitute each other. Rather, the so produced empirical account has 
to be judged as a particular conceptualization and interpretation of the respective object of 
study it has constructed. Similarly, it follows from this that we can neither identify or generate 
causal relationships
21
 in the social world nor assume that our theoretical approach offers a 
‘view from nowhere’ (Smith 1995: 26-28; Howarth 2002: 130; Hansen 2010: 168-169). 
This proposition necessarily leads to a rejection of a positivist mode of inquiry. Positivism is 
characterized by the following presuppositions: first, there is a real world with regularities and 
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 As we have seen, however, discourses regularly establish cause-and-effect relations, which however only exist 
in this particular discourse and do not signify a causal mechanism in an ‘objective’ reality.   
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causal relations that exists independently of human subjectivity; second, this independent re-
ality can be described and explained in a value-free, ‘scientific’ way; third, objective knowl-
edge can be gained by testing the correspondence of truth claims and external experience; 
fourth, the reliance on an empiricist and rationalist epistemology. While empiricism is the 
belief that knowledge of the world is grounded in bare experience and observation, rational-
ism, by contrast, asserts that reason – a universal property of the human mind – is the crucial 
instrument to interpret our observations and experiences and deduce the regularities and 
causal mechanism that generate them (Ashley 1984: 249; Smith 1996: 15-21). 
By rejecting a positivist scientific philosophy, we acknowledge that our research objects are 
themselves engaged in a continuing process of (re-)producing the social world and that the 
way how they make sense of it should therefore also be part of our scientific enterprise. 
Likewise, it recognizes that the instruments of social science research rely on the human be-
ings’ capacities to interpret the world. And these instruments, in turn, work in a way that is 
exactly similar to the processes of meaning generation that we as social scientists seek to 
study. Finally, it accepts that every theoretical approach observes or reasons about the world 
from a certain vantage point or discourse (George/Campbell 1990: 280; Fox 2008: 662). As 
Robert Cox (1981: 128) noted in his famous dictum: “Theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose.”  
Hence, if we cannot know or study the world independently of historically contingent systems 
of significant differences, if language is no neutral tool that can describe the world in an im-
partial and objective way, and if we cannot test our theories or concepts against an objective 
reality in order to verify or falsify their accuracy, we are left with no stable and secure foun-
dations for knowledge and truth claims. In this sense, we have to reject the notion of founda-
tional thought that believes in the possibility of grounding knowledge on a universal base, an 
Archimedean point that transcends contingent human subjectivity and action. Following 
Nietzsche’s radical perspectivism (1988), we have to accept the absence of a universal point 
of reference (such as God or human reason) and the existence of a plurality of perspectives, 
with every perspective constituting the world in a particular way. Hence, there is no ‘truth’ as 
a feature of an externally existing reality. Rather, ‘truth’ is conditioned by ‘discursive truth 
regimes’ that produce varying meanings of truth depending on the particular social, economic, 
cultural and historical context. As a result, we can only judge truth claims within a particular 
discursive context and the ‘reality’ it constitutes. This does neither entail a nihilistic relativism   
or the conviction that ‘anything goes’, but the acknowledgement that truth, morality and eth-
ics are constituted by discourses and that these discourses provide us with a framework of 
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relatively specific standards, values and criteria for judging whether something is true or false, 
good or bad, right or wrong (Foucault 1986: 74; Torfing 2005: 14f./19).  
Acknowledging the historicity, contingency and cultural specificity of our knowledge, does 
not mean, however, to embrace an anti-foundationalist position that assumes the absence of 
any grounds for generating knowledge, but a post-foundationalist position. Our theoretical 
presumptions and arguments rest on specific contingent foundations which we need in order 
to avoid pure relativism, but which are never ultimate or universal. In contrast to anti-
foundationalism, post-foundationalism thus acknowledges the necessity of grounding thought, 
but treats these foundations as contingent and partial in a field of competing foundational at-
tempts. In this sense, it weakens the ontological status of foundations by highlighting the im-
possibility of an ultimate ground and raising awareness not only for the historicity, contin-
gency and cultural specificity of our knowledge, but also to the dimension of the political in – 
the ultimate unsuccessful and partial – grounding attempts (Marchart 2007: 2f./7).22 As a re-
sult, while we should acknowledge the historicity and cultural dimension of knowledge, for 
instance, it does not follow from this that we cannot produce general knowledge and should 
instead privilege ‘local’ or ‘contextual’ knowledge, as some postcolonial scholars seem to 
suggest, thereby implying that ‘local’ forms of knowledge are necessarily incompatible and 
knowledge production is a closed and self-referential endeavour. Such a scientific relativism 
would not only render scholarly dialogue and the evaluation of research results almost impos-
sible, but would also promote nationalist and parochial accounts of world politics 
(Makarychev/Morozov 2013: 329/336). 
Against this background, this study is not based on or searching for an ultimate, traceable 
foundation or origin of truth and instead adopts a reflexive mode of social inquiry that sees 
every theory as practice, since it cannot transcend its discursive context and thus represents 
‘reality’ from a particular vantage point, thereby contributing to the reification and naturaliza-
tion of particular constructions of reality. A reflexive mode of social inquiry pays attention to 
“the way different kinds of linguistic, social, political and theoretical elements are woven to-
gether in the process of knowledge development, during which empirical material is con-
structed, interpreted and written” (Alvesson/Sköldberg 2009: 9). 
Reflexivity implies in this context thus two things: first, it seeks to create awareness for its 
own situatedness in the discursive field that contains different discourses that seek to confer 
meaning to the world and to problematize the way how the drawing on particular discourses 
                                                 
22
 This understanding of post-foundationalism departs from the conceptualization by Monteiro and Ruby (2009) 
who call for ‘foundational prudence’ and an end of foundational debates.   
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and their constitution of truth, morality or ethics might impact the research process; second, 
given its recognition of the socio-linguistic constitution of reality, a reflexive mode of social 
inquiry expresses deep scepticism towards universalizing and totalizing perspectives and at-
tempts to denaturalize these perspectives and their objectivist conception by attempting to set 
out their underpinning ideological and normative foundations. It thus aims to shed light on the 
distinctive relationship between knowledge, power and representation in conceptualizing the 
social world and how particular fixations of meaning could prevail as the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ 
understanding of the world and thus achieve a hegemonic status. In doing so, it is not claimed, 
however, to provide a new foundation that transcends its discursive context or a new form of 
ideology critique that has access to a higher truth and can expose the false consciousness pro-
duced by the hidden workings of power and ideology. Rather, it highlights the contingency 
and historicity of our representations of reality, emphasizes the political involved in the vari-
ous – seemingly innocent – representational practices and sets out how ideologies, by totaliz-
ing and naturalizing meanings, imaginaries and identities, attempt to obscure this contingency, 
historicity and the moment of the political involved in the practices of representation (Torfing 
2005: 15). 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
Summing up, this chapter has set out the ontological framework of this study. Drawing on 
poststructuralist discourse theory and insights of postcolonialism, the subsequent analysis 
subscribes to a discursive, anti-essentialist ontology and thus understands reality as discur-
sively constructed, i.e. the objects and subjects in the social world have no pre-given, fixed 
meanings and identities, but come into being through discourses. Discourses are understood 
as relational and differential systems of signification that construct the social world in mean-
ing by constituting the identities of subjects and objects. The poststructuralist discourse theory 
is combined with insights of postcolonialism that sheds light on the ‘Western’-centric concep-
tion of world politics in the study and practice of international relations and offers particular 
insights into the formation of identities in the colonial encounter. The study adopts a post-
foundationalist and reflexive perspective on the relationship between ‘knowledge’ and ‘real-
ity’ and assumes that there are no solid, final or universal foundations for generating knowl-
edge. In contrast to anti-foundationalism, however, it acknowledges the necessity of ground-
ing thought, but treats these foundations as contingent and partial in a field of competing 
foundational attempts. Committed to a reflexive mode of inquiry, the study recognizes that it 
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cannot transcend its discursive context and thus represents ‘reality’ from a particular vantage 
point, but seeks to create awareness for its own discursive situatedness and maintain a scepti-
cal attitude towards universalizing and totalizing perspectives. 
In the next chapter, the theoretical framework elaborated here is applied to the phenomena 
that are subsumed under the categories of ‘global power shifts’, ‘world order’ and Post-
Western IR. It shows that world orders can be understood as the outcome of a successful 
struggle for discursive hegemony that managed to universalize a particular representation of 
world politics and how this hegemonic order has been dislocated by the discourse of ‘global 
power shifts’ 
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3. Global Power Shifts and World Order: The Contestation of ‘Western’ 
Discursive Hegemony 
 
There is today a strong sense, among scholars and practitioners of international relations, that 
the 21
st
 century witnesses profound shifts in the global configuration of power and a crisis of 
the ‘Western’ liberal world order. This transformation and crisis comes only two decades after 
the euphoria of the United States and its ‘Western’ allies about the victory over the Soviet 
Union and communism, when there was a wide-spread conviction in the international rela-
tions discourse that the ideological and geopolitical struggles between great powers were over 
and the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy and market economy would gradually lead to 
the worldwide diffusion of the ‘liberal’ order both on the national and international level (Fu-
kuyama 1992). However, the emerging discourse of global power shifts has increasingly cast 
doubts on this forecast and the future of the ‘liberal’ order. Accordingly, there is a shift in the 
economic and military distribution of power from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’ provoked, in par-
ticular, by the (re-)emergence of China, India and Russia and the apparent decline of the U.S. 
global leadership role after the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the recent 
economic and financial crisis. This poses a challenge to the ‘Western’-led world order and its 
norms, rules and institutions (see, inter alia, Sørensen 2006, Cox 2007, Mearsheimer 2010, 
Ikenberry 2011, Kupchan 2012, Layne 2012, Acharya 2014a).  
At the same time, the discipline of international relations has increasingly come under attack 
for its underlying ethnocentrism and parochialism that celebrates, promotes and defends the 
‘West’ as the privileged and proactive agent of and the highest normative reference point in 
world politics. In other words, world politics is spoken of, framed and performed predomi-
nantly on the basis of ‘Western’ experiences, conditions, values, concerns and interests and 
thus displays not only various cultural biases of ‘Western’ states and societies, but also ten-
dencies to (violently) impose these on a culturally and politically still-diverse world. There-
fore, the discipline of international relations is criticized for its ‘Western’ or Euro-centric con-
ception of world politics and there are calls for ‘re-writing’ the discipline by decentring the 
‘West’ and moving to a ‘post-Western’ IR (see Tickner 2003, Jones 2006a, Shanhi 2008, 
Acharya/Buzan 2010, Nayak/Selbin 2010, Lizée 2011, Seth 2011, Shilliam 2011a, Hobson 
2012, Tickner/Blaney 2012, Acharya 2014b).  
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This chapter re-conceptualizes the phenomena that are subsumed under labels of ‘global 
power shifts’ and ‘post-Western IR’23 as a shift of representational power that is dislocating 
and contesting the ‘Western’ discursive hegemony in the political and academic domain. 
Drawing on the theoretical model of discursive hegemony introduced in the last chapter, it 
provides a novel reading of ‘global power shifts’, the emergence, constitution and transforma-
tion of world orders and their inter-linkage with the IR discipline. In the dominant IR reading, 
‘global power shifts’ are treated as a purely objective and brute material fact with a given 
meaning or essence, thereby suggesting that it is possible to understand material and social 
phenomena without studying the way how these phenomena are endowed with meaning 
(through systems of significant differences). By understanding ‘global power shifts’ and 
world order as discursive phenomena, this study, by contrast, contends that discourses materi-
alize their attributes or effects by fixing particular meanings and establishing a field of intelli-
gibility.  
The chapter argues that the ‘West’ has obtained discursive hegemony in the prevalent interna-
tional relations discourse in the sense that the ‘West’ as a particular historical subject with 
particular experiences, values, interests etc. managed to assert a particular representation of 
world politics as having universal significance and thus representing ‘reality’. This discourse, 
as is argued here, has become dislocated and thus increasingly unable to fix and stabilize 
meanings whereby the contingency and particularity of the discourse have been exposed. The 
articulation of a crisis or challenge of the ‘liberal’ world order embodies this dislocation just 
as the increasing awareness for the ‘Western’-centrism of IR in recent times. ‘Global power 
shifts’ thus symbolize and intensify a hegemonic struggle for the fixation of meanings by dis-
locating existing identities or subject positions, exposing tensions or contradictions in the 
prevalent conceptualization of world order and enabling ‘new’ agents to assert particular rep-
resentations of the world as universal.  
The chapter has three purposes: first, it wants to provide the context for studying India’s for-
eign policy discourse and the way how it articulates India’s role in the world order. This con-
text is no extra-discursive realm, but the field of discursivity that contains various discourses 
within which India’s foreign policy discourse is embedded in the sense that articulations made 
in India’s foreign policy discourse are conscribed and informed by other discourses, but also 
seek to shape and alter these discourses. The discourse on global power shifts has given so-
called emerging powers such as India a greater degree of agency by dislocating the hege-
                                                 
23
 Post-Western IR theory is used here as an umbrella term for the literature that deplores, criticizes and seeks to 
overcome the Western-centric nature of IR theory. 
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monic international relations discourse, and the subject positions articulated therein, and thus 
fuelling the discursive struggle over establishing meanings and meaning systems in world 
politics. Second, the concept of discursive hegemony can capture the emergence, constitution 
and transformation of world orders. Given its anti-essentialist ontology, this study does not 
provide a definition or operationalization of the term world order, but examines how world 
order is endowed with meaning through discourses. For this endeavour, however, it is neces-
sary to understand the mechanisms of hegemonic projects that underpin every world order 
and here the concept of discursive hegemony provides important insights. Therefore, the 
chapter develops an idealtypical framework for conceptualizing the evolution and implica-
tions of – what is framed here as – a shift in representational power. This allows us to com-
prehend the process of the constitution, contestation and transition of hegemonic discourses 
and the social orders established by them.     
Third, the chapter seeks to elaborate a common theoretical framework that allows us to study 
the constitution of and linkage between the discourses of global power shifts and Post-
Western IR. Informed by an anti-essentialist, discursive ontology, the concept of discursive 
hegemony transcends the binary and untenable dichotomies between ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ 
or the ‘material’ and the ‘ideational’ by investigating how material and ideational elements 
are both embedded in discursive structures that confer meaning to them and thus  (re-)produce 
their conditions of possibility and constraints. A materialist understanding of discourse can 
thus capture both the shift in the distribution of material power (by studying how this shift is 
discursively constructed and thus becomes meaningful in the first place) and the potential 
repercussions of this shift in material capabilities on the level of knowledge and theory pro-
duction.  
Against this backdrop, the chapter is divided into two parts: In the first part, the interrelation 
between discursive hegemony and world order is discussed by illustrating some of the mani-
festations of the ‘Western’ discursive hegemony in the prevalent international relations dis-
course and thus how the ‘West’ as a particular social force assumed in the world order the 
representation of a universality that is incommensurable with it. The second part briefly out-
lines the dominant reading of global power shifts in world politics before re-conceptualizing it 
through the concept of discursive hegemony as a shift of representational power and elaborat-
ing an idealtypical framework to grasp this.  
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3.1 Discursive Hegemony and World Order  
As shown in chapter 2, discursive hegemony refers to the battle over the fixation of particular 
meanings or a particular meaning system. Different discourses, standing for different repre-
sentations of social reality, seek to dominate the field of discursivity and install a widely 
shared frame of intelligibility that makes the actors, practices and relations in the social world 
knowledgeable to us. The struggle for discursive hegemony always involves the political 
practice of coalition-building, in which different demands, interests, subjects etc. are linked 
together to create a common socio-historical project by placing it into opposition to a com-
mon ‘other’ or ‘shared negativity’. This points to the underlying antagonisms and exclusions 
of every hegemonic project. Given the absence of a final ground and the resulting dimension 
of undecidability in the social fabric, a hegemonic project seeks to establish order in the con-
text of contingency through a set of practices that divide the social space and obscure this lack 
of a final ground. We can speak of a hegemonic constellation, if a certain particularity (of 
interests and demands) is represented as the universal in the sense that it is naturalized and the 
same reality is reflected in the discursive practices of all relevant agents. In short, a hege-
monic discourse has successfully institutionalized and maintains a dominant interpretative 
framework or ‘common sense’ for understanding and explaining the relevant structures, actors, 
issues, processes, relations and normative concerns in the social world.  
Against this backdrop, a world order can be understood as the outcome of a successful strug-
gle for discursive hegemony that has managed to universalize a particular representation of 
and particular subjects as (hegemonic) agents in world politics by fixing a certain meaning 
system and concealing the radical contingency of all social relations. In other words, a world 
order is the product of a hegemonic articulation through which, under the conditions of the 
absence of a final ground and essentialized entities, a particular social force assumes the rep-
resentation of a universality that is incommensurable with it. In this hegemonic operation, a 
hegemonic subject with universal values, interests and norms is constructed in opposition to 
an antagonist ‘other’ that is excluded or marginalized in the hegemonic discourse. This hege-
monic subject ‘controls’ the meaning of the signifier world order.   
A hegemonic discourse is always organized around a nodal point – a privileged signifier that 
can bind together a chain of signification by serving as the overarching reference point. For a 
successful hegemonic articulation, the nodal point must be an empty signifier which embodies 
the absent (and unreachable) closure, fullness or universality of any discursive system by 
‘emptying’ discursive difference to an extent that it can provisionally symbolize the identity 
of the discourse (Laclau 2000: 58). World order is such an empty signifier. It is an ‘umbrella 
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term’ for numerous different and partially contradictory meanings, thereby providing a com-
mon nodal point for different positions or meanings, but also making its content almost inde-
terminable. The empty signifier world order symbolizes the universal in the sense that it em-
bodies the ideal of closure and fullness of world politics through integrating humanity into a 
common overarching framework and transcending chaos, instability, irregularity, violence and 
difference. As Laclau (1996: 44) explicates:     
 
“‘Order’ as such has no content, because it only exists in the various forms in which it is actually real-
ized, but in a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty 
signifier, as the signifier of that absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their ef-
forts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemon-
ize something is exactly to carry out this filling function.” 
 
The emptiness and integrative power of the signifier ‘order’ becomes apparent in the signifi-
cance world order is endowed with in the international relations discourse: Though the term 
world order is a key concept in the study and practice of international relations, the notion of 
order itself is often not discussed or reflected upon in the literature.
24
 Instead, scholars and 
policy-makers alike take its meaning often as self-evident and regard world order as natural, 
desirable or necessary. We can, idealtypically, distinguish between a ‘descriptive-empirical’ 
and ‘normative’ understanding of world order in the international relations discourse. ‘De-
scriptive-empirical’ approaches understand world order as “the arrangements through which 
global affairs move through time” (Rosenau 2000: 10), “the way things usually happen” in 
world politics (Cox 1981: 151) or “any regular or discernible pattern of relationships that are 
stable over time” (Clark 2006: 730). Hence, order in this sense implies that the constituents of 
order “are related to one another according to some pattern, that their relationship is not 
purely haphazard but contains some discernible principle” (Bull 2002 [1977]: 3). On the other 
hand, there is also a more ‘normative’ understanding of world order. Here, world order signi-
fies “the settled rules and arrangements between states that define and guide their interaction” 
(Ikenberry 2011: 12), an “architecture of political authority” (Deibert 1997: 10) or “govern-
mental arrangement” (Sørensen 2006: 344) at the global level, i.e. institutions, norms, rules 
and procedures, that guide the relations of states and promote certain political principles or 
goals seen as desirable such as peace, stability and prosperity. This political authority or ar-
rangement can, for example, be imposed by a global hegemon or agreed upon by the relevant 
actors in world politics (Ikenberry 2011: 13). 
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 Notable exceptions are: Walker 1984, Smith 1999, Rengger 2000 and Chaturvedi/Painter 2007. 
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What unites these two approaches to world order is the desire for universality by imposing 
‘order’ on the world in the sense that they seek to conceal the radical contingency of all social 
relations and try to ‘empty’ discursive difference. For instance, while the ‘descriptive-
empirical’ understandings of world order belief in the existence of universal and discernible 
patterns in the interactions of states, the ‘normative’ approaches seek to integrate humanity 
into an a common set of rules and institutions that maintain peace, cooperation, stability etc. 
However, a world order, regardless if the term is used in a ‘descriptive-empirical’ or ‘norma-
tive’ way, cannot simply be treated as something ‘out there’, waiting to be observed and dis-
covered, but is a discursive formation, which is endowed with meaning through systems of 
significant differences and thus gains its significance only through a common ‘other’ that 
symbolizes a threat to this order and thus embodies disorder. As Chaturvedi and Painter (2007: 
381) note:   
 
“The choice of the word ‘order’ to designate a state of affairs is thus not innocent but has a purpose; it 
implies a certain orientation towards the matters of concern. ‘Order’ has moral implications – most of-
ten positive. ‘Order’ involves predictability, regularity, proportionality, stability, rationality and the ab-
sence of violence (though not necessarily the absence of the threat of force). Its opposite, disorder, sug-
gests the irrational, the disproportionate, the irregular, the chaotic and the unstable – concepts which 
usually have negative moral import. [...] ‘[O]rder’ is never a neutral term. It always invokes a process of 
ordering.”  
  
This reasoning in binary oppositions represents, in the terminology of Derrida (1976), a logo-
centric procedure of identity and hierarchization that generates meanings and understandings 
by distinguishing a privileged entity (‘order’) from an inferior other (‘disorder’). Thus, every 
world order is based on certain exclusions and can only persist as long as there is an ‘other’ 
that serves as the negative reference point for constructing a chain of equivalence between 
subjects, demands and interests.  
In the prevalent international relations discourse, the ‘West’ has obtained discursive hegem-
ony in the sense that the ‘West’ as a particular historical subject with particular interests, de-
mands, experiences and so on managed to assert a particular representation of world politics 
as having universal significance and thus representing ‘reality’. The ‘West’ is here not under-
stood as a geographical entity, but as a political community that came into being, as Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985: x) explain the constitution of political communities, in that a particular 
social force has assumed the representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable 
with it. The constitution and maintenance of this ‘Western’ subjectivity25 is premised upon 
various and changing antagonistic ‘others’, serving as common negative referent objects that 
                                                 
25
 See for a broader discussion of the concept and the constitution of the ‘West’: Hobson 2004, Browning/Lethi 
2010 and Delanty 2013.       
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help to establish a chain of equivalence between the different subjects, demands and interests 
comprising the so-called West by expressing and reaffirming shared values, experiences, in-
terests etc. In doing so, an “exclusive collectivity of societies” is constructed, as Bahar Ru-
melili (2013: 70) argues, with a  
 
“distinct and shared historical and cultural trajectory. This shared trajectory is loosely defined in terms 
of Antiquity, Renaissance, Enlightenment and Modernity, wherein the now universal values of human-
ism, secularism and rationalism have originated. The fact that those values have originated in the unique 
historical trajectory of the West sets the West apart from those societies whose experiences with them 
are only second-hand. […]  As a particularist discourse, the discourse on the West thrives on clear-cut 
binary distinctions between the West and the non-West”.  
 
However, there exists no clear-cut distinction and geographical border between the ‘West’ 
and the ‘non-West’. The emergence of the ‘West’ as a subject of world history and interna-
tional political community is insuperably intertwined with its colonial encounter with and 
imposition on non-‘Western’ communities. In this process of colonial othering, as we have 
seen, the identities of both colonizers and colonized were co-constituted by establishing cul-
tural and civilizational difference (Bhabha 1994: 199ff.). The formation of a ‘Western’ iden-
tity and social, political, economic and cultural modernity is thus intertwined with colonialism 
and imperialism (Fanon [1963] 2004: 57ff.; Jones 2006b: 4).
26
 The violent and unequal inte-
gration of the colonies into the ‘Western’ international political community laid the founda-
tion for the current world order. The initially subordinated subjects, however, became agents 
and complice in the further development, sedimentation and universalization of this particular 
order by mimicking the discourses of the colonizers, thereby simultaneously reproducing 
these discourses but also misappropriating and perverting them. In doing so, they contested 
and circumvented not only colonial rule, but also became sovereign states and thus members 
of the world order. They assumed, however, a hybrid position in the world order in the sense 
that they are “‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet unexpectedly ‘different’ 
way” (Bilgin 2008: 5) and are not equal members, as long as they have not fully emulated the 
‘West’s’ political and economic model and practices.  
While the ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilized’ peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America served as 
antagonistic others in the early stages of ‘Western’ identity formation, the antagonistic others, 
which serve as a shared negativity for maintaining a chain of equivalents between the subjects, 
                                                 
26
 However, while postcolonial scholarship often tends to essentialize the colonial encounter, the production and 
evolution of identities and modernity actually precedes the era of colonialism and imperialism. They have so 
many sources and are characterized by various and multidirectional interconnections between different geo-
cultural spaces, that it is impossible to speak of a pure and homogenous culture, identity or modernity. In this 
sense, the ‘West’ is not an autonomous force of progress and modernity in the world, but is the product of vari-
ous (peaceful and violent) encounters with the non-‘Western’ others (see Mitchell 2003, Hobson 2004). 
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demands and interests that constitute the political community, are today mainly authoritar-
ian/totalitarian regimes and Islamic fundamentalists. The ‘West’ itself is an empty signifier, 
whose geopolitical essence and scope is highly ambiguous, complex and contingent (see 
Browning/Lethi 2010). The hegemonic position of the ‘West’ in the prevalent international 
relations discourse means, on the one hand, that the ‘West’ is the nodal point of the discourse 
in the sense that the ‘West’ serves as a reference point for all actors – both in a positive and 
negative sense – and the privileged signifier of a chain of significance that binds together 
various elements, which are similarly ‘empty’ signifiers and highly contested, such as free-
dom, democracy, liberalism, civilization, modernity, capitalism, Europe, America, globaliza-
tion, Christianity or free world. This chain makes up the fuzzy and hybrid identity of the 
‘West’ and partially fixes the meaning of these elements by reference to the nodal point 
‘West’. On the other hand, this hegemonic position implies that the ‘West’ hegemonically 
controls the empty signifier world order. Hence, the ‘West’ as a particular historical subject 
could endow order with a particular meaning and thus universalize its own particular institu-
tions, practices and norms, suggesting that the ‘West’ embodies universality and a superior 
agency which found the only legitimate and feasible solution to political and economic order 
on the national and international level.  
Given the ‘emptiness’ of the signifiers world order and ‘West’, the international relations dis-
course affirms the hegemonic position of the ‘West’, but disagrees about the exact nature of 
the contemporary world order. Accordingly, the discourse frames the world order as ‘liberal’, 
‘American’ or ‘Western’ usually build around a system of sovereign states, an open world 
economy and liberal institutions and norms (see Sørensen 2006, Hurrell 2008, Ikenberry 2011, 
Kagan 2012, Acharya 2014a).  
Realism and liberalism provide the two dominant (and complementary) readings of the evolu-
tion and functioning of the ‘Western’ world order. For realism, the military and economic 
power of the United States is the foundation of the ‘Western’ world order. The world order is 
thus the outcome of the global distribution of material capabilities, in which the U.S. has en-
joyed unmatched primacy and could thus dominate the international system by creating inter-
national institutions and rules and enforcing them (see Mastanduno 1999, Wohlforth 1999, 
Walt 2005, Layne 2012, Kagan 2012). For liberalism, this order does not rest on the U.S. pre-
ponderance in the international system, but rather on the successful diffusion of liberal norms 
and institutions across the world, the growing political and economic interdependence in the 
international system, the process of globalization and the increasing regulation and institu-
tionalization of world politics (see Keohane/Nye 2001, Russet/Oneal 2001, Held 2010, Doyle 
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2012, Cerny 2013, Dunne/Flockhart 2013). In another reading, most prominently articulated 
by G. John Ikenberry (2006, 2010, 2011), it is the confluence of the both dimensions de-
scribed by realists and liberals that accounts for the emergence, constitution and resilience of 
the ‘Western’ world order.  
The ‘Western’ hegemonic control over the signifier world order reflects in what scholars have 
coined the ‘Western’- or Eurocentrism27 in the realist and liberal approaches to world order, 
and the international relations discourse in general: first, the endowment of the ‘West’ with a 
privileged and pioneering agency that represents the ‘West’ as the sole and autonomous driv-
ing force of progress and modernity in the world; second, the belief in the universal relevance, 
validity and applicability of ‘Western’ knowledge, practices and institutions; third, a disjunc-
ture between the theories and concepts of IR and the conditions and experiences of the non-
‘Western’ world (such as imperialism and colonialism) (see Tickner 2003, Jones 2006a, 
Nayak/Selbin 2010, Lizée 2011, Seth 2011, 2013a, Shilliam 2011a, Hobson 2012, Tick-
ner/Blaney 2012, Acharya 2014b).  
In the liberal world order, there exists thus a dichotomy between the liberal ‘West’ as the 
privileged and superior agent and the ‘non-West’ as an ensemble of inferior and backward 
agents. The ‘West’ is thus endowed with the civilizational status and a higher agency in world 
politics by equating civilization with the ‘West’ and delineating it from a ‘barbaric’ rest. 
Therefore, as Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry (2009: 93) summarize the policy impli-
cations of this insight: “The foreign policy of the liberal states should continue to be based on 
the broad assumption that there is ultimately one path to modernity – and that it is essentially 
liberal in character”. This assertion provides ultimately the legitimization and justification for 
the U.S. global leadership role in world politics or for (humanitarian) interventions into non-
liberal states in order to promote and enforce human rights, democracy and market economy. 
Accordingly, a state’s sovereignty and right of self-determination is conditional to the com-
pliance with the ‘Western’ standard of civilization and violations are avenged by liberal states 
endowed with a hyper-agency and absolute sovereignty (Hobson 2012: 194ff.; Jahn 2012).  
Though the ‘Post-Western IR’ discourse often speaks of the ‘Western’ hegemony in the study 
and practice of international relations and questions the universality of ‘Western’ knowledge, 
practices and institutions, it remains often unclear on what this hegemony is actually based on, 
how this hegemony is constituted and operating and why there is suddenly a growing aware-
ness for the ‘Western’-centrism in IR theory and such a proliferation of articles, books, re-
                                                 
27
 This study uses the term ‘Western’-centrism, since Europe is only one of the ‘empty’ signifiers that constitute 
the ‘Western’ hegemony in the international relations discourse and the usage of the term Euro-centrism thus 
runs the risk of being itself Euro-centric. 
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search projects and conferences that seek to address and overcome it. Often it appears, as if 
these scholars understand hegemony in a rather conventional sense as the materialist domi-
nance of a particular state (or group of states) in the international system. Referring to the 
relationship between the United States and the discipline of international relations, Steve 
Smith (2002) suggests, for instance, a correlation between the “Hegemonic country” and the 
“Hegemonic Discipline”. Likewise, Andrei P. Tsygankov (2008: 762-763) attributes the 
“‘West’s’ hegemony in IR theory” particularly to the United States. This implies a kind of 
causal relationship between the material distribution of power and knowledge production. 
Though there certainly exist significant and various asymmetries in knowledge production in 
IR (see Wӕver 1998, Smith 2000, Tickner/Waever 2009, Tickner 2013), can this asymmetry 
really account for the ‘Western’-centric conception of world politics? This would suggest that 
‘non-Western’ scholars are simply marginalized in the international relations discourse and 
their stronger participation would mitigate the ethnocentrism and parochialism of IR. How-
ever, if we look into the domestic IR scholarship of countries such as China or India, we 
could until recently hardly find attempts to develop distinct Chinese or Indian IR theories and 
concepts or strong complaints about the ‘Western’-centrism of IR (see Bajpai/Mallavarapu 
2005, Behera 2010, Qin 2010, Weng 2013, Noesselt 2014). In fact, ‘Western’ IR realism ap-
pears to be as powerful in the ‘periphery’ as it is in the ‘core’ (see Bilgin 2008, Chakma 2009, 
Moshirzadeh 2009, Acharya/Buzan 2010). While it might appear self-evident to attribute the 
growing interest in ‘non-Western’ IR theory directly to the shift in the material distribution of 
power in the international system and the aspiration of rising powers to promote their world-
views or ideologies, this can hardly explain the great interest scholars located in the ‘core’ 
rather than in the ‘periphery’ take in this debate. 
Against this backdrop, the concept of discursive hegemony can add to this debate by provid-
ing an elaborated theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the emergence, 
constitution, contestation and transition of hegemonic discourses. In contrast to prevalent un-
derstandings of hegemony in IR, hegemony is here not equated with the dominance of a par-
ticular state or group of states, but refers to the hegemony of a discourse that has elevated a 
particular representation of world politics and particular subjects to a hegemonic and thus 
apparently universal status. In this sense, the ‘West’ as a particular social force managed to 
partially fill the void of world order with a particular meaning and has thus assumed the rep-
resentation of a universality that is radically incommensurable with it.  
By stressing the political practice of coalition-building in this hegemonic operation, hegem-
ony is differentiated from dominance and conceptualized as a social relationship that is politi-
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cally instituted to reach the closure or fullness of an international political community. Unlike 
a system of domination, a hegemonic order, and the regime of social institutions and practices 
created therein, is partially consensus-based in the sense that it has managed to create a range 
of empty signifiers and a broad chain of equivalence between different demands, interests and 
subjects by placing them into opposition to a common ‘other’ that defies the existence and 
realization of this particular type of universality. This universal political community, however, 
can never be truly universal, because this would imply the inclusion of the social forces of 
disorder as well.  
By incorporating the notion of hybridity into its anti-essentialist ontology, the theoretical con-
cept of discursive hegemony could show, on the one hand, how the ‘West’ as a subject of 
world history and international political community, above all, emerged through its imposi-
tion on non-‘Western’ communities and thus how the ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ were mutually 
constituted in the process of colonial othering. On the other hand, it can shed light on how the 
subordinated subjects became agents and accomplice in the further development and univer-
salization of this particular order by mimicking the discourses of the colonizers. In doing so, it 
does not run the risk of essentializing the ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ and treating them as two 
closed, homogenous and radically different entities, but as mutually co-constituted and inter-
linked by various peaceful and violent encounters. There is a tendency in parts of Post-
Western IR scholarship, as critics have pointed out (see Bilgin 2009, Hutchings 2011, 
Makarychev/Morozov 2013, Hurrell 2015), to stress the significance of geo-cultural differ-
ence in the process of knowledge production and search for culturally pure knowledge or 
radically different ways of approaching world politics in the ‘non-West’, thereby unwillingly 
reproducing existent political frontiers and ignoring the presence of the ‘non-West’ in the 
emergence, constitution and development of the international relations discourse.  
The concept of discursive hegemony also transcends the artificial and untenable separation 
between the ‘material’ and ideational’ realm. Hegemony does not mean ideational dominance 
(i.e. the dominance of certain ideas and norms) or material dominance (i.e. the domination 
over military, economic and technological capabilities) but constitutes and institutionalizes a 
dominant “horizon of intelligibility” (Norval 1996: 4) that endows ideas or military power 
with a particular meaning in the first place and delineates what potentials and constraints exist 
in world politics, what can be said or done, what kind of positions may legitimately be taken 
or what actions can be engaged in. In this sense, the hegemony of the ‘West’ also rests on its 
material power, but the scope and relevance of this power in international relations is gener-
ated by discourse and does not ontologically precede this discursive formation.  
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Discursive hegemony as a dominant ‘horizon of intelligibility’ is in a way more pervading 
and powerful than existent materialist theories of hegemony suggest. At the same time, how-
ever, the Laclauian-Mouffian discourse theory underscores that no discourse, not even a 
hegemonic one, can reach closure and permanently stabilize meanings and identities, but is 
constituted in the context of radical contingency and thus always instable and vulnerable to 
the ‘surplus of meaning’ located in the field of discursivity. Given the absence of any stable 
foundations underlying these meanings and identities, and the exclusion of certain other op-
tions, every discourse is thus vulnerable to a ‘discursive exterior’ that threatens to subvert (or 
dislocate) its articulations. Hence, the concept of discursive hegemony allows for social 
change and (‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’) agency. It can thus, as we will see in the next sec-
tion, shed light on the way how agents can contest and change the ‘Western’ hegemony in the 
international relations discourse and seek to fill the void of world order with a different mean-
ing.  
 
 
3.2 The Contestation of World Order: ‘Global Power shifts’ and Counter-Hegemonic 
Discourses 
The ‘Western’ hegemonic control over the signifier world order has become increasingly con-
tested. There is talk of “The End of American World Order” (Acharya 2014a), a “Post-
Western World” (Stuenkel 2016), “The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New 
Global Order” (Jacques 2009), “A Liberal World Order in Crisis” (Sørensen 2011) or “Liber-
alism in Crisis: A Collapsing World Order” (Morgan 2013). Crisis seems to embody the cur-
rent state of international relations. Along with this discourse of crisis, as Dirk Nabers (2015: 
3) notes, “emerged one of the well accepted clichés of our times, conveyed by the media as 
well as academics, which claims that we are living in a world of major and rapid transforma-
tions and societal change”. In international relations, this duality of crisis and change is above 
all related to the global power shifts in the international system. For instance, G. John Iken-
berry (2014: 1) states: 
 
“The global system is in the midst of a great transformation. The distribution of power is shifting. Great 
powers are rising and declining. For almost a century, the United States dominated world politics. But 
today, China and other rising non-Western states, such as India and Brazil, are growing in wealth, 
power and influence, and ambition. The old order – led by the United States and its allies – is still a 
commanding presence in the global system. But the power once concentrated in the hands of the United 
States is diffusing outward and, as a result, new struggles are emerging over global rules and institu-
tions.” 
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And the U.S. National Intelligence Council (2008: iv/vii) predicts in its report Global Trends 
2025: A Transformed World:  
 
“The international system – as constructed following the Second World War – will be almost unrecog-
nizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of 
relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. 
[…] By 2025 a single ‘international community’ composed of nation-states will no longer exist. […] 
Power will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the game while risks will 
increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken. A global multipolar system is emerging with 
the rise of China, India, and others. […] [T]he transfer is strengthening states like Russia that want to 
challenge the Western order.” 
 
The discourse of ‘global power shifts’ deals with the rise of new states in world politics and 
represents this rise as a profound challenge to the structure of the international system and its 
underlying normative order. It depicts the rise and fall of great powers as an enduring pattern 
of world politics. This cyclical phenomenon is attributed to shifts in relative economic growth 
rates, technological advances, demography and military developments in particular. Power 
shifts are represented as critical moments in world politics, because they are believed to have 
direct repercussions on the stability of the international system, the likelihood of great wars 
and the formation of world orders. Accordingly, the general trajectory of world politics over 
the last 500 years has been that one nation becomes the dominant power in the international 
system in terms of its share of the material distribution of power. This hegemonic power 
largely defines the rules and institutions of the world order. If the distribution of power begins 
to shift in favour of another nation or group of nations and these nations have acquired a suf-
ficient amount of power, they will challenge the hegemonic power. This results normally in a 
war and a transition of power. The nation that emerged as the pre-eminent power in the post-
war period decides about the fate of the world order. The last 500 years saw five world orders: 
Iberian order led by Portugal and Spain (16
th
 century), Dutch order (17
th
 century), British or-
der (18
th
 century till the beginning of the 20
th
 century) and U.S.-American order (since the 
mid-20
th
 century)
28
 (see Organski 1968, Organski/Kugler 1980, Kennedy 1989, Wittkopf 
1997, Knutsen 1999, Ikenberry 2000, Tammen et al. 2000, Black 2008).   
This interpretative frame is applied by the discourse on what it identifies as the current major 
shift in the distribution of power in the international system: the rise of China and other pow-
ers such as India, Russia and Brazil. Given the global shifts in economic growth, demography, 
technological advancements and defence capabilities, the discourse predicts another funda-
mental transformation of world politics in the 21
st
 century and the gradual shift from the uni-
                                                 
28
 Though accompanied by two great wars, the last power transition between Britain and the U.S. is seen as re-
markable in the sense that the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic powers were not enemies but allies in these 
wars. 
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polar U.S.-dominated international system to a bi- or multipolar system. With this shift in 
relative power towards rising states, it is expected that the international system witnesses not 
only a greater probability of war, instability and uncertainty, but also potentially the propaga-
tion of new ideas, norms or even entire world order paradigms which might challenge the 
institutions, norms and rules underpinning the ‘Western’ world order. This amounts in the 
discourse to the questions: what are the implications of the global power shifts? Will it lead to 
another great war or another cold war? What is the future of the ‘Western’ world order? Can a 
liberal order prevail without ‘Western’ dominance? What kind of ideas, norms or orders do 
rising powers seek to promote and implement in the international system? Do they seek to be 
part of or overthrow the ‘Western’ world order? (see Ikenberry 2008, 2011, Iken-
berry/Jisi/Feng 2015, Hurrell 2006, Layne 2006, 2012, Kagan 2008, Mahbubani 2008, Za-
karia 2008, Hart/Jones 2010, Herd 2010, Kupchan 2012, Murray/Brown 2012, Acharya 2014a, 
Nye 2015).     
In the rest of this chapter, we will re-conceptualize ‘global power shifts’ through the theoreti-
cal framework of poststructuralist discourse theory and postcolonialism as a shift of represen-
tational power that contests ‘Western’ hegemony in the political and academic discourses of 
international relations. The Western-liberal world order, as we have seen, embodies the dis-
cursive hegemony of the ‘West in the sense that the ‘West’ as a particular historical subject is 
upheaved to a position from where it can assert a particular representation of world politics as 
having universal significance and thus symbolizing ‘reality’. The ‘West’ hegemonically con-
trols the signifier world order and could thus partially fill the void of a universality with a 
particularity. The ability to (partially) fix meanings and thus to hegemonize a discourse ex-
poses the underlying configuration of power in contemporary world politics.  
Accordingly, the growing contestation of world order through counter-hegemonic discourses 
indicates that this configuration of power is shifting, i.e. the previously dominant discourse is 
increasingly struggling to fix meanings and thus to reproduce a particular representation of 
world politics and world order. Thus, we can conceptualize ‘global power shifts’ as a shift of 
representational power, that is the ability to constitute and frame the entities, structures, proc-
esses and issues of world politics in a way that corresponds with the worldview, interests and 
demands of a particular historical subject and places this subject in a position that allows it to 
play a privileged or dominant role in the world order. The ‘global power shifts’ and the related 
contestation of world order reflect in the political as well as academic discourses. In both dis-
courses, we thus find attempts to ‘particularize’, ‘de-centre’ or ‘provincialize’ the ‘West’ and 
endow world order with different meanings: While policy-makers in (re-)emerging powers 
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such as China, Russia or India draw on the discourse of multipolarity and seek to universalize 
their particular experiences, demands and interests in order to contest the ‘Western’ hegemony 
in the political domain, the Post-‘Western’ IR discourse has attacked the IR discipline for its 
parochialism and ethnocentrism and calls for introducing ‘non-Western’ or ‘post-Western’ IR 
theories and concepts.  
We can, idealtypically, conceptualize and illustrate this shift in representational power and the 
related contestation of the hegemonic discourse as a process that encompasses three stages: 1) 
dislocation, 2) discursive struggle for interpretative dominance over the significance, scope 
and implications of the ‘global power shifts’, and 3) defence, transformation or overthrow of 
the hegemonic discourse.        
 
1) Dislocation  
In the first stage, the hegemonic discourse becomes dislocated and thus incomplete, i.e. there 
is an ‘event’ or ‘phenomenon’29 that the discourse cannot explain, integrate or represent sys-
tematically. This rupture in a seemingly stable social order exposes not only the contingency 
and ultimately the particularity and deficiencies of the discourse, but also symbolizes a failed 
structural identity in the sense that actors cannot any longer (entirely) identify with the subject 
positions provided by a discourse, throwing the identities of actors into a crisis and prompting 
them to act in order to re-construct subject positions (Laclau 1990: 39-41, 2000: 39ff.). Given 
its underlying ‘Western’-centrism, the hegemonic international relations discourse increas-
ingly struggles to integrate the rise of ‘non-Western’ states into its discursive structure and 
maintain the myth of its universality, mainly because it allocates these states only subordinate 
subject positions and thus only conditional or inferior agency in world politics. This makes it, 
for instance, difficult for emerging powers to fully identify with these existing subject posi-
tions anymore, since they are increasingly acquiring all the material capabilities that the dis-
course presupposes for power and influence in global politics.   
The hegemonic international relations discourse, and the world order articulated therein, 
draws a hierarchical dichotomy between a privileged, superior self (‘West’) and an inferior or 
threatening other (‘non-West’”), thereby justifying the hegemonic position towards the ‘other’ 
and largely negating its agency in world politics. By attributing the ‘emerging powers’ only a 
subordinate agency, the international relations discourse can only conceive three alternatives 
                                                 
29
 As noted in chapter 2, these events or phenomena are no extra-discursive entities with some ‘objective’ char-
acteristics or implications, but their meaning and significance is exactly what is at stake in moments of disloca-
tion and different discourses seek to establish.   
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with respect to their ‘rise’ in the international system: conflict/disciplining, conversion or so-
cialization.  
Realism highlights the struggle for security and power in an anarchic international system as 
the key feature of world politics. Hence, the ‘other’ is conceived as a threat and the power 
shift will inevitably follow ‘Western’ patterns, generating conflicts, tensions and clashes, thus 
requiring counter-balancing or containment to discipline and curtail the ‘other’ (see Walt 
2005, Kagan 2008, Mearsheimer 2010, Friedberg 2012, Layne 2012, Schmidt/Roy 2013). 
Liberalism, by contrast, emphasizes the globalized character of world politics and assumes the 
possibility to integrate the ‘rising powers’ into the existing order, believing either in the ulti-
mate evolution of a culturally homogenous global polity and in the conversion of the rising 
powers along the ‘Western’ development model or at least in their willingness to accommo-
date to the liberal world order due to their interest in the capitalist world economy (see Lardy 
2002, Ikenberry 2008, 2010, Snyder 2013, Flockhart et al. 2014). English School and con-
structivism predominantly believe in the socialization of the rising powers into the existent 
norms and institutions of international society. Socialization means here the gradual integra-
tion into the international normative framework and transmission of the appropriate behaviour 
(see Buzan 2004, Hurrel 2008, Johnston 2008, Finnemore 2009). This socialization process is, 
however, often seen as only “running one direction: from the socializer to the socializee” (Ep-
stein 2012: 140). In short, these different theoretical approaches all tend to equate develop-
ment with the progression of the ‘Western’ civilization.  
This conceptualization of ‘global power shifts’ leaves the emerging powers with no substan-
tial agency in world politics, for instance, to (re-)frame and reappraise the notions of order, 
justice or security or to circumvent the ‘Western’ development path, including the numerous 
wars and conflicts associated with power shifts in the international system. At the same time, 
it largely fails to grasp particular phenomena and conditions of the ‘non-Western’ world such 
as the (continuing) relevance of colonialism and imperialism or divergences from the – appar-
ent universal – development path; for example, as in the case of China, which generated very 
high economic growth despite authoritarian rule and stabilized its authoritarian system of 
government in spite of economic liberalization, which should, according to the ‘Western’ 
modernization theory, lead to a gradual political liberalization. The apparently natural link 
between capitalism/market economy and liberal democracy is thus less an objective condition 
or scientific law, but rather a product of the hegemonic ‘Western’ discourse that has linked 
these two elements and the interests and demands associated with them together in a chain of 
equivalence for forging a hegemonic project.  
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The dislocation of the hegemonic discourse is, however, not simply ‘provoked’ by the emerg-
ing powers, but rather the hegemonic subject itself, the ‘West’, has been gripped by a crisis, 
since the emergence of ‘non-Western’ agents and the divergence from ‘Western’ political, so-
cial or economic development patterns is casting doubts on its universality and privileged 
agency in the world. In short, the ‘West’ is experiencing an identity crisis resulting from its 
increasing difficulties to articulate its particular interests and values as universal ones, the 
decreasing support for its hegemonic project and the potential decline of its hegemonic lead-
ership role in global politics.   
 
2) Discursive struggle for interpretative dominance 
In the second stage, competing political forces attempt to make sense of the phenomenon of 
global power shifts and hegemonize the political space by offering the dominant interpretation 
in the moment of dislocation. In other words, alternative discourses evolve and compete for 
establishing an interpretative framework through which the transformation can be understood. 
In particular, the subject positions are gradually dissolving and the appropriate actions to deal 
with the transformation are delineated. For the actual evolution of the global power shifts it is 
of particular importance how the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are framed in the discourse and thus 
what kind of practices are conceived as appropriate to deal with the ‘other’. 
The hegemonic subject will attempt to defend and, if necessary, modify its hegemonic project 
through the (partial) integration of the rising powers into this project and prevent the emer-
gence of a counter-hegemonic coalition. An example for such a potential counter-hegemonic 
coalition is the BRICS group (Brazil-Russia-India-South Africa) formed in 2009 (see 
Kornegay/Bohler-Muller 2013, Panda 2013, de Coning/Mandrup/Odgaard 2015a). A potential 
discursive strategy for the hegemonic subject is to extend the chain of equivalence by redraw-
ing political frontiers and disrupting the ‘unity’ of the emerging powers. For instance, the 
Indo-US nuclear deal, which de facto acknowledges India’s status as nuclear weapons power, 
can be interpreted as an attempt to co-opt India into the existing hegemonic order and under-
mine attempts to forge a counter-hegemonic coalition between the emerging powers (see 
Burns 2007, Feigenbaum 2010, Pant 2011b, Zakaria 2012, Mistry 2014, Rauch 2014). Like-
wise, the proposal for a ‘concert of democracies’, put forward by U.S. policy-makers and 
scholars (see McCain 2007, Kagan 2008), seeks to disrupt the bond between the emerging 
powers and enlarge the chain of equivalence. By drawing a distinction between democratic 
(e.g. India and Brazil) and non-democratic (e.g. China and Russia) emerging powers, the phe-
nomenon of global power shifts is framed primarily as a struggle between democratic and 
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authoritarian regimes rather than a re-distribution of power between ‘Western’ and ‘non-
Western’ actors. Accordingly, India and Brazil are represented and promoted as successful 
examples for the superiority and universality of the ‘Western’ development path, while China 
and Russia are represented as antagonistic ‘others’. Another, more defensive strategy of the 
hegemonic subject would be to reformulate the universality of the hegemonic project by 
downgrading it to areas of convergence between the ‘established’ and the ‘emerging powers’ 
such as the functioning and maintenance of the capitalist world economy and integration of 
the emerging powers into the global economic governance system (see Kupchan 2012, Brzez-
inski. 2013). Examples for such an attempt are the forming of the G-20 after the global finan-
cial and economic crisis in 2007/08 or proposals for a condominium of the U.S. and China 
(G-2).  
The emerging powers, by contrast, will seek to create new subject positions in the discourse, 
which provide them with a higher degree of agency in world politics. A discursive struggle is 
emerging over the inscription of the empty signifier of world order and related concepts such 
as peace or justice. For instance, the emerging powers might attempt to fix different meanings 
to the signifier world order by universalizing their own experiences, demands and interests. In 
particular, the emerging powers will emphasize the shortcomings of the existent order and 
represent the global power shifts as a chance and necessity to ‘correct’ these deficiencies, for 
instance, by reforming international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and creating a new power equilibrium in the international system: a multipolar order. 
In addition, the emerging powers might also attempt to challenge the realist account which 
represents global power shifts as a threat to peace and order in world politics and replace it 
with an interpretative framework that stresses a peaceful transition of power and peaceful co-
existence between the major powers. Prominent examples are the notion of ‘China’s peaceful 
rise’, which has also informed the attempts to develop Chinese IR theories (see Xinning 2001, 
Zhang 2012, Wang 2013, Zhang/Chang 2016), or, as we will see later, India’s reformulation of 
its policy of non-alignment as multi-alignment, which presumes that India is in the position to 
forge close relations with established and emerging major powers in the Global ‘North’ and 
‘South’ (see Khilnani et al. 2012, Tharoor 2012a). In short, the ongoing global power shifts 
and the emergence of a multipolar order are represented in the discourses of the emerging 
powers as the correction of a historical anomaly and as an opportunity to build a more peace-
ful, stable and just global order.    
The counter-hegemonic discourses can vary in their degree of contestation, ranging from de-
mands to modify/transform the existent order to its overthrow. The degree of contestation 
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will, above all, depend on the way how the hegemonic subject responds to the global power 
shifts and to what extent the emerging powers can manage to create a counter-hegemonic pro-
ject by linking together their demands and interests. In general, counter-hegemonic dis-
courses, drawing on the logic of difference, seek to disrupt the chain of equivalence the 
hegemonic project is based on by exposing its particularity and weaken its antagonistic fron-
tier. For a modification or transformation of the hegemonic order, emerging powers would 
follow a mixed strategy consisting of attempts to break off the hegemonic chain of equiva-
lence and integrating themselves into a reformed hegemonic order, whereas the overthrow of 
the existing world order would require the forging of an inclusive counter-hegemonic project 
that links together various demands and interests and the representation of the ‘West’ as an-
tagonist ‘other’.  
While the BRICS group certainly displays elements of a counter-hegemonic coalition, it 
rather seeks to constrain and modify than overthrow the ‘Western’ hegemonic order. The 
BRICS members are united in their opposition to the ‘hegemonistic’ attitudes of the United 
States and its allies and in their striving for a multipolar world order that rests on the princi-
ples of stable and peaceful co-existence: mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference into 
the domestic affairs of other states, non-aggression and the acknowledgement of different 
political systems and development paths. These principles re-affirm to a great extent key ele-
ments of the existent global order (de Coning/Mandrup/Odgaard 2015b: 4ff./18). It points to 
the hybrid position that the BRICS countries as former colonial ‘others’ or other semi-
peripheral countries have in the world order. They mimic discourses of the ‘West’, whereby 
they simultaneously reproduce these discourses and their meaning fixations but also misap-
propriate and pervert them. For instance, Russia and China simultaneously oppose the ‘West’, 
but nevertheless frame their own interests and demands often in the ‘Western’ language of 
democracy. They acknowledge, in other words, the universal significance of these values but 
seek to detach them from their particularistic origin and endow them with a somewhat differ-
ent meaning (Morozov 2015: 25). For example, when Russia invaded the Ukraine in 2014 and 
annexed Crimea, it invoked – like the United States and its allies in their various military in-
terventions – the language of self-determination, democracy and humanitarian intervention. In 
doing so, Russia is not radically contesting the ‘Western’ world order, but rather seeks to 
shape the world order in a way that is more in line with its interests. Moreover, given rivalries, 
tensions and differences between the BRICS members, in particular between India and China, 
as we will see in the course of this study, the emerging powers also face several challenges in 
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forging a counter-hegemonic project and agreeing on much more than the lowest common 
denominator: a multipolar world order.    
Generally, the trajectory of the global power shifts will to a great extent depend on the degree 
of antagonism inherent in the emerging discourses. Discourses that obscure the mutual consti-
tution of and various interlinkages between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ rather impede the 
possibility of a peaceful contention of antagonisms between the various actors in world poli-
tics, not to mention the possibility of intercultural dialogue and learning, since the ‘self’ and 
its cultural values are defined in an absolutist and exclusive way and thus the ‘other’ is not 
only viewed as different, but also as morally inferior. The liberal (or cosmopolitan) world or-
der concept, for instance, tends to adopt a post-political position that refuses to take this an-
tagonistic dimension of politics seriously and overstates the potential of dialogue, cooperation 
and deliberation in world politics. In doing so, liberalism ignores that all political identities 
and political orders are constituted through difference and certain exclusions. Instead of ac-
knowledging the constitutive role of the ‘other’ for the ‘self’s’ identity and regarding its posi-
tions, though ultimately incompatible with one’s own perspectives, as politically legitimate, 
the political antagonism is shifted to the moral sphere that cannot offer a rule-based frame-
work for political contestation, but rather reinforces the antagonist potential by transforming 
political opponents into enemies (Mouffe 2005: 11/23). 
 
3) Defence, transformation or overthrow of the hegemonic discourse 
In the third stage, the (new) inscriptions and subject positions generated in the course of dis-
location become more stable and routinized. Eventually, this could lead to the institutionaliza-
tion of a discourse that generates particular political subjects and practices along the lines of a 
horizon of intelligibility. Whether the previously hegemonic discourse is defended, modified 
or replaced by a new hegemonic discourse or whether no discourse is able to achieve hegem-
ony, which would imply an ongoing antagonistic struggle, will thus ultimately depend, on the 
one hand, on the degree of contestation inherent in the counter-hegemonic discourses and 
their ability to link together various contingent subjects, interests and demands into a chain of 
equivalence in order to produce a collective identity and a common understanding or, in other 
words, an alternative hegemonic project.  
On the other hand, it depends on the hegemonic subject’s response to the shift of representa-
tional power, particularly on its ability to defend the universality of its representation of ‘real-
ity’, for instance, by integrating the ‘new’ agents into the hegemonic discourse and thus con-
taining the dislocation of identities (e.g. through representing and promoting India and Brazil 
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as successful examples for the universality of the ‘Western’ development path) or on its ability 
to show greater awareness for the particularity of its own experiences, interests and demands 
and to adopt a more pluralist understanding of world order.  
 
 
3.3 Summary  
This chapter re-conceptualized the phenomena that are subsumed under labels of ‘global 
power shifts’ and ‘post-Western IR’ as a shift of representational power that is dislocating and 
contesting the ‘Western’ discursive hegemony in the political and academic domain. Under-
standing global power shifts and world order as discursive phenomena, it was argued that dis-
courses materialize their attributes or effects by fixing particular meanings and establishing a 
field of intelligibility. In this sense, the global power shifts constitute an intensified hege-
monic struggle for the fixation of meanings. This hegemonic battle finds expression in the 
dislocation of existing identities, disclosure of the inherent tensions and contradictions in the 
prevalent concepts of world order and the empowerment of ‘new’ agents to assert particular 
representations of the world as universal. The dislocation of the hegemonic discourse has thus 
loosened the ‘West’s control over the signifier world order and enables other actors to fill the 
void of a universal political community with meaning. The discourse on global power shifts 
also offers the discursive context for studying India’s foreign policy discourse and the way 
how it articulates world order and India’s role in this order. The discourse on global power 
shifts constitutes India as an emerging power and upheaves it to subject position from where it 
can claim to have a legitimate voice in the debate and struggle over world order, i.e. what 
meaning is tied to the (empty) signifier world order. 
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4. Studying India’s Foreign Policy Discourse: Analytical Strategy and Data 
Corpus 
 
This chapter explicates the analytical strategy and data corpus for examining India’s foreign 
policy discourse. It elaborates the research procedure and techniques of the discourse analysis 
and the textual data employed in this study. The main objective of the chapter is to demon-
strate how this study identified, described, interpreted, explained and evaluated world order 
articulations – that is, how competing Indian discourses seek to endow the empty signifier of 
world order with meaning – in India’s foreign policy discourse. The discourse analysis is 
guided by the anti-essentialist, post-foundationalist discourse theoretical approach outlined in 
chapter 2. For putting discourse theory into practice, this study applies the logics-approach 
devised by Jason Glynos and David Howarth (2007). Informed by the anti-essentialist, discur-
sive ontology of the Essex School of Discourse Theory, Glynos and Howarth introduced the 
logics-approach to guide and structure the process of a discourse analysis. The authors distin-
guish between three different sets of logics: social, political and fantasmatic logics that point 
to the different dimensions in the formation, institutionalization, contestation and transforma-
tion of discourses. This study argues that the logics-approach can help us in comprehending 
and explaining foreign policy practices and entire world orders as an interplay of different 
logics that work on three different levels. 
The chapter is structured into three parts: The first part of the chapter clarifies the need of a 
clear and transparent analytical strategy for carrying out a discourse analysis. The second part 
discusses the logics-approach and its different dimensions in greater detail. In the third part of 
the chapter, the generation, scope and handling of the empirical data used in the discourse 
analysis is explained by outlining how the body of textual material was processed, structured 
and interpreted. 
 
 
4.1 Analytical Strategy   
The main objective of discourse analysis is to identify and analyse the different mechanisms 
by which meaning is generated, stabilized, contested and subverted within a particular body 
of texts. Studying ‘talk and text in context’, discourse analysis treats this body of texts or writ-
ings as the horizon in which subjects experience the world of objects, words and practices. In 
particular, discourse analysis seeks to problematize and de-naturalize how certain fixations of 
meaning could prevail as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ understandings of the world. While discourse 
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analysis refers to the range of techniques to study signifying practices as discursive forms, 
discourse theory refers to the ontological level that specifies the underlying presuppositions 
for inquiring into the nature of social objects and relations. For discourse theory, this onto-
logical level is constituted by the discursive as the horizon of meaningful practices (Howarth 
2002: 10, 2005: 336/341). 
Discourse theory, however, does not provide a clear and ready-made guideline for carrying 
out a discourse analysis. Partially, this can be attributed to the sceptical attitude of poststruc-
turalist scholarship towards methodology in the social sciences. Methods and methodology 
are associated with a positivist mode of inquiry which is based on the belief that there is a 
free-standing, universal and objective set of rules and techniques that can be mechanically 
applied to all objects of study and produce true knowledge. In doing so, methods and method-
ology can serve as instruments of normalization, exclusion and domination in academia that 
draw scientific borders by demarcating valid and invalid forms of knowledge production (see 
Foucault 1972, Ashley/Walker 1990, George 1994, Campbell 1996). Though this study shares 
this opposition to the ontological and epistemological postulates of positivism, it also ac-
knowledges, along with a number of other poststructuralist scholars, the need to reflect upon 
and make transparent research strategies and techniques with respect to the collection and 
processing of data (see, for instance, Diez 2001, Wӕver 2003, Torfing 2005, Hansen 2006, 
Glynos/Howarth 2007).  
Against this backdrop, this study uses the term analytical strategy (see Malmvig 2006) to un-
derscore, on the one hand, its opposition to the positivist demand of developing a general set 
of methodological rules or criteria that could guarantee the generation of ‘true’ knowledge, 
and, on the other hand, its belief in the necessity to address and specify the analytical choices 
taken in a study. The term analytical strategy draws attention to the fact that the way how the 
objects of study are investigated is first and foremost an analytical choice made by the analyst. 
In other words, the objects of study are constructed by the analyst on the basis of analytical 
choices and definitions made in the research process. These choices and definitions are, in 
turn, formulated within a particular scientific paradigm, which specifies the ontological pre-
suppositions of the study, and are influenced by the way how a research problem or ‘puzzle’ 
is framed. 
Further specifying the different stages of social science research from the perspective of post-
structuralist discourse theory and the way how the proponents of this theory explain, interpret, 
criticize and evaluate, Glynos and Howarth (2007) have put forward the model of Logics of 
Critical Explanation. Their approach is set out against the three prevalent onto-
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epistemological traditions in the social sciences: hermeneutics, positivism and critical realism. 
Congruent with hermeneutics, the authors agree that social science research should start with 
the actors’ contextualized self-interpretations, presuming that institutions and practices are 
partially constituted by the beliefs and desires of social actors. A traditional hermeneutical 
approach, however, is problematic, because, for comprehensive understandings of social prac-
tices, we often cannot rely solely on the actors’ self-interpretations, but need to incorporate 
concepts or logics not available to the actors themselves. Though they share this criticism 
with positivism and critical realism and thus seek to move beyond these contextualized self-
interpretations and to provide explanations with a higher degree of generality, Glynos and 
Howarth take issue with the principles of empiricism and subsumption. While empiricism 
suggests an unmediated access to the ‘real-concrete’ in the sense that the researcher can draw 
general conclusions by ‘empirically’ overserving ‘raw material’, subsumption derives expla-
nations of particular phenomena only from abstract concepts and theories or subsumes con-
crete events under empirically verified laws (Howarth 2005: 319ff.; Glynos/Howarth 2007: 
78ff.). Instead, Glynos and Howarth conceptualize the research process in poststructuralist 
discourse theory as comprising the following stages: problematization of empirical phenom-
ena, retroductive explanation of these phenomena, articulation as a means of linking together 
analytical concepts and empirical contexts, and, finally, the persuasion of and intervention 
into the relevant community and practices of scholars (ibid.: 11/19; Glynos et al. 2009: 10).    
Problematization conceptualizes discourse theory as a ‘problem-driven’ rather than ‘method’-  
or ‘theory-driven’ approach in the sense that discourse theory is neither guided by the tech-
niques of data-gathering nor by the desire to confirm a particular theory through testing it 
against an ‘empirical reality’. Likewise, a problem-driven approach may not be confused with 
a ‘problem-solving theory’ that generally treats both the existing social structures and the as-
sumptions about this reality by dominant theories as given, and then addresses certain incon-
sistencies between theory and ‘reality’. A problem-driven approach, by contrast, acknowl-
edges that the subjects of investigation are constructed as a problem in a particular socio-
historical context (Howarth 2005: 318). It relates to Foucault’s technique of problematization, 
in which he synthesizes his archaeological and genealogical modes of inquiry and seeks to 
shed light on “how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how 
these different solutions result from a specific form of problematization” (Foucault 1997: 118-
9).
30
 This implies that discourse theory as a ‘problem-driven approach’ does not take social or 
                                                 
30
 While archaeology thus describes the rules that make objects to objects of a particular discourse, genealogy 
illuminates their constitution by narrating the different historical practices through which they were constructed.       
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political phenomena as pre-given, but interrogates the way how the objects of study are con-
stituted. This problematization is, however, not taking place in a theoretical vacuum, but in-
formed by the ontological presuppositions and categories of discourse theory (Howarth 2005: 
319). In this sense, the investigation of the world order articulations in India’s foreign policy 
discourse, for instance, encompasses an interrogation of the discourse of global power shifts 
that articulates India as an ‘emerging power’ and thus as an agent which has a legitimate 
voice in the struggle and debate over world order as well as a critique of realist accounts of 
India’s contemporary foreign policy.      
Retroduction refers to a mode of explanation that is distinct from both induction and deduc-
tion. It involves “a to-and-fro movement between the phenomena investigated and the various 
explanations that are proffered. In this way, an initially chaotic set of concepts, logics, empiri-
cal data, self-interpretations, and so on, at varying levels of abstraction, are welded together, 
so as to produce an account which, if it removes our initial confusion, can constitute a legiti-
mate candidate for truth or falsity” (Glynos/Howarth 2007: 34). The justification of the of-
fered explanation encompasses criteria that are not separate but internal to the process of con-
structing an explanatory narrative. For assessing the validity of an explanation, it can be 
asked, for instance, if a particular explanation matches the problem under investigation in the 
sense that it renders it ineligible, and if this explanation is more informative and revealing 
than competing interpretations (ibid.: 34/39). 
Articulation sheds light on the relation between theoretical categories and ‘empirical’ – or 
more precisely discursive – phenomena. Following Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of 
discourse as a “structured totality” of articulatory practices, which put together discursive 
elements such that the meaning/identity of these elements is modified as a result of this articu-
latory practice (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 105), Glynos and Howarth also conceptualize social 
science research as an articulatory practice. After all, how the objects of investigation are 
studied is an analytical choice made by the analyst and not predetermined by the objects of 
observation themselves. Accordingly, the research process consists of a series of articulations 
that link together the various elements that make up an explanation. It is a process of linking 
together analytical concepts and ‘empirical contexts’ so that each explanatory narrative is 
modified as a result of this articulation process, without reducing one to the other (Gly-
nos/Howarth 2007: 180). Drawing on the ontological presuppositions and categories of post-
structuralist discourse theory combined with insights of postcolonialism, this study thus ar-
ticulates various elements together to describe, understand and explain the construction of 
world order in India’s foreign policy discourse.  
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Critique, as the final dimension of the social scientific practice, refers to the aspiration of the 
researcher to make a critical intervention into ongoing debates and persuade the community 
of scholars that the own explanation or narrative is more convincing and illuminating than 
others. It also relates to exposing the contingency of all social formations and relations stud-
ied by the researcher and the exclusions they produce by highlighting their non-necessary 
character and the way how actors conceal the contingency through certain myths and narra-
tives. In doing so, however, it is not claimed to provide a new foundation that transcends its 
discursive context or a new form of ideology critique that has access to a higher truth and can 
expose the false consciousness produced by the hidden workings of power and ideology (Tor-
fing 2005: 15; Glynos/Howarth 2007: 191ff.). 
Against this backdrop, Glynos and Howarth develop their logics approach to address the ac-
tual content of explanations. The logics-approach and their three-fold typology of logic is 
discussed in the following section  
 
 
4.2 Logics-Approach 
Based on the ontological assumptions of discourse theory – the discursive character and radi-
cal contingency of all social relations, the incompleteness of symbolic orders resulting  in a 
constitutive lack at the heart of every subject, and the moments of dislocation that reveal the 
contingency of social relations (see chapter 2) – Glynos and Howarth (2007) distinguish be-
tween four different ontological dimensions of social reality, which also delineate the differ-
ent ways of dealing with the radical contingency of social relations and moments of disloca-
tion:  
The social dimension captures situations in which identities, relations and practices are sedi-
mented in the sense that they are naturalized and not subject to public contestation. In other 
words, the radical contingency of social relations is obscured. The political dimension, by 
contrast, refers to moments where subjects respond to dislocatory events, which reveal the 
contingency of social relations and formations, and either contest or defend the existing social 
order, i.e. a set of discursively constructed institutions, practices and identities. Hence, the 
political dimension refers to the institution and contestation of the social. Accordingly, the 
social and the political dimension are about the degree of public contestations of the institu-
tions, practices and identities of a given social order. The ideological and ethical dimensions 
of social reality, on the other hand, address the way subjects are consciously or unconsciously 
complicit in obscuring the radical contingency of social relations (ideological), or attentive to 
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the non-necessary nature of social relations and the plurality of discourses (ethical) (Gly-
nos/Howarth 2007: 14). 
Informed by these ontological commitments, Glynos and Howarth elaborate the concept of 
logics. Drawing on Laclau’s later work, a logic is understood, at the most general and abstract 
level, as the rules or grammar governing practices, institutions or systems of relations be-
tween subjects and objects, and the conditions that make these different entities and their rela-
tions possible, intelligible and vulnerable (Laclau 2000: 282-283; Glynos/Howarth 2007: 
136). In other words, looking into the “logic of a practice aims not just to characterize it, but 
to capture the various conditions which make that practice ‘work’ or ‘tick’” (Glynos et al. 
2009: 11). Glynos and Howarth clarify the concept of logics with the example of the market: 
 
“Clearly, the way we conceptualize the market depends on whether it is a supermarket, a market in en-
ergy supply, a market in educational goods, and so on. In other words, the meaning of expressions such 
as the ‘efficient allocation of resources’, ‘fair price’ or ‘supply and demand’ depends on the way we un-
derstand the key actors and terms associated with the specific market paradigm we have adopted. There 
is a clear relational network at stake here which the concept of a logic must try to capture and name. 
Crucial in this respect is the way actors themselves interpret their roles and activities. In abstract terms, 
we can say that a particular market comprises a particular set of rules or grammar that govern the ar-
rangements and meanings that bring together the buyers and sellers of goods and services. Hence the 
logic of the market comprises a particular set of subject positions (buyers and sellers), objects (com-
modities and means of exchange) and a system of relations and meanings connecting subjects and ob-
jects, as well as certain sorts of institutional parameters (such as a well functioning legal system). How-
ever, our concept of a logic also aims to capture the conditions that make possible the continued opera-
tion of a particular market practice, as well as its potential vulnerabilities” (Glynos/Howarth 2007: 136).  
 
As said before, based on the different ontological dimensions of social reality, we can distin-
guish between three sets of logics: social, political and fantasmatic logics. These different 
logics help us to capture not only the general patterns or rules that govern practices such as 
the constitution of and relationship between subjects and objects, but also the conditions that 
made these practices or regimes of practices possible and the political struggles that maintain 
or challenge their existence. At this point, it is important to note that all practices or regimes 
of practices are discursive practices. Discourses, as structured totality of articulatory practices, 
are predicated on practices that link together, and thereby modifying, contingent elements 
(e.g. subjects, demands or interests) into a common system of signification, and, at the same 
time, constitute and organize these very practices (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 105; Glynos/Howarth 
2007: 15). Social logics capture the general content, purpose and rules governing a particular 
practice or a whole discourse. Political logics enable us to understand and explain the emer-
gence, institutionalization and defence of particular practices or social orders by exploring the 
conditions of their possibility and vulnerability. Fantasmatic logics, finally, are closely inter-
twined with the ideological dimension and enable us to understand why specific practices or 
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discourses ‘grip’ subjects, i.e. why subjects desire to identify with the subject positions pro-
vided by a discourse and how the subject thus contributes to the concealing of the radical con-
tingency of all social relations (Glynos/Howarth 2007: 106f.). 
We will now examine the individual logics in greater detail and how they help us to compre-
hend and explain foreign policy practices and entire world orders as an interplay of different 
logics. Social logics encompass the general grammar or rules governing a particular practice 
or an entire social order. They enable us to reconstruct the meaning, form and function of 
practices (Laclau 2005: 117; Glynos/Howarth 2007: 106/137): What are their main character-
istics, what is their purpose, who participates in them and what is the context. An example for 
a social logic is ‘sovereignty’ which is based on various discursive practices such as ceremo-
nies, border control, citizenship, speeches or the use of force and creates a particular system 
of spatial-political relations between subjects and objects, involving, inter alia, a separation of 
different ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ into distinctive, formally equal entities, the right of autonomy 
and limitations on the legitimate use of force, and an overarching institutional framework (e.g. 
United Nations and various international law treaties) to uphold this spatial-political order.  
Against this backdrop, when we study the social logics of a world order, we carve out and 
describe a particular, interrelated set of subject positions (e.g. ‘sovereign states’, ‘civiliza-
tions’ or ‘great powers’), objects (e.g. ‘power’, ‘security’, ‘wealth’, ‘war’, ‘territories’ or 
‘peace’), the system of relations and meanings that connects subjects and objects (e.g. ‘hierar-
chy’, ‘equality’, ‘rivalry’ or ‘amity’), and the institutional parameters (e.g. ‘international law’, 
‘balance-of-power’, ‘great power management’ or ‘international organizations’). In short, 
social logics revolve around a ‘what’-question and seek to capture or re-construct what a dis-
course takes to be the ‘reality’ of global politics.   
Political logics capture the emergence, institutionalization and transformation of practices and 
social orders. “Political logics”, as Glynos and Howarth (2007: 141) note, “aim to capture 
those processes of collective mobilization precipitated by the emergence of the political di-
mension of social relations, such as the construction, defence and naturalization of new fron-
tiers. But they also include processes which seek to interrupt or break up this process of draw-
ing frontiers”. In other words, political logics help us to comprehend the process of the divi-
sion of socio-political spaces through antagonisms and frontiers and thus how practices and 
social orders are discursively constituted, challenged, sustained or changed. Consider, for in-
stance, the imperialist/colonialist practices of European powers which divided the world into 
a ‘modern’, civilized’ and ‘superior’ Europe and a ‘traditional’, ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’ rest 
that can be exploited and oppressed.  
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The processes of institution and contestation are closely intertwined, because the very institu-
tion of a new social practice or order presupposes the possibility that previous social practices 
or orders are removed from their hegemonic position. The political dimension of social rela-
tions thus reveals, qua moments of dislocation, the limits of a social formation. As explicated 
in Chapter 2, dislocatory moments signify, in Lacanian terms, the presence of ‘the real’ in a 
symbolic order, thereby indicating certain disparities and ultimately the contingency of all 
social relations (Laclau 1990: 39-41; Glynos and Howarth 2007: 142-143). At the same time, 
dislocations point to the moment of the political in social relations, i.e. the antagonist nature 
of politics that manifests itself in the way how the social is ordered and unified in the context 
of contingency through processes of hierarchical identity formation that demarcate ‘us’ from 
‘them’ and thus always exclude certain possibilities (e.g. demands, interests etc.) (see Laclau 
1990, Mouffe 2005). As we have seen, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 127ff.) distinguish between 
two fundamental political logics that constitute and structure social formations: the logic of 
equivalence and the logic of difference.  
Fantasmatic logics address the affective and ideological dimension of social relations, thereby 
enabling us to comprehend why specific practices and regimes of practices ‘grip’ or ‘interpel-
late’ subjects in the sense that subjects desire or enjoy to identify with the subject positions of 
a discourse and how subjects are rendered complicit in concealing the radical contingency of 
social relations (Glynos/Howarth 2007: 15). In Laclauian terms, fantasmatic logics capture 
the “force” or motive behind the “signifying operations” of political logics (Laclau 2005: 
101). “The role of fantasy in this context”, as Glynos and Howarth (2007: 145-146) point out, 
“is not to set up an illusion that provides a subject with a false picture of the world, but to en-
sure that the radical contingency of social reality – and the political dimension of a practice 
more specifically – remains in the background. […] In this context, we can say that the role of 
fantasy is to actively contain or suppress the political dimension of a practice. Thus, aspects 
of a social practice may seek to maintain existing social structures by pre-emptively absorbing 
dislocations, preventing them from becoming the source of a political practice. […] The op-
eration of fantasmatic logics can thus reinforce the social dimension of practices by covering 
over the fundamental lack in reality and keeping at bay what we have labelled ‘the real’”. 
Fantasmatic logics can be analysed as (meta-)narratives. Narratives are simplified and mythi-
cal stories of particular social phenomena based on a plot and a cast of characters. They create 
narrative frameworks that order experiences by placing actors, events, developments or inci-
dents into a seemingly linear story and thus reduce the complexity of everyday life. These 
stories usually begin with an idealized and fictional moment of purity, glory or affluence that 
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must be re-created. Meta-narratives are broader and more complex narrative frameworks and 
can be understood as ideologies. As set out in Chapter 2, actors draw consciously or uncon-
sciously on ideologies in order to totalize and naturalize meanings, imaginaries and identities 
by asserting an ultimate interpretation that is taken to be independent of any standpoint and 
condition. In doing so, they obscure the radical contingency of social relations and the exclu-
sions of certain subjects, interests and demands. In other words, we can say that ideologies 
constitute the subject positions within a discourse by providing the actors with a simplified 
narrative or interpretative framework that reduces the complexity of everyday life and the 
anxieties resulting from the incomplete nature of these subject positions, which never fully 
capture the ‘true’ identity of individuals. The interpretative framework provides actors with 
an account of the existing order, advance a template of a desired future and the obstacles to its 
realization, and suggests how political change can or should be brought about. By highlight-
ing the radical contingency of social relations and the subjects’ role in concealing the non-
necessary character of social practices and orders, fantasmatic logics also gives us means to 
formulate a normative critique of existing social formations and present potential alternatives 
(Laclau 1990: 61; Glynos/Howarth 2007: 117ff.).    
Accordingly, world orders consist of various articulatory practices that link together subjects 
and objects, thereby placing them in a common, differential system of relations and meanings. 
The different logics enable us not only to distil and describe the general characteristics or 
grammar of these sets of practices and institutions, but also to explore how and why they are 
brought into being, maintained, challenged and transformed. While the social logics allow us 
to characterize the general pillars, i.e. established practices and institutions, of the world or-
der, the political logics capture how these have emerged and are contested. The fantasmatic 
logics, in turn, explain why subjects are gripped by these practices and institutions and thus 
desire to identify with the subject positions provided by a discourse.    
 
 
4.3 Data Corpus and Textual Analysis  
Having discussed the different stages and dimensions of the social science research process 
on a more abstract level, the chapter now elaborates how the actual discourse analysis was 
carried out in the present study by explicating the selection, processing and interpretation of 
the empirical data. In discourse analysis, data is treated as a body of texts. In this sense, as 
Derrida (1976: 158) noted in his famous dictum, “[t]here is nothing outside the text”. How-
ever, it is important to clarify at this point that this does not imply a linguistic reductionism. 
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Rather, it means that subjects and social practices and institutions can be seen as the product 
of historical systems of significant differences (or discourses), in which language plays a key 
role. Though discourse can ontologically not be reduced to language patterns, language is the 
point of departure for studying the construction of meaning. A discourse as the sum of articu-
latory practices includes all kinds of verbal and non-verbal practices that are common to a 
particular society, but it is only through the interplay of words and actions and thus language 
in the broadest sense that objects are socially constructed and become meaningful for us. 
Unlike (neo-)positivist accounts, discourse analysis treats its objects of investigation as self-
referential in the sense that meanings are generated through reference to previous, contrastive 
or subsequent meanings and not to an extra-discursive reality (Nabers 2015: 144-145). This 
points to the importance of intertextuality. According to the concept of intertextuality, devised 
by Julia Kristeva (1980), every text is part of a wider universe of other texts on which it im-
plicitly or explicitly draws upon, thereby providing a particular interpretation of the previous 
texts while, at the same time, being the product of these earlier texts. By referring to former 
texts, a text produces and naturalizes particular meanings and contexts.  
The starting point of every discourse analysis is the selection of the sources to be investigated 
and thus the collection of the data-set. This selection process is a delicate issue, given the 
magnitude of potentially relevant sources and the impact of this selection process on the out-
come of the analysis. As the selection of sources is a decision by the analyst, the choices 
taken in this process must be made transparent and be explained. This study analyses the 
world order concepts in India’s official or political discourse. Instead of studying the aca-
demic discourse and investigate or assess Indian theories of international relations, the present 
study thus focuses on how Indian policy-makers in the broadest sense, i.e. politicians, gov-
ernment, military and intelligence officials, and government advisors, draw on and shape par-
ticular discourses that endow the signifier world order with a particular meaning. The data 
corpus of the present study thus consists of government and party documents, speeches, 
statements and publications by Indian politicians, (former) diplomats, intelligence and mili-
tary officials, and parliamentary debates. In addition, speeches and publications of past or 
present holders of public policy positions, e.g. membership in the National Security Advisory 
Board, were also incorporated into the discourse analysis.  
The period of investigation covers India’s entire post-cold war foreign policy till May 2014, 
when the tenure of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government ended 
and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party came to power. This time period has been 
chosen, because this study seeks to analyse how discourses in India, which is constituted by 
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the contemporary global power shifts discourse as an emerging power with a legitimate voice 
in the current debate and struggle about world order, endow world order with meaning. In 
addition, the end of the cold war is often conceptualized as a turning point and a fundamental 
shift in India’s foreign policy from ‘idealism’ to ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’. This study seeks 
to problematize this narrative and provide a more nuanced reading of India’s contemporary 
foreign policy. Finally, by choosing this time period, the study could take into consideration 
the tenures of different Indian governments that represent different social forces, interests and 
demands.         
In total, the data corpus of the study comprises roughly 11,000 documents. The main criterion 
for the selection of texts was that they refer to foreign, international, global or world affairs 
rather than national affairs, thereby demarcating what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’ the In-
dian nation-state. The study attempted to read very broadly and a wide range of different texts 
instead of delimiting the composition of the data corpus beforehand to a certain body of texts, 
theme or fixed referent such as security or trade. The reading and analysing of texts was ter-
minated in the moment when the investigator was confronted with a continuous repetition of 
themes, issues and relations, i.e. new texts did not add upon anything new to the texts already 
read. Given the almost endless number of applicable texts, the study addressed this challenge 
by searching for particular ‘events’ in the textual material that have provoked a substantial 
amount of debate in the sense that they have generated many texts. These events – or, to be 
more precise, the texts that they have created – were given a particular emphasis in the analy-
sis. These events include, inter alia, India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the strategic partnership and 
nuclear agreement with the United States, the crises and peace negotiations with Pakistan and 
international trade negotiations. Though discourse analysis gives priority to the study of pri-
mary sources, this does not imply that secondary literature has no place in the analysis. Sec-
ondary sources offered important background information for this study and also influenced 
the way how the research problem was framed in the sense that standard works are taken as a 
point of departure for articulating a slightly different reading of India’s foreign policy prac-
tices and to contest the seemingly objectivity or naturalness of these representations.            
By studying the foreign policy discourse of a country, we are implicitly or explicitly treating 
the state as a corporate agent and privilege certain actors within a state. Actors always speak 
or act from specific subject positions, which are discursively constructed and enable as well 
as constrain the subject’s sovereignty. The field of foreign policy is still largely dominated by 
the state and thus by the agents who represent the state, i.e. mainly governmental actors such 
as the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defence minister or the national security advi-
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sor. In other words, subject positions are closely intertwined with power and place subjects in 
a hierarchical web of relations that gives them more or less favourable positions, legitimacy 
and authority in the struggle for discursive hegemony. Like discourses in general, foreign pol-
icy discourses are never closed. Meanings are never ultimately fixed and can always be con-
tested by other discourses, even though particular meanings can be temporarily fixed and be-
come sedimented. There is thus a continuous struggle between various actors from within and 
outside the government for discursive hegemony. As explicated in chapter 2, the concept of 
discursive hegemony, devised by Laclau and Mouffe, refers to the discursive struggle for the 
fixation of particular meanings or a particular meaning system. In other words, policy-making 
can be understood as “an arena of struggle over meaning” (Taylor 2004: 435), in which dif-
ferent discourses representing divergent interests, values, demands etc. seek to provide the 
dominant interpretative framework for foreign policy making. Against this backdrop, this 
study investigates the hegemonic and the main counter-hegemonic foreign policy discourse in 
India, which are framed as Post-Nehruvian and Hyper-nationalist discourse. It does not take 
into account other counter-hegemonic discourses such as the communist discourse, given the 
limited impact of these discourses, their inability to contest the hegemonic discourse signifi-
cantly and the rather low number of social forces, demands and interests they represent. In 
addition, the privileging of particular discourses is due to the limited scope of this study and 
the necessity to delimit the textual analysis.         
In contrast to traditional foreign policy analysis, a discourse analytical approach does not pri-
marily investigate why a particular foreign policy option was chosen, but how particular dis-
cursive constructions of reality make possible particular foreign policy options in the sense 
that it appears rational, self-evident or appropriate to pursue this policy, while others seem to 
be irrational, absurd or illegitimate. Foreign policy plays a crucial role in the constitution and 
reproduction of a state’s identity by demarcating an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’. In doing so, 
foreign policies (re-)produce the state’s identity but also depend on specific representations of 
identity. In this sense, foreign policy and identity are mutually constitutive. Identity is both a 
product and a precondition of foreign policy. In other words, the objective of discourse analy-
sis is to study the conditions that enable the construction of particular subjectivities and the 
pursuit of particular foreign policies. Thus, discourse analysis does not seek to explain the 
causes of particular policies or to carve out the ‘real’ or ‘hidden’ intentions of policy-makers. 
Instead, a discourse analytical approach draws primarily on public texts. Based on the insight 
that discourses generate meaning structures that condition what can be meaningfully said and 
done, it discards the idea of autonomous agents that can act independently of these structures. 
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Agents must engage with and act upon the subject positions and categorizations made avail-
able by a discourse. In other words, policy-makers must use the ‘grammar’ of a discourse to 
craft, design and implement certain policy options. As discourses define fields of meaning 
and possibilities and structure them in light of implementation scenarios for preparing deci-
sions, we can also formulate well-grounded predictions on future developments (Campbell 
1998: 11-12; Wӕver 2005: 35-36; Hansen 2006: 1-2; Nonhoff/Stengel 2014: 50).  
As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the main aim of textual analysis in discourse theory 
is to identify and analyse the way how meaning is produced, stabilized, contested and dis-
rupted within particular texts. This raises the question how discourse analysis grasps the 
meaning of a word? At the most general level, discourse analysis searches for patterns in lan-
guage use. It thus locates the contexts in which a signifier is used and situates the signifier in 
the complex system of differences of a language. Words or signifiers acquire their meanings 
never out of themselves or by their composition, but only in relation to other signifiers in the 
field of discursivity. Context refers here thus not an extra-discursive reality, but the textual 
surroundings, i.e. the sentences or paragraphs in which a word is used, the overarching topic 
of the texts, the other themes and issues that the texts cover, the references to other signifiers 
and texts etc. Accordingly, for investigating and carving out what meaning is conferred to the 
signifier ‘order’ in India’s foreign policy discourse, this study initially searched in the textual 
material for appearances of the term ‘order’ and analysed the context in which the term ap-
peared. In doing so, the analysis could identify those words that are normally directly linked 
or tied to the signifier ‘order’, namely ‘world order’, ‘international order’, ‘global order’, 
‘multipolar order’ and ‘polycentric order’. In addition, it could carve out those words, phrases 
or themes that were regularly used in this corpus of texts. This allowed us, on the one hand, to 
find signifiers that were frequently used in concordance with the term ‘order’ such as ‘interna-
tional scenario’, ‘international equation’, ‘international equilibrium’ or ‘global governance’ 
and thus to extend our analysis to those texts in which these terms appeared and look again 
into the context of their usage. On the other hand, this enabled us to identify the issues, as-
pects or sub-themes that are subsumed under or associated with the label of ‘order’ in the 
body of texts (e.g. state sovereignty, non-discrimination or non-violence). This sheds light on 
the actual content or embodiment of ‘order’. The signifiers that form or embody this content 
were then further investigated by searching for them in the textual material and situating them 
in the respective contexts to ascertain their meaning or ‘grammar’.31    
                                                 
31
 Given the very large number of not-digitalized texts in the body of texts, the discourse analysis did not make 
use of software programmes for the textual analysis, but carried out the analysis manually.   
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For grasping and exploring the discursive struggle over the meaning of world order in India’s 
foreign policy discourse, the subsequent discourse analysis thus employs the concept of dis-
cursive hegemony elaborated in chapter 2 and combines it with the logics-approach and the 
postcolonial concepts of hybridity and mimicry. The study thus articulated together various 
elements such as hegemony, antagonism, nodal point, empty signifier or hybridity to under-
stand and explain this hegemonic struggle over the fixation of meaning in India’s foreign pol-
icy discourse. The concept of discursive hegemony enables us to comprehend this process as 
a political practice of coalition-building, in which different demands, interests, subjects etc. 
are linked together to create and institutionalize a common socio-historical project that pro-
vides a shared horizon of intelligibility of world order. There are thus competing discourses 
that seek to hegemonize the field of discursivity and represent a particular interpretative 
framework as common sense through the stabilization and sedimentation of meanings and 
identities. Against this backdrop, the discourse analysis proceeded as follows: 
 
(1) A first step is to identify the nodal points of a discourse. All hegemonic articula-
tions seek to establish nodal points. As privileged and ideally empty signifiers 
nodal points provide a common reference point under which different demands 
and interests can be potentially subsumed and thus articulated as equivalent de-
mands and interests in the sense that a shared understanding of the prob-
lem/challenge and of the ways to overcome it is formed. Nodal points thus form 
the basis for constructing a hegemonic project. For identifying the form, purpose 
and main characteristics of a particular hegemonic project, and its articulation of 
world order, we analyse the social logics operating within the discourse. Social lo-
gics encompass the general grammar or rules governing a particular practice or an 
entire world order. They enable us to reconstruct and describe the interrelated set 
of subject positions constituted by a discourse, the objects, system of relations and 
meanings that connects subjects and objects, and the overall institutional parame-
ters of the hegemonic project.  
 
(2) For forging equivalent demands and interests, hegemonic practices divide the dis-
cursive space by drawing political frontiers. In this process, captured by Laclau 
and Mouffe’s logic of equivalence, a common ‘other’ or shared ‘negativity’ is 
identified as the cause for the problem/challenge. While this common ‘other’ is be-
lieved to be responsible for the blocking or incompleteness of the self’s identity 
77 
 
and this is why it is antagonized and must be overcome, the ‘other’ is, at the same 
time, the precondition for the constitution of the self’s very identity. This interplay 
of difference and equivalence is constitutive for all social relations and formations. 
These operations are captured by the political logics which enable us to understand 
and explain the emergence, institutionalization and defence of particular practices 
or social orders by exploring the conditions of their possibility and vulnerability. 
While the political logic of equivalence helps us to comprehend how different po-
litical forces, demands and interests are linked together into a common hegemonic 
project/discourse and thus the emergence, institutionalization, universalization and 
defence of a hegemonic project/discourse, the logic of difference grasps the con-
testation and transformation of hegemonic projects/discourses through counter-
hegemonic discourses which seek to (re)construct political frontiers by breaking up 
chains of equivalence and exposing the plurality and differences between the enti-
ties/elements. By revealing the contingency, complexity of and the moment of the 
political in social relations, the logic of difference can disrupt the forging or main-
tenance of a common identity. Counter-hegemonic discourses are likely to emerge 
and succeed in moments of dislocations, when there is an event or phenomenon 
that cannot be fully captured by the discourse and that disrupts existing identi-
ties/meanings. The postcolonial categories of hybridity and mimicry can provide 
additional insights into this hegemonic operation by helping us to comprehend, for 
instance, the way how post-colonial societies simultaneously adopted and repro-
duced the discourses of the former oppressors, but also misappropriated and per-
verted their meanings, thereby contesting and subverting colonial rule as well as 
generating new – hybrid – identities that transcend the confines of one socio-
cultural space. 
 
(3) Hegemonic articulations must thus provide a broad vision or project capable of 
representing a high number of demands and interests as equivalent, integrating 
various political forces and offering a desirable alternative to the existing situation, 
which promises to fulfil all these demands and interests by overcoming the ‘other’. 
For comprehending this part of the hegemonic formation, we can draw on the fan-
tasmatic logics, which enable us to understand why specific discourses ‘grip’ sub-
jects, i.e. why subjects desire to identify with the subject positions provided by a 
discourse and how the subject thus contributes to the concealing of the radical con-
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tingency of all social relations. Fantasmatic logics can be conceptualized as (meta-) 
narratives. As fictional and mythical narrative frameworks they order experiences 
by placing actors, events, developments or incidents into a linear, idealized story, 
thereby reducing the complexity of everyday life.  
  
(4) A discourse can be classified as hegemonic, if it is successfully institutionalized in 
all relevant social and political institutions and could successfully conceal its par-
ticularity in the sense that the interpretative framework provided by the discourse 
is universalized and thus reflects in the discursive practices of all relevant social 
actors. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter elaborated the analytical strategy and data corpus for studying India’s foreign 
policy discourse. It explicated the analytical steps taken and the textual data employed by this 
study. A central aim of this chapter was to shed light on the way how this study identified, 
described, interpreted, explained and evaluated world order articulations in India’s foreign 
policy discourse. For putting discourse theory into practice, the logics-approach by Glynos 
and Howarth was introduced and their three-fold typology of logics – social, political and 
fantasmatic – was discussed. A world order can thus be conceptualized as a set of sedimented 
practices and institutions (social logics), that have been established and can be contested 
through the logics of equivalence and difference (political logics) and contain certain fictional 
and mythical (meta-)narratives that cover over the particularity of the discourse and the radi-
cal contingency of all social relations, thereby stabilizing and normalizing these practices and 
institutions. Finally, the chapter spelled out the procedure of the discourse analysis and the 
way how hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses were located and analysed.         
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5. The Evolution and Disruption of the Nehruvian Foreign Policy Discourse  
 
This chapter illuminates India’s post-independence foreign policy discourse that is typically 
closely associated with the state founder Jawaharlal Nehru. There is a broad consensus among 
scholars and policy-makers that Nehruvianism constituted the guiding foreign policy frame-
work, or in the terminology of this study the hegemonic foreign policy discourse, in India 
between independence and the end of the cold war. This period is normally divided into two 
distinctive phases: The initial phase is said to have lasted from independence till 1962 and is 
characterized as the more ‘idealist’ variant of Nehruvianism. The second phase is said to have 
extended from 1962 till the end of the cold war and is viewed as the more ‘realist’ version of 
Nehruvianism characterized by a greater emphasis on defence policy and the strategic tilt to-
wards the Soviet Union. With the end of the cold war and India’s economic crisis in 1991, the 
Nehruvian consensus is usually said to have partially eroded and India has given up at least 
some of the dogmas that have shaped Indian foreign policy in the four decades of its inde-
pendence (see, inter alia, Dixit 2001, Cohen 2002, Bajpai 2003a, Mohan 2004, Mehta 2009, 
Sagar 2009, Chellaney 2010a, Ganguly 2010, Malone 2012, Narang/Staniland 2012).  
The purpose of discussing this narrative of Indian foreign policy in this chapter is to shed light 
on the evolution and main tenets of Nehruvianism and India’s post-independence foreign pol-
icy that allows us to investigate the apparent ruptures, changes and continuities in India’s for-
eign policy discourse after the end of the cold war and the world order models it articulates. 
The chapter argues that the end of the cold war symbolized, what Laclau calls, a dislocatory 
moment that disrupted the hegemonic Nehruvian discourse and constituted an Indian identity 
crisis, i.e. actors could not any longer (fully) identify with the discourse and engaged in a dis-
cursive struggle to make sense of the ‘new structural context’32. The evolution and disruption 
of the Nehruvian foreign policy discourse is of particular relevance, because this study argues 
that the contemporary hegemonic foreign policy discourse in India constitutes a modified ver-
sion of the Nehruvian discourse.  
The first part of this chapter identifies non-alignment as the cornerstone, or nodal point, of the 
Nehruvian foreign policy discourse and explicates its meaning and relevance in India’s for-
eign policy. The second part gives a brief historical overview of India’s post-independence 
foreign policy. In the final part of the chapter, the disruption, or dislocation, of the Nehruvian 
discourse is elaborated.        
                                                 
32
 As has been pointed out before, this ‘new context, however, does not represent an objective, extra-discursive 
reality, but is made meaningful through discourses that actors invoke to recreate the disrupted discursive struc-
tures and establish subject positions with which they can identify.  
80 
 
5.1 Non-alignment: An Independent Foreign Policy for an Independent India    
The concept and policy of non-alignment was devised and adopted by India’s first prime min-
ister Jawaharlal Nehru after Indian independence in order “to keep away from the power poli-
tics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and 
which may again lead to disasters on even vaster scale” (Nehru 1961: 2). On the one hand, the 
Nehruvian discourse framed non-alignment as an assertion of India’s right after attaining in-
dependence to pursue a foreign policy that is not prescribed by any great power or power bloc, 
but reflects India’s national interests and its right to self-determination. On the other hand, it 
was also seen as response to the severe threat to world peace emanating from the ideological 
and military conflict between the Soviet and the Western power blocs in the nuclear age 
(Nanda 1998).     
A main objective of non-alignment has thus been to maintain an independent foreign policy 
and India’s strategic autonomy. As the later prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1979: 38/73) 
noted during his tenure as External Affairs Minister: “after freeing itself of the clutches of 
imperialism, a great country like India could not possibly become a camp follower of some 
great power” and instead attempts to pursue “alignment with all”. And his successor Manmo-
han Singh (2006a) adds: “‘non-alignment’ was based on the principle that we were aligned 
only with our values and our enlightened national interests; we were not aligned with anyone, 
or against anyone. The underlying philosophy was that issues would be judged on merits 
rather than in a mechanical or deterministic manner. Non-alignment was therefore always an 
expression of our enlightened national interest and I dare say, will remain so”. 
Non-alignment constituted the nodal point around which the hegemonic Nehruvian discourse 
was organized. A nodal point is a privileged and typically ‘empty’ signifier, which is based on 
a broad, socially shared and appreciated concept whose meaning can never be ultimately 
fixed, thereby enabling the integration of various interests, preferences and demands (Laclau 
2000: 58). This is a crucial precondition for the formation and maintenance of a hegemonic 
project. A nodal point is thus a privileged signifier around which a particular chain of signifi-
cation or system of meaning can be bound together. For the institutionalization of a hege-
monic project, a discourse must forge a long and stable chain of equivalence by linking to-
gether different demands and interests and presenting them as equivalent. This requires, in 
turn, the identification of a common ‘other’ – a problem, challenge or enemy – that blocks the 
full constitution and completeness of the ‘self’, i.e. the Indian nation-state, and must thus be 
overcome. In the Nehruvian discourse, this common ‘other’ were, above all, colonialism and 
the cold war. By constructing the nodal point and empty signifier non-alignment, the Nehru-
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vian discourse articulated a demand that managed to represent all equivalent demands and 
hold out the promise to overcome the ‘other’, provided that the representative demand is ful-
filled.  
Embodying freedom, independence and autonomy, an appreciation of India’s anti-colonial 
struggle and its (regained) ‘greatness’, and a balance between nationalism and international-
ism, non-alignment allowed to articulate various societal demands and interests as equivalent 
and to forge a national consensus and identity for a post-colonial state. On the one hand, the 
negation of this hegemonic project would imply an affirmation of the colonial subjugation 
and a betrayal of the independence movement. On the other hand, the vagueness and openness 
of concepts such as autonomy, freedom or independence, both with respect to their actual 
meaning and how to achieve them, means that different political forces could and can identify 
with non-alignment. For example, for the Indian communist parties, non-alignment means 
primarily anti-imperialism and third world solidarity, while the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya 
Jana Sangh, and its successor the BJP, largely equate non-alignment with defending and 
maximizing India’s strategic autonomy and national interests. Accordingly, while various 
social forces can identify with the hegemonic project in general, there is a continuous struggle 
for the fixation of its exact meaning and how it can or should be put into practice. 
Unsurprisingly, there is no agreement in the literature on the actual status, characteristics, 
significance or purpose of non-alignment in Indian foreign policy. For some scholars, non-
alignment was “a modernized version of the classical balance of power in a bipolar world 
locked in hostility but unable to go to war because of the existence of nuclear weapons” 
(Subrahmanyam 1999: ix). Accordingly, non-alignment is conceived of in a ‘realist’ fashion 
as a ‘rational’ foreign policy strategy driven by considerations of realpolitik to defend and 
maximize India’s national interests and autonomy (Rana 1976; Mohan 1999: 83; Pant 2011a: 
16; Narang/Staniland 2012: 80; Subrahmanyam 2012a). As Amitabh Mattoo (2005) noted: 
  
 “India's primary quest seems to be to acquire the strength and strategic autonomy that will allow it to 
 stabilise an ‘unfriendly neighbourhood’, give it the capability to make independent, even unpopular, 
 choices in the international system, and be able to influence the future course of international relations. 
 These objectives have defined India's foreign policy since Independence and were the basis for non-
 alignment. [...] It is the aggressive pursuit of these goals – clinically, amorally and non-ideologically – 
 which is remarkable and unprecedented.” 
 
Likewise, it has been argued that non-alignment was (and continues to be) India’s “route to 
great power status – a strategy that is independent of external forces by prioritizing national 
interest and ensuring strategic manoeuvrability” (Bhattacharya 2014; see also Nayar/Paul 
2003; Ogden 2011). In a similar vein, the political analyst and spokesperson of prime minister 
82 
 
Manmohan Singh, Sanjaya Baru, pointed out that non-alignment reflected India’s mixed do-
mestic economic policy and aimed at getting the most from both superpowers, while accom-
modating different domestic political forces. In other words, it is a calculated and instrumen-
talist foreign policy approach primarily driven by India’s national self-interest and not a 
commitment to particular ‘universal’ values (Baru 2006: 60-62).  
On the other hand, non-alignment has been represented as a foreign policy approach that, 
rooted in India’s non-violent independence struggle, is driven more by moralpolitik and the 
promotion of certain values in global politics than by pure national self-interests. Non-
alignment, as the retired Indian diplomat Rajiv Sikri (2009: 259) notes, is “the right to follow 
an independent foreign policy and to decide foreign issues on merit; moral, diplomatic and 
economic support for the struggle against colonialism, racialism, apartheid and other forms of 
discrimination; non-violence and the quest for nuclear disarmament, and India’s role as an 
international peacemaker”. Hence, non-alignment is understood as an attempt to promote a 
more equitable world order based on justice, peace, tolerance, pluralism and the equal treat-
ment of all countries through the peaceful means that India successfully exercised in its inde-
pendence struggle (Misra/Narayan 1981: 16ff.; Mitra 2009: 20; Dubey 2013: 2; Ogden 2014a: 
96).  
While these different accounts of non-alignment do not necessarily conflict with each other 
and there is a certain degree of convergence,
33
 it shows that non-alignment is understood in 
quite different ways ranging from hard-nosed ‘realism’ to moralistic ‘idealism’. Likewise, 
there is no agreement in the literature on the actual role of non-alignment in India’s foreign 
policy, i.e. to what extent India has lived up to the principles of non-alignment and whether 
non-alignment still guides Indian foreign policy. There are several events in Indian foreign 
policy that are said to have shattered or at least seriously questioned India’s non-alignment 
stance: the India-China war, India’s military intervention in East-Pakistan, the friendship 
treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971, the end of the cold war, India’s economic liberalization, 
India’s nuclear tests in 1998 or the nuclear deal with the United States (see Harshe 1990, 
Thakur 1992, Cohen 2002, Nayar/Paul 2003, Mohan 2004, Kapur 2006, Ganguly/Pardesi 
2009, Sikri 2009, Mukherjee/Malone 2011, Srinivasan 2012, Tharoor 2012a, Singh [Jasw.] 
2013).  
 
                                                 
33
 For Rajiv Sikri and others, India’s support of decolonization, anti-imperialism and Third Worldism was and is 
not only morally right, but has also served India’s national interest, because India’s interests and values converge 
with those of other developing and post-colonial countries and would help India in realizing its global aspirations 
(Sikri 2009: 209).     
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5.2 Nehruvianism and India’s Post-Independence Foreign Policy Discourse 
Though there exist different readings of the Nehruvian foreign policy in general and the con-
cept of non-alignment in particular, a short discussion of Nehruvianism and India’s post-
Independence foreign policy is essential for understanding the evolution and characteristics of 
the foreign policy discourse in the post-cold war era. However, it needs to be pointed out that 
this historical sketch does not provide an objective, extra-discursive account of Indian foreign 
policy, but is rather, as stated above, a short summary of the standard narrative of India’s 
post-independence foreign policy. 
Jawaharlal Nehru is widely regarded as the founding architect of India’s foreign policy (Dixit 
2004: 77ff.; Ganguly 2010: 1). As India’s first prime minister and Minister of External Affairs, 
he devised the main contours of India’s post-independence foreign policy stressing that inde-
pendence must encompass full autonomy in domestic and foreign affairs. Drawing inspiration 
from India’s civilizational heritage, non-violent freedom struggle, size, geography and re-
sources, Nehru was convinced that India, despite its relative economic and military weakness 
after almost two centuries of colonial rule, would play a special role in Asian and global af-
fairs (Nehru [1946] 1985: 535; Nehru [1949] 1961: 49). Confronted with the cold war dynam-
ics, he wanted India to keep distance from both power blocs and shape international relations 
as an independent force:  
 
“India is too big a country herself to be bound down to any country, however big it may be. India is go-
ing to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs, not I hope in the military sense, but in 
many other senses which are more important and effective in the end […]  While remaining quite apart 
from power blocs, we are in far better position to cast our weight at the right moment in favour of peace, 
and meanwhile our relations can become as close as possible in the economic or other domain with such 
countries with whom we can easily develop them. So it is not a question of our remaining isolated or cut 
off from the rest of the world” (Nehru [1949] 1961: 47).  
 
This policy of non-alignment meant detachment from the two power blocs and “not becoming 
entangled in any alliances, military or other, that might drag us into any possible conflict” 
(Nehru [1949] 1961: 37). By declaring that India would be non-aligned between the cold war 
blocs, Nehruvianism asserted India’s right to pursue an independent foreign policy and judge 
international issues on their merits in accordance with India’s national interests instead of 
following the dictates of one bloc. Unlike neutrality, non-alignment was intended to be an 
activist policy designed to shape the outcomes of world politics, in particular to mediate, if 
possible, between the two power blocs, to advocate global disarmament and to promote a 
more just and peaceful world order. Similarly, while the policy of non-alignment ruled out 
permanent alignments with one power bloc, it acknowledged the need of international coop-
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eration and even, in certain circumstances, short-term alignments with a particular power 
(Krishna 1984: 272; Bajpai 2003a: 241).  
An important component of non-alignment was the idea of pan-Asianism and ‘third world 
solidarity’ (see Mishra/Narayan 1981, Abraham 2008, Singh [S.] 2011). By seeking close ties 
with Asian and other developing countries, India wanted to create an “area of peace” (Nehru 
[1955] 1961: 67) between the two rival camps in an attempt to preserve the newly independ-
ent countries in Asia and beyond from cold war entanglements and allow them to focus on 
their socio-economic development and nation-building. This association of countries from the 
Global South, which later culminated in the Non-Alignment Movement
34
, should also help in 
overcoming imperialism, colonialism and racism, which were not only unjust, but also seen as 
main causes for conflicts and rivalries and thus as main obstacles for a peaceful, just and co-
operative world order (Kalyanaraman 2014: 153-154). For Nehru, the Non-Alignment 
Movement was not a rival bloc in the cold war equation but “an experiment in co-existence, 
for the countries of Asia and Africa” (Nehru [1957] 1961: 70) that promoted their interests in 
world politics and allowed them to pursue an independent foreign policy. The idea of peaceful 
co-existence (Panchsheel) also found expression in the 1954 India-China agreement that 
stipulates the mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, 
mutual non-inference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit in bilateral relations and 
the resolve to co-exist peacefully (MEA 2004a). This “policy of friendship toward all nations, 
uncompromised by adherence to any military pacts” (Nehru 1963) was based on the convic-
tion that the politics of fear, hostility, competition and alliances, which characterized the cold 
war, could and, due to the existence of nuclear weapons, must be overcome. In other words, 
Nehru was convinced that the current ‘reality’ of international politics could be replaced by a 
new mind-set and that India through its policies of non-alignment and Panchsheel could play 
a leading role in bringing this new reality about.  
While the Nehruvian foreign policy discourse had a ‘moralist’ or ‘idealist’ foundation in the 
sense that it believed in the possibility of change and saw India “as a messenger of peace, as a 
                                                 
34
 The NAM was not established as a formal organization, but refers to a loose grouping of states that gathered 
for the first time for the Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. An 
important milestone in the development of the NAM was the 1965 Bandung conference, where the participating 
countries agreed on a set of principles that should later become the requirements that states must fulfil in order to 
join the movement. These include: respect for human rights and the principles of the United Nations; respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; recognition of national independence movements; recogni-
tion of the equality of all races and nations; abstention from intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of 
other states; peaceful conflict resolution and the promotion of international cooperation, justice and interests. 
The political agenda of the NAM has traditionally centred on decolonization, opposition of military interventions 
in post-colonial states and the promotion of an international architecture that better reflects the interests and 
positions of developing and post-colonial states. See for a more detailed account of the origins, evolution and 
themes of the NAM: Mišković 2014.  
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catalyst for creating a just and moral world order” (Dixit 2003: 62) which could be achieved 
through a commitment to reason, non-violence and moral influence, it was also driven by 
more ‘pragmatic’ considerations. As a democracy and a developing country that opted for a 
largely socialist, state-directed economic policy, characterized by an emphasis on economic 
planning, self-reliance, import-substitution, heavy capital intensive industrialization and a 
large public sector (see Patnaik 2003, Nayar 2007a, Mukherji 2007a), India stood politically 
and economically between the two power blocs and had thus no incentive to align either with 
the ‘West’ or the Soviet Bloc in order to gain economic and technological assistance from 
both camps and focus on its socio-economic development in an environment free from con-
flict (Mohan 2004: 37; Baru 2006: 60ff.). As Nehru proclaimed after Indian independence, 
“even in getting economic help, or in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all 
our eggs into one basket. […] Therefore, purely from the point of opportunism, if you like, a 
straightforward, honest policy, an independent policy, is the best” (Nehru 1949 [1948]: 219).  
India’s policy of non-alignment was initially relatively successful. In spite of its rather limited 
material capabilities, India was recognized as an emerging Asian power and an important 
member of the international community during this period. India played a leading role in cre-
ating collectivity and solidarity among the Asian and African states, which later led to the 
formation of the NAM, successfully promoted the process of decolonization and anti-
imperialism, became a key proponent of global disarmament and mediated in the Korean cri-
sis and thus eased the tensions between the two cold war blocs. From the mid-1950s, however, 
India’s foreign policy was deprived from some of its momentum and effectiveness. India was 
increasingly dragged into the cold war dynamics and lost its standing in Asian and global af-
fairs. In 1954 and 1955, Pakistan, which emerged from the violent partition of the Indian sub-
continent and became India’s main politico-military rival, joined the Western alliance system 
and formed a defence partnership with the United States, which from now on indirectly sup-
ported Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir issue in the United Nations (UN). Realizing that the 
UN is driven by the logics of power politics, the Nehruvian belief in the organization and 
multilateralism in general partially eroded. As a result, India sought closer ties with the Soviet 
Union, which had redefined its position towards the non-aligned countries after Stalin’s death 
and prevented anti-Indian resolutions in the UN Security Council. In addition, the Indo-China 
relations deteriorated after China’s invasion and reoccupation of Tibet in 1950 and, above all, 
the border dispute between the two countries. The tensions in the Sino-Indian relations led 
eventually to a war in 1962 and a devastating defeat for India (Dixit 2001: 25ff.; Dubey 2013: 
4-5; Mohan 2013: 26-28 ).  
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The Indio-China border war is widely seen as a turning point in India’s post-independence 
foreign policy, leading to a greater acknowledgement of the compulsions of ‘realpolitik’ in 
international relations (see Cohen 2002, Dixit 2003, Nayar/Paul 2003, Sinha 2007 [2002], 
Ganguly 2010, Malone 2012, Ogden 2014a). On the one hand, the war marked the failure of 
Nehru’s accommodative policy towards China, which was based on the conviction that the 
two Asian civilizations could and must be partners in Asian and global affairs. On the other 
hand, the war brought to light the negligence of defence policy
35
 and the dangers of staying 
non-aligned despite limited defence capabilities. After the war debacle, India increased its 
defence expenditure, upgraded its weapon systems and improved its defence preparedness 
(Pant 2009b: 257f.; Cohen/Dasgutpa 2010: 7-8).  
However, despite the Sino-Indian war and Nehru’s demise in 1964, the Nehruvian foreign 
policy was not abandoned, but a more pessimistic view on India’s security environment took 
hold and a greater focus was laid on safeguarding the country’s national security. Conse-
quently, while India continued to oppose formal military alliances or security arrangements, it 
sought military assistance from the U.S. and the United Kingdom during and after the China 
war and continued its strategic rapprochement towards the Soviet Union, which culminated in 
the ‘Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ in 1971. Given the strategic 
rapprochement between China, Pakistan and the U.S., the treaty, which provided, inter alia, 
for defence cooperation and mutual defence assistance in case of either party being subjected 
to threats to their territorial integrity and security,
36
 gave India a strategic reassurance and 
room for manoeuvre which was of particular importance for dealing with the East Pakistan 
crisis. Confronted with several million refugees from East Pakistan as a result of the outbreak 
of civil war in Pakistan in the late 1960s, India supported the Bengali liberation movement 
and militarily intervened in East Pakistan in 1971. India’s military intervention led to the 
break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh (Nayar/Paul 2003: 201; Ganguly/Pardesi 
2009: 8-9; Ogden 2014a: 13).  
Apart from humanitarian concerns, India’s response to the East Pakistan crises was also 
driven by clear political and strategic considerations: On the one hand, the separation of 
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 See for a more nuanced view on the alleged neglect of defence policy under Nehru: Subrahmanyam 2003 and 
Raghavan 2010.  
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 The Indio-Soviet Treaty, however, did not include any provisions that provided for automatic military assis-
tance and was thus no formal military alliance. In addition, India continued to highlight its strategic autonomy 
and the paramount importance of its national interests. For example, India refused to participate in the Asian 
collective security system proposed by the Soviet Union and criticized the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. At 
the same time, the treaty also reflected a higher degree of commonalities between India and the Soviet Union, 
resulting, on the one hand, from Indira Gandhi’s more nationalist and anti-Western foreign and economic poli-
cies and, on the other hand, the Soviet Unions more positive attitude towards non-alignment (Harshe 1990: 420; 
Pardesi/Ganguly 2012: 136).          
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Bangladesh undermined the two-nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan was originally 
created, namely that religion constitutes national identity, a theory that was firmly opposed by 
India. On the other hand, by breaking Pakistan up, India had no longer to confront and possi-
ble fight Pakistan on two fronts in a crisis (Dixit 1998a: 103/109). Though the military inter-
vention demonstrated a tougher stance on the use of force in dealing with external threats, 
which has led scholars to coin Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy as “Militant Nehruvianism” 
(Cohen 2002), India continued to exercise strategic restraint: In spite of its swift and clear 
victory in East Pakistan, which marked the greatest military success of independent India, 
New Delhi did not asserted its military advantage to West Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir 
dispute. In addition, India adopted a relatively conciliatory stance in the post-war negotiations 
and did not use the more than 90,000 Pakistani war prisoners to coerce Pakistan to abandon 
its claims on Kashmir, believing that the dispute can only be solved peacefully through a ne-
gotiated agreement (Dixit 1998a: 108ff; Cohen/Dasgupta 2010: 9). 
Nevertheless, through the break-up of Pakistan, India emerged as the pre-eminent power in 
South Asia and demonstrated its willingness to use force to settle conflicts and defend its na-
tional interests (Ogden 2014a: 7-8). As early as 1967, after having sought security guarantees 
from the great powers in vain, prime minister Indira Gandhi authorized India’s Subterranean 
Nuclear Explosions Project mainly as a reaction to China’s nuclear weapons programme, 
leading to India’s first nuclear test in May 1974. The nuclear test, known as Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion, demonstrated India’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons programme, but India 
refrained from deploying nuclear weapons and its nuclear weapons programme slowed down 
until the mid-1980s when there were clear indications that Pakistan is close to have nuclear 
weapons capability (Perkovich 1999: 3; Basrur 2006: 61-62).
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The nuclear test further substantiated India’s aspiration for regional pre-eminence. Driven by 
colonial anxieties about the ‘foreign hand’ and a particular conception of national security that 
India inherited from the British Raj, post-Independence India has sought to establish its re-
gional pre-eminence by excluding external powers and establishing an Indo-centric regional 
security system that draws India’s smaller neighbours into its security orbit. Accordingly, 
India signed unequal treaties with Bhutan and Nepal in 1949 and 1950, which made India 
largely responsible for their foreign and defence policies, used military action to end Portu-
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tude towards nuclear weapons characterized by a moral aversion to nuclear weapons and a desire for global 
nuclear disarmament, but also a fascination for nuclear technology and an acknowledgement of the potential 
compulsion to develop nuclear weapons to safeguard India’s national security (Bajpai 2003b: 372; Basrur 2006: 
60-61).  
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guese colonial rule over Goa in 1961 and peacefully annexed Sikkim in 1975 (Pardesi/    
Ganguly 2012: 137-138).  
Against this backdrop, it is often argued that the Nehruvian foreign policy combined global 
moralpolitik with regional realpolitik, even though India had neither the political will nor the 
material capabilities to play the role of an imperial power and normative considerations were 
also not entirely absent in its regional policy. Under the tenures of Indira Gandhi and her son 
Rajiv Gandhi, India is said to have taken this striving for regional pre-eminence further and 
proclaimed its version of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine. According to this so-called ‘Indira Doc-
trine’, India demanded, first, that no neighbouring country undertakes any action in its foreign 
or defence policy that is averse to India’s interests; second, that no external power establishes 
a presence or influence in a neighbouring country; and third, that all disputes on the subconti-
nent are resolved bilaterally, with India as key mediator or provider of military assistance. 
Against this background, India intervened in the Sri Lankan civil war initially through lending 
support to the Tamil Tigers and rupturing the Sri Lankan air blockade and later through an 
imposed peace settlement and the deployment of Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka in 1987. 
Likewise, India intervened in Fiji (1987) and the Maldives (1988). India’s regional activism 
in the 1980s was accompanied by a military modernization programme and large-scale mili-
tary exercises as well as a cautious rapprochement towards the United States and China (Bur-
gess 2009: 236-237; Mitra 2009: 21; Muni 2009: 34ff.).  
 
 
5.3 A Moment of Dislocation: India’s Identity Crisis after the End of the Cold War 
The end of the cold war that coincided with a severe economic and financial crisis in India, 
which brought the country to near bankruptcy, is usually represented as a turning point that 
challenged the post-independence Nehruvian consensus and provoked a gradual shift in In-
dia’s foreign policy. Normally, this crisis and the subsequent shift in India’s foreign policy are 
said to have been caused mainly by the changes in the global balance-of-power as well as 
domestic and international demands to liberalize India’s economy (Kapur 2006: 5; Ganguly 
2010: 3-5; Malone 2012: 257). This study, by contrast, re-conceptualizes this apparent turning 
point in India’s foreign policy through the analytical prism of poststructuralist discourse the-
ory as a dislocatory moment that disrupted India’s hegemonic foreign policy discourse and 
prompted political actors to ‘fix’ this rupture in the discursive order. In doing so, we can show 
that India’s political situation cannot simply be attributed to some (objective) systemic or do-
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mestic changes, but that India was affected by a deep identity crisis that raised questions 
about India’s self-understanding and role in the world.     
As discussed in chapter 2, a discourse becomes dislocated, as Laclau (1990: 39-41, 1996: 19/ 
73f.) explicates, if there is an event or phenomenon that cannot be fully symbolized by the 
discourse. Dislocatory moments thus signify, in the terminology of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
the presence of ‘the real’ in any symbolic or discursive order, thereby indicating certain dis-
parities and ultimately the contingency of the discourse, i.e. what actors have taken for 
granted and identified with suddenly appears questionable and uncertain. The disruption of 
the existent discursive order reflects in a failed structural identity in the sense that actors can-
not any longer (entirely) identify with the subject positions provided by the discourse, throw-
ing the identities of actors into a crisis and prompting them to act in order to re-construct sub-
ject positions and thus the interpretative framework through which the transformation and the 
‘new context’ can be understood. In other words, Indian policy-makers did not simply re-
spond to some structural developments and demands on the international and national level, 
but rather the hegemonic discourse that was invoked by political actors to make sense of In-
dia’s role in the world and endowed them with a source of identification was partially eroded 
and provoked an identity crisis. 
To argue that Nehruvianism has been the hegemonic foreign policy discourse that was dis-
rupted with the end of the cold war is not to suggest that the discourse has never been con-
tested before and provided the only source of identification for political actors in India. Dis-
courses can fix meanings and identities only partially and are thus inherently instable and vul-
nerable to the ‘surplus of meaning’ located in the discursive field. Given the lack of any stable 
foundations underlying these meanings and identities, and the exclusion of certain other op-
tions, every discourse is dependent on and vulnerable to a ‘discursive exterior’ that threatens 
to subvert (or dislocate) the articulation of meaning, but is also the precondition for discursive 
articulations in the first place (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 110-112; Howarth 2002: 103). As every 
hegemonic project, the Nehruvian discourse created particular meanings and identities by 
linking together contingent demands and interests and thus placing them into a chain of 
equivalence. This required the identification of a common ‘other’ against which these differ-
ent demands and interests can be articulated as equivalent. In the Nehruvian discourse, this 
common ‘other’ were, as we have seen, India’s colonial subjugation and the cold war as per-
manent threats to the country’s new won freedom and independence. Non-alignment, the 
nodal point of the discourse, managed to symbolize all equivalent demands and the adequate 
response to overcome this threat. Domestically, this implied economic self-reliance. Interna-
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tionally, this implied foreign policy autonomy and the attempt to place India into a chain of 
equivalence with other post-colonial states. This chain of equivalence sought to overcome the 
dissimilarities and differences among these states by identifying anti-racism, anti-colonialism 
and anti-imperialism as shared aspiration and non-alignment as the right strategy to overcome 
them. The Nehruvian discourse thus merely articulated contingent elements into chains of 
equivalence by placing them into opposition to a common ‘other’ and was, as every discourse, 
vulnerable to the surplus of meaning located in the field of discursivity and thus to political 
contestation.  
In other words, chains of equivalence can always be broken up through the logic of difference 
that exposes the plurality and differences between elements and thus shows that the discursive 
space can also be organized differently. For instance, instead of representing India primarily 
as a post-colonial state that must defend its economic self-reliance and political independence 
against bullying great powers and whose natural partners are the fellow victims of European 
imperialism, it is also possible to highlight India’s democratic credentials and articulate India 
rather as a natural partner of the United States and other Western democracies. Likewise, the 
notion of India as symbol of non-violence and peaceful co-existence was contested. These and 
other demands and interests have always been present in the discursive field and have par-
tially also been articulated by counter-hegemonic discourses already before India’s independ-
ence and throughout the cold war. For instance, one prominent oppositional voice, who drew 
on these counter-hegemonic discourses, was the independence fighter and first Indian deputy 
prime minister, Sardar Patel, who criticized, inter alia, Nehru’s ‘idealist’ policies towards 
Pakistan and China (Guhu 2007: 168ff./175). However, these oppositional discourses did not 
manage to seriously challenge the hegemonic Nehruvian discourse by creating a broad and 
inclusive alternative hegemonic project with which many social forces could identify. This is 
precisely what the Nehruvian hegemonic project achieved with its articulation of non-
alignment, which promised an independent and pre-eminent role for India in international 
relations, and a development model that struck a subtle balance between different social de-
mands and interests by choosing a middle path between capitalism, economic nationalism and 
socialism.    
With the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, the main 
parameters of this hegemonic project were shaken to the core and the Nehruvian discourse 
struggled to fix meanings and thus to uphold its system of intelligibility: First, the end of the 
cold war deprived India’s stance of non-alignment of its main rationale. In a world no longer 
divided between the capitalist ‘Western’ bloc and their socialist opponents, as the later prime 
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minister I.K. Gujral asked, “who are you going to be non-aligned against?” (quoted in Gan-
guly 1994: 154). Second, India lost its main strategic partner on which India relied in the UN 
Security Council, for its armaments and for its trade and was now gripped by the discourse of 
unipolarity and the United States as the main power centre in world politics (Dixit 2001: 45; 
Mansingh 2005: 43). Prime minister Atal Vajpayee (2003a: 196) described “the evolution of 
the post-Cold War world” and the impact of the downfall of the USSR on India’s “political, 
diplomatic, strategic and security equations” as follows: 
 
“The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union gave a strong jolt to many of India’s 
strategic and security assumptions of nearly five decades. The changed circumstances of the Indo-
Soviet strategic alliance greatly affected India’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre in the world. The qual-
ity of many of our other relationships and alliances also suffered from the realignment of world forces. 
All of you know how badly the collapse of the USSR disrupted our defence cooperation with that coun-
try. Simultaneously, our security environment also deteriorated rapidly.” 
 
Likewise, the prominent political analyst and member of the National Security Advisory 
Board during 1998-2000 and 2004-06, C. Raja Mohan (2004: 11) pointed out: 
 
“The end of the cold war did not bring the expected peace dividend for India; instead it accentuated the 
Indian security problems. India was confirming a radically transformed world order. With few reliable 
friends, the importance of self-help in managing its national security was coming to the fore with 
greater clarity [...] The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, left India without a reliable ally 
in the new world order dominated by one superpower.” 
 
Third, the end of the cold war casted doubts on India’s largely socialist, state-directed eco-
nomic policy. “With the disintegration of the Soviet Union”, as the former foreign secretary 
Muchkund Dubey (2013: 172) noted, “an entire epoch of contemporary history came to an 
end, as did the Indo-Soviet relationship, as it was shaped and had evolved during the Soviet 
era. The Soviet experiment in socialism had profoundly influenced the course of events in the 
rest of the world. The Soviet system provided the much sought after alternative to the capital-
ist system prevailing in major countries and was widely seen as the harbinger of social justice 
and equality”. The feeling that the Soviet experiment, which has also influenced the direction 
of India’s own economic policy after independence, might not be a successful alternative to 
the capitalist system was further exacerbated by India’s severe balance of payment crisis in 
1991. “[T]he crisis in the economy”, as the then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (1991) 
noted, “is both acute and deep. We have not experienced anything similar in the history of 
independent India”. In addition, the poor performance of the Indian economy in terms of eco-
nomic growth and poverty reduction compared to the East Asian countries, which have opted 
for a more open economy with an emphasis on exports, the private sector and foreign invest-
ments, questioned the utility of India’s economic approach and underscored, in the dominant 
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reading of India’s economic crisis, the need for a policy shift (Singh [M.] 1991; Mohan 2004: 
xviii; Ahluwalia 2007a: 87; Baru 2008).
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Fourth and finally, many themes that have dominated the cold war era and conveyed identity 
to India such as decolonization or anti-apartheid lost their relevance in the post-cold war 
world order and gave way to new ‘global’ issues such as human rights, democracy promotion, 
globalization and environmental degradation that reflect predominantly ‘Western’ concerns 
and interests (Chandra 2011a; Sibal 2012a). As the External Affairs Minister in the BJP-led 
NDA Government, Yashwant Sinha (2002a) noted:      
 
“The dominant themes of the last century were issues such as colonialism, apartheid, and the Cold War. 
Countries pursued international relations through the prism of the East-West divide. This divide was 
aggravated by an ever widening North-South gap, with attendant political and economic tensions.  
The Cold War has now been consigned to the dustbin of history, colonialism has been eradicated, apart-
heid has been banished and the supremacy of democracy established in much of the world.” 
 
With the end of the cold war and the economic crisis questioning the utility of non-alignment 
(as a policy and a movement) and India’s socio-economic development model, India was 
plunged into an identity crisis. As the Congress politician Mani Shankar Aiyar (2012: 20) 
noted, “[t]he collapse of the Soviet Union changed the world for India […]”, confronting In-
dia with the essential question “[w]hat was to be the future of non-alignment in an unaligned 
world?”. It questioned India’s self-imagination as a ‘third force’ in world politics that stays 
away from the two power blocs, pursues an independent foreign policy, combines democracy 
with socialism and is a leader of the non-aligned and developing countries by depriving the 
discourse of its main ‘other’, the cold war, that served as a negative reference point for the 
articulation of India’s identity.   
While India’s non-aligned policy gave the country some global influence and importance dur-
ing the cold war, Indian polcy-makers saw their country’s status and leverage declining in the 
post-cold war era and found India increasingly isolated. Deploring that “[…] in the post-Cold 
War period India does not enjoy the same prestige and status and exercise the same influence 
in the comity of nations as it used to do before”, Muchkund Dubey (1998) argued that this 
declining prestige and influence “has come about primarily because we did not redeem the 
promise we held out after our independence, of becoming a strong, powerful and prosperous 
nation. We have remained mired in poverty and underdevelopment, whereas numerous others 
which were much lower down the ladder than us, have since forged ahead and left us far be-
hind. These countries naturally regard themselves as equal, if not superior, to India, and want 
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to play their rightful role in international affairs. Why should we then expect them automati-
cally to fall behind us?” For Dubey, this development also results from the triumph of the 
‘West’ and its political and economic values in the international system:  
 
“[B]ecause of the recent changes in the world – the ongoing process of globalisation, the triumph of the 
western world view and the extreme vulnerability of the economies of the vast majority of developing 
countries – these countries are not looking at the world the same way as we are doing. On many issues, 
their views coincide with those of the western countries. On several others, they are pressurised into 
echoing the western point of view. We are too large and too proud and self-respecting to succumb to 
other's pressure. At the same time, we are not strong enough to be able to stand alone and impose our 
will on others. This drives us frequently into isolation” (Dubey 1998).  
  
The global sedimentation of the ‘Western’ hegemonic project, that provided the discursive 
context in which India’s foreign policy discourse was articulated around the end of the cold 
war, made it increasingly difficult for the Nehruvian discourse to reproduce India’s identity, 
because the Western hegemonic discourse allocated India a low subject position in interna-
tional relations and pushed India to the margins of the world order. It tended to represent In-
dia as a poor, socially and economically backward and crisis-ridden developing country stuck 
by a low ‘Hindu rate’ of economic growth and numerous internal cleavages that threaten its 
survival as a united nation-state. For instance, hardly any ‘Western’ scholar or policy-maker 
in the early and mid-1990s spoke of India as a great power, emerging power or important ac-
tor in the world order, but mainly looked upon India through the prism of nuclear non-
proliferation and the conflict with Pakistan. With the fundamental tenets and presuppositions 
of Indian foreign policy in doubt, the Nehruvian foreign policy discourse thus increasingly 
failed to confer identity to India in the sense that political actors could not fully identify with 
the political project it has articulated anymore, thereby creating an identity crisis and forcing 
Indian policy-makers to act in order to recreate these structures.  
 
 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed India’s post-independence foreign policy and Nehruvianism as the 
hegemonic foreign policy discourse in that era. It showed how the discourse managed to forge 
a successful hegemonic project around the nodal point of non-alignment that could serve as a 
source of identification for various social forces in India. Non-alignment invoked broad, open 
and widely shared concepts such as freedom, independence and autonomy and promised a 
special role for India in world politics in recognition of India’s unique anti-colonial struggle 
and civilizational greatness. It struck a subtle balance between various societal demands and 
94 
 
interests and presented them as equivalent, thereby creating a relatively broad national con-
sensus and identity for a post-colonial state.  
Having discussed the evolution and main tenets of the Nehruvian foreign policy discourse, the 
chapter then framed the end of the cold war and India’s financial crisis, which is typically 
seen a turning point in India’s foreign policy, as a dislocatory moment that disrupted the 
hegemonic Nehruvian discourse and symbolized an Indian identity crisis. In the following 
chapters, we will examine the way how India’s political actors responded to this dislocation 
and thus how they attempted to re-structure the discursive order by engaging in a discursive 
struggle over the meaning and implications of this crisis and the new ‘structural context’ as 
well as seeking to (re-)hegemonize the political space through the defence, modification, con-
testation or replacement of the hegemonic project. The subsequent analysis will show that the 
Nehruvian foreign policy discourse was not overthrown and replaced by a counter-hegemonic 
discourse, but reinterpreted, modified and adapted to the seemingly new structural circum-
stances. The outcome of this gradual transformation process is the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.              
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6. Post-Nehruvianism: India’s Hegemonic Foreign Policy Discourse in the 
Post-Cold War Era    
 
Having discussed the dislocation of the hegemonic Nehruvian discourse, which has informed 
India’s post-independence foreign policy, in chapter 5, we will now investigate how India’s 
political actors responded to this dislocatory moment in India’s foreign policy discourse and 
sought to re-construct the discursive structure by engaging in a discursive struggle over the 
meaning and implications of the crisis and the new ‘structural circumstances’ and attempting 
to (re-)hegemonize the discursive space. In short, the meaning of the empty signifier world 
order had to be re-established. This chapter will show that the dislocated Nehruvian foreign 
policy discourse was not overthrown and replaced by a counter-hegemonic discourse, but de-
fended and reinterpreted, modified and adapted. This modified hegemonic foreign policy dis-
course is called ‘Post-Nehruvianism’ in this study. It embodies a particular understanding of 
world order and India’s role in it that is still inspired by the Nehruvian vision for India in 
world affairs. Post-Nehruvianism, as the prefix ‘post’ already suggests, draws on and re-
affirms but also goes beyond and partially contests the Nehruvian foreign policy discourse.  
The exact balance between this simultaneity of continuity and change is partially contentious 
in the discourse and thus the discourse encompasses both more ‘traditional’ and more ‘re-
mote’ Nehruvian articulations, which it seeks to harmonize. As a hegemonic discourse, Post-
Nehruvianism has forged a broad socio-historical project which integrates various social 
forces and their (conflicting) demands and interests. This means that there are occasionally 
tensions and contradictions within the discourse. No discourse can produce closure and fully 
fix meanings, but is always incomplete and vulnerable to the ‘surplus of meaning’ in the dis-
cursive field. However, the discourse has a core that holds it together: India is a great and ex-
ceptional agent in the world that pursues an independent, multi-aligned foreign policy, is 
guided by its enlightened self-interest, exercises strategic restraint, defends its sovereignty 
and struggles for a more equitable, just and peaceful world order.    
Given the end of the cold war and India’s growing economic, political and military power, a 
common assertion in contemporary studies on Indian foreign policy is that India has shifted 
from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ to a foreign policy driven by ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’ (see Cohen 
2002, Mohan 2004, Kapur 2006, Ganguly/Pardesi 2009, Ganguly 2010, Ogden 2011, Malone 
2012). Accordingly, India is “placing considerations of realpolitik and national security above 
its until recently dominant focus on liberal internationalism, morality and normative ap-
proaches to international politics”, thereby shaking off the “prism of the Third World and 
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anti-imperialism” (Mohan 2004: xix/7) through which Indian policy-makers used to look at 
global politics during the cold war era and instead started pursuing a foreign policy based on 
“practical geopolitical considerations” (Kapur 2006: 5) and economic self-interests (Malone 
2012: 257). “Having shed most of its ideological burden”, as Sumit Ganguly (2003/04) 
pointed out, “and adopted more pragmatic policies at home and abroad, India is in a position 
to move into the ranks of the major powers”. In doing so, India is said to increasingly behave 
like “a normal nation” (Mohan 2004: xix) and typical “rising power” (Pant 2009c), i.e. like a 
state that follows the imperatives of realist IR theory. 
While acknowledging changes in India’s post-cold war foreign policy, this study argues that 
this standard narrative, which claims that India has moved from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ to a 
foreign policy driven by ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’, tends to offer a rather simplistic account 
of Indian foreign policy. On the one hand, it largely fails to grasp and theoretically explicate 
the complexity, ruptures, tensions and continuities in India’s post-cold war foreign policy 
discourse. For instance, why a ‘realist’ and ‘pragmatic’ India tested nuclear weapons in 1998, 
but did not make its nuclear deterrent operational, or why Indian policy-makers are still very 
concerned – or even obsessed – about maintaining India’s independence and autonomy in 
world affairs and why India is regularly seen as a ‘spoiler’ or ‘obstructionist’ in international 
negotiations. On the other hand, this narrative often fails to provide a theoretically informed 
discussion of what ‘idealism’, ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’ actually signify in the Indian context, 
and seems to suggest that it is possible to formulate and follow a foreign policy ‘freed’ from 
any ideological burden. The present study, by contrast, seeks to show that the changes, conti-
nuities and apparent tensions in India’s contemporary foreign policy can better understood 
against the background of a (intensified) struggle for discursive hegemony provoked by the 
ultimate disruption of the erstwhile hegemonic Nehruvian discourse after the end of the cold 
war. This disruption symbolized, as we have seen, an Indian identity crisis and forced India’s 
political actors to re-construct the discursive order. The simultaneity of change and continuity, 
including the apparent tensions and contradictions, in India’s post-cold war foreign policy can, 
as this study argues, better be understood and explained as the outcome of the successful 
transformation and modification of the hegemonic Nehruvian foreign policy discourse.   
The first part of this chapter will show that the transformation process of India’s foreign pol-
icy has largely taken place within the framework of the Nehruvian discourse, i.e. the major 
political actors did not renounce and abandon Nehruvianism and its core element non-
alignment, but rather sought to re-interpret, re-fashion and adapt it to the – discursively con-
veyed – conditions and requirements of the post-cold war world. In the second part, the chap-
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ter will discuss the social logics that inform the Post-Nehruvian discourse and thus what the 
discourse takes to be the ‘reality’ of world order. It will show that the discourse articulates the 
social logics of state sovereignty, enlightened self-interest, non-violence, non-discrimination 
and international unity in diversity as the building blocks of world order. The third section of 
the chapter is devoted to the political logics invoked by the Post-Nehruvian discourse and thus 
sheds light on the temporal and spatial-political ‘others’ that serve as reference points for the 
articulations of meanings and identities in the discourse. In the fourth and final section, the 
chapter will deal with the fantasmatic logics of the Post-Nehruvian discourse by exposing and 
elaborating the ideological fantasies and myths underpinning the discourse, namely the narra-
tives of ‘Indian Greatness’ and ‘Indian Exceptionalism’. In doing so, the chapter will show 
that India’s foreign policy practices and its understanding of world order can be compre-
hended and explained as an interplay of these different logics which can thus serve as inter-
pretative framework for making sense of India’s post-cold war foreign policy.    
 
 
6.1 From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment: The Transformation of the Nehruvian 
Foreign Policy Discourse  
Responding to the dislocatory moment in India’s foreign policy discourse, India’s policy-
makers and leading government advisers did not turn away from the Nehruvian foreign policy 
discourse and non-alignment, but searched within the discourse for solutions to ‘repair’ the 
disrupted discursive order. This required, in particular, to fix the nodal point, around which 
the discourse was organized, and thus to find a new meaning or purpose for non-alignment in 
an ‘un-aligned’ world. Instead of contesting and replacing the Nehruvian discourse, the politi-
cal actors rather sought to re-interpret, supplement and refashion the discourse and its hall-
mark non-alignment for a globalist and unipolar world. As PM Manmohan Singh (2005a) 
noted:  
  
“while we remain faithful to the abiding principles of foreign policy laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru and 
followed consistently by our country since then during the past half a century and more, we are, never-
theless, alert to the compulsions imposed upon us by a rapidly transforming world order and we have 
the capacity, capability as a nation to respond successfully to the newly emerging challenges that con-
front us.” 
 
Talking about India’s response to “the emergence of the so-called unipolar world” and the 
changes in its foreign policy after the end of the cold war, the BJP politician and Minister of 
External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha (2002b), pointed out:    
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“India's foreign policy has deep roots. It's a policy which was enunciated even before we became an in-
dependent country. […] From time to time, the nuances of foreign policy have been undergoing a 
change but the basic thrust has remained more or less the same. […] We have had to adjust our policies 
to suit the requirement of these changes. […] At the same time, we have not diluted our commitment to 
the infrastructure of non-alignment. I personally believe that non-alignment is still a very relevant phi-
losophy in international relations because the basic thesis of non-alignment is that we should be able to 
follow an independent foreign policy.” 
 
Likewise, the senior Congress politician, Pranab Mukherjee (2008a), who served as Defence, 
External and Finance Minister in the UPA Government, underscored the continuing relevance 
of the Nehruvian foreign policy and non-alignment:   
 
“We have an independent foreign policy based on the principles of non-alignment laid down by our first 
Prime Minister. All successive governments of all political shades have adhered to these principles. We 
guard our strategic autonomy and stand by the principles of independence and freedom of action in ex-
ternal relations. This has, however, not prevented us from developing friendships and good relations 
with all the major countries. We believe this is the strength of our foreign policy. Friendship between 
India and any one strategic partner is not at the expense of relations with any third country or another 
strategic partner.” 
 
The role of non-alignment for dealing with the challenges of the post-cold war era is also 
highlighted by the Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran (2006): 
 
“The end of the Cold War, the accelerating process of globalization and the emergence of transnational 
challenges have become the defining features of contemporary international relations. India’s foreign 
policy has had to adapt to this rapidly changing international environment. […] While meeting these 
challenges, India has maintained a remarkable continuity in the fundamental tenets of its policy. The 
core of this continuity is to ensure autonomy in our decision making. It is to ensure independence of 
thought and action. This was and remains the essence of our adherence to the principle of Non-
Alignment. It is also the basis of our commitment to the Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence […].” 
 
Summarizing the task in front of Indian policy-makers and strategic thinkers after the end of 
the cold war, the policy analyst and civil servant K. Subrahmanyam, who is often seen as the 
doyen of India’s strategic community and national security debates (see Menon 2012a, Ogden 
2014a), noted: 
 
“While there is worldwide recognition that with the end of the Cold War and emergence of a unipolar 
system which is under pressure to be transformed into a polycentric one there is an imperative need to 
evolve a new flexible framework for foreign and security policies for major powers like India, large sec-
tions of this country’s political, bureaucratic, academic and media elite still find it difficult to free them-
selves from the shibboleths of the last three decades. Jawaharlal Nehru formulated nonalignment as the 
optimum security and foreign policy strategy for a country like India in a nuclear bipolar world. […]  
The essence of nonalignment was the freedom of exercising options on the basis of perceived national 
interests. […] A true Nehruvian should try to advance India’s national security and interest by adapting 
Nehru’s strategy for a bipolar world to one most appropriate for a polycentric world. This must neces-
sarily begin with a critical analysis of pluses and minuses of Nehruvian policy and more so of its deep 
frozen version in the decades that followed after his death” (Subrahmanyam 1999: viii/x) 
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In addition to K. Subrahmanyam, several proponents of a more ‘realist’ and ‘pragmatic’ for-
eign policy such as C. Raja Mohan (1999, 2004), Jaswant Singh (1999), Brajesh Mishra 
([2000] 2005), Jasjit Singh (2001a), Bharat Karnad (2002a), Sanjaya Baru (2006), G. Par-
thasarathy (2007a) or Shashi Tharoor (2012a) explicitly refer to Nehru and do not really ques-
tion the utility of non-alignment but rather the way how it was put into practice and, in the 
post-Nehru period, reduced to an ‘ideology’ or ‘mantra’ characterized by Third Worldism, 
anti-Westernism and moralism, thereby neglecting its (alleged) underlying rationality.
39
 This 
‘rationality’ was, as we have seen in chapter 5, to insulate India from the negative effects of 
the cold war and enable it to get the most from both superpowers. Likewise, the BJP, as the 
main political opponent of the Congress Party, has not directly contested Nehruvianism and 
non-alignment, when it has been in power from 1998-2004, but rather sought to present its 
foreign policy as a continuation of India’s post-independence foreign policy, coupled with 
some necessary adjustments to the ‘imperatives’ of a post-cold war world. As the BJP politi-
cian and Minister of State in the MEA, Vasundhara Raje, pointed out: “Independence of mind 
and autonomy of action as manifested in our abiding faith in the principle of Non-alignment 
has been the hallmark of our foreign policy as much with the first Indian Government headed 
by Late Shri Jawaharlal Nehru as with the present Government and no deviation is contem-
plated from these well articulated principles” (Lok Sabha Debates 1998a). Likewise, 
Yashwant Sinha (2002a) noted:   
 
“India's foreign policy has shown elements of both constancy and change over the last five decades. 
While we have preserved the basic principles that were enunciated by the founding fathers of the Re-
public, we have also crafted creative responses to the challenges of the post Cold War and the post 
globalisation world. This has been made possible, in large part, because on foreign policy and national 
security matters, our country has had a broad national consensus, cutting across all political divides, 
ever since independence.”  
 
Though the BJP also attempted to present itself as a political alternative to the Congress Party 
and occasionally invoked the counter-hegemonic Hyper-nationalist discourse
40
, it has not, as 
will become clear in the course of this study, transcended the Nehruvian discourse and re-
placed it by a new hegemonic project, but rather tried to achieve a change from within and has 
thus contributed to the successful transformation of the dislocated hegemonic Nehruvian dis-
course. This transformation was a very gradual process that came to a tentative ‘end’ in the 
course of the first tenure of the UPA Government (2004-2009), which re-affirmed and took 
                                                 
39
 While some might dismiss such references as mere rhetorical devices or strategies, the very fact that policy-
makers or analysts feel the need to develop their arguments against the background of Nehruvianism or non-
alignment and underscore their support for their ‘original’ rationale shows to what extent the discourse has be-
come sedimented in India and shapes the discursive practices of almost all relevant actors. 
40
 The Hyper-nationalist discourse will be discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
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further the political, economic and strategic changes initiated by previous governments, 
thereby contributing to the sedimentation of the (new) policy practices.   
Nehruvianism and non-alignment have predominantly, and even for oppositional political 
forces, served as the common reference point for making sense of the new structural circum-
stances and requirements of the post-cold war era. In other words, for recreating the dislo-
cated discursive structure, political actors largely drew on and re-fashioned the existent 
Nehruvian discourse. The processes of dislocation and transformation of the discourse have, 
however, not taken place within a discursive vacuum, but have been shaped by the global 
sedimentation of the ‘Western’ discursive hegemony which which articulates market econo-
my and liberal democracy as the universal and superior form of political and economic order 
and places the West at the centre of global politics. Thus, in the moment of dislocation, In-
dia’s political actors had no unlimited agency to re-structure the Nehruvian discourse and to 
re-define India’s role in the world order, but were also restricted by global discourses such as 
the discourses of globalization and unipolarity and the subject positions they articulated for 
India and other countries.  
Post-Nehruvianism, as the outcome of the transformation of the hegemonic foreign policy 
discourse, has shifted away from the ‘traditional’ Nehruvian discourse in two respects: first, it 
accommodated to the discourse of globalization (cf. Dixit 2001: 45; Vajpayee 2003b; Singh 
[M.] 2004a; Mukherjee 2005; Ahluwalia 2007b; Saran 2006) and largely abandoned the so-
cialist, state-directed economic policy. Hence, India initiated a gradual process of economic 
liberalization, including reducing restrictions of imports, a major liberalization of foreign di-
rect investments (FDI) and the introduction of greater competition in various sectors of the 
Indian economy (see Mukherji 2007b; Nayar 2007b). Though the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
endorses globalization and the economic reform agenda, the discourse still displays elements 
of the ‘traditional’ Nehruvian discourse such as self-reliance (swadeshi) and thus a certain 
ambivalence with regard to India’s response to the so-called ‘imperatives’ of globalization 
and the exact direction of India’s economic policy. Therefore, in justifying the economic re-
forms, Indian leaders and parties are drawing on core elements of the Nehruvian discourse 
such as swadeshi in an attempt to re-fashion them and link together different social demands 
and interests (see Government of India 1996, Congress Party 1999, BJP 2004).    
By affirming and incorporating the discourse of globalization, the political actors developed 
an increased awareness for economic interdependence and the need of a economic and politi-
cal re-engagement with the world, in particular with the U.S. and other emerging economies 
such as China, ASEAN, Brazil or South Africa. The necessity of a rapprochement towards the 
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United States was also imparted by the discourse of unipolarity that emerged after the end of 
the cold war and represented the U.S. as the sole, uncontested superpower in the international 
system (Dixit 1998a: 223; Sinha 2003a; Vajpayee 2003a; Mohan 2004: 56; Subrahmanyam 
2012b: 22-23). The global re-engagement, which has also affected the way how Indian pol-
icy-makers define India’s national interests and security, was also motivated by the desire to 
overcome India’s relative isolation after the end of the cold war and India’s ‘reduction’ to 
Pakistan’s South Asian rival. “South Asia had always been an inadequate framework”, as 
Brajesh Mishra ([2000] 2005: 19) noted, “for situating the Indian security paradigm. As India 
re-discovers its extended neighbourhood – Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and 
Southeast Asia – through greater economic, commercial and defence engagement, the role of 
a secular and democratic India as a factor of stability on the Asian continent becomes increas-
ingly apart”. In a way, this re-engagement with Asia and the world can be, as S.D. Muni and 
C. Raja Mohan note (2004: 313), represented as a return to Nehru’s activist and globalist for-
eign policy and his vision for India’s critical role for a resurgent and united Asia.  
Second, the Non-Aligned Movement has lost its central role in India’s foreign policy and is 
today rather seen as one political grouping among many (see Sibal 2003a, Singh [M.] 2009a, 
Krishna 2010, Tharoor 2012b). As Shyam Saran (2012a) notes, “non-alignment was a strat-
egy and not a dogma. Its relevance as a principle of our foreign policy must also be distin-
guished from the fate of the Non-Aligned Movement, which was specific to a binary Cold-
War construct that no longer exists”. And the foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit (1998b) adds:  
 
“Remaining nonaligned would always be a valid frame of reference for India's foreign policy because it 
implies a clear intention of retaining our freedom of options to take policy decisions according to our 
perceived interests. Remaining a NAM member or participant will only be relevant if the movement has 
a basic cohesion and a commonality of purpose and capability to work together for the collective inter-
ests of the developing countries. And that too within the basic framework of India's own interests. If this 
prospect is not there, the NAM need not be a sine quo non of our foreign policy.” 
 
Against this backdrop, non-alignment, the original nodal point of the Nehruvian discourse, 
was re-interpreted and re-fashioned as multi-alignment in the Post-Nehruvian discourse. Af-
firming that the prime objective of India’s foreign policy and non-alignment has always been 
to maintain India’s strategic autonomy, the discourse argues that this objective can today best 
be achieved if India aligns with all key actors (see Mohan 1999, Baru 2006, Mukherjee 2008b, 
Chellaney 2010b, Rao 2011a, Singh [M.] 2011, Menon 2012a, Saran 2012a; Tharoor 2012a). 
“By strategic autonomy”, as the former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal (2012b) notes, “India 
means friendly ties and mutually beneficial relations with all countries, with its own legiti-
mate – not purely selfish – interests primarily in mind”. As the BJP leader L.K. Advani 
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(2008a) notes affirmatively, this “omnidirectional foreign policy seeks to engage with all the 
major centres of power”. By forming various kinds of partnerships and issue-based networks, 
India, as the discourse maintains, can forge close political, economic and strategic relations 
with a wide range of partners to promote India’s national interests in a globalized world, 
while maintaining its strategic autonomy (Parthasarathy 2007a; Tharoor 2012a: 426-427). It 
allows preserving core, and widely shared principles of the traditional Nehruvian foreign pol-
icy, namely independence and freedom in decision-making, while giving the Indian political 
establishment greater room for manoeuvre to protect and promote India’s national interests. 
As the Minister of External Affairs Salman Khurshid explained:   
 
“We don’t like putting ourselves in a box anywhere. Frankly, the language that we used during the hey-
day of the NAM movement is today translated into a modern-day phrase that we use, which is strategic 
autonomy. We remain strategically autonomous. Remaining strategically autonomous is, we believe, the 
right moral thing to do. It may have specific advantages and disadvantages, given the situation in the 
world, but we do believe that our foreign policy has a huge element of moral principles built into it, and 
it is consistent with those moral principles that we don’t place ourselves in any group or any alliance 
that would be inimical to anybody else” (quoted in Suryanarayana 2013: 3-4). 
 
Likewise, the authors of the proposal for a new Indian grand strategy, ‘Non-Alignment 2.0’, 
note (Khilnani et al. 2012: iv/8):  
 
“Strategic autonomy has been the defining value and continuous goal of India’s international policy 
ever since the inception of the Republic. Defined initially in the terminology of NonAlignment, that 
value we believe continues to remain at the core of India’s global engagements even today, in a world 
that has changed drastically since the mid-twentieth century. The challenge is to renovate that value and 
goal for the twenty-first century – thereby enabling the continuous and cumulative pursuit of India’s in-
terests in a world at once full of uncertainty and of great opportunity. […] The core objective  of a stra-
tegic approach should be to give India maximum options in its relations with the outside world – that is, 
to enhance India’s strategic space and capacity for independent agency – which in turn will give it 
maximum options for its own internal development.” 
 
By shifting the nodal point from non-alignment to multi-alignment, the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course thus paved the way for India’s re-engagement of the world, while avoiding strategic 
entanglements and one-sided dependencies which could impede and thus threaten the deep-
seated desire and demand for the autonomy and independence of India’s decision making. 
Hence, while seeking closer ties with the United States and other major powers, India, how-
ever, may neither jeopardize its strategic autonomy and join an alliance-like relationship that 
threatens friendly and stable relations other states nor ignore the continuing importance of 
partnerships with other post-colonial and developing countries (Sinha 2003b; Baru 2006; 
Mukherjee 2008a; Sikri 2009: 277f.).  
As we will see in this chapter, India’s post-cold war foreign policy discourse has been organ-
ized around strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. Almost all major controversies and de-
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bates in Indian foreign policy (e.g. India’s nuclear tests, the nuclear agreement with the 
United States or India’s response to international crises such as Iran’s nuclear programme or 
the Iraq war) ultimately came down to the question whether India’s behaviour was in line 
with strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. The persistent importance of strategic auton-
omy in India’s foreign policy does not merely reflect some strategic calculations, but is a 
deep-seated orientation that derives from the way how the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse has 
articulated India’s national identity and is thus likely to remain a core element that circum-
scribes and conditions India’s foreign policy. It would thus be incorrect to represent the recur-
rent references to non-alignment or autonomy merely as popular sentiments or rhetoric, while 
India’s ‘real’ foreign policy has been moved away from these commitments. Rather, India’s 
foreign policy discourse has re-defined the purpose of non-alignment in a post-cold war world. 
What Indian policy-makers ‘really’ mean or want to achieve when referring to non-alignment 
or strategic autonomy does not need to concern us here; the very fact that policy-makers regu-
larly do so, regardless of which party they belong to, demonstrates that non-alignment, auton-
omy and independence still serve as main sources of identification and crucial elements for 
forging a political consensus in India – and are thus at the centre of the hegemonic Post-
Nehruvian discourse and the chain of equivalence it (re-)produced.   
To signify the transformation of the Nehruvian discourse, the Post-Nehruvian discourse in-
deed recurrently articulates a greater ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’ as cornerstones of India’s 
‘new’ outlook to the world in order to underscore that India is not circumscribed by a narrow 
understanding of non-alignment (any longer) but seeks to align with all to further its national 
interests. As PM Singh (2005b) noted, “international relations are ultimately power relations, 
based on realpolitik, not on sentiment. And howsoever, we may regret it, international rela-
tions are not a morality play”. And his national security adviser Shivshankar Menon (2012a) 
adds that India must “use realpolitik to influence the behaviour of your friends and enemies. 
That is precisely what successive Indian governments under Atal Behari Vajpayee and Man-
mohan Singh have done.” This, however, does not mean, as will become clear in the course of 
this study, that India has simply shifted from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ to ‘realism’ and ‘pragma-
tism’ or that India’s contemporary foreign policy can be adequately understood or explained 
with realist IR theory.  
The Post-Nehruvian discourse transcends such simplistic categorizations and consists of ele-
ments that can be subsumed under all these three labels. This also means that India has not 
simply given up its ‘moral’ or ‘ideological’ concerns such as non-violence or third world soli-
darity, but still seeks to strike a balance between its – discursively conveyed – values, inter-
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ests and the imperatives of world politics.
41
 In this respect, India’s contemporary foreign pol-
icy is not very different from the Nehruvian foreign policy, as even C. Raja Mohan and others 
who claim that India has shifted to ‘realism’ and ‘pragmatism’ concede, thereby partially un-
dermining their own argument. Exemplifying the problems linked to these categories, the re-
tired diplomat Chinmaya R. Gharekhan (2009: xvi-xvii) noted for instance: “By and large, the 
governments in New Delhi since the end of the Cold War have followed realistic and prag-
matic foreign policies. This is not to suggest that Mr Nehru was simply an idealist and fol-
lowed a strictly ‘principled’ foreign policy. […] Mrs Indira Gandhi was, if anything, even 
more pragmatic”. ‘Realism’ and ‘pragmatism’ are empty signifiers in the discourse, because 
they suggest a ‘rational’, ‘balanced’ and ‘practical’ foreign policy, but whose exact meaning 
remains rather nebulous whereby they can unite different social forces in a hegemonic project. 
What is considered ‘realistic’, ‘pragmatic’ or ‘common sense’ at a given point of time is al-
ways the product of a successful hegemonic articulation. In other words, in the course of the 
transformation of the hegemonic discourse, it was re-defined what it means to pursue a 
‘pragmatic’ or ‘realistic’ foreign policy. In this sense, the framing of neo-liberal economic 
reforms, for instance, as a ‘pragmatic’ policy reflects not only the discursive hegemony of the 
Post-Nehruvian discourse in India, but also the discursive hegemony of the ‘West’ and its 
liberal socio-historic project in world politics.     
Instead of framing India’s foreign policy through the simplistic categories of ‘realism’, 
‘pragmatism’ and ‘idealism’, which can ultimately describe the foreign policy of every coun-
try in the world, the subsequent analysis of the social, political and fantasmatic logics under-
pinning India’s hegemonic foreign policy discourse seeks to provide a more sophisticated and 
multi-dimensional explanatory narrative of the changes, continuities and apparent contradic-
tions in India’s contemporary foreign policy.   
 
 
6.2 The Social Logics of the Post-Nehruvian Discourse: The Pillars of World Order  
Having discussed the transformation and nodal point of the hegemonic discourse, the chapter 
will now look at the different social logics that inform Post-Nehruvianism and their embodi-
ment in India’s foreign policy practices. This allows us not only to illuminate what the dis-
course takes to be the ‘reality’ of world order, but also major events in India’s post-cold war 
                                                 
41
 In other words, there is no national interest, for instance, that exists independently of certain moral and ideo-
logical considerations and can be identified or assessed in a purely ‘rational’ or ‘objective’ way. In fact, the very 
notion of a national interest is already ideological, because it implies that states are ultimately relatively homog-
enous entities in which a common ‘national’ bond allows to transcend the different societal demands and inter-
ests and promote the interests of all. 
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foreign policy. The Post-Nehruvian discourse articulates five different social logics: state sov-
ereignty, enlightened self-interest, non-violence, non-discrimination and international unity in 
diversity. These different logics are interrelated and overlapping, but there exist also tensions 
between them.     
 
6.2.1 State Sovereignty   
The social logic of state sovereignty regards states as the main entities in world politics and 
draws a rather rigid line between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, thereby maintaining a particular or-
ganization of socio-political space. Given the absence of a higher authority which has the le-
gitimate monopoly on the use of force in the international system, states are ultimately them-
selves responsible for maintaining their security and interests (Sinha ([2002] 2007: 311; Singh 
[M.] 2009b). As the national security adviser Shivshankar Menon (2010a) noted: “The nation-
state is still the basic unit of international security. Sovereignty and territorial integrity remain 
the foundation of the international system, as do traditional security concerns and zero-sum 
competition between nation states”.  
On the other hand, states are also endowed with particular rights and privileges such as the 
principles of non-interference into internal affairs or self-determination. Accordingly, a for-
eign policy informed by this logic highlights and defends the independence of decision-
making and is reproduced through numerous ritualized practices such as diplomacy, border 
controls or the formally equal status of states in international organizations. State sovereignty 
is the most direct manifestation of strategic autonomy and has thus a special status in Indian 
foreign policy. As a result, major foreign policy events and debates always boil down to ques-
tions of national sovereignty. Responding to the opposition’s allegations that the Indo-U.S. 
nuclear agreement “would be mortgaging our independence of Foreign Policy”, as the BJP 
leader L.K. Advani claimed, and negatively “affect the country’s independent nuclear pro-
gramme”, thereby making India “a client State of the United States” and “dictating what In-
dia’s foreign policy should be” (Lok Sabha Debates 18 Dec 2006: 534/542-545),42 PM Singh 
(2008a) underscored: “There is nothing in this Agreement which will affect our strategic 
autonomy or our ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. I state categorically that our 
foreign policy will at all times be determined by our own assessment of our national interest. 
This has been true in the past and will be true in future regarding our relations with big pow-
ers as well as with our neighbours in West Asia, notably Iran, Iraq, Palestine and the Gulf 
                                                 
42
 In a similar way, the communist parties reproached the UPA Government for making India a “subordinate 
ally” (Karat 2008) of the United States and subjugating India’s foreign policy under U.S. imperialist interests 
(see Communist Party of India (M) et al. 2008).    
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countries.” The Congress and other oppositional parties launched similar attacks against the 
BJP-led NDA Government after it formed a strategic partnership with the United States in 
2000, claiming that the BJP, in the words of the Congress politician and later foreign minister 
K. Natwar Singh, “was taking the country straight into the US camp” (quoted in Times of 
India 2001a).
43
  
The social logic of state sovereignty suggests that India should be very cautious when enter-
ing into binding agreements and avoid, as far as possible, one-sided political, economic and 
strategic dependencies and entanglements. As PM Singh (2010a) notes, “India is too large a 
country to be boxed into any alliance or regional or sub-regional arrangements, whether trade, 
economic or political”. In a similar vein, Yashwant Singh defended and clarified the rap-
prochement of the BJP-led NDA Government towards the U.S. by saying that “we are too big, 
too great and too large a nation to be cowed down by anyone. We will not be cowed down. 
We will continue to follow our policies independently and according to our best judgement of 
our national interest” (Sinha 2003b: 132).  
For preserving the autonomy of India’s decision-making process, the logic asserts that India 
must seek to forge “well-rounded strategic relationships and partnerships with all the major 
powers” (Rao 2011a) and “never to define relations with any one country through the prism 
of any other country or regional equations or alliance systems” (Sibal 2003b: 79). Accord-
ingly, India has formed simultaneously strategic partnerships with the United States, Russia, 
China, Japan and the European Union (Subrahmanyam 2005: 551-552). By “creating mutu-
ally beneficial relationships of interdependence” (Baru 2013a: 37) with all these countries, 
India is maximizing its room for manoeuvre towards them and thus maintaining its foreign 
policy independence (Saran 2006; Mukherjee 2008b; Mohan 2009: 54). “It is important to 
have multiple choices”, as the former NSA Brajesh Mishra (2007) pointed out, “to be not de-
pendent on one source. Partnership with as many countries as possible must be India’s aim. 
Promiscuity in international relations is not only permissible but is most desirable. To have 
only one partner shows weakness not loyalty”. Similarly, the retired Indian diplomat Rajiv 
Sikri (2009: 277-278) notes with respect to India’s relations with the major powers: “In to-
day’s complicated and fast changing geo-political situation, India has wisely diversified its 
foreign policy options, but must retain flexibility in order to be able to pursue an independent 
foreign policy, on which there is an overwhelming national consensus”.  
                                                 
43
 Again, whether the opposition parties are really serious about this critique or only want to score points against 
the government is not our prime concern here, but the fact that all Indian opposition parties, unlike the political 
opposition in European states for instance, regularly attack the government on the grounds that it has compro-
mised the country’s independence and is not following India’s national interests but the dictates of an ‘external 
actor’.      
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Sovereignty and defence  
The strong adherence to the social logic of sovereignty has also implications for a state’s de-
fence policy. As the former Air Commodore and director of the government-funded Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Jasjit Singh (2013: 19) explains, “a sovereign na-
tion-state can only remain sovereign if it has the ability to defend its territorial integrity and 
its vital interests with all means at its disposal. This is what sovereignty is all about – in terms 
of both its domestic dimensions and its external dimensions in dealing with other states”. This, 
in turn, rules out military alliances: “India is not a member of any military alliance or strategic 
grouping”, as the Ministry of Defence (2003/04: 14) notes in its Annual Report, “nor is this 
consistent with our policies. India thus requires a certain independent deterrent capability”. As 
a result, India ultimately needs to rely on its own defence resources to safeguard its sover-
eignty and national interests. The social logic of state sovereignty was also activated in the 
context of India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998.44 Nuclear weapons were represented as the 
ultimate source of state sovereignty preserving the autonomy of India’s decision-making and 
its territorial integrity. As PM Vajpayee (2003c) noted, “India cannot be dependent on others 
for her security. Therefore, the first act of my Government five years ago was to make India, 
for her self-defence, a nuclear weapons state”. 
These concerns about potential infringements of Indian sovereignty further increased after the 
end of the cold war, given the discontinuation of the close strategic partnership with the So-
viet Union and the sedimentation of the ‘Western’ hegemony in the international system. As 
the BJP (2000 [1992]: 34) pointed out:  
 
“The post-cold war international relations are characterized by fluidity and turbulence. The international 
situation is yet to evolve into a settled pattern. But one fact is crystal clear. It is that the post-cold war 
world lacks a balanced power structure. This is inherently bad for the world because untrammelled 
power in the hands of one country or a group of countries with ideological similarity would inevitably 
lead to resurgence of hegemonic attitudes. Even today hegemonistic tendencies abound. The treatment 
meted out to the countries of the Third World by a group of powerful countries clearly violates a fun-
damental principle of international relations viz. the principle of sovereign equality of nations. They ex-
ert pressure openly on the countries of the third world to follow their philosophy and their political and 
economic models.” 
 
With the Western countries, particularly the United States, and a ‘co-opted’ Russia dominat-
ing the international political and economic agenda and institutions such as the UNSC, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, India and other developing countries 
were pressurized and forced into the ‘new world order’ through military interventions, sanc-
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 The development of India’s nuclear weapons programme and the decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 
can, as will become clear in the course of this study, not be explained by a single social logic but must be con-
ceptualized as a complex of interplay of various logics.   
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tions against human rights violations or structural adjustment policies (Dixit 1998a: 223; 
Sreenivasan 2003; Dubey 2013: 13/15-16). In particular, the new willingness of the major 
powers to interfere either through the UN or NATO into internal conflicts such as in the for-
mer Yugoslavia or Iraq was worrisome for India, “setting a dangerous precedent that cannot 
but cause concern to all nations who cherish their political sovereignty” and “representing a 
form of “unilateral action” that undermines international norms and institutions (BJP 2000: 
75).  
Against this backdrop, nuclear weapons were represented as the last instrument to safeguard 
India’s autonomy and independence, as argued by K. Subrahmanyam (2002: 63f./83):  
 
“The ability of the three nuclear weapons states, the United States, Britain, and France to devastate a 
nonnuclear-weapons state, Yugoslavia, while the other two nuclear-weapons states, Russia and China, 
could do nothing to stop it, reinforces the Indian case for pursuing a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. 
[…] Accompanying this high-technology campaign against a defenseless state in the name of some 
hypocritical universal morality, was the shrill international propaganda war conducted through the in-
ternational media to project a world of good versus evil. […] The issue before India is whether it wants 
to preserve its sovereignty won after a long freedom struggle, and whether it should try to develop one 
sixth of mankind economically, socially, politically, and technologically according to the democratic 
wishes of the Indian people without the threat of foreign intervention of the type we saw in Yugoslavia. 
[…] It was not accidental that the only countries that voiced strong protests against the bombing of 
Yugoslavia happened to be Russia, China, and India, all nuclear-weapons powers.” 
 
Non-interference into internal affairs 
In particular, Indian policy-makers were concerned about an internationalization of the 
Kashmir dispute which was, also due to alleged human rights violations, back on the interna-
tional agenda after the end of the cold war. Given a strong assertion of its sovereignty and a 
firm stand that there can be “no compromise on India’s unity and integrity” (MEA 2004b: 8), 
the Post-Nehruvian discourse still objects to interferences into the internal affairs of other 
states, even though it has endorsed the globalization discourse and the need of trans-border 
trade and commerce, regional economic integration and a peaceful environment for India’s 
own socio-economic development (Vajpayee 2002a: 499, Sinha 2003c; Baru 2006). Never-
theless, the logics firm stance on state sovereignty recurs repeatedly and the process of global-
ization is simultaneously represented as a challenge for Indian sovereignty ranging from 
transnational terrorist groups, which make use of new communication technologies and rec-
ognize no state boundaries (Anthony 2008) to foreign non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) operating in India and the presence of foreign capital jeopardizing India’s economic 
independence (Aiyar 2009: 189ff.; Dubey 2013: 15). Rejecting the notion that we are in a 
“post-Westphalian world in which globalisation has reduced classical identity of States as 
autonomous entities”, the foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai (2011) points out that “the nation 
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state remains the primary unit of international politics, and regional architecture cannot end 
competition among nation states”. The logic of state sovereignty also shapes the attitude of 
Indian governments towards ‘democracy promotion’ and the principle of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ (R2P). 
In spite of being the largest democracy in the world, the promotion of democracy has never 
been a priority in Indian foreign policy. As the secretary (East) in the Ministry of External 
Affairs, Anil Wadhwa (2014) notes, “though India is a robust practitioner of democratic plu-
ralism and religious moderation, we don’t believe in intrusive prescriptive diktats. On the 
contrary, we have always maintained and said that it is up to the people of the region to de-
cide the pace and the means to achieve those goals, keeping in mind their traditions and his-
tory. This is why we oppose armed conflict or external intervention as a way of resolving po-
litical issues in the region or elsewhere in the world”. However, India joined in 1999, under 
the BJP-led NDA Government, the Community of Democracies (CD), a multilateral platform 
that is committed to “work together to promote and strengthen democracy” across the world 
(Community of Democracies 2000). “This was a significant shift in India’s foreign policy”, as 
the retired Indian diplomat S.D. Muni (2009: v) pointed out, “as hitherto, India had not joined 
any international effort aimed at promoting and strengthening democracy as the desirable po-
litical system in any country”.  
While Indian governments recognized the shared commitment to democracy as an important 
source of leverage in forging closer relations with the United States and other ‘Western’ lib-
eral democracies, there were, at the same time, clear limits to India’s multilateral engagement 
in democracy promotion. According to C. Raja Mohan (2008: 29-30), “[t]o be sure, India rec-
ognized the value of sharing experiences and best practices but was not willing to inject more 
into the notion of democracy promotion. […] Thus, India went along with the United States 
on the Community of Democracy initiative, but it was not prepared to invest significant po-
litical or diplomatic energies into it”. As a result, India was neither willing to support the Cen-
tre for Asian democracy, proposed by the U.S. with clearly anti-China undertones, nor to as-
sume the leadership role in the CD offered by the Clinton Administration (ibid.: 29). In par-
ticular, the NDA Government underscored that India would never participate in a “crusade for 
the universalisation of democracy” (Sibal 2003a: 254) and forcibly export democracy to re-
luctant states. 
The succeeding UPA Government under Manmohan Singh followed a similarly nuanced ap-
proach. While openly endorsing democracy as “the natural order of political organization in 
today’s world” (Singh [M.] 2005c) and supporting the creation of the United Nations Democ-
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racy Fund (UNDEF) in 2005, whose stated objective is the provision of financial resources 
for building and strengthening democratic institutions and processes (UNDEF 2005), PM 
Singh (2005g) pointed out that India would only “help those countries which want that help. 
There is no imposition, there is no question of our, for example, being forced to be a partner 
in any act of aggression against any other country and there is no question that we will ever 
entertain even that sort of thought. […] If some countries want our help in managing their 
elections, in voter registration, in setting up an audit office in which we have great expertise, 
we would be providing that”. In line with this policy stance, Indian governments have largely 
refrained from supporting UN resolutions condemning the human rights situations in coun-
tries like Iran, North Korea or Myanmar and the imposition of sanctions (Sullivan 2013: 154-
155).  
Accordingly, Indian governments have also not fully endorsed the principle of the ‘responsi-
bility to protect’ and did not support military interventions in Syria or Libya. As Muchkund 
Dubey (2007: 175-176) asserts: 
 
“This extension of the mandate of the Security Council relating to the authorisation of military interven-
tion by it is not tenable in international law. The so-called norm of collective international ‘responsibil-
ity to protect’ is still under dispute. This norm is also susceptible to being used selectively and discrimi-
natory, depending upon the political convenience and national interest of the dominant nation or nations. 
[…] Moreover, judgements with regard to what constitutes a failed state or sovereign governments 
which have proved powerless or unwilling to protect, are bound to be subjective and under the influence 
of a variety of extraneous factors”.  
 
While Indian policy-makers were initially very sceptical of the principle of R2P, stressing that 
the United Nations, in the words of the Indian UN permanent representative, Nirupam Sen, 
“had not yet produced a common understanding of the concept in question, particularly in the 
context of national sovereignty” and is thus “lacking a legitimate mandate” (UNGA 2011: 9), 
the Indian government has, influenced by the developments in the Arab world and the civil 
war in Sri Lanka, cautiously shifted its position from 2009 onwards and acknowledged that 
the “responsibility to protect its population is one of the foremost responsibilities of every 
state” (Singh Puri 2009).  
Responding to the killings of thousand of Tamilian civilians by the Sri Lankan army in the 
final stages of the civil war, the Indian government deplored the “humanitarian situation” and 
reminded the Sri Lankan Government of its “responsibility to protect its own citizens”, but, at 
the same time, underscored that a solution of the conflict must “be achieved within the politi-
cal framework” of Sri Lanka and cannot be imposed from the outside. This indicates that the 
Post-Nehruvian discourse recognizes the first two pillars of R2P, namely that sovereignty 
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entails certain responsibilities and that there is a need for a “collective response by the inter-
national community to ensure that mass atrocities like genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes 
against humanity do not take place” (Singh Puri 2012). However, the discourse has not en-
dorsed the third pillar of R2P that encompasses coercive measures. This also reflects in In-
dia’s selective voting behaviour in the United Nations with respect to the crises in Libya and 
Syria, oscillating between the condemnation of human rights atrocities and its principal oppo-
sition against external interventions (Mohan 2011, Sibal 2013a; Singh Puri 2013).  
The way how the ‘responsibility to protect’ as well as ‘democracy promotion’ are framed by 
the Post-Nehruvian discourse cannot be entirely understood through the social logic of state 
sovereignty, but must also be seen in connection with the social logics of non-violence and 
the enlightened self-interest, which will be further discussed in the following sections of this 
chapter. While the social logic of non-violence includes a deep-seated scepticism of the pos-
sibility of military conflict resolutions, the logic of the enlightened self-interest suggests, inter 
alia, that all states are primarily driven by their national interests. Consequently, there is al-
ways the danger that states invoking R2P are influenced by narrow self-interests rather than 
humanitarian concerns and exploit the principle to undermine a state’s sovereignty. At the 
same time, a military intervention, regime change or democratic transition is also not neces-
sary in India’s interest. For example, given India’s dependency on oil and gas from the Mid-
dle East, the various interventions of ‘Western’ states and the turmoil in the Arab world had 
negative effects on India’s energy security (Menon 2011, 2013, Parthasarathy 2014).  
The balancing of the social logics of the enlightened self-interest and state sovereignty also 
shapes India’s policies towards its neighbours in South Asia. Outlining India’s regional policy, 
the former diplomat Achal Malhotra (2014) notes, 
 
“India adheres to its benign and noble policy of non-interference into internal affairs of other countries 
in the region. However, if an act – innocent or deliberate – by any country has the potential of imping-
ing upon India’s national interests, India does not hesitate in quick and timely intervention. Mind it: in-
tervention is qualitatively different from interference, particularly when the request for intervention is 
made by the country concerned […] India has endeavoured to deal with the government-of-the-day, be 
it a democracy, monarchy or military dictatorship, insisting that the choice of the form of government is 
best left to the people of the country concerned. India does not believe in exporting democracy but does 
not hesitate in promoting democracy wherever potential exists.” 
 
While the Post-Nehruvian discourse articulates a sovereignty-oriented foreign policy on the 
global level, which largely rules out interventions into the internal affairs of other states, its 
commitment to the sovereign equality of states is less persistent in India’s direct neighbour-
hood, where Indian governments are more inclined to interfere when India’s interests suggest 
so. Given the conviction that India is the pre-eminent power in South Asia and that other 
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states must acknowledge India’s special status in the region, the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
enunciates the expectation that the smaller states respect India’s national interests and security 
concerns and, for instance, do not allow a military presence of an external power such as 
China in South Asia (cf. Kumar 2007, Sikri 2009, Swaraj 2010). This also affects India’s en-
gagement in democracy promotion in the region. As the Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran 
(2005) notes:   
 
“As a flourishing democracy, India would certainly welcome more democracy in our neighbourhood, 
but that too is something that we may encourage and promote; it is not something that we can impose 
upon others. While democracy remains India’s abiding conviction, the importance of our neighbour-
hood requires that we remain engaged with whichever government is exercising authority in any coun-
try in our neighbourhood.” 
 
Accordingly, Indian governments have largely supported the development or maintenance of 
democratic practices in Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives by providing financial resources and 
assistance in capacity building or mediating between conflict parties as during the civil war in 
Nepal as long as it had no adverse effect on India’s national interests and security concerns. In 
Myanmar, by contrast, these national interests and security concerns, namely energy security, 
the North-eastern separatist movements using Myanmar as a safe heaven and China’s growing 
influence in Myanmar, meant that India abandoned the open endorsement of the democratic 
forces in the 1990s and began to cooperate with the military junta. Consequently, Indian gov-
ernments largely refrained from openly criticizing the regime – for instance, after the junta’s 
brutal crackdown of the protests by Buddhist monks in 2007 – and opposed sanctions or ex-
ternal pressure (Tharoor 2012a: 111, The Hindu 2007; Mohan 2008: 36ff.). 
 
6.2.2 Enlightened Self-Interest  
The social logic of the enlightened self-interest acknowledges that world politics is ultimately 
competitive and driven by the self-interests of states. All states attempt to maximize their own 
interests and thus India too, as PM Singh (2006d) points out, must be guided by its “enlight-
ened national interest”. What makes this social logic to talk of the enlightened self-interest is 
the conviction that the pursuit of national self-interest can and must be combined with a 
commitment to fundamental values and the broader concerns of humanity. This “realism-
plus” recognizes the need for normative concerns and principles to find cooperative solutions 
to common challenges such as war and peace (Menon 2012a). 
The Post-Nehruvian discourse represents India as a developing country which has limited 
power resources and is still marginalized in several international decision-making bodies such 
as the UNSC, the IMF or the World Bank. Therefore, India cannot necessarily rely on a sup-
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portive international environment that shares its interests or concerns, but is ultimately self-
responsible for safeguarding and, if necessary, defending its national interest in interactions 
with other countries, international organizations or in international negotiations. As Much-
kund Dubey (2013: 1) notes, “[t]he fundamental purpose of India’s foreign policy – and for 
that matter of any other nation’s – is to promote its national interest. […] In the hierarchy of 
national interests, security occupies the preeminent position”. According to External Affairs 
Minister Pranab Mukherjee (2007a), “concern for the security of a nation is inherent in the 
very concept of a nation-state. National security implies the creation of national and interna-
tional political conditions favourable to the protection and furtherance of vital national inter-
ests. The core strength of a nation lies in its ability to defend itself and maintain its freedom to 
employ elements of its national power to further its vital interests”. This poses a particular 
challenge for India, because, as the Ministry of Defence (2009/10: 9) highlights in its annual 
report: “Few countries of the world face the range of security concerns that India faces today”.   
 
National security  
After the end of the cold war in particular, India’s foreign policy discourse did not share the 
‘Western’ euphoria of a ‘new world order’, but spoke of a phase of uncertainty in which In-
dia’s “security environment also deteriorated” (Vajpayee 2003a: 196) in a world “dominated 
by the industrially and technologically advanced countries led by the United States”, whose 
first objective “would be to create an international political system in which states and civil 
societies would be structured on the basis of political and economic terms of reference ac-
ceptable to the US and those world powers which would be responsive to their interests uni-
polar world” (Dixit 1998c). In addition, the discourse articulated concerns “about the nuclear 
environment in India’s neighbourhood” (Government of India 1998).  
Invoking the counter-hegemonic Hyper-nationalist discourse, the BJP-led NDA government 
sought to represent “national security considerations” (Vajpayee 1998a), in particular the 
“collaborated threat” posed by Pakistan and China (Fernandes 1998), as the prime rationale 
for India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Though the Hyper-nationalist discourse shortly surfaced in 
1998, as will be shown in chapter 7 in greater detail, it did not hold sway and manage to re-
place the dislocated Nehruvian discourse. While the political opposition unanimously rejected 
the articulation of the collaborative Sino-Pakistani threat as the prime motivation for the nu-
clear tests (see Lok Sabha Debates 1998a, Lok Sabha Debates 1998b), the NDA Government 
soon moved away from its confrontational rhetoric and sought to re-engage China and Paki-
stan. It also framed the nuclear tests, in a more traditional Nehruvian sense, as a response to 
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the “nuclear apartheid” (Singh [Jasw.] 1998) of a discriminatory global nuclear order and a 
demonstration of India’s technological and political prowess. As a result, the NDA Govern-
ment did not show any urgency to make India’s nuclear deterrent operational, but adopted a 
memorandum on no further nuclear tests and declared that it would continue to push for the 
global elimination of nuclear weapons (Vajpayee 1998b).  
Against the backdrop of India’s economic liberalization, which led to high economic growth 
rates and an opening to the world and the gradual improvement of the relations with the 
United States and other major powers in the subsequent years, the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
has articulated a more optimistic outlook on the global security environment (Singh [M.] 
2004b; Mohan 2005: 32ff.; Mukherjee 2007). Highlighting the opportunities and challenges 
of the post-cold war era for India, the foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon (2009) noted:  
 
“The true realization of our foreign policy potential had to wait for the end of the bipolar world in 1989 
and our economic reform policies, opening up the Indian economy to the world. […] The post Cold War 
external environment of a globalizing world, without rival political alliances, gave India the opportunity 
to improve relations with all the major powers. The risk of a direct conflict between two or more major 
powers had also diminished due to the interdependence created by globalization. […] Paradoxically, 
some of the same forces of globalization – the evolution of technology, the mobility of capital and so on 
– which have led to the decline or collapse of the Westphalian state order are also the source of our 
greatest dangers.[...] Looking ahead, the real factors of risk that threaten systemic stability come from 
larger, global issues like terrorism, energy security and environmental and climate change. With global-
ization and the spread of technology, threats have also globalised and now span borders.” 
 
While the Post-Nehruvian discourse views the global security environment in more favour-
able way, it represents India’s regional security environment still in more pessimistic terms. 
Elaborating on India’s “dangerous neighbourhood” and “peculiar security challenges” in the 
21
st
 century, Pranab Mukherjee (2005) pointed out that “India is located at the centre of an arc 
of fundamentalist activism, terrorism and political instability” and “has, since independence, 
faced aggression and conflicts with its two largest neighbours”, Pakistan and China.  
For the Post-Nehruvian discourse, Pakistan is India’s prime and most immediate external se-
curity challenge. Given Pakistan’s Indian-centric foreign and defence policies, the unresolved 
Kashmir dispute and a history of aggressions, the relationship between the two South Asian 
neighbours is fraught with mutual mistrust and hostility (Dixit 2001: 44; MOD 2008/09: 5; 
Dahiya 2012: 75). As Muchkund Dubey (2013: 39) notes: 
 
“India faces a direct and immediate threat to its security from Pakistan. Pakistan has sought, and to a 
large measure, achieved parity with India in its military build-up. Its armed forces are built, mobilized, 
trained and oriented to fight a war against India. Successive Pakistani governments have systematically 
depicted India as the enemy country and carried out a vicious propaganda against it. Pakistan has fought 
three wars against India and has, for several years, been waging a proxy war against it in the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has consistently reiterated its claim over Kashmir and has never given up 
the option of going to war against India in order to take possession of this territory. Pakistan has estab-
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lished near parity with India even in the acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them. 
The latest reports indicate that it has, in fact, an edge over India in building a nuclear arsenal. […] Paki-
stan has been harbouring, training, arming and otherwise assisting terrorist groups in its territory for car-
rying out terrorist activities not only in Jammu and Kashmir, but also in other parts of India.” 
 
The threat Pakistan poses to India today derives not primarily from its conventional and nu-
clear capabilities, but from the army’s tolerating and support of Islamic fundamentalist groups 
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, the proxy war it wages against India and the increasing fragility of 
its state institutions. The Pakistani Army and the use of terrorism as an instrument of state 
policy are framed as the main obstacles for a normalization of the bilateral relations in the 
discourse (Singh [M.] 2009b; Subrahmanyam 2012b: 19; Tharoor 2012a: 27ff.).  
China is represented by the Post-Nehruvian discourse less as a direct security threat, but 
rather as a long-term security challenge for India. This strategic challenge emanates mainly 
from the still unresolved border dispute, China’s growing military capabilities and the over-
lapping ‘strategic space’ of both countries (Kapoor 2008; Mehta [S.] 2009; Swaraj 2011). 
Though recognizing competitive elements and a degree of uncertainty in the Sino-Indian rela-
tions, the Post-Nehruvian discourse believes that China is, unlike Pakistan, more willing to 
normalize and stabilize the bilateral relationship with India and thus no immediate danger 
(Raghunath 2007; Saran 2009; Rao 2011b; Khurshid 2012; Menon 2012b). As External Af-
fairs Minister S.M. Krishna (2010) pointed out, “[the] Government of India does not view 
China or China’s development as a threat. That said, however, we recognize that cooperation 
and competition can overlap, as it is not possible to have a perfect congruence of interests 
between two nations as vast and diverse as India and China. Such competition or lack of co-
operation must not be misunderstood as antagonism”.  
Like the traditional Nehruvian discourse, the Post-Nehruvian discourse articulates a hybrid 
understanding of security that both incorporates and transcends mere physical security by 
making nation-building in the broadest sense the prime national security objective. As a rela-
tively poor, post-colonial state with unsettled borders and a tremendous ethnic, religious, lin-
guist and social diversity, India’s main security concerns have thus been and continue to be 
socio-economic development, internal cohesion and integrity, food security and energy secu-
rity. The open or weak borders with its smaller neighbours, resulting in (legal and illegal) mi-
gration as well as spill-over effects of political turmoil, and the more recent incorporation of 
non-traditional security issues such as environmental or human security into the academic and 
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political discourse of security in the West
45
 have further substantiated India’s hybrid under-
standing of security (Mishra 2003a; Mukherjee 2005; Kak 2010).  
The Post-Nehruvian discourse also moved away from an understanding of national security 
that is centred on territorial defence and confined to South Asia to an understanding of na-
tional security that underscores the defence of India’s economic, political and strategic inter-
ests in its wider neighbourhood. “India’s parameters of security concerns”, as External Affairs 
Minister Jaswant Singh (2000) noted, “clearly extend beyond confines of the convenient al-
beit questionable geographical definition of South Asia […] given its size, geographic alloca-
tion, trade links and the EEZ, India’s security environment and therefore potential concerns 
range from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca in the West”. In a way, this re-
engagement of Asia can be, as S.D. Muni and C. Raja Mohan note (2004: 313), seen as a re-
turn to and realization of “Nehru’s vision of a resurgent Asia and India’s critical engagement 
in reshaping its destiny”. It found expression in the ‘Look East’ Policy that was initiated by 
the Rao Government in the early 1990s and taken up by subsequent governments to deepen 
India’s economic, political and strategic ties with Southeast Asia, East Asia and Oceania, and 
the extended neighbourhood concept, which was launched by the BJP-led NDA Government 
and led to numerous bilateral and plurilateral initiatives in the respective regions. 
Outlining India’s “enlightened self-interest”, the MEA (2008/09: 1) states:  
 
“The primary objective of India’s foreign policy is to promote and maintain a peaceful and stable exter-
nal environment in which the domestic tasks of inclusive economic development and poverty alleviation 
can progress rapidly and without obstacles. Given the high priority attached by the Government of India 
to socio-economic development, India has a vital stake in a supportive external environment both in our 
region and globally. India, therefore, seeks a peaceful periphery and works for good neighbourly rela-
tions in its extended neighbourhood. India’s foreign policy also recognizes that the issues that are cru-
cial to India’s transformation are global and require global cooperative solutions – issues such as cli-
mate change and energy and food security”. 
 
On the basis of this discursive construction of ‘national security’ and the ‘national interest’, 
India’s foreign policy must give priority to the goal of comprehensive national development 
that, in turn, requires a peaceful environment, high and inclusive economic growth and coop-
erative relations with all major economies, access to technologies as well as energy and to 
promote trade. In addition, India must maintain and strengthen its pluralist-secular democracy 
and its strategic autonomy allowing India to pursue its national interests (see Baru 2006, 
Mohan 2004, Mukherjee 2008b, Kumar/Kumar 2010, Rao 2011a, Khilnani et al. 2012, Singh 
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 Elaborating on India’s conception of security and the recent broadening and deepening of security in the West, 
Kapil Kak (2010: 385) points out: “Jawaharlal Nehru enunciated the concept of comprehensive security nearly 
six decades before Barry Buzan and others of the Copenhagen School in 1983 and argued for the inclusion of 
non-military, societal, economic and environmental issues”. 
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[Jasj.] 2013). Endorsing Nehru’s conviction, made after India’s independence, that 
“[u]ltimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy” (Nehru [1947] 1961: 24), 
PM Singh, in particular, has stressed the crucial link between India’s development and foreign 
policy: “ever since India became independent the foremost task before our country has been 
to accelerate the pace of social and economic development” (Singh [M.] 2008b). As a result, 
there is an “intrinsic link between our foreign policy and the economic aspirations of our peo-
ple” (Singh [M.] 2013a).  
 
Economic liberalization  
Though the discourse views economic development as India’s major national challenge, it 
remains ambiguous about India’s exact economic policy. While the globalization discourse 
was incorporated into Post-Nehruvianism and there was a shift away from the socialist, state-
directed economic policy pursued by Nehru and his successors, elements of traditional 
Nehruvianism such as swadeshi, economic planning and the preference for small businesses 
still figure in the discourse. For the Congress politician and more traditional Nehruvian, Mani 
Shankar Aiyar, for instance, globalization is less an opportunity for India, but a challenge un-
dermining India’s economic self-reliance and putting pressure on India’s small businesses and 
Indian farmers (Aiyar 2009: 14ff.). Likewise, the benefits of the liberal economic reforms are 
contested, with critics such as Aiyar questioning the alleged ‘trickle down’ effect of the eco-
nomic liberalization, claimed by the supporters of the reforms (see Mohan 2004, Rasgotra 
2005, Baru 2006, Ahluwalia 2007b) by highlighting growing internal social disparities and 
India’s continued poor performance in the UN Development Report (Aiyar 2009: 5/247f.).  
Against this backdrop, the Post-Nehruvian discourse is characterized by a tension between the 
endorsement and promotion of economic liberalization and a plea for human development, 
protecting Indian farmers and (small) businesses and avoiding a further increase of social ine-
quality. This division can be found across the party spectrum and also within both the Con-
gress Party and the BJP, resulting in the respective opposition party often refusing further 
economic reforms that it has itself propagated and implemented when in power. Indian gov-
ernments try to reconcile both positions by pursuing a policy of gradual but restrictive liber-
alization and subsidized development programmes. The Congress Party (2004), for instance, 
promised in its election manifesto that it will be “combining sustainable economic growth 
with social justice, and marrying economic liberalization to social liberalism”.   
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Enlightening the national interest  
While the social logic of the enlightened self-interest requires that “India's national interest 
must be protected to the fullest possible extent” (Singh [M.] 2008b), it takes into account the 
broader interests of humanity and core national values that stem from India’s civilizational 
history and independence struggle such as anti-imperialism, anti-racism, pluralism or non-
violence (Ahamed 2013, Menon 2012a, Singh [M.] 2013), since the pursuit of narrow self-
interests and power politics would have devastating consequences for international peace, 
cooperation and progress. As EAM Salman Khurshid (2012a) noted in this respect:   
 
“It is true that international relations are ultimately about your own welfare and it is about your own in-
terest. But that same interest can be an enlightened self interest or it can be a narrow self interest. And I 
do believe that in spite of the changing balance between principles and pragmatism, India’s approach of 
enlightened self interest survives. Not only does it survive but I believe that […] a reaffirmation of an 
enlightened self interest for India, something that was given to us or articulated for us for the first time 
by our first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who in fact very categorically said that if these principles 
were organised in the mutual relations of all countries, then indeed there would hardly be any conflict 
and certainly no war”. 
 
In a similar vein, K. Subrahmanyam (1999: 20) argues: “So long as nation-states are units in 
the international community, national interest will be the driving force of national policies. 
But unbridled pursuit of national interest at the expense of the interest of other nations in to-
day’s world is bound to lead to very adverse, counter-productive results”. The notion of the 
enlightened national interest thus suggests that every country is compelled to safeguard its 
own interests, but, in doing so, it should try not to affect the core national interests of other 
states or global peace, justice and security adversely. In a globalized and interdependent world, 
it is believed that countries are no longer able to dismiss the interests of other states or the 
international community entirely, but must share – according to their respective capabilities – 
their burden in addressing common challenges (Rasgotra 2007: 17; Sibal 2012b). Highlight-
ing the relationship between the national interest and international responsibility, foreign sec-
retary Nirupama Rao (2010a) explains:  
 
“Responses to the challenges we face are shaped and calibrated by the imperatives of the nation’s inter-
est, first and last. At the same time, with power comes ever increasing responsibility – responsibility in 
weighing every move we make and positions we take with the realization that India is one of the key 
players on the global stage today and will be called upon increasingly to deploy its manifest strengths in 
the interest of global peace and development. […] For instance, there is growing realization of the im-
portance of preserving the ‘Global Commons’ – Space, Ocean, Air, and Cyber Space. With its size, 
technological capabilities, and standing as a responsible country, India is recognized as an important 
stakeholder and partner in these processes”. 
 
In addition, as Rajiv Sikri (2009: 259/298) notes, “India can and must play its role as con-
science-keeper of the world” acknowledging that “morality has a role in world affairs” and 
119 
 
assuming the responsibility to promote a more just and peaceful world order. For the Post-
Nehruvian discourse, military might or the use of force are not the key determinants for pro-
moting national interests or increasing India’s influence in the world. This requires rather that 
India has a well-run, prospering economy, realizes its development aspirations and stands for 
something more than its pure self-interests, whereby India is endowed with legitimacy and 
authority in the world order (Sinha 2004; Singh Mehta 2007: 73; Mukherjee 2007b; Krishna 
2009: 349; Khilnani et al. 2012: iv).  
For instance, India should assume the responsibility for safeguarding the interests of fellow 
developing countries in international organizations and negotiations and further South-South 
cooperation (see Sinha 2003d: 86-87; Krishna 2011; Menon 2011; Dubey 2013: 2-3). This 
belief in shared interests, experiences and values with other developing countries also entails 
that India, despite its democratic system of government, does not necessarily side with other 
(Western) democracies and opposes prescriptive policies. Though the importance of ‘Third 
World Solidarity’ has declined in the Post-Nehruvian discourse (Bajpai 2007: 83/88; Mohan 
2013: 35), it still figures in India’s foreign policy (Sinha 2004; Khurshid 2013). While India 
should regard the Global South as its “natural constituency” (Baru 2006; Sikri 2009) to in-
crease its global leverage and opt for multilateral policies, it should neither treat ‘Third World 
Solidarity’ nor multilateralism as an end in itself and neglect its own interests (Rao 2010a; 
Tharoor 2012a: 14-15). Thus, the notion of the enlightened self-interest implies that India 
needs to strike a balance between its values and interests. Accordingly, India must, if core 
national interests are involved, deal with authoritarian regimes such as Myanmar or reconcile 
its close defence ties with Israel and the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership with its membership 
in the NAM and its close relationship with Iran. For example, when the United States and 
other countries saw clear evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and pressed in the 
IAEA for referring Iran’s file to the UNSC in 2005, India voted after some hesitation against 
Iran in the IAEA, accommodating India’s quest to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and 
regional instability in West Asia, its traditionally close ties with Iran and the importance of 
the strategic partnership with the U.S., with which India negotiated the nuclear agreement at 
that time (Subrahmanyam 2005; Singh [M.] 2009b; Tewari 2010; Indian Express 2013). 
In terms of the means to promote India’s enlightened self-interests, Shivshankar Menon 
(2013b) noted: “We seem to use multilateralism for our values and bilateralism for our inter-
ests”. This rather sceptical view on multilateralism derives from the insight that all states pri-
marily promote their self-interests and is underscored by India’s past experiences with multi-
lateralism:  
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“India is still paying a price for having gone to the U.N. on the Kashmir question after the Partition and 
Independence. India rushed again to the U.N. seeking a disarmament treaty following China's first nu-
clear test in 1964; it got, instead, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that targeted New Delhi. As it 
tried to end one of the world's biggest genocides in East Pakistan in 1971, India got little support at the 
U.N. When it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the U.N. in 1996, India found it-
self in virtual isolation. After testing nuclear weapons in 1998 and declaring itself a nuclear weapons 
power, India became the subject of the unanimous UNSC Resolution 1172 (June 1998) that calls on 
New Delhi to give up its nuclear and missile programmes. The contradiction between India's eager sup-
port to multilateralism and its immediate security requirements can no longer be hidden” (Mohan 2002). 
 
Against this backdrop, Indian governments are not willing, for instance, to accept ‘third party’ 
interference or an internationalization of the Kashmir dispute, but assert that “bilateral dia-
logue, in accordance with the Simla Agreement, reiterated in the Lahore Declaration, is the 
only way to address all bilateral issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of 
J&K” (MEA 2004: 4). “The essence of bilateralism”, as the Congress politician Kapil Sibal 
(1999) explicates, “is the freedom of sovereign nations to decide when to negotiate and the 
parameters in relation thereto. Under what conditions India and Pakistan agree to resume bi-
lateral talks will entirely depend on the capacity of Pakistan to create an atmosphere in which 
India will be convinced of Pakistan's sincerity to make bona fide attempts to resolve out-
standing bilateral issues”. Though Indian governments have, in the course of the rapproche-
ment with the U.S., welcomed Washington’s pressure on Pakistan to end its Kargil misadven-
ture and end its sponsorship of terrorist groups, they continue to rule out the United States as a 
mediator in the conflict or any external pressure to resume dialogue with Pakistan (The Hindu 
1999). As Yashwant Sinha (2002b) noted: “The role of the outsiders today is confined only to 
a discussion on cross-border terrorism. We are not discussing any other issue with them. Our 
firm stand that all the issues between India and Pakistan should be settled through bilateral 
discussion remains totally undiluted”.  
While Indian governments were less willing to form close bilateral ties with major powers 
during the cold war and often sought to promote India’s values and interests through the 
NAM, G77 or the UN, the Post-Nehruvian discourse has reversed this trend and discovered 
the utility of close bilateral relations with major powers such as the U.S. or Japan if it suits 
India’s interests. At the same time, the discourse acknowledges the compulsions of globaliza-
tion and interdependence and thus the need for international cooperation to tackle common 
challenges (Mukherjee 2007b, Subrahmanyam 2010, Mohan 2013). In particular, in a way of 
bridging bilateralism and multilateralism, the discourse recognizes the utility of plurilateral-
ism and formed or joined issue-specific networks with like-minded countries such as BRICS, 
IBSA or BASIC to strengthen India’s bargaining power and promote its interests (Saran 2013: 
154), not the least because the discourse assumes that “[t]he importance of formal global gov-
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ernance structures […] is likely to diminish whereas that of informal structures […] will 
grow” (Kumar/Kumar 2010: 14).  
The logic of the enlightened national interest also implies that India is inclined to act unilater-
ally and is very reluctant to enter into international commitments if its core national interests 
are affected, e.g. socio-economic development or strategic autonomy. While taking interna-
tional treaty obligations very seriously, India’s threshold for joining such agreements is very 
high. Indian governments will in particular adopt unilateral actions or a very tough negotia-
tion stance if there is a convergence between India’s core national interests and values. This 
applies particularly to climate and trade negotiations and the global nuclear regime, where 
India’s development imperatives and quest for autonomy, respectively, converge with its aspi-
rations for global justice and equality, embodied by the social logic of non-discrimination 
discussed later. Even when facing strong international pressure or isolation, India is in these 
cases often not willing to yield and follows the practice of passive resistance (satyagraha)
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by opting for staying out of treaties it conceives as discriminatory such as the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  
 
6.2.3 Non-violence 
The social logic of non-violence (ahimsa) is a strong principle for the conduct of inter-state 
relations. It is predicated on the general belief that international conflicts cannot be success-
fully solved through the use of force but should be tackled through dialogue, negotiations, 
growing economic interactions and people-to-people contacts. The commitment to non-
violence, which has already informed the traditional Nehruvian discourse, is closely inter-
twined with India’s peaceful struggle for independence led by Mahatma Gandhi. As EAM 
Salman Khurshid (2012) notes:    
 
“The world has known innumerable greats who won celebrated military victories. However, there is 
only one person who won the world's greatest battles for emancipation and empowerment not by wag-
ing war but by waging peace. Mahatma Gandhi's arsenal included no arms and ammunition, but only 
‘truth force’ or satgyagraha, which he described as, ‘a force born of truth and the love of nonviolence’, 
his moral equivalent for a war. […] It is true that the world of today is vastly different from the world 
that Mahatma Gandhi lived in. But conflict and inequality continue to be an inevitable part of the hu-
man condition. Mahatma Gandhi’s greatest lesson to the world was that this need not be destructively so. 
Conflicts can be resolved and inequalities can be contained. And, worthy means are needed for achiev-
ing worthy ends. The Gandhian way is a real, live option, an option that informs and illuminates. We 
must have the courage and strength of mind to follow in his footsteps.”47 
 
                                                 
46
 Satyagraha was also propagated and practised by India’s independence movement under the leadership of 
Mahatma Ghandi against British colonial rule.  
47
 See for a discussion of Gandhi’s political thought on ahimsa and satyagraha: Iyer 2000 and Jain 2011.   
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The social logic of non-violence denies neither the existence of the reality of conflicts nor the 
continuing relevance of military force in international relations, but the inevitability of vio-
lence and its utility for solving conflicts (Menon 2011b). There are thus no permanent or natu-
ral enemies. Rather, relations between adversaries can be transformed by accommodating and 
being sensitive to each others’ core interests and concerns. In contrast to military conflict 
resolutions, the “resolution of disputes through peaceful means and dialogue […] advocates 
the need for concessions and compromise from both sides in any dispute” (Sinha 2003e: 66) 
and “since the resolution of the dispute is by mutual consent, often arrived at after a kind of 
bargaining that may involve elements of give and take, there is a greater probability of the 
parties carrying our the agreement faithfully […] [while] an imposed solution to a dispute is 
likely to be reopened by the party that feels aggrieved or compelled at the time of settlement, 
thus proving to be no real settlement at all” (Nambiar 2003). In other words, peaceful conflict 
resolution allows addressing the causes of conflicts and developing common understandings 
and perceptions, thereby gradually removing mutual mistrust and ultimately paving the way 
for peaceful co-existence. 
The social logic of non-violence implies that Indian governments predominantly exercise stra-
tegic restraint when dealing with security challenges. It means that India is generally unwill-
ing or unable to effectively generate and use military power to achieve its strategic objectives 
(Cohen/Dasgupta 2010: xii). The endorsement of the globalization discourse, which suggests 
that the use of military force has lost in importance in a globalized and interdependent world, 
into the Post-Nehruvian discursive framework has further substantiated India’s inclination 
towards strategic restraint (Sinha 2004, Menon 2009).  
 
‘Arming without aiming’48 
The preference for strategic restraint in the Post-Nehruvian discourse, however, does not rule 
out the use of force or discards the importance of conventional and nuclear deterrence (Muk-
herjee 2006a). The discourse articulates the need to modernize India’s armed forces and ex-
pand its military capabilities. Accordingly, India’s high economic growth rates were accom-
panied by significant and steady increases in defence spending between 1998 and 2009 in 
particular. While India’s defence budget amounted to $12 million in 1998, it has risen to $30 
in 2009. That year also saw the single largest year-on-year increase of 34 per cent in India’s 
history (Cohen/Dasgupta 2010: 16; Sipri 2015). Given India’s growing financial resources, 
there were growing expectations in the armed forces and strategic community that India 
                                                 
48
 This characterization of India’s defence policy comes from Cohen and Dasgupta 2010. 
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would adopt a more robust military policy and give up its strategic restraint (see Chellaney 
1999b; Kanwal 2000a; Karnad 2002a; Prakash 2008). India’s defence acquisitions and plan-
ning suggest that India is indeed seeking greater “power projection capability”, as the doc-
trines and strategies of Indian Navy, Air Force and Army demand (see MOD 2004, 2007, In-
dian Air Force 2012), by improving the scope of operations and offensive punch capacities of 
its armed forces.  
However, India’s defence spending has remained constantly between 2,0 per cent and 3,0 per 
cent of the GDP and dropped, in the course of the downfall of economic growth, from 2,9 per 
cent in 2009 to 2,4 per cent in 2013 (World Bank 2013). More importantly, “India’s military 
modernization”, as Cohen and Dasgupta (2010: xii) point out, “has lacked political direction 
and has suffered from weak prospective planning, individual service-centered doctrines, and a 
disconnect between strategic objectives and the pursuit of new technology. The haphazard 
character of military change in India suggests that the country’s historical preference for stra-
tegic restraint remains firmly in place”. In other words, the concrete strategic objectives 
linked to the acquisition of weapons remain often unclear in the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
Given India’s still very low nominal per capita GDP and degree of human development, the 
discourse also points to the financial and political constraints on India’s defence spending 
(Bhaskar 2008: 121; Nair 2009), making it even more important to spend the limited re-
sources efficiently. Finally, while Indian governments are trying to improve the power projec-
tion capacities of India’s armed forces, as policy analysts note, the actual force strength will 
actually decline in the medium-term, due to the upcoming decommissioning and delays in 
defence procurement, indicating that India is primarily modernizing rather than building-up 
its armed forces and will remain a regional rather than global military power with limited 
power projection capabilities (Ladwig 2010; Pant 2010; Rehmann 2012).   
 
Nuclear weapons and non-violence 
The Post-Nehruvian discourse has sought to frame India’s nuclear tests as a continuation of 
India’s principled nuclear policy, which has always opposed nuclear weapons and demanded 
nuclear disarmament (Dixit 1998c; Ghose 2007: 985/1005; Subrahmanyam 1998a). “On the 
face of it, there is a serious contradiction”, as Jasjit Singh (1998a: 9) notes after India’s nu-
clear weapons tests in 1998, “of the land of Mahatma Gandhi and his creed of ahimsa (non-
violence) acquiring the most destructive of the weapons of mass destruction”. After conduct-
ing the nuclear tests and thus formalizing India’s status as nuclear weapons state, PM Va-
jpayee sought to resolve this contradiction by highlighting the utmost restraint in exercising 
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the nuclear tests and India’s continued support for global disarmament by declaring in the Lok 
Sabha:  
 
“In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, the 
nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, and 
freedom of thought and action. We rejected the Cold War paradigm and chose the more difficult path of 
non-alignment. Our leaders also realised that a nuclear-weapon-free-world would enhance not only In-
dia's security but also the security of all nations. That is why disarmament was and continues to be a 
major plank of our foreign policy. […] These tests are a continuation of the policies set into motion that 
put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action. India is now a nu-
clear weapon state. […] Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. We have not 
violated any international agreement either in 1974 or now, in 1998. The restraint exercised for 24 years, 
after having demonstrated our capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example” (Lok Sabha Debates 
1998a). 
 
This duality of possessing nuclear weapons and calling for nuclear disarmament underpins the 
Post-Nehruvian discourse. As the Congress-led UPA Government (2004: 21) stated in its Na-
tional Common Minimum Programme: “The UPA government is committed to maintaining a 
credible nuclear weapons programme while at the same time it will […] take a leadership role 
in promoting universal, nuclear disarmament and working for a nuclear weapons-free world”. 
Accordingly, India’s nuclear doctrine emphasizes “credible minimum deterrence”, “no first 
use” and “[c]ontinued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, 
verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament” (Government of India 2003).  
The doctrine of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ rests on the conviction that “where nuclear 
weapons are concerned, it takes very little to deter. Neither number nor technological sophis-
tication matters. The capacity to inflict unacceptable damage gives a state minimum deter-
rence capability” (Basrur 2006: 25). Nuclear weapons are seen as “political instruments” 
(Mohan 1999; Singh [Jasj.] 2013: 73) and “not weapons of war but can only serve as a deter-
rent” (Saran 2014). This deterrence does not require a large nuclear arsenal, active deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons (i.e. warheads are not mated with delivery systems) or more nuclear 
tests to prove India’s nuclear capabilities (Subrahmanyam 1998a; Sinha 2002c: 13; Roy-
Chaudhury 2009: 410; Mansingh 2012. 191), but must possess nuclear forces that are large 
enough to survive a first strike and the ability “to retaliate against a nuclear attack on it by 
either of its two nuclear neighbours, should be credible to the potential adversary. In other 
words, the retaliation should result in unacceptable damage in terms of population and prop-
erty” (Subrahmanyam 2009). 
The Post-Nehruvian discourse re-affirms that “a non-violent world order, through global, 
verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament continues to be an important plank of 
our nuclear policy, which is characterized by restraint, responsibility, transparency, predict-
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ability and a defensive orientation” (Saran 2007: 115). The discourse articulates strong doubts 
that nuclear weapons promote peace and stability, but rather that the “total prohibition of the 
possession, use and manufacture of nuclear weapons through a universal non-discriminatory 
regime” would enhance India’s security (Singh [Jasj.] 1998b: 287-288; cf. also Mukherjee 
2008c; Tharoor 2012a: 24; Mansingh 2012: 191f.).  
The Post-Nehruvian discourse approach to nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-
proliferation is based on the conviction that these three issues are closely interlinked. “Non-
proliferation cannot be an end in itself”, as Shashi Tharoor (2012a: 25) explains, “and has to 
be linked to effective nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
should be seen as mutually reinforcing processes. Effective disarmament must enhance the 
security of all states and not merely that of a few”. In contrast to an absolutist demand for the 
immediate and total abolition of nuclear weapons, which has guided the Nehruvian discourse, 
the Post-Nehruvian discourse has shifted to a slightly more reformist perspective that also 
accepts non-discriminatory bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements and CBMs (Si-
bal 2003b: 81; Ghose 2007: 1006; Mohan 2007: 1030; Khilnani et al. 2012: 56).  
However, while both the BJP-led NDA Government and the Congress-led UPA Government 
have indicated that India might sign the CTBT, there continues to be domestic opposition to-
wards any compromise either on the grounds that India would not benefit from entering a 
treaty which does not acknowledge India’s nuclear weapons status and face constraints on its 
nuclear programme (Dixit 1998d; Mukherjee 1998; Vajpayee 1999a; Sinha 2000; 
Kumar/Kumar 2010: 15) or, in the view of more traditional Nehruvians such as the Congress 
politician Mani Shankar Aiyar or the former foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey, that it would 
be a deviation from India’s demand for nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear 
weapons (Aiyar 1999; Dubey 2013). The more traditional Nehruvians also adopt a more criti-
cal view of the nuclear tests in 1998, given the negative effects for the global nuclear disar-
mament agenda and the incompatibility “to reconcile our acquisition of nuclear weapons with 
our demand that others eliminate theirs” (Aiyar 2009: 263).  
 
Dealing with India’s adversaries  
The social logic of non-violence also underpins India’s approach towards Pakistan and China. 
Ruling out the possibility of a military solution of the territorial disputes and other out-
standing issues, India seeks to solve the bilateral conflicts primarily through negotiations, 
growing economic and political engagement and the introduction of CBMs, and exercised 
strategic restraint in times of crises. At the same time, it acknowledges the need to maintain 
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India’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities to prevent aggressions or blackmail-
ing and the utility of forming strategic ties with other stakeholders, e.g. the U.S. and Japan, to 
increase its strategic room for manoeuvre and create strategic uncertainty for its adversaries, 
without, however, entering into alliances or alliance-like relationships which would not only 
jeopardize India’s strategic autonomy, but also result in adverse reactions by Pakistan and 
China and impair India’s engagement efforts (Mohan 1999: 82ff.; Sikri 2009: 44ff./105ff.; 
Kumar/Kumar 2010: 15-16; Khilnani et al. 2012: 18ff./38ff.; Menon 2014). 
With Pakistan, India attempted to normalize its relations within the framework of a ‘bilateral 
composite dialogue’ process, which was intended to address all contentious issues between 
both countries. Originally devised by the Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and his Pakistani 
counterpart Nawaz Sharif in 1997, the idea of a ‘bilateral composite dialogue’ was taken in by 
the BJP-led NDA Government after the nuclear tests in 1998. Calling for a resumption of bi-
lateral talks as early as possible on the topics of CBMs, Jammu & Kashmir, economic and 
commercial cooperation and cross-border terrorism, PM Vajpayee pointed out that “India has 
always desired a peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan based 
on confidence and respect for each other’s concerns […] a secure and prosperous Pakistan is 
in India’s interest” (Lok Sabha Debates: 1998c: 478-479). Vajpayee’s peace initiative led to 
the Lahore summit in February 1999, where India and Pakistan agreed on solving the issue of 
Jammu & Kashmir and all other contentious issues peacefully. Given the Kargil war in 1999 
and the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, the dialogue process was fully as-
sumed not until January 2004 and paused (and was not resumed) again after the 2008 Mumbai 
terrorist attacks. Amongst the achievements of the dialogue process are various CBMs, joint 
agreements to combat terrorism, the expansion of train routes and bus services, enhanced 
people-to-people contacts and an increase in bilateral trade (see Wojczewski 2014). In addi-
tion, India and Pakistan also discussed possible solutions of the Jammu & Kashmir issue in 
back-channel talks, which brought both sides close to a final settlement.  
India’s reactions towards Pakistan’s provocations or aggressions were characterized by strate-
gic restraint. The intrusion of Kashmiri insurgents and Pakistani soldiers disguised as insur-
gents into Kargil in 1999 took the Indian armed forces by surprise both from the intelligence 
point of view, but also in their initial defence preparedness to counter the attack. Though the 
Indian Army could ultimately prevail against the intruders and restore the status quo ante, the 
Indian Government deliberately limited its retaliatory operations to the Kashmir area instead 
of retaliating at a more favourable theatre and did not cross the LoC (Line of Control) 
(Subrahmanyam 2000: 1159ff.; Saran 2011). Highlighting India’s strategic restraint during 
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the Kargil war, the then-External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh (2006: 227) asserts: “What 
truly was the greatest challenge to Prime Minister Vajpayee during this near sixty-day trial 
was his (PM’s) continued conviction to not expand the field of combat beyond the LOC, 
whatever the provocation. This obviously cost India many lives, it cost us time too, many gal-
lant officers and soldiers had to lay down their lives because of this enormous restraint that 
India had placed upon itself”. 
Similarly, India demonstrated its strategic restraint after the terrorist attacks on the Indian 
parliament in 2001 and the financial hub Mumbai in 2008 by terrorist groups operating from 
Pakistani territory and most likely with the support of elements in the Pakistani Army: In both 
cases, Indian governments did not take military action against Pakistan and soon started to re-
engage Pakistan (Krishna 2009; Singh [M.] 2009c; Singh [Jasw.] 2013: 247).
49
 Defending 
India’s strategic restraint after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, Shashi Tharoor (2012a: 38-
39) noted: 
 
“India had to act: we all knew that anything that smacked of temporizing and appeasement would fur-
ther inflame the public just a few months before national elections were due. But New Delhi also knew 
that though some hotheads in India were calling for military action, including strikes on terrorist facili-
ties in Pakistani territory, this would certainly lead to a war that neither side could win, if anything, such 
an Indian reaction would play into the hands of the terrorist, by strengthening anti-Indian nationalism in 
Pakistan and easing the pressure on the Islamists. And since both India and Pakistan have nuclear 
weapons, the risk of military action spiralling out of control is always too grave for any responsible 
government to contemplate.”  
 
Strategic restraint has also marked India’s approach towards China. Believing in the possibil-
ity of peaceful conflict resolution and co-existence, the Post-Nehruvian discourse propagates 
a policy of economic and political engagement towards China, but combines its engagement 
with certain counter-measures to address the challenges and uncertainties emanating from the 
rise of China. This policy-mix can be described as a hedging strategy (Dutt 1998: 239; Aiyen-
gar 2010; Kumar/Kumar 2010: 76ff.; Menon 2012b). “India will engage China [...]”, as the 
Ministry of Defence (2008/09: 6) describes this policy, “while taking all necessary measures 
to protect the national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of India”. By the same 
token, PM Singh stated: “It is a historic necessity for the two great neighbours to work to-
gether. There will be areas of competition, and there will be areas for cooperation. There is 
enough space in the world for both countries to continue to grow and address the develop-
mental aspirations of their peoples” (2008c); and, “[w]e want the world to prepare for the 
                                                 
49
 Though the NDA Government responded to the terrorist attack with the largest and longest military mobiliza-
tion in India’s history (Operation Parakram), as we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, it ultimately 
opted against launching an attack and the crisis de-escalated into a stalemate along the LOC (Roy-Chaudhury 
2009: 406).  
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peaceful rise of China as a major power. We ourselves have tried very hard to engage China. 
[…] But there is a certain amount of assertiveness on the part of the Chinese, I do not fully 
understand the reasons for it, that has to be taken note of” (2009c). 
After the fallout of bilateral relations in the course of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the BJP-
led NDA Government started to re-engage China and paved the way for the thaw in Sino-
Indian relations. India’s engagement of China becomes apparent: first, in the significant in-
crease in high-level official visits as well as dialogue and consultative mechanisms. The major 
component of India’s engagement policy are the economic and trade relations with China. 
However, the cooperation in other policy fields has also been steadily expanded. A crucial 
turning point in India-China relations was the India visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao in April 2005, when India and China institutionalized and broadened their relationship 
by concluding a strategic partnership.  
Second, Indian governments do not regard the solution of the border dispute as a precondition 
for normalizing and expanding their relations but seek to solve the dispute peacefully on the 
basis of the growing cooperation and common interests through an institutionalized dialogue 
(Rao 2011b). India is engaged in negations with China to settle the border dispute and agreed 
on CBMs to prevent an escalation of the conflict. An initial success was that China finally 
recognized Sikkim, another disputed territory between both countries, as a part of India 
(Garver 2012: 102); evenly important was the conclusion of the agreement on the ‘Political 
Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ 
in April 2005. However, the agreement has so far not brought about a solution of the border 
dispute, which has repeatedly created tensions in India-China relations in recent years (e.g. 
alleged Chinese incursions into Indian territory). Exercising restraint and reaffirming its 
commitment to an engagement policy, Indian governments largely played down reports on a 
growing number of incursions by stating repeatedly that the “the India-China boundary is, one 
of the most peaceful of all borders” (Rao 2011b) and that incidents “arise due to differences in 
the perception of the Line of Actual Control” (MEA 2013) and by adopting new CBMs to 
mitigate a conflict escalation.  
Though Indian governments have been engaging China believing in the possibility of a reso-
lution of the border dispute and a cooperative relationship between both countries, they have 
also sought to hedge against the risks of a pure engagement strategy (see Wojczewski 2016)  
by, first, enhancing India’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities towards China 
(e.g. development and induction of the nuclear-capable Agni ballistic missiles and improve-
ment of India’s defence preparedness in the border region); second, increasing India’s strate-
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gic room for manoeuvre through a strategic partnership with the United States
50
; third and 
finally, deepening India’s economic, political and strategic engagement of Asian countries 
through its ‘Look East’ policy. By forming closer political, economic and strategic ties with 
ASEAN and countries such as Japan, Vietnam, Singapore or Australia, Indian policy-makers 
want to prevent a Chinese dominance in Asia, successfully compete with China for markets 
and investments, and increase its strategic leverage towards China (Dutt 1998: 23; Gupta 
2007: 352ff.; Sikri 2009: 44ff.). Rather than seeking to contain China, Indian governments 
understand the ‘Look East’ policy as a contribution for building “a regional architecture that 
promotes cooperation and reinforces convergence, reduces the risks of confrontation and con-
flicts, and draws all countries of the region into a common framework of norms and principles 
of engagement” (Khurshid 2012c; author’s emphasis).  
 
6.2.4 Non-discrimination 
In addition to non-violence, the social logic of non-discrimination is a strong principle for the 
conduct of inter-state relations. The logic has two dimensions: First, it asserts the formally 
equal status of all states in the international system. This equality, as the logic maintains, is 
currently overridden by “a highly discriminatory, exclusive and prescriptive international or-
der inherited from the last century’s wars” (Sinha 2003f: 191). The logic opposes “all forms 
of political and economic hegemonism” (BJP [1998] 2000: 67) found, for instance, in treaties 
or institutional regimes that establish unequal relations among its members and marginalize 
certain interests and actors. A particular concern is the continuing marginalization and dis-
crimination of developing countries in the contemporary world order. As the Gujarat Chief 
Minister Narendra Modi explicated in 2008: “The basic problem of world scenario today is 
that rich countries consider and dictate the poor and underdeveloped countries as others. They 
should not dictate but should create structures where everyone’s voice is heard. […] It is nec-
essary to democratise the World Bank and the IMF as they do not have representatives from 
the developing countries” (quoted in The Hindu 2008). The international system is represent-
edby the discourse as a hierarchical political and economic structure established and largely 
dominated by an international alliance consisting of the United States and other, mainly 
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 Explicating the rationale of incorporating the U.S. into India’s China strategy, Shyam Saran (2010a) noted:  
 
“The more diplomatic options India is perceived to have, the more diversified its relations with other 
major powers, the greater the display of accommodation on the part of China on Sino-Indian issues. 
Therefore, we should actively pursue coalition-building globally as well as with all those major powers 
who wish to see a more plural and loosely structured economic and security architecture in Asia. […] 
We should promote a more inclusive arrangement in the region, welcoming the participation of the US 
[…]. This is not a containment policy towards China. It is a strategy of expanding India’s options”. 
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‘Western’, industrialized countries often pressuring developing countries to follow their eco-
nomic and political models, while, at the same time, impairing the development and political 
ascent of these countries by denying them access to their markets or certain technologies, the 
imposition of sanctions or other conditionalities and excluding them from international deci-
sion-making bodies (Dixit 1998b; Vajpayee 2000a; Sinha 2007: 30; Dubey 2013: 9ff.).  
Second, the social logic of non-discrimination is directed against practices that do not recog-
nize India’s status and virtues in world politics, for instance, by putting India on par with 
Pakistan. As the retired Indian diplomat Harsh Bhasin (2009: 48) notes with respect to the 
irritants in Indo-U.S. relations: “If there is one single issue that India always detested in its 
past relationship with the US, it was this US tendency to bracket India with Pakistan – a na-
tion of 120 million versus a nation of 1 billion, a military dictatorship versus a flourishing 
democracy, a theocratic state versus a secular state, an epicenter of terrorism versus a victim 
of terrorism, and the list could go on and on”. Likewise, the existent global governance struc-
ture is believed to discriminate India in particular. For instance, India is no permanent mem-
ber of the UNSC, even though it is “the world’s largest democracy, the biggest develop-
country democracy, and a pluralist, secular, and constitutional democracy” (Baru 2013b: 75). 
And Shyam Saran (2006) adds: “We believe that India, with its large population, dynamic 
economy, long history of contribution to international peacekeeping and other regional and 
international causes, deserves to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council”. This 
second dimension of the social logic of non-discrimination thus partially contradicts the asser-
tion of the equality of all states and underscores that India has a special status in world poli-
tics.  
Though the Post-Nehruvian discourse adopts a somewhat revisionist stance towards the exis-
tent global governance structure, it demands that India reshapes rather than overthrows the 
existent institutional frameworks (Sinha 2004; Singh [M.] 2009c; Baru 2010: 57). While it 
thus demands a place for India at the ‘high table’, it highlights that India does not want to be 
“simply co-opted into the existing international order that is controlled by the west. It must 
find its due place in it in its own right and be in a position to change the rules rather than sim-
ply adhere to existing ones” (Sibal 2012b; see also Sikri 2009, Khilnani et al. 2012, Dubey 
2013).  
 
‘Nuclear apartheid’ 
India has regarded the global nuclear regime based on “discriminatory non-proliferation trea-
ties” as an attempt of some countries “to perpetuate their hegemony” (Vajpayee 1999a: 192) 
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and creating a situation of “nuclear apartheid” (Advani [1995] 2000, Singh [Jasw.] 1998, 
Subrahmanyam 2002, Sibal [Kap.] 2008, Singh [M.] 2008a) “that arbitrarily decided on the 
nuclear haves and have-nots. India has always insisted that all nations’ security interests are 
equal and legitimate. From the start, therefore, its principles were in opposition to the self-
identified and closed club of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, who 
were also the Nuclear Five” (Singh [Jasw.] 2013: 167-168). This ‘nuclear apartheid’ is first 
and foremost embodied by the NPT signed in 1968, which “was never accepted by India be-
cause it was inherently unequal. It recognized 5 countries, i.e., U.S., Russia (then the Soviet 
Union), Britain, France and China as the only countries entitled to have nuclear weapons, 
with all other countries categorized as non-weapons states. Under this treaty, access to nuclear 
fuel and technology was restricted to those who joined the NPT, and all transfers to non-
weapons states were subject to IAEA safeguards” (Singh [M.] 2008a). This created an “unjust 
hegemonic and racist status quo” (Subrahmanyam 1998a), because it denies the legitimate 
security and economic interests of developing countries such as India, while allowing un-
checked nuclear proliferation by the recognized nuclear powers and the preservation of the 
‘political, military and technology hegemony’ by the paramount nuclear powers. 
In the early and mid-1990s, India was confronted with additional non-proliferation initiatives 
which were supposed to curb nuclear proliferation in South Asia in particular and put severe 
pressure on India’s nuclear policy of keeping its nuclear option open and simultaneously 
pushing for global nuclear disarmament (Dixit 1998a: 420/426; Singh [Jasw.] 1999: 326). 
Apart from the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, without any further amendments to 
promote nuclear disarmament, efforts were made to prevent the further nuclear weapons test-
ing through a CTBT and to control the spread of fissile material and missiles. “The hegemony 
of the nuclear-weapons power”, as K. Subrahmanyam (2002: 70-71) noted, “was directly felt 
by India during the negotiations on the CTBT. Even while the negotiations were going on in 
the Conference on Disarmament they were totally marginalized by the parallel negotiations 
among the five nuclear weapons states […]. [T]he five hegemonic powers behave in this ro-
guish manner and attempt to impose on the world the legitimacy of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in their own hands and prohibition for other”. Realizing that the CTBT would ultimately 
close the nuclear powers club and not stipulate any concrete steps towards global nuclear dis-
armament, India’s chief negotiator at the Conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, 
made a definite statement in June 1996 that “India will never sign this unequal treaty – not 
now, not later” (quoted in the New York Times 1996). Explicating the “deficiencies of the 
CTBT”, Pranab Mukherjee (1998) pointed out:  
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“It was not aimed at nuclear disarmament; it was not an effective instrument to create a nuclear weapon-
free world; it was not really comprehensive as it did not arrest the qualitative development of nuclear 
weapons; it does not enhance the global security for which the mandate was received at the Conference 
on Disarmament in January 1994; both the NPT and the CTBT were unequal and flawed and both the 
treaties were discriminatory and recognised the concept of ‘deterrence’ in favour of the five nuclear 
weapon states”. 
 
Forcing India to accede to the CTBT, the international community led by Canada and China 
introduced a clause making it compulsory that India, along with 43 other states, signs the 
treaty before it enters into force. This measure is represented in the Indian foreign policy dis-
course as a severe violation of international law and interference into the country’s national 
sovereignty. Similarly, it put tremendous political pressure on India and created a time-bound 
imperative for India to demonstrate its nuclear capability (Ghose 2005: 53; Singh [Jasj.] 2013: 
83-84). Though India’s nuclear weapons programme can be understood as an interplay of 
different social logics, it was ultimately the logic of non-discrimination that turned the bal-
ance and led to the decision to test nuclear weapons in 1998 and declare India a nuclear 
weapons state. Against the backdrop of the indefinite extension of the NPT and the CTBT 
negotiations, with the nuclear weapons powers showing “no signs of moving decisively to-
wards a world free of nuclear danger”, Jaswant Singh (2013: 166-167), External Affairs and 
Finance Minister in the BJP-led NDA Government, explained: 
 
“The tests carried out on 11 and 13 May in 1998 were in reality ‘against nuclear apartheid’. […] India’s 
options therefore, narrowed critically and inevitably. India had to ensure that its nuclear option, devel-
oped and safeguarded over decades, was not limited by any self-imposed restraint. […] The nuclear 
tests […] were not only inevitable but a continuation of policy from almost the earliest years of Inde-
pendence. India’s nuclear policy remains firmly committed to a basic tenet: that in a world of nuclear 
proliferation, the country’s national security lies either in comprehensive global disarmament or in ex-
ercising the principle of equal and legitimate security for all.” 
 
Similarly, K. Subrahmanyam framed India’s nuclear tests as a challenge of “the present inter-
national nuclear hegemonic order”:     
 
“Our whole purpose of going nuclear is to ensure that the nuclear club is wound up, nuclear disarma-
ment is advanced. What we must do is to knock on the door of this club and say that something must be 
done about this unjust and iniquitous order which is creating two kinds of security paradigms in the 
world. It is racist, it is colonial and it is hegemonic. We should push for altering such a world order, not 
join it and consolidate it. Otherwise, it would be contrary to everything that India has stood for” (quoted 
in the Times of India 1998). 
 
And the former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral (1998) noted:  
 
“Going nuclear has never been an Indian preference, our over-riding preference is for a world free of all 
nuclear weapons. What we have difficulty in accepting is that countries armed to the teeth in nuclear 
weapons should preach to us the virtues of disarmament. This is hypocrisy somewhat akin to a clique of 
drunkards trying to enforce a regime of prohibition. This situation, bad enough in itself, was further 
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compounded by growing evidence of the clandestine proliferation being encouraged in India's 
neighbourhood by certain nuclear weapon states”.  
 
This reference to the clandestine proliferation activities of some members of the global nu-
clear regime points to the second dimension of the logic of non-discrimination. While the 
(Post-) Nehruvian discourse regards the global non-proliferation regime as a discriminatory, 
neo-colonial order that divides the world into a group of privileged ‘monopolist powers’ and a 
group of disadvantaged subordinates, it also displays a deep resentfulness about the non-
recognition of India’s status in world politics, a feeling that India in particular was discrimi-
nated against, since it was harshly criticized and pressurized before and after the nuclear tests 
despite having exercised tremendous strategic restraint and acting as a responsible country in 
a hostile regional environment, while some of the recognized nuclear weapon powers have 
directly or indirectly contributed to horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation (Singh [Jasw.] 
1999: 327; Sreenivasan 1999; Parthasarathy 2004: 74). 
Highlighting India’s “commitment to non-proliferation”, PM Vajpayee ([1998] 2000: 23) un-
derscored: “our record in this regard has been impeccable and better than that of some coun-
tries who are parties to the NPT or members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group or even Perma-
nent Members of the UN Security Council”. As K. Subrahmanyam (2002: 81-82) pointed out 
with respect to China’s proliferation activities: “Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs are 
highly dependent on Chinese help which is extended to Pakistan in clear violation of various 
international arms-control regimes. It is now well established that Pakistan continues to re-
ceive assistance for its nuclear and missile program from China, and the United States contin-
ues to look away”.  
Given this ‘discriminatory’ and ‘hegemonistic’ global nuclear order, India continued drawing 
on the sub-logic of satyagraha (passive resistance), which has informed India’s nuclear policy 
since 1974, and resisted passively against this order by refusing to give up its nuclear weap-
ons capability and enter into this “system of unequal and discriminatory rules” (Singh [M.] 
2005b), while adhering to key principles such as non-proliferation and no further nuclear tests 
(Vajpayee 1999 [1998]: 185-186; Saran 2010b). At the same time, shrugging off the restric-
tions of India’s nuclear programme, imposed by the existent non-proliferation regime and the 
sanctions after India’s nuclear tests, and gaining recognition as a nuclear power became a ma-
jor objective of Indian foreign policy after Pokhran II. In particular, Indian policy-makers 
have been concerned about the negative consequences of these “regimes of technology denial, 
created in the name of non-proliferation” (Sinha 2003g: 102) for India’s socio-economic de-
velopment. Therefore, the NDA and UPA governments (re-)engaged the recognized nuclear 
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weapons states, particularly the United States, and could gradually achieve a higher degree of 
convergence of perceptions, with the United States now more willing to understand India’s 
national security imperatives. An important role in this rapprochement between India and the 
U.S. played the talks between External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and U.S. Deputy Sec-
retary of State, Strobe Talbott (Chari 2000; Talbot 2004; Singh [Jasw.] 2006: 274ff.). This 
rapprochement process also paved the way for the nuclear agreement between the United 
States and India in 2005 and ultimately ratified by the parliaments of both countries in 2008 
after protracted debates in the Indian parliament and the approval of the IAEA and the Nu-
clear Suppliers Group. Highlighting the rationale behind the nuclear deal and its great poten-
tial for India, PM Singh (2008b) stated: 
 
“In recent years our government has sought a new dimension to our relationship with the United States 
in the form of a nuclear deal. [...][I]t is for the first time we got the US to appreciate that India is a nu-
clear weapons state, that India has the right to develop nuclear power to protect it's strategic interests, 
and that it is a decision that must be made by the people of India not subject to any international super-
vision or any international interference. And despite the fact that we are not a signatory to the NPT, and 
we have also said that if the CTBT came into being we will not sign it, there is no pressure from the US 
on India to sign the NPT or any other international arrangement of that sort to enter into nuclear coop-
eration for civil energy. […] [I]t is very important for us to move forward to end this nuclear apartheid 
that the world has sought to impose on India”. 
 
By agreeing to separate its nuclear and civilian power reactors and placing the latter under the 
safeguards from the IAEA, India could not only bring an end to its nuclear isolation and gain 
access, without joining the NPT and CTBT, to urgently needed dual use high technologies 
and fissile material, but also achieve a de facto recognition as nuclear weapons power. The 
agreement, which required the amendment of U.S. national law and the rules of the global 
non-proliferation regime, demonstrates that the U.S., and ultimately other countries too, were 
willing to accept an ‘Indian exceptionalism’ in the existing nuclear order and thus to recog-
nize India’s status as a restraint and responsible nuclear power, its security concerns and its 
economic interests (see Subrahmanyam 2006; Mukherjee 2008b; Sibal 2008: 174f.; Chari 
2012: 4/7). “No other non-NPT signatory country”, as the former diplomat Achal Malhotra 
(2014) pointed out, “has been given this privilege. And this can be considered as an out-
standing achievement in the foreign policy pursuits during the past two decades.”51 While 
many countries have accommodated to India’s nuclear weapons status after the Indo-U.S. 
nuclear agreement, Indian governments continue to support non-discriminatory disarmament 
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 The BJP, which played an important role in bringing about the rapprochement between India and the U.S. after 
the nuclear tests, also invoked the logic of non-discrimination in articulating its (formal) opposition against the 
Indo-U.S. nuclear deal by criticizing that India is not de jure recognized as a nuclear power and has not the same 
status as the U.S., China, Russia, UK and France (see Mishra 2006, BJP 2008, Shourie 2008).  
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and arms control agreements. This, in turn, means that India would only join the NPT, if it is 
recognized as nuclear weapons state and the treaty encompasses at least some initial steps 
towards nuclear disarmament. Likewise, it could only sign the CTBT, if the U.S. and China 
finally ratify it and concerns for nuclear disarmament are addressed (Singh [M.] 2009b; 
Ghose 2010; Kak 2010: 386; Rao 2010b). 
 
Asymmetries in the multilateral trading system 
At the same time, the logic of non-discrimination points to the continuing inequality between 
the developed and developing countries in the global political and economic order and at-
tempts by the developed countries to maintain this condition by imposing discriminatory rules 
on developing countries that impair their development. This applies, in particular, to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) regime, where developed countries have been trying to 
include labour or environmental standards at the expense of developing countries, resort to 
protectionist policies for products, in which developing countries have a competitive advan-
tage, and deny developing countries the possibility to protect their own economies against the 
more competitive economies of the industrialized countries – a policy to which industrialized 
countries have themselves relied on in their development process (Vajpayee [1998] 1999: 209; 
Baru 2006: 122; Sinha 2007: 30). 
While the Indian government recognizes, in the words of PM Vajpayee (2001), that “interna-
tional trade can be a powerful engine of economic growth and social development around the 
world” and that the WTO can play an important role in this respect, “this benign potential can 
be realized only if the world trading system is re-oriented to make it just, rule-based, non-
discriminatory, and dynamic”, because “[t]he WTO is born into an unequal world, into a 
world divided among developed and developing countries”. This division, as the prime minis-
ter goes on, continues despite the process of “globalisation was supposed to deliver economic 
equality among all nations through free flow of goods, services and capital”, but [t]he reality 
we see today is an asymmetry in the benefits from globalisation between the developing and 
developed worlds”. The growing “economic interdependence”, resulting from globalization, 
can help overcoming this asymmetry if “it is based on the principle of non-discrimination […], 
[o]nly then can nations benefit equitably from global trade and commerce” (Vajpayee 2000a). 
India’s striving for “an open, non-discriminatory, predictable, rule based and equitable multi-
lateral trading system” (Puri 2007: 1083-1084) is articulated in the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
as a response to the inequalities and asymmetries in the world, which go back to colonialism 
and imperialism. The discourse demands that today’s industrialized countries, which were all 
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colonial and imperialist powers, acknowledge their historic responsibility for the underdevel-
opment of the ‘Third World’ and compensate for the historical injustice they inflicted upon 
other nations by making greater concessions to developing countries in the international trade 
regime. As PM Vajpayee (2001) noted,  
 
“the first mandate of the WTO was, and continues to be, to help bridge this developmental gap among 
nations of the world. The current inequalities and divisions, reflected in the poor human development 
indices of developing and least developed nations, are an affront to the collective dignity and ethical 
sensibilities of humankind. […] It should be apparent to all that there cannot be equal treatment for all 
in a world that is essentially unequal. The principle of affirmative action justifies and demands reason-
able protection for the developing nations and assistance for the least developed nations.” 
 
In addition, Indian governments are aware of the fact that all states, as the social logic of the 
enlightened self-interest suggests, primarily try to maximize their own interests and that the 
industrialized countries’ main interest lays in “preserving the status quo in the global balance 
of economic and political power” (Dubey 2013: 9; see also Saran 2012b). As a result, India 
must defend its interests in the WTO such as protecting its agricultural sector, food security 
and rural development (Mukherjee 2005). Though agriculture is not the most productive sec-
tor of the Indian economy and its contribution to the GDP has further declined in recent years, 
a large proportion of the Indian population is still employed in this sector, which cannot be 
easily transformed due to India’s relatively weak industrial sector, high level of illiteracy and 
welfare mechanisms without threatening the livelihood of India’s farmers (Narlikar 2013: 
609). “While sensitivities of developed countries in matters of trade liberalisation”, as the 
Minister of Finance Kamal Nath pointed out, “involve commercial issues, for developing 
countries such sensitivities involve the survival of their poorest citizens, the bulk of whom 
depend on agriculture for their livelihood” (quoted in The Hindu 2006).  
Against this backdrop, the discourse frames India as an important veto-player who must 
strictly adhere to the principle of distributive justice and does not shy away from blocking, 
obstructing or jeopardizing the WTO trade rounds in order to establish an open, non-
discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system. At the WTO talks in Seattle in 1999, 
for instance, India raised its voice against the inclusion of labour and environmental standards 
on the WTO agenda and insisted that the developed countries must reduce tariff and non-tariff 
trade barriers of products where developing countries have a competitive advantage such ag-
riculture and textiles (Vajpayee 1999b, Congress Party 2004).  
Though the Indian government gradually shifted its stance on trade in services between the 
Uruguay and Doha Rounds and agreed, mainly due to India’s service-led economic growth, 
on a partial liberalization of trade in services, its strong demand for an end of agricultural sub-
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sidies in developed countries and unwillingness to compromise on protecting its agricultural 
sector and issues of food security continued. Indian policy-makers also actively sought to co-
ordinate and align India’s positions with other developing countries in order to increase its 
bargaining power. Ahead of the WTO summit in Cancun in 2003, India organized a meeting 
with trade representatives of other developing countries to coordinate their bargaining strat-
egy. It also formed the IBSA-Group with Brazil and South Africa in 2003 to deepen its coop-
eration in multilateral trade negotiations as well as other policy fields. India’s uncompromis-
ing stance on agriculture and export subsidies and its successful coalition-building signifi-
cantly contributed to the protected negotiations of the Doha Round (Sinha 2003h: 220-221). 
Lamenting the lack of progress of the Doha development round, PM Singh (2006c) pointed 
out: 
 
“If the Doha Round has to have a successful outcome, and we sincerely wish this, then it must remain 
true to its original mandate of being a Development Round. We can not continue to live in a world of 
‘butter mountains’ and ‘rivers of milk’, liberally funded by government subsidies, when the poor starve 
in the villages of the Third World. We all know subsidies distort trade. In the case of the agricultural 
subsidies offered by developed industrial economies, these not only distort trade but destroy lives.” 
 
Against this backdrop, India, with the support of Brazil, confronted the U.S. and other indus-
trialized countries on agriculture issues ahead of the Geneva talks of the WTO in 2008. As the 
members attempted to negotiate a package deal at the summit and came close to reaching an 
agreement to overcome the deadlock of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations, the In-
dian representatives ultimately blocked the conclusion of the agreement by adopting a particu-
lar hard line position on the ‘Special Safeguard Mechanism’, which would have allowed de-
veloping countries to raise tariffs temporarily and thus protected Indian farmers from import 
surges or price falls. The collapse of negotiations was largely ascribed to India’s refusal to 
compromise on the issue of agriculture (Surie 2012: 91; Tharoor 2012a: 394). After the sum-
mit, India’s chief negotiator, Kamal Nath seemed to claim credit for the failure of the talks 
and the ultimate deadlock of the Doha Round: “I kept saying ‘No, I don’t agree’ at every 
point. […] I come from a country where 300 million people live on 1 dollar a day and 700 
million people live on 2 dollars a day. So it is natural for me, and in fact incumbent upon me, 
to see that our agricultural interests are not compromised. You don't require rocket science to 
decide between livelihood security and commercial interests” (quoted in the Washington Post 
2008).   
While India’s negotiation behaviour might suggest otherwise, the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
affirms that a “rule-based, transparent multilateral trading system is in India’s strategic inter-
est” (Baru 2010: 56). The discourse thus believes that “[l]iberalization of trade” has benefits 
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and it is “a far more effective tool for poverty eradication and economic development than 
foreign aid”, provided that it “include[s] policies that address societal needs and integrate the 
development dimension of developing countries into its framework” (Sinha 2003e: 292-293). 
Indian governments are also willing to take responsibility for maintaining the multilateral 
trading system. India joined the G-20, a multilateral forum of 20 major economies to discuss 
international trade and financial issues, and the G-8+5 process, which aims at integrating 
emerging economies into the group of leading industrialized countries. In doing so, the Indian 
government underlined its willingness to sit at the ‘high table’ of trade negotiations and con-
structively work with the industrialized countries. At the same time, however, Indian policy-
makers do not want that India is being co-opted into the existing international economic order 
and simply acquiesces in the rules and norms set by the industrialized countries; rather they 
believe that India must seek to modify or alter these rules and norms in accordance with its 
own interests and priorities. For Indian policy-makers, responsibility means first and foremost 
a responsibility for India’s own developmental aspirations, and thus to the livelihood of 
roughly 700 million people affected by poverty in India, and – though to a lesser extent – for 
fellow developing countries which would, like India, benefit from a more open and equitable 
economic and financial order (Singh [M.] 2004a; Sikri 2009: 289-290; Baru 2010: 60-61; 
Saran 2012b: 8/38).  
 
6.2.5 International Unity in Diversity  
The social logic of International Unity in Diversity embeds the sovereign states with their 
national interests into a broader, universal framework that does not necessarily undermine the 
importance of states, but points to the shared global aspirations of an international community 
and thus to a universal subjectivity that transcends the narrow national interests of states and 
reckons the existence of shared global norms and objectives. This universal framework is de-
rived from the ancient Vedic ideal Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, “the whole world is one family”, 
and India’s experience of being and managing a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious 
and socio-economically heterogeneous political entity (see Vajpayee [1998] 1999; Tharoor 
2010; Krishna 2012a; Singh [M.] 2005d). As External Affairs Minister Khurshid (2013) notes, 
 
“in re-imagining the global order, the theorists and practitioners of international relations have to push 
the envelope and think out of the box to help give birth to a new global order which is reflective of the 
philosophy of the world as a family. I do hope that drawing upon vast Indian intellect we would be able 
to provide the lead […] against parochialism, bloc-based politicking, etc. The rapidly globalising world 
has to think like one without diluting national and indigenous identities and cultures. This has been en-
capsulated in Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam the ancient Vedic ideal – One World, One Family. There are 
comparative formulations in all religions and value systems that we can draw upon.” 
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The Post-Nehruvian discourse projects India’s national experiences and polity onto the global 
order and grants them a universal significance. In other words, the discourse seeks to univer-
salize a particularity and tie a meaning to the signifier world order that corresponds to India’s 
national political order. “This ‘idea of India’”, as PM Singh (2007a) pointed out, “is the idea 
of ‘unity in diversity’. The idea of pluralism, the idea that there need be no ‘conflict of civili-
zations’, the idea that it is possible for us to facilitate and work for a ‘confluence of civiliza-
tions’. These ideas, I believe, have a universal, a truly global relevance. In a world enveloped 
by the darkness of conflict and hatred, these ideas come as rays of sunshine, lighting up our 
lives, giving us hope, renewing our faith in our common humanity”. However, the universal 
aspiration inherent in this ideal deviates, as India’s foreign policy discourse asserts, from the 
‘Western’ notion of universality in that it is more willing to acknowledge and appreciate dif-
ference and diverse ways to achieve particular objectives. It presupposes that all states strive 
for prosperity and peace but choose different political, social and economic means to arrive at 
these goals and that these different pathways are, in principle, all legitimate.  
A world order in the spirit of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam seeks to institutionalize a pluralist and 
equitable polity structure on the global level in which more actors have a voice and that stipu-
lates the principles of peaceful co-existence (Panchsheel), originally enunciated in the 1954 
India-China agreement
52
, to manage the diversity in the international system and arising con-
flicts: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-
aggression, mutual non-interference, and quality and mutual benefit (Sinha 2003f: 190ff.; 
Narayanan 2004; Singh [M.] 2009c; Rao 2011b). According to the Indian diplomat Sanjay 
Bhattacharyya (2007: 708), 
 
“there is a need to promote an ideology of holism, which embraces coexistence, plurality and tolerance. 
[…] The world needs a new international order in which the old model of confrontation is replaced by a 
new approach that evolves from rule-based legitimacy, consultation and respect for the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. Thus international relations need not only to display sensitivity to 
each other’s concerns but also provide space for all to live in peace and prosperity. A future interna-
tional order based on multipolarity connotes different nodes functioning in harmony and cooperation 
with one another and provide for economic and social development.” 
 
In a similar vein, Pranab Mukherjee (2008c: 16) noted:  
 
“As the world becomes more connected and interdependent, the diversity that we see at the level of in-
dividual nations will necessarily get more and more reflected at the global level. The management of 
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 As Jawaharlal Nehru (1961: 89) explicated the notion of peaceful co-existence:  “It has always been our policy 
to build bridges and create links between the opposing groups of nations and at the same time expand the area of 
peace […] It is a mental or spiritual attitude which synthesises the differences and contradictions, tries to under-
stand and accommodate different religions, ideologies, political, social and economic systems, and refuses to 
think in terms of conflict or military solutions.” 
140 
 
this global diversity under conditions of interdependence would require the application of democratic 
principles to global governance as well. India is not looking for new poles, but rather a pluralistic world 
order that is reflective of the diversity of the world today and accommodating of new players who can 
contribute solutions to tomorrow’s problems.”  
 
Towards a polycentric order  
The social logic of International Unity in Diversity rejects the notion of a unipolar or bipolar 
order, in which one or two countries can act unilaterally and decide over the faith of the rest, 
but demands a multipolar world order that allows for managing and tackling global issues in a 
more multilateral fashion by taking better into account the interests and concerns of the main 
stakeholders of the order and the different interests and values held in the international system. 
As Atal Bihari Vajpayee (2004) highlighted:  
 
“India does not believe that unipolarity is a state of equilibrium in today’s world. At the same time, we 
do not advocate a form of multipolarity, which creates tension between the poles. We believe a stable 
equilibrium lies in a cooperative multipolar world which accommodates the legitimate aspirations and 
interests of all its component poles and of the international community as a whole. This is the world 
which India is committed to working for.” 
 
Underscoring the desire of the Post-Nehruvian discourse for multipolarity, his successor 
Manmohan Singh (2005e) stated:  
 
“We live in a world which is not a world which we like in all respects. Yet, it is a fact that inter-
dependence of nations is a reality. And, that in this inter-dependent world, there is such a thing as power 
relations. This power in the world is not distributed equally, and we know, through history, that where 
there is inequality of power – international relations are fundamentally power relations – those who are 
more powerful cannot resist temptation to coerce those who are weak. The United States is today a pre-
eminent power. It is a super-power. It has global interest. In many areas, those interests do not coincide 
with our interests. Our ambition is to work to create a more just international system, a world which will 
be more moving towards multi-polarity. […] We are not saying that this multi-polar world can become 
reality overnight, but we have a contribution to its realisation that can be done only by making India a 
strong pole of the global economy.” 
 
Drawing on the discourses of ‘globalization’ and ‘global power shifts’, the Post-Nehruvian 
discourse presupposes that these two processes bring the world not only closer to a multipolar 
world order in the spirit of unity in diversity, but even make it imperative to establish such an 
order on the global level to maintain peace, stability and development in the 21
st
 century. 
While the world, as the discourse of globalization presumes, is characterized by an increasing 
interconnectedness between states and societies and a growing number of transnational chal-
lenges that require global solutions, the benefits and opportunities of globalization are not 
distributed evenly among states and there are persistent economic and political inequalities 
(Sinha 2003f: 190/194; Tharoor 2010; Saran 2012b: 6; Singh [M.] 2013).  
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It is presupposed by the Post-Nehruvian discourse that “the increasing global inter-
dependence and the trans-border nature of many threats have made strategic concepts devel-
oped in a bi-polar world somewhat irrelevant” (Singh [M.] 2005f). In an interdependent and 
interconnected world, the old mindsets of ‘containment’ or ‘balance of power politics’ are 
thus hardly feasible anymore and major powers are forced to cooperate with each other (Saran 
2006; Mukherjee 2007b). As PM Singh (2005f) explicated:   
 
“We must evolve a new paradigm of security cooperation relevant to an emerging multi-polar world in 
which global threats obtain global responses. This is precisely what India has sought to do. We have en-
tered into strategic partnerships with the United States, Russia, Japan and the European Union and are 
pursuing strategic cooperation with China. Today, nations are engaged simultaneously both in competi-
tion and cooperation. […] No doubt this involves sophisticated bargaining with each of them. It is unre-
alistic to expect nations to act for altruistic reasons. International relations are in the final analysis, 
power relations. This balance of power politics in international relations is more sophisticated than dur-
ing the Cold War era. […] Consequently, we should develop friendly interactive relations with as many 
major powers as possible.”  
 
What is evolving, according to the Post-Nehruvian discourse, is thus a more diffused and di-
versified global order “marked by the preponderance of several major powers, with minimal 
likelihood of direct conflict amongst these powers, but where both cooperation and competi-
tion among them are intense” (Menon 2009). Though the United States remains the pre-
eminent power pole and there exist substantial asymmetries of power among the major pow-
ers, the world is currently witnessing the emergence of various centres of power in an Asian-
centred international system that encompasses the United States, China, Russia, Japan, India 
and potentially the European Union. These actors are able of acting relatively autonomously 
and have sufficient economic, political, cultural and military capabilities to shape the world 
order. Asia is the meeting ground of these different power centres and thus the geopolitical 
space, where the 21
st
 century world order will be defined (Singh [Jasj.] 2001b: 69-70; Man-
singh 2005; Mukherjee 2005; Subrahmanyam 2006; Rasgota 2007: 9-11; Kumar/Kumar 2010: 
14/78; Mohan 2012). 
In a globalized and interdependent world, where profound diversities and differences exist in 
terms of culture, religion, socio-economic conditions and political persuasion and power is 
increasingly diffused across several power centres, the Post-Nehruvian discourse articulates, 
through the logic of international unity in diversity, the conviction that the pursuit of confron-
tational hegemonistic or balance-of power politics, as exercised in 19
th
 century Europe or dur-
ing the cold war, is hardly sustainable. Rather, the major powers are trying to achieve a ‘bal-
ance of interest’ among them and are engaged in a more nuanced politics of competition and 
cooperation (Narayanan 2000; Mukherjee 2007b; Singh [M.] 2008b). Highlighting this spe-
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cific characteristic, the discourse signifies the emerging global order more accurately as a 
polycentric order (see Subrahmanyam 1998b; Baru 2006; Dasgupta 2007; Kak 2010; Khilnani 
et al. 2012; Singh [Jasj.] 2013). In contrast to multipolarity, a polycentric order does not 
evolve around multiple power poles with exclusive spheres of interest, hostile alliance sys-
tems and zero-sum relationships, where good relations with one power automatically have a 
negative impact on relations with another power. Instead states are inclined to form temporary 
and shifting coalitions with partners that have a common interest on a specific issue (Subrah-
manyam 1999: 22; Mishra 2003b: 350; Dasgupta 2010). As Shashi Tharoor (2012a: 425) 
notes: 
 
“we are witnessing a world of many rising (and some risen) powers, of various sizes and strengths but 
each with some significant capacity in its own region, each strong enough not to be pushed around by a 
hegemon, but not strong enough to become a hegemon itself. They coexist and cooperate with each 
other in a series of networked relationships, including bilateral and plurilateral strategic partnerships 
that often overlap with each other, rather than in fixed alliances or binary either/or antagonisms. The 
same is true of the great economic divide between developed and developing countries.” 
 
This move “from a nation-centric to an issue-centric approach, with no permanent enemies or 
allies, clearly pose a new challenge” (Tewari 2010). While states can, for instance, cooperate 
in economic matters, they may differ strongly on political issues or strategic objectives. They 
must thus manage the simultaneity of competition and cooperation in their relations with 
other major powers and avoid too close alignments which could be at the expense of relations 
with another state or group of states. In this sense, a polycentric order is represented by the 
discourse as less polarized and divisive. This induces a relatively high degree of flexibility 
into the international system, allowing to create a more cooperative and inclusive world order 
which replaces the competitive security paradigm with a cooperative security framework and 
is more accommodative to the legitimate concerns and interests of the major stakeholders and 
the international community in general. While the discourse believes that multiple centres of 
power and the frictions that exist between them maintain an equilibrium in which all major 
powers, including the U.S., can be kept in check, thereby preventing unilateral, confronta-
tional or hegemonistic polices, it also acknowledges that a polycentric order entails a certain 
degree of fluidity and unpredictability (Singh [Jasj.] 2001b: 69ff.; Sinha 2003f: 193; Mukher-
jee 2008b; Congress Party 2013). 
In a polycentric order, India must thus seek and maintain robust, constructive and issue-
specific relationships with all major powers (Singh [M.] 2005f; Baru 2006: 72; Narayanan 
2008: 88; Saran 2012a; Sibal 2012b). As Chandrashekhar Dasgupta (2010) notes:  
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“India must follow a multidirectional foreign policy, seeking to cultivate co‐operative relations, to the 
extent possible, with all countries and, more particularly, the major powers. This will enable us to ob-
tain maximum leverage with each of the major powers. For example, success in cultivating close bilat-
eral ties with Washington can also raise our profile in Beijing. Likewise, a cooperative relationship with 
Beijing can give us leverage in Washington. In tomorrow’s polycentric world, nonalignment will be re-
incarnated in the form of a multidirectional foreign policy.” 
 
This multi-directional engagement or multi-alignment will allow India not only to maintain its 
strategic autonomy, sustain its economic growth and hedge against the uncertainties of an 
emerging polycentric order and the shifting balances in the international system, but also to 
contribute to the multilateral solution of urgent global challenges such as climate change 
(Menon 2011a; Tharoor 2012a: 425ff.; Khurshid 2013). 
In the coming polycentric order, as the Post-Nehruvian discourse maintains, major powers are 
not only defined by their accumulation of military power, but by their advances in the spheres 
of economics, technology and science as well as the skilful management of relations with 
other major powers, in particular to find the right balance between cooperation and competi-
tion (Singh [M.] 2006b, Baru 2008, Gharekhan 2012, Khilnani et al. 2012: 9, Subrahmanyam 
2012b). Against this backdrop, India must “[e]ngage will all major powers, but align with 
none”, and “become adept at forming and working through coalitions that are issue based and 
sometimes even specific” (Saran 2013: 54). For instance, with the United States, India has 
built a broad-ranging strategic partnership, which enjoys bipartisan support in both countries. 
The U.S. is a crucial source of investments, technology, knowledge and skills, which India 
urgently needs for its successful socio-economic development. As the preponderant power in 
the international system and major player in Asia, the United States has an enormous political 
clout and influences global and regional issues. With the nuclear agreement, the Bush admini-
stration has redefined the global nuclear regime and de facto acknowledged India’s status as a 
nuclear weapon power, thereby freeing India not only from sanctions against its nuclear pro-
gramme, but also demonstrating the U.S.’ willingness to integrate India into the existent 
global security and economic architecture. In Asia, the U.S. government shares India’s con-
cerns over a potential Chinese hegemony and provides India with strategic leverage to deal 
with a rising and more assertive China (Jaishankar 2007: 774; Saran 2012a; Menon 2013c).  
However, while the U.S. government has declared “to help India become a major power in the 
21st century” (U.S. Department of State 2005), the Post-Nehruvian discourse seeks no alli-
ance or alliance-like relationship with the United States. Such a relationship would contradict 
the logics of the world order model articulated by discourse. For instance, congruent with the 
logic of the enlightened self-interest, the U.S. focuses on its own national interests and thus 
regards Pakistan as a non-NATO ally and provides the anti-Indian regime with substantial 
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military and financial assistance; hollowing out the principles of state sovereignty and non-
violence, the U.S. has repeatedly (militarily) interfered into other countries, showing he-
gemonistic tendencies and often no real concern for the needs and interests of developing 
countries, the U.S. blocks the realization of a non-discriminatory order (Singh [M.] 2005a; 
Mishra 2007; Sikri 2009: 277ff.; Subrahmanyam 2010; Khilnani et al. 2012: 31-32; Dubey 
2013: 144ff./166ff.).  
Crucially, a close strategic alignment with the United States would also jeopardize India’s 
relations with other states and partners such as Russia and thus violate a key logic of the poly-
centric order, namely to rely on issue- rather than nation-specific relations and gain strategic 
leverage and room for manoeuvre towards all major players in the international system.
53
 In 
particular, plurilateral groupings with other (re-)emerging powers such as BRICS, IBSA or 
BASIC
54
 have become widely used instruments for pushing for “a more democratic multi-
polar order, in a world that is undergoing major and swift changes that highlight the need for 
corresponding transformations in global governance” (Mathai 2012). Lamenting on the urgent 
need to reform the system of global governance, PM Singh (2009d) noted that “[t]he un-
workability of the existing structures has led to a greater reliance on plurilateral groupings”. 
By joining and participating in these groupings, India wants in particular secure a place in the 
main global decision-making bodies and shape global rules and institutions, but also implic-
itly recognizes the diminishing importance of formal institutions such as the IMF or the 
UNSC (Kumar/Kumar 2010: 14; Mohan 2013: 59). 
The Post-Nehruvian discourse thus suggests that India should pursue a multi-directional for-
eign policy to manage the challenges and benefit from the opportunities emanating from a 
world order in transition. While India should thus actively encourage the trend towards a 
more multipolar world and work with other countries who share this objective, the discourse 
believes that it is neither feasible nor in India’s national interest to join or rely on a counter-
                                                 
53
 Though India’s multidirectional engagement or multi-alignment is a strategy of forming and managing shifting 
(often contradictory) coalitions of interests, this does neither imply that these partnerships or coalitions are all 
equally important or sustainable in the long run nor that India should discard its values or principles (e.g. democ-
racy and pluralism). For instance, India’s relations with the United States are and will remain closer than India’s 
relations with China – and could even further deepen, if China should opt for a more assertive or aggressive 
foreign policy (Mohan 2012b; Subrahmanyam 2012b; Tharoor 2012a: 426/428). 
54
 By joining forces and proposing a BRICS Development Bank as an alternative to the World Bank and the 
IMF, the BRICS countries have, for example, enhanced pressure on the United States and the European Union to 
implement a governance and quota reform in both institutions. The bank would also provide an alternative 
source of capital for countries that do not want to bow to the ‘Washington consensus’ and accept prescriptive 
loans (Krishna 2011; Sanwal 2013). After the financial and economic crisis in 2007/08, the BRICS group has 
also exerted pressure on the industrialized countries “to adopt responsible macroeconomic and financial policies, 
avoid creating excessive global liquidity and undertake structural reforms to lift growth that create jobs” (BRICS 
2012). In addition, the BRICS states are also examining alternatives to the U.S.-dollar as primary international 
reserve currency. 
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hegemonic coalition to contest the contemporary world order, since India seeks to restructure 
rather than overthrow the current order and needs both the established and the emerging pow-
ers for realizing its vision.   
 
India as the bridge between the worlds  
The social logic of international unity in diversity presupposes that India has a “diverse iden-
tity”, represents “multiple interests” and can thus be “a unique bridge between different 
worlds” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 31). India is a pluralist, non-Western democracy, which op-
poses democracy promotion, a developing country with the potential to become an economic 
superpower and a secular country that is home of many religions and harbours the third larg-
est Muslim population in the world. Given its diverse identity and multiple interests, India can, 
as the discourse asserts, not only pursue a multi-directional foreign policy and manage a set of 
complex and diverse relations, but also play a crucial role in a more pluralist world. On the 
one hand, the coming world order is believed to resemble India’s multi-cultural, multi-
religious, multi-lingual, democratic and pluralist nation-state model, so that India can draw on 
its vast experiences and human resources to deal with this diverse world order. On the other 
hand, India is due to its diversity and pluralism, as the Post-Nehruvian discourse claims, also 
seen by others as a role model, giving India substantial leverage and a leadership role in craft-
ing, shaping and maintaining this order. India can assume the role of a bridging power and 
potential mediator between ‘West’ and ‘East’, the different religions, cultures and civiliza-
tions, democratic and non-democratic countries and the developed and the developing world 
(Sinha 2004; Mukherjee 2005; Tharoor 2007, 2012b; Baru 2010: 60-61; Subrahmanyam 
2012b). As PM Singh (2007b) noted:  
 
“The success of a secular democracy in a nation of a billion people with such diversity is viewed with 
admiration. This great idea of India as a symbol of unity in diversity is increasingly viewed with respect 
and regard. […] India wants to have good relations with all the countries of the world. Big and small. 
Countries of the East and the West, the North and the South. Today, we enjoy good relations with all 
major powers and all developing countries. We have emerged as a bridge between the many extremes of 
the world. Our composite culture is living proof of the possibility of a confluence of civilizations. India 
will always be a nation bridging the many global divides.” 
 
In a similar vein, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao (2010a) notes: 
 
“There is in some sense, a duality that India contends with – one as a developing country working to 
sustain inclusive domestic growth with a view to eradicate poverty and enhance prosperity for its own 
citizens and the other as a re-emerging global power with the requisite intellectual acumen and eco-
nomic weight to work out solutions to global problems in cooperation with the developed as well as the 
developing economies. This ability of India to literally hold the world in its hands, because of our plu-
ralism, our diversity, and our relevance in terms of the developmental experience we have accumulated, 
and our responsible image in the world, has resulted in our increasingly being called upon to play an in-
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creasingly substantive role whether it is the G20 or the various fora of the United Nations, Trade delib-
erations or Climate Change negotiations.” 
 
This bridging potential places India in a relatively privileged position to shape the world order 
by forming partnerships with a very diverse group of countries and to promote its interests 
and mediate between these different groups.  
 
 
6.3 Political Logics: The Constitutive ‘Others’ in the Post-Nehruvian Discourse   
Having discussed the social logics of the Post-Nehruvian discourse and thus carved out what 
the discourse takes to be the ‘reality’ of world order, we will now explore how the discourse 
generates meanings and identities. This process is captured by the political logics. Political 
logics aim to comprehend the emergence, institutionalization, contestation, defence or trans-
formation of a hegemonic discourse and the practices it contains. In other words, political 
logics illuminate how a discourse articulates different demands and interests as equivalent by 
dividing the socio-political space on the basis of particular antagonisms and political frontiers. 
In this process, captured by Laclau and Mouffe’s logics of equivalence, a common ‘other’ or 
shared ‘negativity’ is identified as the cause for the problem/challenge and a desirable alterna-
tive is offered to the existing situation, which promises to fulfil all these demands and inter-
ests by overcoming the ‘other’ that blocks the identity of the ‘self’. This ‘sameness’ or ‘com-
monality’ of interests and demands, however, is illusionary and always subject to the logic of 
difference that subverts the equivalence and points to the plurality and particularity of mean-
ings and identities (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 127ff.; Laclau 1996: 38). In short, the ‘other’ is both 
constituting but also threatening the identity of the ‘self’. The Post-Nehruvian discourse ar-
ticulates two sets of ‘others’: While Western colonialism and the cold war constitutes the 
temporal ‘others’, Pakistan and China constitute the spatial-political ‘others’.  
 
6.3.1 Temporal ‘Other’: Colonialism and Cold War   
The temporal ‘others’, which the Post-Nehruvian discourse invokes to (re-)produce meanings 
and identities, are India’s encounter with European colonialism and the cold war. Colonialism 
constitutes not only a ‘shared negativity’, but was also the discursive context for articulating 
an Indian national identity. Colonialism symbolizes a strong form of humiliation and institu-
tionalized oppression, exploitation and discrimination that gave rise to a “sense of victimiza-
tion” (Chatterjee Miller 2009) in the Indian discourse. This collective and traumatic experi-
ence of domination and suffering led to a strong desire to correct the injustice inflicted upon 
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India and other peoples by the colonizers and to prevent the recurrence of colonial practices or 
relations in the future. There are thus particular post-colonial sensitivities, a set of principles 
and goals emanating from the colonial encounter, that inform the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
and India’s engagement with the world. Apart from being recognized as a victim and casting 
other states as victimizers, these include a particular concern about status and equality in in-
ternational relations and a strong commitment to uphold India’s autonomy. Though the age of 
colonialism has long passed, anti-colonialism has survived the dislocation of the traditional 
Nehruvian discourse and continues to be a crucial signifier for articulating and maintaining 
India’s national identity, not the least because neo-colonial practices, according to the Post-
Nehruvian discourse, continue to shape world politics. 
The colonial encounter provided the discursive context for the formation of an Indian national 
identity and shaped the kind of nationalism that emerged in India. It is a distinctive post-
colonial nationalism characterized by an ambivalent relationship towards ‘Western’ moder-
nity. It was mainly through European colonialism that Indian elites were imparted the notions 
of civilization, nationalism and modern statecraft via the Euro-centric, orientalist discourse 
which represented a ‘civilized’ Europe in opposition to a ‘backward other’, the colonies. The 
discourse was based on a hierarchization of different peoples in a Eurocentric framework: It 
placed peoples on a scale of development, ranging from the ‘state of nature’ to the ‘civilized 
stage’ represented by Europe and its ‘modern’ political, economic and social institutions and 
practices (Chacko 2012: 4-6).   
Against this backdrop, a nationalist discourse gradually emerged in India in the 19
th
 century 
that articulated the demand for independence from British colonial rule and sought to estab-
lish an Indian national identity. The opposition to colonialism has formed a very durable and 
effective basis for articulating and fashioning an Indian national identity. As the ethnic, reli-
gious, linguist and socio-economic heterogeneity and diversity precluded – in the reading of 
the dominant secular-nationalist discourse associated with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal 
Nehru – the construction of an Indian nation along the lines of European nationalism, it was, 
above all, the collective trauma of colonialism and the joint struggle against colonial rule that 
created a bond and a common awareness among the Indian people (Khilnani 2003: 153ff.; 
Chakrabarty 2008: 39). In this sense, the colonial ‘other’ served as ‘shared negativity’ to con-
struct the foundational chain of equivalence of the Indian nation and present different subjects, 
demands and interests as homogenous and equivalent. It places India into an antagonist rela-
tionship with the colonial ‘other’. Social antagonisms, as Laclau and Mouffe explicate, occur 
when “the presence of [an] ‘other’” blocks or threatens the identity of the ‘self’, because the 
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different identities are constructed in a way that they mutually exclude each other (Laclau/ 
Mouffe 1985: 125). The construction of antagonisms is, at the same time, a necessary pre-
condition for the constitution of the identity of the ‘self’ by serving as a shared horizon of 
negativity that enables the articulation of different elements (e.g. Bengalis, Tamils, Punjabis, 
Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Muslims, Jains and Dalits), which are at least in principle unrelated 
and heterogeneous, into a common chain of equivalence: the Indian nation. 
At the same time, the experience of colonialism has created an awareness for India’s back-
wardness, which also made it prone to fall under foreign rule, and a desire to mimic modern 
‘Western’ discourses and its practices of statecraft, technology and science in order to over-
come this backwardness or ‘lack’ and develop India into a modern nation-state. However, 
given the fact that this very ‘Western’ modernity has been closely intertwined with colonial-
ism, imperialism and other destructive tendencies, the colonial subjects were confronted with 
a dilemma: they had to adopt and use the concepts, practices and institutions of the former 
oppressors and exploiters in order to become free, independent and modern (Chatterjee 1993: 
5; Bhabha 1994: 44; Chakrabarty 2000: 4).  
This has resulted in a very ambivalent and, at times, contradictory relationship towards 
‘Western’ modernity characterized by the post-colonial subjects’ simultaneous mimicry of 
and resistance to the colonizer, its institutions and practices. While the Indian nationalist dis-
course used and adopted ‘Western’ practices and institutions – such as the nation-state, de-
mocracy, industrialization or bureaucracy – driven by a desire for development, progress and 
modernity, it also sought to indigenize, repudiate, disrupt and distance itself from these colo-
nial practices and institutions (Krishna 1999: 9-10; Muppidi 2004: 43). While opposing the 
‘West’ for its destructive and imperialist path to modernity, India’s national leaders neverthe-
less regularly framed their own demands and interests through the language of ‘Western’ dis-
courses.  
Though the Post-Nehruvian discourse has embraced globalization and emphasizes India’s re-
engagement with the world, the collective trauma of colonialism and the struggle for inde-
pendence continue to serve as a source for India’s national identity. It is, however, not the 
colonizer as a spatial-political ‘other’, represented by the British, but the practices and rela-
tions associated with colonialism – such as inequality, domination, military interventions, 
discrimination, economic exploitation, subjugation to the dictates of powerful countries etc. – 
that constitute the ‘colonial other’ today. The Post-Nehruvian discourse thus draws a political 
frontier between India and these neo-colonial practices and relations, thereby constructing a 
chain of equivalence between different social forces in India ranging from the communists to 
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the Hindu nationalists. While the British colonial power is blamed for the past discrimination 
and exploitation and served as the constitutive ‘other’ in the independence struggle, the role 
of the colonial ‘other’ can today be assumed by actors which are not directly linked to the 
colonial era such as the United States, the industrialized countries or the ‘West’ in general, 
international media, transnational corporations or environmental and human rights NGOs (see 
Advani 2006, Aiyar 2009, Sikri 2009, Dubey 2013, Sibal 2013b).  
The colonial ‘other’ is predominantly embodied by the ‘West’ in the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course. Though the ‘West’ does not constitute a spatial-political enemy or threat to India, it 
can potentially become an antagonized ‘other’, since the discourse associates it with neo-
colonial practices and thus the past injustice inflicted upon India. This makes the creation and 
maintenance of a chain of equivalence with the ‘West’ more difficult. While the Post-
Nehruvian discourse sought to reconstruct the political space and re-define India’s relations 
with ‘Western’ states by stressing a shared commitment to democracy and pluralism as well 
as the need for ‘Western’ investments and technology to advance India’s socio-economic de-
velopment, it could not fully shed its ambiguity towards the ‘West’. The chain of equivalence 
is thus consistently under stress from the logic of difference, which highlights the differences 
between India as a post-colonial, developing democracy and the industrialized ‘Western’ de-
mocracies whose affluence and dominance in the world cannot be separated from their colo-
nial and imperialist past.     
The ‘Western’ interferences and military interventions in Iraq, Libya or Syria have nourished 
this ambiguity and difference. For the colonial encounter has created a bond, a chain of 
equivalence, with other peoples that have also suffered from colonialism and imperialism. 
This sense of solidarity with other post-colonial states, coupled with a strong distrust of the 
‘true’ motivations beyond ‘Western’ inferences and military interventions into post-colonial 
states (Parthasarathy 2011, Dubey 2013, Menon 2013a), still shapes the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course. However, the chain of equivalence between India and other post-colonial states has 
been weakened in the Post-Nehruvian discourse through the logic of difference, whereby the 
political space is (re)structured in terms of plurality of different entities. Instead of drawing a 
political frontier between the post-colonial, developing states on the one side and the industri-
alized countries and former colonizers on the other side
55
, the discourse organizes the political 
space in a more differentiated way by invoking the category of emerging powers and creating 
a chain of equivalence between India and countries such as Brazil, South Africa or China that 
                                                 
55
 For instance, this political frontier has underpinned the Non-alignment Movement and India’s strong engage-
ment with the NAM during the cold war.  
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assume a privileged position among the post-colonial, developing countries and sit at the 
‘high table’ with the established powers. At the same time, the discourse has, as we have seen, 
sought to create a stronger chain of equivalence with the ‘West’ by underscoring India status 
as stable pluralist democracy that distinguishes India from many post-colonial, developing 
states. The logic of difference thus tends to prevent revolutionary or antagonistic politics in 
favour of a more nuanced politics of a gradual reform of the world order.   
The articulation of the colonial ‘other’ as a source for India’s national identity finds its main 
expression in a desire to maintain India’s national sovereignty and autonomy, especially be-
cause India’s independence coincided with the partition of British India and thus with another 
trauma resulting not only in large-scale violence and displacements, but also with a great loss 
of territory, which is seen as a direct consequence of colonialism (see Narayanan 2000; Aiyar 
2004: 205ff.; Mukherjee 2005). This, in turn, has installed a strong impulse for preserving 
India’s territorial integrity and “an inherent distrust of outside forces that had formed the new 
borders of India and Pakistan, an action seemingly undertaken to inspire instability in the re-
gion by failing to synchronize with ethnic and state borders” (Ogden 2011: 6).  
The Post-Nehruvian discourse, however, has somewhat moved away from these post-colonial 
anxieties and depicts India’s international environment less a threat than an opportunity. In 
the course of India’s economic liberalization, for instance, the other “is now being invited 
inside the national economic space and is being coded not as colonial (and hence exploitative 
and dominating of the Self) but as beneficial to the Self” (Muppidi 2004: 53). However, post-
colonial anxieties about the role of external forces regularly surface in India’s foreign policy 
discourse, as the national debates on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal or the allowance of FDIs in 
additional sectors of the Indian economy have illustrated. Warning India against joining the 
“American bandwagon” and associating itself with NATO, which might not hesitate to target 
India, the former prime minister I. K. Gujral, for instance, recalled what the former Iraqi 
President, Saddam Hussein, had told him: “‘You [Indians] suffered earlier because you were 
rich in cottons. Now, we [Iraqis] are suffering because we are rich in oil’” (quoted in The 
Hindu 2005).  
The resilience of the colonial ‘other’ in India’s foreign policy discourse can partially be at-
tributed to the cold war. Having shattered the chains of colonialism, India was confronted 
with the challenge of the cold war. The cold war is represented by the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course as a continuation of colonialism and imperialism and a direct threat to India’s inde-
pendence and nation-building (Bajpai 2007: 80; Aiyar 2012: 3/10). By dividing the world into 
two antagonistic, nuclear-armed camps, the cold war discourse threatened to undermine In-
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dia’s newly won freedom and autonomy and to impair its developmental aspirations. Driven 
by the logics of balance-of-politics, alliances, containment and geopolitics, which have re-
sulted in and legitimized European colonialism, the cold war was, according to this reading, 
an (anew) attempt to subjugate the post-colonial states and thus to defend the international 
political, economic and cultural structure of dominance, dependency, exploitation and hu-
miliation created by European colonialism and imperialism.  
The cold war evoked India’s colonial experience and created an awareness for the very fragile 
status of India’s independence and territorial integrity. Given the cold war dynamics, India, as 
all other states, was expected to join one of the two camps and largely subordinate its foreign 
policy under the dictates of one of the superpowers, thereby substantially circumscribing In-
dia’s sovereignty and limiting its political room for manoeuvre in international affairs. Instead 
of pursuing a foreign policy in accordance with India’s national interests and forging relations 
with other countries to India’s benefit, the “Cold War paradigm” implied that “good relations 
with one power automatically entailed negative consequences with its rivals” (Mukherjee 
2007b). The cold war paradigm also entailed frequent political interferences and military in-
terventions in the Global ‘South’, which posed a severe challenge for a country in the midst of 
a nation-building process with unsettled borders. It also overshadowed and marginalized the 
concerns of India and other post-colonial states such as development, decolonization or anti-
racism.  
Against this backdrop, the Nehruvian discourse sought, as we have seen in chapter 5, to keep 
India away from the two power blocs and pursue a policy of non-alignment, thereby affirming 
the right of former colonies to assert their autonomy in world politics and allowing them to 
focus on their own national priorities. The Post-Nehruvian fully affirms this policy as the 
right choice and underscores that a bipolar order, which often reduces foreign policy to binary 
choices, benefits the interests of the two power poles at the expense of the concerns of the rest 
(Damodaran 1995; Dixit 1998a: 18ff.; Singh [Jasw.] 1999: 32; Narayanan 2008: 88). As 
Shashi Tharoor (2012a: 9) notes:  
 
“It is understandably fashionable to scoff at the concept [of non-alignment] when there is no longer a 
pair of superpowers to be non-aligned between, but its origins were unexceptionable. At  a time of great 
pressure to join one of the two Cold War alliances, as so many countries had done around us, our first 
prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, chose to stay free of such entanglements in the pursuit of our enlight-
ened self-interest. We had spent too long with foreigners deciding what was good for us internationally; 
we were not going to mortgage our freedom of action or decision to any alliance when we had just be-
gun to appreciate the value of our own independence. So we stayed out of other countries’ fights, and 
sought to judge each issue on its merits, rather than taking sides automatically or based on alliance poli-
tics.” 
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The cold war has exacerbated and institutionalized India’s post-colonial anxieties and pro-
vided the rationale for adopting the policy of non-alignment. As temporal ‘other’, the cold 
war suggests that a world dominated by power blocs negatively affects third parties such as 
India: on the one hand, it undermines India’s room for manoeuvre by putting pressure on In-
dia to follow the interests and dictates of one power bloc. On the other hand, power blocs tend 
to wage and accommodate their competition and conflicts in third countries. Though the cold 
war discourse disappeared and could not serve as major reference point for the articulation of 
meanings and identities in India’s foreign policy discourse anymore, there is still the threat 
that the world will be again divided into antagonist blocs as demonstrated by the hegemonistic 
and unilateral policies of the U.S., Russia’s growing resistance towards the ‘West’ and the 
rise of China as a U.S. peer competitor, which could lead to a ‘new cold war’ or a U.S.-China 
condominium (also referred to as G-2) making India a subordinate power in Asia (Bhaskar 
1998; Parthasarathy 2007c; Mohan 2009c; Sikri 2009: 10/260ff.; Subrahmanyam 2010).  
By articulating colonialism and the cold war as ‘others’, the Post-Nehruvian discourse thus 
evokes the (still existent) threat of (neo)colonial domination and of a potential return of the 
cold war paradigm that circumscribed India’s strategic space and role in world politics. There-
fore, the discourse asserts that India must not jeopardize its strategic autonomy, become en-
tangled in the strategic competition between the U.S. and Russia and China and strive for an 
equitable, non-discriminatory multipolar world order that provides a peaceful and stable equi-
librium between different power centres. 
 
6.3.2 Spatial-political ‘Others’: Pakistan and China  
The spatial-political ‘others’ invoked by the Post-Nehruvian discourse are Pakistan and China. 
According to conventional poststructuralist IR scholarship (see Ashley 1984, Walker 1993, 
Campbell 1998), international relations is first and foremost based on a spatial-political dif-
ferentiation that draws a hierarchical dichotomy between the ‘inside’, represented by the state 
as the space of order, peace, progress, unity etc., and the ‘outside’, represented by the interna-
tional system as the space of disorder, violence, stagnancy, disunity etc. While the Post-
Nehruvian discourse does not entirely override this inside/outside dichotomy, it defuses the 
notion of the spatial-political ‘other’. This rests on the conviction that India’s internal diver-
sity and heterogeneity exacerbates the construction of an unified ‘inside’ and has given rise to 
a particular national narrative
56
 that highlights diversity, pluralism, syncretism and peaceful 
                                                 
56
 This narrative will be discussed in greater detail in the sub-chapter 6.4 which looks into the fantasmatic logics 
underpinning the Post-Nehruvian discourse.  
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co-existence as the hallmarks of the Indian nation. Accordingly, given ethnic, regional, reli-
gious, linguist, caste and socio-economic cleavages, the Indian polity is not a homogenous 
and closed entity, but marked by a high degree of internal ‘difference’ and thus displays a 
similar plurality and complexity as the international system as a whole. Having opted for a 
pluralist and secular state model after independence, the Indian nationalist discourse has 
sought to accommodate, integrate and fuse these diverse elements into a common political 
entity. Indian-ness is thus less constituted on ethnic, geographic or religious grounds, but out 
of internal diversity and plurality (Mukherjee 2007c: 21; Tharoor 2007; Ahamed 2013, Ansari 
2013). 
As Sunil Khilnani (2003: xiii) points out: “The founding idea of India was never simply a 
commitment to abstract values or ideas – of pluralism and democracy – but was rooted in a 
practical understanding of the compulsions and constraints of Indian politics”. In other words, 
given the pervasive power of the logic of difference, the creation of broad and stable chains 
of equivalence between different social demands, interests and subjects can hardly be estab-
lished merely on the basis of exclusive religious, ethnic, linguist, caste or class identities in 
India, but require a more diverse ‘shared negativity’. For instance, though Hindus constitute 
by far the largest religious community in India, they speak different languages, belong to dif-
ferent castes and classes and have different ethnic backgrounds. In the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course, difference and diversity is thus less represented as a threat that can or must be over-
come, but rather as a natural condition of India that can be managed through accommodation 
rather than assimilation and uniformity.
57
  
 
Pakistan 
Nevertheless, the Post-Nehruvian discourse articulates meanings and identities also in opposi-
tion to external ‘others’. Since the bloody partition of British India, Pakistan has been the 
prime external ‘other’ in India’s hegemonic foreign policy discourse. The partition marked 
the beginning of a relationship fraught by mutual distrust and hostility which generated four 
wars (1947-8, 1965, 1971 and 1999), frequent skirmishes at the Line of Control, severe crises 
with a high escalation potential and arms races. The Post-Nehruvian discourse invokes the 
secular-nationalist articulation of India’s identity, which was enunciated by Indian National 
                                                 
57
 This position is contested by the counter-hegemonic Hyper-nationalist discourse, which we will explore in 
chapter 7. However, even the BJP as the main political force invoking this discourse has deviated from its origi-
nal Brahmanic Hinduist identity and moderated its political stance in order to integrate different social forces 
into its counter-hegemonic project and for coming to power. In doing so, however, the BJP has to a great extent 
re-affirmed and endorsed the secular-nationalism of the Congress Party and other political forces, except of the 
assertion that India’s pluralist, tolerant and peaceful ethos has originated exclusively in Hinduism.   
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Congress before Indian independence and constructed a diverse, syncretic, inclusive and tol-
erant ‘self’ in opposition to the Muslim League’s assertion that Muslims and Hindus represent 
two different nations and cannot live together peacefully in a Hindu-dominated state (Com-
muri 2010: 152/154). After the partition, Pakistan became the theocratic, intolerant and mono-
lithic Pakistani ‘other’ against which the secular, tolerant and pluralist Indian ‘self’ defined 
itself.  
According to the Post-Nehruvian discourse, Pakistan’s identity as a Muslim state on the basis 
of the Two-Nation-Theory poses a challenge to India’s secular and pluralist state model. Paki-
stan struggles to accept a multi-religious, secular and democratic India and India’s claim to 
Kashmir, since this would jeopardize the political foundation and legitimacy of Pakistan’s 
own – weak and fragmented – state-model that is centred around a religious nationalism. 
Therefore, particular forces within the Pakistani political and military establishment impede a 
peaceful co-existence of both countries and seek to disrupt and weaken India by supporting 
Islamic terrorist groups or separatist movements, conducting covert operations in India or 
using military force to recapture Kashmir (Dixit 2001: 136ff.; Vajpayee 2003d; Mukherjee 
2005; Dubey 2013: 53ff.). 
India and Pakistan are thus locked in an antagonist relationship. This antagonism is condi-
tioned by the presence of an ‘other’ that prevents the ‘self’ from fully attaining its identity, as 
the different identities mutually exclude each other (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 125). The construc-
tion of antagonisms is, however, also the pre-condition for the constitution of the identity of 
the ‘self’ by serving as a ‘shared negativity’ against which the identity of the ‘self’ can be 
articulated. In this sense, dissimilar and heterogeneous elements – such as the different (al-
ready constituted) ethnic, religious, linguist, caste and class identities found in the discursive 
field in India – are articulated together into a common chain of equivalence: the secular, plu-
ralist, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguist and democratic Indian nation, that is set in 
opposition to the authoritarian, theocratic and intolerant Pakistan, which symbolizes the anti-
thesis to India and the impossibility to fully realize India’s national identity.  
The presence of a theocratic, hostile and revanchist Pakistan is, in other words, a permanent 
reminiscence of India’s fragile nationhood and blocks the completion of India’s own identity. 
Kashmir, the only predominantly Muslim state in the Indian Union, is thus considered to be 
crucial to the legitimacy and integrity of India’s national identity and model of state. “India 
cannot allow”, as J.N. Dixit (2002: 304) noted, “any part of its territory and any of its peoples 
to be alienated from the Indian republic on the basis of religious affiliation. Such an eventual-
ity would destroy the basic terms of reference on which independent India came into exis-
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tence, the terms of reference of a pluralistic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, national territorial 
identity”. Underscoring the antagonistic mind-set of Pakistan’s rulers, Rajiv Sikri (2009: 
33/39) points out:  
 
“Pakistan’s raison d'être, simply put, is that the Muslims of India allegedly cannot live and prosper in a 
single State dominated by Hindus. India obviously feels differently, and this gave rise to Pakistan’s po-
litical compulsion to prove otherwise. […] Six decades after its Independence, Pakistan continues to 
search for a durable and credible identity, other than it being ‘not Indian’. Pakistan’s rulers constantly 
strive to show how Pakistan is equal to, if not better than, India in all respects. The complex psychology 
of the Pakistani ruling elite, dominated by the military, is seen in a small but telling illustration – some 
of Pakistan’s missiles are curiously named after various foreign invaders who ravaged India, including 
the territory of present-day Pakistan, centuries ago! […]. The mindset of the ruling elite is a cocktail of 
arrogance and brashness, at times bordering on cockiness, which has of late become even more potent 
with the addition of a measure of fundamentalism. This has led to a policy of unremitting hostility to-
wards India that occasionally breaks out into conflict.” 
 
Given Pakistan’s religious identity, its very poor economic performance, its political instabil-
ity and the dominance of the army in Pakistani politics, the Post-Nehruvian discourse frames 
India’s national identity and state model as superior and progressive and represents contempo-
rary Pakistan as a backward state that is anachronistic in the age of globalization. Thus, Paki-
stan serves as a common negative reference point in the Post-Nehruvian discourse, a warning 
that India may never become a ‘Hindu Pakistan’, but must remain a pluralist, secular and de-
mocratic country.   
In this sense, Pakistan simultaneously challenges but also reaffirms and strengthens India’s 
national identity in various ways: While Pakistan has been ruled directly or indirectly by the 
military that has internally prevented the development of a stable and democratic state, and 
resorts externally to risky military adventurism and pursues policies which jeopardize the 
country’s socio-economic development in order to maintain its power in the Pakistani state, 
India’s parliamentary democracy has generated a stable political system, a responsible and 
accountable political leadership, a prospering economy and armed forces that are fully con-
trolled by the civilian leadership and act with utmost strategic restraint (Dixit 1998a: 217; 
Baru 2006: 25; Menon 2011b). In the words of Pranab Mukherjee (2005), “India stands as a 
bulwark against fundamentalism and extremism, a centre of economic gravity, a beacon of 
democracy despite challenges of human diversity, poverty and economic disparity, a bastion 
of stability, and a symbol of peaceful coexistence and non-violence”. 
While India is a secular state in which all religions, as the Post-Nehruvian discourse asserts, 
are treated equally and people of different faiths live peacefully together (Aiyar 2004: 5; 
Sinha 2004; Varma 2004; Ansari 2013), Pakistan is a theocracy that suppresses religious free-
dom, encourages Islamic fundamentalism and uses “terrorism as an instrument of State pol-
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icy” (Singh [M.] 2009c). In addition, Pakistan has become the ‘epicenter of terrorism’ and the 
same terrorist organizations nourished by the Pakistani Army in its proxy war against India 
are now turning increasingly against the Pakistani state and further undermine the country’s 
stability and integrity (Tharoor 2012a: 35; Dubey 2013: 54/151).  
According to the Post-Nehruvian discourse, “India reconciled itself long ago to the creation of 
Pakistan” (Vajpayee 2003d) and has “made every effort to establish a peaceful and coopera-
tive relationship” (Mishra 2003a: 363), while Pakistan has retained its “compulsive hostility 
towards India” (Singh Bhasin 2002: 10) and undermined India’s various peace initiatives by 
its continuing support of terrorist outlets, which conducted several terrorist attacks in India 
(Singh Mehta 2003; Vajpayee 2004 [2002]: 85; Mukherjee 2005). By depicting Pakistan as a 
belligerent, unstable, theocratic and militarized state, which has not only initiated all four 
wars (Tharoor 2012a: 28/32) but also ‘forced’ India to develop nuclear weapons (Subrah-
manyam 2009), the Post-Nehruvian discourse can re-affirm India’s peaceful, tolerant and plu-
ralist ethos. According to this reading of India-Pakistan relations, the persistence of the Indo-
Pakistani conflict is thus almost entirely attributed to Pakistan’s hostile and revanchist attitude, 
its inferiority complex towards India and its inability to develop a positive national identity 
that is not solely bound by hatred towards India (Dixit 2001: 137ff.; Sikri 2009: 39).  
The Post-Nehruvian discourse, however, does not represent Pakistan as a full-fledged antago-
nist ‘other’, not the least because the ‘other’ is literally part of the ‘self’. On the one hand, the 
discourse, though accepting the existence of Pakistan, presupposes that ‘Pakistan’ has been a 
part of the Indian nation and was carved out of the Indian polity as a result of colonialism and 
the fear of the Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, of being politically marginal-
ized in a united, independent India (Narayanan 2000; Aiyar 2004: 205). The ‘other’ is there-
fore less constituted by the Pakistani people, who were all originally Indians, but by Paki-
stan’s anti-Indian military and political establishment and the Islamist fundamentalists in 
Pakistan. On the other hand, with a national identity centred around the notion of ‘unity in 
diversity’ and around 150 million Muslims living in India, the Post-Nehruvian discourse is 
disinclined to antagonize an Islamic country (Singh [Jasw.] 2001; Sinha 2004; Singh [M.] 
2009c; Ahamed 2013). 
Pakistan is thus a constitutive ‘other’ that simultaneously blocks the full realization of India’s 
identity, but also contributes to its articulation and preservation. The dissociation from an ag-
gressive, intolerant, theocratic and militaristic Pakistan allows the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
to link together the interests and demands of various social forces (ranging from the Leftist 
parties to the centrist parties and various minority parties) into a chain of equivalence and to 
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stabilize India’s pluralist-secular nation-state model and accommodate India’s religious, eth-
nic and linguist diversity. Similarly, this chain of equivalence also appeals, as we will see in 
greater detail in the next chapter, to the BJP that invokes India’s secular national identity to 
underscore India’s superiority towards Pakistan and the inherent peacefulness and tolerance 
of Hinduism (see Vajpayee 1992, Advani [L.K.] 2001), which is contrasted with the ‘Muslim 
invasions’ of the Indian subcontinent, Islamist terrorism and Pakistan’s continued aggressions 
against India. In contrast to the secularism of the Congress Party and other secular forces in 
India, however, the BJP points out that the ‘Indian secularism’ derives from the innate plural-
ism and tolerance of Hinduism and has thus religious roots.  
 
China  
In addition to Pakistan, the Post-Nehruvian discourse articulates China as spatial-political 
‘other’. Unlike Pakistan, which symbolizes in many respects the anti-thesis to India, China is 
represented in a more ambivalent way in the sense that China is both a rival and a partner, a 
challenge and an opportunity, and a source of fear and of admiration. For the Post-Nehruvian 
discourse, China’s size, its status as ancient civilization and fastest growing economy in the 
world and its experience of imperialism mirror and re-affirm in many ways India’s own iden-
tity (see Vajpayee 2003e, Gandhi 2007, Mukherjee 2008a, Singh [M.] 2008c). “When assess-
ing their country's status in the hierarchy of nations”, as Devin and Herbert Hagerty (2005: 23) 
note, “postindependence Indian decision makers have for more than half a century reflexively 
cast their gaze at China for purposes of comparison.” The traditional Nehruvian discourse 
initially sought to construct a chain of equivalence between India and China, which both 
emerged as continental-sized, modern, post-imperial, civilizational states in the late 1940s and 
sought to find their destiny in the comity of nations. After India’s independence, Jawaharlal 
Nehru declared that Indians and Chinese are brothers (Hindi-Chini bhai bhai) and should 
jointly struggle for a pan-Asian security and economic community and a more equitable and 
pluralist world order (Nehru 1961: 3/186).  
However, the logic of difference disrupted this attempt to forge a chain of equivalence and  
realize the vision of Sino-Indian brotherhood in a united Asia. The border dispute and the 
1962 war epitomize this difference. India’s defeat in the war has given rise to a feeling of hu-
miliation and betrayal. Though the Post-Nehruvian discourse concedes that the war was also 
triggered by mutual misperceptions and miscalculations, colonial border drawing and the cold 
war dynamics, there remain misgivings about the way how China reciprocated to Nehru’s 
policy of friendship and uncertainties about China’s long-term intentions, particularly about 
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Beijing’s readiness to accept India as an equal player in Asia (Mohan 2004: 155; Dixit 1998a: 
55/63; Motha 2007: 51; Singh [Jasj.] 2012: 2ff.;). As the Indian diplomat Maharajakrishna 
Rasgota (2007: 12) notes: “Memories of Mao’s hastily perpetrated war against India in 1962 
linger in the minds of both countries and suspicions persist concerning each others’ policies 
and objectives. In India, in particular, there are grave apprehensions about China’s South Asia 
policy”. 
After the war, China formed an enduring partnership with Pakistan and thus created India’s 
‘two front problem’. China is also believed to have substantially assisted Pakistan’s conven-
tional and nuclear build-up (Mattoo 1999: 22; Singh [Jasw.] 2006: 115/185; Kak 2010a: 373: 
Saran 2011: 14). Elaborating on the rationale behind China’s military assistance, PM Singh 
(2004b) noted: “[w]e cannot also ignore the strategic cooperation that Pakistan secured from 
China in many ways. We cannot rule out the desire of some countries [read: China] to keep us 
engaged in low-intensity conflict with some of our neighbours as a means of getting India 
bogged down in a low equilibrium.” Likewise, K. Subrahmanyam (1998c: 47-48) pointed out 
that “China presumably planned to countervail India and lock India and Pakistan in mutually 
deterrent relationship as regional powers. That would leave China to adopt the role of a global 
power with a patronizing attitude towards India, not necessarily antagonistic”.  
China’s economic, political and strategic engagement with India’s smaller South Asian 
neighbours such as Nepal or Sri Lanka and its increasing presence in the Indian Ocean have 
caused similar misgivings. Though the Post-Nehruvian discourse does not affirm the theory of 
a ‘strategic encirclement of India’, put forward, as will be shown later, by the Hyper-
nationalist discourse, by conceding China’s (legitimate) economic and political interests in the 
region, it acknowledges the potentially negative strategic implications and the growing com-
petition for influence emanating from China’s ‘intrusions’ into South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean (Saran 2006; Guruswamy/Singh 2009: 128-130; Singh [M.] 2013c). As Salman Khur-
shid (2012a) highlighted: “we will have to accept the new reality of China’s presence in many 
areas that we consider an exclusive playground for India […]. The rules of the game will 
change. China will come in and add to the richness of the participation, but will also then pro-
vide greater competition”. 
The Post-Nehruvian discourse’s main concern is that China does not recognize India as an 
equal, but might seek a hegemonic position in Asia by confining India to South Asia (Bajpai 
2007: 87; Dubey 2013: 200). Expressing his misgivings about China’s long-term ambitions 
and its willingness to accommodate to India’s rise in the international system, Rajiv Sikri 
(103-104) notes: “Traditionally China has never looked at India as equal, but merely as up-
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start wannabe. India’s place, in Chinese eyes, is in South Asia only; it should not aspire to be 
an influential Asian, much less a global player. […] India is the only other Asian country with 
the size, resources, demographic profile and all-round capabilities to pose a credible challenge 
to China’s dominance over Asia in the long term”. This, according to the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course, makes India the potential antagonist ‘other’ for China and vice versa. The search for 
equality with China shapes not only the Sino-Indian relations, but also India’s aspirations in 
the world order in the sense that India wants to achieve parity with China and enjoy similar 
privileges (e.g. becoming a recognized nuclear weapons power or member of the UNSC). In 
this sense, China blocks the full realization of India’s identity, because it does not fully accept 
India as an equal and enjoys a privileged status in the world that India is denied.       
However, the Post-Nehruvian discourse also recalls Nehru’s vision and seeks to create a chain 
of equivalence between India and China, Asia’s two emerging powers, “the world’s two most 
populous nations and largest emerging economies” which face similar challenges and have “a 
growing congruence of regional, global and economic interests, driven by our respective de-
velopmental aspirations and shaped by the evolving strategic environment” (Singh [M.] 
2013b). The bilateral relationship is thus believed to have far-reaching repercussions for the 
world and could serve as a potential role model for peaceful co-existence in a multipolar order 
that both countries seek to create (Rao 2009; Krishna 2010). Calling for “Revitalising 
Panchsheel”, the former diplomat and Indian President K. R. Narayanan (2004) notes: 
 
“China and India believe in a multi-polar world where power is diffused over several centres in a world 
of infinite diversities and differences in terms of culture, language, religion, economic condition, and 
political persuasion. Unipolar and interventionist theories and practices are unsustainable and opposed 
to a democratic and pluralistic world order. Recognition of sovereignty, non-aggression and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states and equality and mutual benefits and peaceful co-existence 
constitute the irreducible minimum on which a viable world order is based.” 
 
A revitalization of Panchsheel would also prove that there is no “inevitability of conflict ow-
ing to overlapping areas of influence between India and China” and that “both India and 
China are too large and too strong to be contained or cowed down by any country, including 
each other” (Sinha 2003g: 334). Likewise, Pranab Mukherjee (2006b) notes: 
 
“The India-China relationship is bound to be one of the most important bilateral relationships in the 
coming decade simply by the sheer weight of demographic and economic numbers. How we manage 
this relationship will have a tremendous impact on peace and stability in the regional and increasingly 
the global context. India-China relations have traditionally been viewed through the prism of ‘balance 
of power’ or ‘conflict of interests’ with Asia as the theatre of competition. This theory has become out-
dated in today’s interconnected and interdependent world. It is increasingly recognized that there is 
enough space and opportunity for both to grow.” 
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The Post-Nehruvian discourse thus tries to frame India’s and China’s interests and demands 
as equivalent by stressing the exceptional character of both countries and placing them into 
opposition to the hegemonistic ‘Western’-dominated world order. The chain of equivalence 
between China and India is, however, fragile and subverted through the logic of difference. 
This difference centres around China’s authoritarian system of government and its more as-
sertive foreign policy. While China’s economic ascent in the world  has been taking place 
under authoritarian rule, India adheres to democratic principles. As PM Singh noted:   
 
“The uniqueness of Indian growth experience is that it takes place entirely within the framework of a 
democratic polity. This has demonstrative implications for the world at large. The success of India will 
be a living proof that growth need not come at the cost of human freedoms. […] there is no doubt that 
the Chinese growth performance is superior to Indian performance. But I've always believed that there 
are other values which are important than the growth of the gross domestic product. I think the respect 
for fundamental human rights, the respect for the rule of law, the respect for multicultural, multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious rights, I think those have values also”  (Singh 2005b, 2009d).  
 
By contrasting India’s pluralist and democratic system of government with China’s authori-
tarian rule, the Post-Nehruvian discourse seeks to compensate for China’s superior socio-
economic level of development and material capabilities and re-establish equality between 
India and China. In drawing this political frontier, the discourse also links together various 
societal demands and interests by invoking and re-affirming the notion of unity in diversity 
sustained by a democratic-pluralist state model as the foundation for India’s existence as a 
nation. As K. Subrahmanyam (2012b: 14/20) pointed out:   
 
“Many people since independence, including some political parties in this country, have debated 
whether our growth would not have been faster and whether our poverty alleviation could not have been 
expedited if the country had adopted alternative models of development. Communism in China led to 
30-40 million deaths due to starvation and even today poverty has not been totally eliminated in that 
country though their effort has resulted in much higher percentage of poverty alleviation than in our 
case. Inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient is worse in China than in this country. […] The Chinese 
are persuaded that their model of one party system combined with a market economy would allow them 
to rise fastest in the world. Like all oligarchies, the Chinese Communist Party wants to perpetuate itself 
without accountability to the people. With 92 per cent of its people being Han Chinese, they are not 
willing to extend minority rights to Tibetans, Hui Muslims, Uighurs, Manchus, Mongols and other mi-
norities. […] China considers India as a rival in spite of all verbal protestations to the contrary, since it 
has approximately an equal population and is proving that a developing country can grow fast economi-
cally without sacrificing democracy or pluralism.” 
 
Closely linked to this distinction between pluralist democracy and authoritarianism, which has 
in the case of China, for instance, resulted in the oppression of the Tibetans and other minori-
ties, the discourse also draws a frontier in the realm of foreign policy between India as a be-
nign power that follows international norms and strives for peaceful co-existence and a multi-
lateral regional architecture in Asia and China as a more assertive power, whose long-term 
ambitions remain unclear due to its rapid military modernization and lack of transparency – 
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and that might attempt “to resurrect its traditional and historical ‘Middle Kingdom’ position”, 
which prevents it from accepting other states as equals, leading to the bulling of smaller ones 
and a desire for “regional predominance” in Asia (Gupta 2007: 352; see also Bhasin 2009, 
Subrahmanyam 2009; Dubey 2013). “Unlike China's rise”, as Manmohan Singh therefore 
pointed out, “the rise of India does not cause any apprehensions. […] The world takes a be-
nign view of India. They want us to succeed” (quoted in The Tribune 2010).  
 
 
6.4 Fantasmatic Logics: Indian Greatness and Exceptionalism   
Fantasmatic logics are closely intertwined with the ideological dimension of social relations 
and enable us to understand why specific discourses ‘grip’ subjects, i.e. why subjects identify 
with the subject positions provided by a discourse and how subjects contribute to concealing 
the radical contingency of all social relations. By exploring the fantasmatic logics of a dis-
course, we seek to carve out the underlying ideological narratives, myths and imaginaries, 
which are constructed by political subjects to hold the discourse together and defend it against 
the discursive exterior that is always threatening to dislocate the discourse. If a narrative con-
structs myths which manage to “cover over” the contradictions and ruptures of a discourse 
and incorporate a wide range of social interests and demands, as Laclau (1990: 60ff.) argues, 
these myths become social imaginaries and thus the “horizon” or “absolute limit which struc-
tures a field of intelligibility”. The hegemony of the Post-Nehruvian discourse rests on the 
successful creation of a collective foundational imaginary. This collective self-imagination is 
above all conditioned by religious myths and ancient texts such as the Mahabharata, Rama-
yana and the Arthashastra, the mighty emperors that ruled over large parts of Indian Subcon-
tinent in the pre-colonial era and the heroic and prophetic figure of Mahatma Gandhi who 
brought the mighty British Empire down to its knees in a peaceful independence struggle. 
Taken together, these mythic figures and narratives are interwoven into a foundational imagi-
nary that symbolizes not only the qualities, characteristics, values and proper conduct of India, 
but also the continuous, pre-colonial unity and agency of India. This collective foundational 
imaginary can be divided into the two closely interrelated narratives of Indian Greatness and 
Indian Exceptionalism. 
 
6.4.1 Indian Greatness 
The narrative of Indian Greatness underscores India’s special importance and status in world 
politics. India’s innate greatness reflects in the sheer size of its population and landmass, its 
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endowment with material resources, its geopolitical location and its civilizational heritage. 
India is seen as the successor state of mighty ‘Indian’ empires dating back several millennia 
and belonging to the most advanced political entities of their time. India is, moreover, not 
merely a state, but a state that embodies a civilization. Accordingly, India is one of the very 
few ancient civilizations that has survived several thousand millennia of human history and is, 
along with China, the only state that represents a world civilization (Dixit 1998a: 17; Man-
singh 2002, Singh [M.] 2010b). As one of the great world civilizations, India has a distinctive 
way of ordering relations within its own society and with the rest of the world, a rich cultural 
and spiritual heritage, produced its own language, made a great contribution to philosophy, art 
and science, and is the origin and home of four world religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism 
and Sikhism (and developed a distinctive strand of Islam) (Cohen 2002: 51-52). 
Hence, long before modern forms of political organization and the industrial revolution took 
hold in Europe, as the narrative points out, “India was one of the great well-springs of human 
intellectual and spiritual achievement” and “a source of cultural influence” in Asia and be-
yond (Mukherjee 2005). As the great Indian epics, the Mahabharata and the Arthashastra, 
demonstrate, the Indian civilization has brought about “a highly evolved and intricate tradi-
tion of statecraft” (Menon 2010b) that not only preceded European theories and practices, but 
also contain still relevant lessons for organizing intra-societal and inter-national relations 
ranging from the art of diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution and the achievement of politi-
cal order to the legitimate and effective use of power and force (Dixit 1998: 24ff.; Sinha 
2003e: 66; Badrinath 2007; Menon 2012a). 
This narrative of India as an ancient and great civilizational-state creates the myth that India 
has always existed as some kind of cultural and political agent in the world. Nations, as La-
clau (1994: 140/210) argues, generally evolve around such myths that construct an origin, a 
period of (fictional) purity, unity or glory that serves as the enduring foundation of the society 
and must be recovered.
58
 The myth conceals that nations are inherently fluid and contentious 
entities, “‘imaginary’ constructions” that only exist if and as long as people imagine them-
selves as members of a community and have a common national consciousness that must be 
constantly reproduced through various rituals such as inscribing and controlling national bor-
ders, picturing territories and populations, and emphasizing certain characteristics and themes 
salient to this national community (Laclau 1990: 64).   
                                                 
58
 This has led poststructuralist scholars such as Derrida (1976) or Foucault (1976, 1979) to deconstruct origins 
and study the genealogy of particular discourses, respectively.    
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Crucially, such myths conceal that national identities and subjectivities can only come into 
being through the encounter with an ‘other’ against which the ‘self’ can define itself through 
articulating a chain of equivalence out of the diverse and dissimilar elements in the field of 
discursivity. This ‘other’ simultaneously constitutes and subverts the identity of the ‘self’, 
making every nation an incomplete discursive formation that is shaped by contestations and 
contradictions from ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.  
In the Indian case, this ‘other’ was, above all, the encounter with European colonialism. The 
Euro-centric, orientalist discourse granted India the status of a civilization in the sense that it 
has achieved a certain degree of development and possesses some distinctive social and cul-
tural features. Emerging at the same time as the British sought to build and consolidate a 
modern Indian state, this discourse constructed the Indian civilization – in what Derrida calls 
a logo-centric procedure – along the lines of the ‘Western’ civilization by understanding, 
evaluating and creating the ‘other’ against the background of one’s own image and privileg-
ing written texts over spoken words. Accordingly, the discourse identified the main traits in 
the extremely diverse mixture of beliefs, practices, values and images that European scholars, 
traders, missionaries etc. encountered in India and constructed India as a civilization that 
originated in the Aryan-Vedic high culture (2000-5000 BCE) and was bound together by a 
common language (Sanskrit), a body of assumedly relatively coherent ancient texts (the Ve-
das), shared rituals and norms, and a shared sacred geography (Hansen 1999: 65-66). While 
the romanticist variant of this discourse represented India as a spiritual, ascetic, magic, sage 
and mythical civilization and placed it affirmatively in opposition to the rationality, material-
ism, utilitarianism and realism of ‘Western’ modernity, the anglicist-utilitarian version of this 
discourse saw the very absence of these virtues as the reason for the decline and backward-
ness of the Indian civilization (Hoeber Rudolph 2009: 140). 
Drawing on the discourses of the colonizer and ‘adapting’ them to the Indian condition, the 
nationalist leaders searched in this rich civilizational past for promising elements for their 
nation-building project that would unite the people against the British colonial rulers and in-
tegrate them into a common Indian nation-state after the successful struggle for independence. 
They traced the origin and foundation of India back to the Aryan-Vedic high culture and cast 
the ‘self’ as a single homogenous entity hold together by a common language, a body of holy 
ancient texts, shared rituals, norms and practices and a common territory, which encompassed 
almost the entire South Asia.  
While there exists today an imagined Indian national community and the myth of an ancient 
Indian nation with a certain foundation and essence has become a collective social imaginary 
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acting as a general horizon or frame for the ordering of all social relations in India, the people 
living in the pre-colonial period in what today constitutes the Indian nation-state actually did 
not see themselves as members of any kind of pan-Indian national community. There was, in 
other words, no consciousness for being an Indian or Hindu in ancient India, whose inhabi-
tants were split into various different castes, religious sects, ethnic or linguist groups, tribes 
and other affiliations that constituted the main sources of identification. For instance, the term 
‘Hindu’ was introduced by outsiders such as the Persians and initially used in a purely geo-
graphical sense to refer to the inhabitants who lived beyond the river Indus (or Sindhu). The 
British colonial rulers appropriated the term ‘Hindu’ to characterize all cultural and religious 
elements and traits they encountered in India that were not Muslim, Christian or Jewish, and 
started to define communities by their religion. This led to a greater uniformity of the diverse 
religious beliefs and practices under the label of Hinduism and created among the Indians a 
stronger awareness for their religious allegiance, not the least because it had an impact on 
their status in the British Raj (Thapar 2000: 75ff.; Doninger 2010: 24ff.).  
Given this absence of a common cultural, religious or national consciousness in pre-colonial 
India, it is hardly surprising that no enduring pan-Indian political entity emerged. The very 
short-lifted periods of imperial unity under the Mauryan, Gupta and Moghul empires, which 
ruled briefly over large parts but never the entire Indian Subcontinent, were rather based on 
the will and power of the emperor and did not result in the political unification of the Indian 
Subcontinent. They were put and held together by force and did not manage to create a pan-
Indian union or consciousness, but remained assembles of relatively autonomous kingdoms 
and princedoms who had their own cultures, languages and histories and disliked being ruled 
by either ‘indigenous’ or ‘foreign’ emperors and thus constantly revolted against them. Like-
wise, the kingdoms and princedoms waged wars and formed temporary alliances against each 
other, whereas they did not agreed on any pacts to defend India as a whole and hardly ever 
cooperated to fight ‘invaders’ (often individual kingdoms even sided with the ‘invaders’) 
(Tanham 1992: 25/50f.).  
Given the very absence of a national consciousness and the diversity found in India, the con-
struction of this national narrative of India as an eternal cultural and political agent has played 
and continues to play a crucial role in the way how the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse forged and 
maintains a chain of equivalence between the various demands, interests and (sub-national) 
identities to (re-)produce the Indian ‘imagined community’. The civilizational narrative is of 
particular importance, because it ‘gave’ the Indian nation a seemingly natural and confined 
territory, which was further consolidated during British colonial rule, and was utilized by In-
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dia’s nationalist leaders to claim that the independent Indian nation-state is not a new but a 
continued international personality, making independent India to the single successor of the 
colonial state as well as the civilization that originated in South Asia (Thakur 2014: 63). As 
Rajiv Sikri (2009: 16) notes, for instance, 
 
“South Asia has a distinctive personality and intertwined history arising out of its definite geographic 
identity. Virtually cut off from the rest of the world by the Himalayas to the north, the Indian Ocean to 
the south, impenetrable forests to the east, barren lands to the west, its inhabitants traditionally had rela-
tively few contacts with the outside world. At the same time, the absence of any significant internal ge-
ographic barriers […] created an inevitable geographical, cultural, economic and ecological interde-
pendence of all parts of this vast expanse of territory. These circumstances gave to the heartland of the 
South Asian sub-continent, covering the bulk of the territory of present-day India, Pakistan and Bangla-
desh, a broadly common history and led to the evolution of a unique civilization and culture. Remote 
and protected in the pre-modern era from the cultural influences of the mainland by the sea and moun-
tains, the periphery of the sub-continent (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan, Baluchistan, the north-
west frontier and tribal regions of Pakistan and India’s Northeast Region) had a more autonomous de-
velopment and therefore more distinctive cultures. But even these regions had considerable interaction 
with, and were greatly influenced by the heartland.”   
 
This claim that South Asia has a distinctive personality and that India is not only the single 
successor of the British Raj, but also of this civilizational heritage has important repercussions 
for the way how Indian governments deal with India’s neighbours, particularly with Pakistan 
that also claims to be the successor state of the British Raj and the heir of this civilizational 
heritage. The narrative of Indian Greatness treats South Asia as a confined geopolitical and 
civilizational space with India at its core. India is the pre-eminent power, leader and hegemon 
in South Asia and the Indian Ocean – a status that is given by geographical, historical and 
cultural facts, and what happens in this geopolitical and civilizational space is of crucial im-
portance to India (Mohan 2004a, Singh 2004b, 2009, Mukherjee 2005, Rao 2010c). “[N]o 
region is more vital for India than South Asia”, as the authors of grand strategy document 
Non-alignment 2.0 point out, “India cannot hope to arrive as a great power if it is unable to 
manage relationships within South Asia” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 15). This means, in particular, 
that the countries in South Asia should acknowledge India’s status as the pre-eminent power 
and be sensitive to its security concerns and interests (Saran 2005; Swaraj 2010), which trans-
cend India’s national boundaries and encompass South Asia and the Indian Ocean as a whole. 
As Pranab Mukherjee (2007) notes: “In our immediate neighbourhood, Indian policy has of-
ten been misconstrued as a search for hegemony. We have also often been accused of treating 
South Asia as an Indian sphere of influence. India’s primacy in South Asia is based on de-
mography and geography.”59  
                                                 
59
 Denouncing any hegemonistic ambitions and acknowledging past failures in India’s regional policy, the Post-
Nehruvian discourse embraces a more conciliatory and integrative approach towards India’s neighbours, which 
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This reasoning can also be partially traced back to the geo-political and imperialist thought of 
British colonial rule, in particular Lord Curzon’s vision of a forward policy to dominate the 
entire South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, thereby protecting colonial India from land- 
and sea-based invasions. Drawing on this reasoning, the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse has artic-
ulated the necessity that India must closely bind the countries in the region to India and ex-
clude extra-regional powers from it (see Mohan 2004: 204ff., 2012; Mansingh 2005: 54, Sikri 
2009: 284ff.). “The interests and presence of major powers in this region”, as the Ministry of 
Defence (2007/08: 2) notes in its annual report, “coupled with the relative instability in our 
immediate neighbourhood are a matter of concern to India”. The articulation of Pakistan and 
China as ‘others’ by the Post-Nehruvian discourse is to a great extent shaped by the narrative 
of Indian Greatness and its vision for regional preponderance. Pakistan that was, according to 
this narrative carved out of the Indian body politic, epitomizes not only the loss of territory 
but also the main challenge to India’s rightful regional status. Likewise, China through its 
various ‘inroads’ into South Asia and the Indian Ocean subverts this status. 
Apart from its status as ancient civilization, the sense for India’s greatness is derived from the 
fact that “India as a nation of over a billion people […] contains one sixth of humankind” 
(Krishna 2012b) and is “a country of continental size with land borders shared with a large 
number of countries, 1197 islands and a coastline of 7516 kilometers with a vast Exclusive 
Economic Zone” (Ministry of Defence 2004: 5). In addition, India is located at “one of the 
world’s great crossroads” (Bajpai  2007: 81) between the “’arc of prosperity’ that includes 
half of the world’s population and many of the world’s largest and most dynamic economies”, 
the “‘arc of energy’ starting from the Persian Gulf […] to Siberia and Russia’s Far East”, 
“‘the arc of instability’” from West Asia passing through Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka to Central Asia and the “‘arc of communications’” in the Indian Ocean that “today con-
trols the energy flows from the Persian Gulf and the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) 
between Europe and Asia. […] India, which has given the Indian Ocean its name, is at the 
heart of Asia, with links to all the sub-regions of Asia. Its geographical puts India at the vor-
tex of these four arcs that carry both potential and peril” (Sikri 2009: 12-13).  
This geopolitical location is believed to give India not only a particular importance in world 
politics, but also to make it prone to external interferences – a narrative that invokes the 
memories of the various ‘outside’ invasions and rulers of the Indian subcontinent ranging 
                                                                                                                                                        
found expression, inter alia, in the so-called Gujral doctrine, named after Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, that stipu-
lates the principle of non-reciprocity calling on India to provide incentives and concessions and taking the lead in 
regional cooperation in South Asia (Mohan 1999: 82; Dixit 2001: 56; Sinha 2003c: 377ff.; Mansingh 2005: 54; 
Mehta Singh 2007: 69).   
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from the Mughal Empire to British colonial rule (Menon 2010). Invoking this narrative, the 
Chief of the Indian Navy, Sureesh Mehta (2008) notes,  
 
“we cannot contest the historical surmise that India never lost her independence till she lost the com-
mand of the seas to the Portuguese in the first decade of the 16th century. The continental mindset of 
Indian rulers was shaped by their experience of invasions which came from landward. However, such 
invasions and conquests either led to transient political changes or to the foundation of new dynasties 
[…]. While dominance over the Indian Ocean passed from the Portuguese to the British, the Mughals 
remained oblivious of the importance of sea-power to the empire. Consequently, India’s maritime capa-
bilities, and what existed of its naval power, could not prevent India’s subjugation by the British.”  
 
India’s civilizational heritage, its past achievements, its geographic and demographic attrib-
utes, and its accomplishments as an independent nation that is today “the world’s largest de-
mocracy” (Vajpayee 2003c: 154) and “the world's fourth largest economy, with the second 
highest rate of GDP growth” (Singh [M.] 2005g) have endowed Indian elites with a sense of 
self-importance, prestige and entitlement and further strengthened the belief, already formu-
lated by Jawaharlal Nehru after independence, that India is destined to become a major global 
power (Mehta [P.B] 2009: 213). As External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna (2012b) pointed 
out: 
 
“India is, no doubt, very large and contains one sixth of humankind. Its territory is astonishingly diverse, 
with its people differentiated by religion, language, caste, ethnicity, as well as by ecology, technology, 
dress and cuisine. India as a nation of over a billion people, driven by the energy and enterprise of its 
youth, living in a democratic framework, celebrating its unparalled diversity, pursuing sustainable and 
inclusive growth, and fulfilling its role as a responsible international citizen, will be a major factor of 
global peace, stability, development and prosperity in the 21st century.” 
 
The growing recognition by the United States and other major powers of India’s status as an 
emerging power, demonstrated, for instance, by the various strategic partnerships and the de-
facto acknowledgement of India as a nuclear weapons state, have thus, in turn, resulted in a 
greater congruence with India’s self-imagination. This overconfidence in India’s role was  
expressed, for instance, by the BJP politician and former Minister of External Affairs, 
Yashwant Sinha (2010) who asserted in the wake of President Obama’s visit to India in 2010 
that the “US needs India more than we do”.  
 
6.4.2 Indian Exceptionalism  
The narrative of Indian Greatness is closely intertwined with the narrative of Indian Excep-
tionalism which articulates the myth that India, as an ancient civilization and as a modern 
nation-state, is a unique symbol of tolerance, moral righteousness, pluralism and peaceful co-
existence in the world and has despite its power and influence “never been an aggressor na-
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tion, a colonizer or a hegemon in her long history” (Vajpayee 2004). Accordingly, India has a 
particular destiny and the capacity for moral leadership in world politics and can thanks to its 
composite, non-violent and syncretic culture make a substantial contribution to peace, plural-
ism and justice in international relations. In the words of the Indian defence minister Pranab 
Mukherjee (2005):  
 
“India is not an aggressive country; it does not harbour any territorial ambitions; it does not espouse or 
export any particular ideology, except the spirit of peace, co-existence and tolerance. It has a strong 
military only to defend itself and protect its territorial integrity. It is one of the world’s oldest civiliza-
tions, but a new nation; the largest democracy of a bewildering mix of people and populations that has 
learnt to accommodate and assimilate over the ages. […] Today, when a more mobile world looks for 
models of co-existence, where minorities live abroad as immigrants or expatriates, India’s historical ex-
perience of co-existence could be a valuable reference point”.    
 
The narrative of Indian Exceptionalism complements the founding myth of India and plays a 
crucial role in the (re-)production of India’s national identity: India is not only a great and 
ancient civilization originating in the Vedic-Aryan high culture, but has also some unique and 
intrinsic characteristics. Drawing on Laclau’s work, Dirk Nabers (2015: 169) points out that 
“founding myths and narratives of uniqueness are significant in any nation”. They emanate 
from – what Laclau calls – “the absence of God as fullness of Being” (Laclau/Zac 1994: 36), 
that is, the absence of a final or universal ground for articulating meanings and identities. 
Myths are then “no more than a foil which represents the missing fullness of a nation” (Na-
bers 2015: 169).  
The myth seeks to conceal or fill this emptiness by attributing the nation some intrinsic es-
sences, thereby enabling a discourse to forge a chain of equivalence which integrates dissimi-
lar elements (demands, interests, identities etc.) into a common national community and 
makes it possible that several actors identify with this community. Given the lack of any sta-
ble foundations and essences, every nation is in constant need of reproducing itself and thus 
of recreating the myths it is founded upon. Hence, myths are constitutive of national identities, 
since they symbolize the seemingly immaculate chain of equivalence around which the na-
tional community was originally institutionalized. They provide an important source of im-
ages, mythic heroes and events that are woven together in a narrative to define the nation’s 
values, virtues, ideals and proper mode of conduct. Usually, these myths evolve around empty 
signifiers such as exceptionalism and signifiers associated with it, thereby allowing the inte-
gration and symbolization of various (conflicting) social demands and interests (Laclau 1990: 
141/144). By articulating the notion of Indian exceptionalism, the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
seeks – like the articulations of exceptionalism in the national discourse of other countries 
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such as the U.S. which frames the U.S. as an ‘indispensable nation’ in the world (see Madsen 
1998, Hodgson 2009) – to universalize a particularity and represent its own actions as a ser-
vice to humanity whereby India’s national identity is re-affirmed and stabilized.  
The myth of Indian Exceptionalism centres, above all, on the notion of ‘unity in diversity’ – 
the hallmark of Indian nationalism – which epitomizes India’s unique tolerant, pluralist and 
peaceful ethos and underpins its moral leadership claim in global affairs. It has become a 
sedimented myth that has contained and survived the dislocation of the Nehruvian discourse 
and incorporated various social demands and interests, making it to a collective social imagi-
nary that provides the discursive horizon in which political decisions and moral judgements 
are taken in India. The myth has emerged during India’s colonial encounter, when India’s 
nationalist movement began to contest the discourse of the colonizers (and the subordinated 
subject positions it created for them), as we have seen, by simultaneously drawing on these 
discourses but also subverting and misappropriating them in the process of forging and con-
solidating a nationalist discourse.  
The myth of Indian Exceptionalism played a crucial role in this process. Confronted with the 
materially superior culture of the colonizers, the Indian nationalist discourse articulated, as 
Partha Chatterjee (1993: 6ff.) has prominently argued, a distinction between an ‘inner’ and an 
‘outer’ domain. While the discourse largely acceded to the superiority of the ‘West’ in the 
outer domain of statecraft, science and technology and thus sought to emulate the ‘West’ in 
these areas, it asserted the superiority of India and the ‘East’ in general in the inner domain of 
culture, morality and spirituality that must be preserved and protected from the ‘West’. 
Though Chatterjee’s distinction is an oversimplification, because it presupposes a homoge-
nous notion of culture, the possibility to draw a clear line between the ideational and material 
domain and neglects the deep ambiguity of Nehru and other national leaders towards ‘West-
ern’ statecraft, science and technology (see Prakash 1999, Mondal 2003, Chacko 2012), it 
captures the way how the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse sought to (re-)produce a distinctive In-
dian nationalism and articulated an aspiration for a new, ethically superior modernity by criti-
cally engaging ‘Western’ modernity and invoking India’s rich cultural and spiritual heritage.  
The myth of Indian Exceptionalism, of India as an inherently tolerant, pluralist and non-
aggressive nation should, on the one hand, underscore that an independent India nation-state, 
though succeeding the British Raj, would not blindly emulate the destructive practices of the 
colonial oppressors, but follow a distinctively Indian path to modernity, and, on the other 
hand, define and maintain a national identity for an extremely diverse society. By construct-
ing the narratives of Indian Exceptionalism and Indian Greatness, the (Post-)Nehruvian dis-
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course can represent India as a continuous cultural and political agent, where different reli-
gious, ethnic and linguist groups have lived together in peace and harmony for thousand of 
years of history. It constructs and emphasizes a kind of organic link between the ancient 
Vedic ideal Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, Buddha, the ancient emperor Ashoka, who turned to 
Buddhism and became the ‘messenger’ of non-violence, the Mughal emperor Akbar, who is 
praised for developing a tolerant and impartial strand of Islam, and Mahatma Gandhi, who 
became the symbol of India’s successful non-violent struggle for independence. Invoking the 
two mythical narratives, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna (2012c) notes, for instance, 
that “India is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. Our civilizational ethos 
has been underpinned by peaceful coexistence and tolerance, values that Mahatma Gandhi 
placed at the core of India’s national life”. Drawing on the same narratives, Pranab Mukherjee 
(2005) adds:  
 
“Historically, India has been a fundamentally ‘open’ society. It has received and absorbed major influ-
ences from outside, like Islam and Christianity, and radiated cultural influences, outward. It was, with 
the Arab, Persian and Sinic civilizations, a source of cultural influence in Asia. India was one of the 
great well-springs of human intellectual and spiritual achievement, of the metaphysical insights of Hin-
duism, and the pacific mission of Buddhism. It is customary to talk of strategic perspectives in terms of 
‘hard’ power: our strategic perspectives were those of trade, religion, culture, spirituality, and the arts; 
and later, the political morality of Gandhi.”         
  
What Krishna and Mukherjee describe here is thus not an authentic account of Indian history 
and traits, but rather the reproduction of a national narrative which India’s nationalist leaders 
constructed and propagated for their nation-building endeavour by searching for elements of 
unity, continuity and cohesion in the – discursively conveyed history of the – civilizational 
past and selectively emphasizing those elements, which supported their vision of a great and 
undivided nation, as the essence of India. That is not say that there is no Indian history or cul-
ture. There surely is one – but this history or culture is not defined by some authentic, un-
changing ancient tradition. Rather, it is defined by the modern imagining (and the continued 
discursive reproduction) of the Indian nation.  
Given the fact that other nationalisms in the world were usually based on a common religion, 
language or ethnicity, India, in the reading of the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse, had to articulate 
and must preserve a distinctive Indian nationalism centred around the notion of ‘unity in di-
versity’ (Khilnani 2003; Tharoor 2007).60 Foreign policy has been and continues to be a cru-
cial site for the (re-)production of India’s distinctive national identity by differentiating India 
                                                 
60
 The main counter-hegemonic discourse in India, the hyper-nationalist discourse also endorses, as we will see 
in chapter 7, the narrative of Indian Exceptionalism and its notion of ‘unity in diversity’, but attributes it exclu-
sively to India’s Hindu heritage.    
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from the narrow, exclusive nationalisms of other states and the hegemonistic policies of great 
powers in the international system and granting India “the role as the conscience-keeper of the 
world” (Sikri 2009: 298): This implies that India acts a moral force which is committed to – 
what Gandhi called – the ‘truthful method’ and struggles for a more just and peaceful world, 
even when facing powerful opposition. Criticizing the U.S. military intervention in Iraq, the 
former prime minister H.D. Deve Gowda (2007) from the Janata Dal (Secular), for instance, 
demanded in the Indian Parliament: “It is high time that the land of Mahatma Gandhi, who led 
a prolonged battle against British imperialism, stands up and asserts itself against the he-
gemonistic tendencies of the U.S. We cherish friendship with the people of the U.S., but that 
should not be at the cost of the principles that our founding fathers stood for.” In other words, 
India’s foreign affairs allow the Post-Nehruvian discourse to construct a chain of equivalence 
by contrasting India’s exemplar of ‘unity in diversity’ and the ‘confluence of civilizations’ 
with an international system shaped by inter-national and inter-civilizational rivalries and 
conflicts. As E. Ahamed (2011), Minister of State External Affairs and President of the Indian 
Union Muslim League, states: 
 
“India has been a living example of Confluence of Civilizations and not Clash of Civilizations. It is a 
place where we celebrate diversity and are enriched by differences. Each and every section of society in 
India has found equal opportunities for expression and for accomplishments. India is the largest democ-
racy in the World and it has ensured for its citizens equality and dignity. Even the weaker sections of 
the society are provided equal status and equal opportunities.” 
 
Likewise, the Congress politician and former diplomat Mani Shankar Aiyar (2004: 5) notes: 
 
“Most civilizations posit nationhood and diversity as antithetical. The single greatest contribution of In-
dia to world civilization is to demonstrate that there is nothing antithetical between diversity and na-
tionhood. Indeed, the celebration of diversity strengthens our unity, even as the imposition of uniformity 
gravely undermines national unity. No other civilization has as long a record as ours in evolving a com-
posite culture. No other country has as long a record as ours of a polity based on secularism”.  
 
The myth of Indian Exceptionalism suggests that India is a non-traditional power – a power 
that has never sought to and never will imitate past or current great powers, which invaded, 
exploited or suppressed other countries and strived for regional or global hegemony. Instead, 
India has acted as a moral and benign force that shaped the global order primarily through 
principled moral and political arguments rather than military means. Though the Post-
Nehruvian discourse concedes the importance of hard power in world politics, it has pre-
served the notion that India should follow a principled foreign policy and rather seek to rede-
fine the role of a great power by becoming “a different power, a power that works for devel-
opment, peace and international understanding, in its own interest and in that of its friends 
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and partners abroad” (Menon 2011a). As the authors Non-alignment 2.0 note, “India must 
remain true to its aspiration of creating a new and alternative universality” and thus “should 
aim not just at being powerful: it should set new standards for what the powerful must do” 
(Khilnani et al. 2012: 69-70). As the External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha (2004) points 
out:  
 
“‘Great Power’ or ‘Major Power’ should be seen in a modern 21st century setting and not in its histori-
cal context. India does not subscribe to the conventional idea of power. India approaches the notion of 
power with an alternative vision. India's power capabilities are a guarantee of the freedom and security 
of its people who constitute one sixth of humanity. For us, power is a means of advancing the welfare of 
our people and a tool for preserving and consolidating the autonomy of our foreign and domestic policy. 
Moreover, as befits India's history and the traditions of its post-independence foreign policy, our pursuit 
of power is firmly anchored in an international mission aimed at eliminating the scourge of war, protect-
ing international law, strengthening the U.N. and striving for a new deal for developing countries whose 
people constitute the large majority of the world.” 
 
Expressing her general uneasiness with the term superpower at the 2006 Hindustan Times 
Leadership Summit ‘India: The next Global Superpower’, Congress leader Sonia Gandhi 
pointed out:      
 
“During long periods of our past, India exercised a profound influence on the course of world history, 
and it did so without exercising any kind of overt power. Consider, for instance how Gandhiji, mocked 
as ‘half-naked fakir’ by the British, took on the Superpower if the day through the mere force of his 
values and ideas. We Indians have always known our place in the world even when the world was treat-
ing us lightly. […] Why should we think of ourselves as a ‘Global Superpower’? Why not instead work 
towards becoming a global force for Peace, Progress and Prosperity?” (Gandhi 2007b: 32).  
 
In contrast to other great powers, India, as the myth of Indian Exceptionalism suggests, is a 
benign power that has always been tolerant and non-violent, acting as a pro-active agent of 
peaceful co-existence, equity and justice in its internal as well as external affairs. “India’s 
universal vision”, as PM Singh (2008d) points out, “defines her place in the comity of nations. 
[…] It is a vision that defines India, that defines the idea of India and that defines India's mes-
sage to the world at large.” Though India, as the narrative of Indian Greatness asserts, was 
once among the most powerful civilizations of the world and its civilization spread to many 
parts of Asia and beyond, “this was not a ‘Territorial’ but rather, a ‘Cultural’ and ‘Civilisa-
tional’ presence. This historical tradition survives to this very day. It underscores our often-
stated assertion that India has no territorial ambitions and no desire to establish any form of 
regional or extra-regional hegemony” (Mukherjee 2007). “[I]n line with our history, culture 
and civilization”, as PM Singh 2006d) notes:  
 
“For centuries, we have lived in peace with the world around us, travelling to distant lands as traders, 
teachers and scholars. Rarely has the world seen armies sailing out of India as conquerors. The Indian 
influence across much of Asia has been one of culture, language, religion, ideas and values, not of 
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bloody conquest. We have always been respected for our traditional export knowledge! Does that not 
also make India a ‘global superpower’, though not in the traditional sense! Can this not be the power we 
seek in the next century?” 
 
The (Post-)Nehruvian discourse ironically draws on the notion of a ‘civilizing mission’, 
which also underpinned European colonialism and India fiercely resisted, to make sense of 
India’s past engagement with the world, whereby India’s influence is represented in purely 
benign terms. In accordance with the myth of Indian Exceptionalism, the spread of India’s 
influence must have been peaceful and benign, because India is and has always been inher-
ently non-violent, non-expansionist and tolerant. It has a general discomfort with or no proper 
instinct for power, and military power in particular, but rather leads by “the power of its ex-
ample” and the moral superiority of its principles and values (see Mehta [P.B.] 2009, Khilnani 
et al. 2012). The main source of this benign power is that India constitutes a multi-religious, 
multi-ethnic and multi-linguist society that is today the largest pluralist democracy in the 
world and undergoing a major socio-economic transformation process, thereby demonstrating 
not only that diversity and peaceful co-existence are not antithetical, but also that develop-
ment can take place in a democratic framework. As PM Singh highlights:       
 
“The uniqueness of Indian growth experience is that it takes place entirely within the framework of a 
democratic polity. This has demonstrative implications for the world at large. The success of India will 
be a living proof that growth need not come at the cost of human freedoms. At the same time, its intrin-
sic stability and consensual basis will make themselves fully felt in long-term partnerships. Many of 
you probably know the diversity and the complexity of a country of one billion people that India is. All 
the great religions of the world are represented in our country. We have 150 million citizens who prac-
tice the faith of Islam and I say it with some pride, about their patriotism, that not one of them has 
joined the ranks of these gangs like Al-Qaeda or other terrorist activities […]. Our success has a global 
significance. India's success and the success of this experiment can alter the course of history in the 21st 
century” (Singh [M.] 2005h, 2007c).  
 
Likewise, E. Ahamed (2011) highlights:  
 
“When we look around for successful models of inclusiveness, tolerance and peaceful existence, I have 
no doubt in my mind that India stands out as a living example of Unity in Diversity. India is a land of 
variety with a mosaic of geography, climate, lifestyles, religions, habits, thought processes and cultures. 
With a population of over 1.2 billion, it has more than 30 languages, more than 1600 dialects and hun-
dreds of ethnic groups. India is the birth place of the great religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism 
and Jainism. We also have one of the largest populations of Muslims in the world and our land has pro-
vided the ground for other religions like Christianity and Zorastranism to flourish. And in spite of all 
these differences, all these diversity, the Indian civilization, from time immemorial, has been character-
ized by inclusiveness and by unity in diversity.”   
 
The fantasy of India as a non-traditional or exceptional power, which is a moral force and the 
messenger of tolerance, peaceful co-existence and equity in world politics, is not simply a 
narrative that Indian policy-makers invoke and utilize as a diplomatic instrument to convince 
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the world of the benign nature of India, but a sedimented myth that has gripped subjects and 
become a collective social imaginary that serves as the surface of inscription for various po-
litical practices. As we have seen, the discourse even uses the myth of Indian Exceptionalism 
as an interpretative framework for depicting the past influence and expansion of the Indian 
civilization. Likewise, the main counter-hegemonic discourse, as we will see in the next chap-
ter, invokes and re-affirms the myth of Indian Exceptionalism, thereby contributing to its 
sedimentation. Even Indian realists (see Chellaney 2009a, Pant 2009b), who generally deplore 
the ‘moralizing’ and ‘idealist’ tendencies in India’s foreign policy, are gripped by the myth, 
when they lament that Indian policy-makers have no understanding of power and military 
force or when they highlight that India’s pluralist, tolerant and non-violent ethos is an asset on 
India’s path to the great power status.  
The mythical narrative of Indian Exceptionalism seeks to conceal the ruptures and inherent 
contradictions of the Post-Nehruvian discourse, functioning as a glue that holds the discourse 
together and defends it against the discursive exterior which always threatens to subvert and 
dislocate it. The myth constitutes India’s national identity and defines its position in the world 
order. In short, if India was not exceptional, it would neither be a nation-state nor have a 
meaningful place in the world order.  
By de-mystifying the notion of an Indian Exceptionalism, we can disclose some of the rup-
tures and inherent contradictions that shape the Post-Nehruvian discourse. The myth of In-
dia’s pluralist, tolerant and peaceful ethos obscures that India, like every other nation and 
civilization, experienced in its history periods of creative peaceful and assimilative interaction, 
but also of extreme violence and intolerance. Non-violence has thus not been an enduring 
condition in ancient and modern India, but rather has become a cultural ideal, which has been 
and continues to be extensively debated in India, against the backdrop of recurrent violence 
and intolerance, coupled with the desire to overcome this state-of-affairs (Doninger 2010: 10-
11). India’s nation-building process, like the nation-building projects of most states, has been 
accompanied by excessive violence from the very beginning. The bloody partition of British 
in India in 1947, which resulted in a mass flight, outbursts of extreme violence and pogroms 
(see Pandey 2002, Talbot/Singh 2009), already demonstrated how difficult it would be to hold 
the ethnic, religious, linguist and socio-economic extremely heterogeneous society together in 
a nation-state.  
Though India is formally a democracy and upholds the principle of peaceful co-existence, the 
modern Indian nation-state has produced, as Itty Abraham (2014: xv/2) has shown, “an un-
even domestic space” that is characterized by internal divisions and hierarchies “that mark 
175 
 
majorities and minorities and that exclude populations from the national center on the basis of 
ethnicity, class, religion, gender, and civilization”. The formation of core-periphery relations 
has resulted in a marginalization and discrimination of certain segments of the Indian society, 
which have contested and upraised against the Indian nation-state, ranging from secession-
ist/separatist movements in Kashmir, the North-east and Punjab to the Maoist insurgency, 
which originated in an uprising of peasants in the union states Andhra Pradesh and West Ben-
gal in 1967 and has become the most violent internal conflict in India. Confronted with these 
dissident movements and insurgencies, Indian governments have frequently resorted to force, 
including the use of the air force against the own population in the north-eastern Nagaland, to 
coerce ethno-nationalist communities in its periphery or socially deprived and dissident peas-
ants, Dalits and Adivasi into the nation-state. Between 1992 and 2014 more than 75,000 peo-
ple died in India’s internal conflicts (SATP 2015).  
For Dibyesh Anand, the narrative of India’s peaceful, tolerant and pluralist ethos shall ob-
scure that the modern Indian nation-state is ultimately a “Postcolonial Informal Empire” 
which has continued in many respects the imperialist policies of the British Raj and sought to 
coerce, discipline and co-opt minorities into the overarching nationalism:  
 
“In India, the self-serving notion of being a moral postimperial country with values of Gandhian non-
violence and Nehruvian nonalignment, and therefore avoiding crude power politics, remains entrenched. 
Even as the Indian state brutalizes populations in its peripheries and subverts democracy by allowing 
the military and paramilitary a free hand, it peddles the myth of a postcolonial democratic nation […] 
Beyond the rhetoric of unity in diversity lies the reality of the dominance of a majoritarian identity” 
(Anand 2012: 74f./77).  
 
Though this account of India’s democracy and minority policies is too harsh in its critique, it 
exposes the shortcomings of peaceful co-existence in India and the divisions, hierarchies and 
inequalities prevalent in the Indian body politic.  
What the myth of Indian Exceptionalism obscures is that peaceful co-existence in India does 
not mean equal status and equal opportunities for everyone, but the marginalization and dis-
crimination of certain segments of the society. Indian Muslims, who constitute the largest 
minority in India, have for instance also become the socio-economically most discriminated 
community in India (Jaffrelot 2011: xxiii-xxv). The Muslim minority also suffers from politi-
cal marginalization and has increasingly become the target of militant Hindu nationalists, 
while, at the same time, Indian Muslims have joined radical Islamist organizations. Inter-
religious or communal violence, in particular between Hindus and Muslims, has recurred re-
peatedly in India, assuming in some cases the proportion of pogrom-like clashes such as the 
Gujarat riots in 2002. Responding to this recurrent violence, the Post-Nehruvian discourse 
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invokes the mythical narratives of Indian Exceptionalism and Greatness and represents these 
events as anomalies in India’s long history of peaceful co-existence or as the result of external 
powers that have – such as the British through their divide-and-rule policy in the colonial era 
– inflicted strife between the communities. Asked about the communal riots in Gujarat in 
2002, the Indian diplomat Lalit Mansingh (2002) highlighted:   
  
“You have to look at India’s track record: long years of civilization and more than 2,000 years of reli-
gious coexistence and harmony. After all, how many countries can boast having eight major religions 
coexisting together? The point is that when you have a billion people subscribing to eight religions, 
some amount of religious tension is to be expected from time to time, and of late, there has been this 
concerted effort to create divisions between the communities and to provoke hatred and animosity.”       
 
Elaborating on the alleged peaceful nature of Indians, the former diplomat and author Pavan 
K. Varma (2004: 165) concedes: “Indians are not non-violent per se. The myth of ahimsa or 
non-violence, as an intrinsic part of the Indian personality, was sold by Mahatma Gandhi and 
conveniently bought by the nation. […] Indians are capable of a great degree of violence, and 
newspapers routinely report instances of domestic servants battered by educated employers, 
of brides tortured and burnt for dowry and of unprovoked police brutality” (Varma 2004: 165). 
While somewhat de-mystifying India’s inherent peacefulness, Varma, simultaneously, con-
tributes to the sedimentation of this myth, when he asserts that:  
 
“the violence that Indians exhibit in society against hierarchically ‘inferior’ or vulnerable, which is eas-
ier inflict and often has social sanction, turns into an inexplicable form of pacifism in dealing with an 
external enemy. […] Historically, Indians have a very mediocre record in defending themselves against 
foreign invaders. Unlike the Mongols, the Turks or the European powers, Hindus have never pursued 
military conquest outside the extended periphery of the subcontinent. The impact of Hindu civilization 
is visible all over South and South-East Asia, but it is mostly religious and cultural […] The simple 
truth is that Indians are not warmongers. They have never initiated war against another country. In vic-
tory they have been accommodating. In defeat, such as that suffered at the hands of China in 1962, they 
have endeavoured to be forgiving. Their military track record has been marked by a distaste for military 
adventurism, and lack of desire for conquest by violence” (Varma 2004: 166-168). 
 
The mythical narrative of Indian Exceptionalism, of India as the non-traditional and benign 
power, is very resilient in India’s foreign policy discourse, although independent India has in 
many respects emulated the behaviour of great powers. For example, India articulated either 
explicitly or implicitly exclusive Indian spheres of influence (South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean), pursued imperialist-like foreign policies towards its smaller neighbours (e.g. unequal 
treaties with Nepal and Bhutan) and acquired typical great power symbols such as nuclear 
weapons, long-range ballistic missiles or aircraft carriers. Unsurprisingly, most of India’s di-
rect neighbours, including China, do not share this depiction of India as a non-hegemonic, 
non-aggressive and non-interfering state (see Garver/Wang 2010, Pande 2011, Mazumdar 
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2015). By attributing the wariness of many South Asian countries towards India, for example, 
as a ‘big brother syndrome’ emanating from their envy and resentments about India’s 
achievements, its size and superior resources and national identities, which are overwhelmed 
by India’s civilisational and cultural grandeur and thus emphasize differences with India (see 
Saran 2006, Sikri 2009, Sibal 2012b, Malhotra 2014), the Post-Nehruvian discourse negates 
the possibility that these countries have legitimate security concerns that are a direct conse-
quence of India’s words or deeds, resulting for instance from India’s military intervention in 
East-Pakistan to foster the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 or, in the case of China, from India’s 
covert support of Tibetan resistance in the late 1950s and India’s provocative forward policy 
before the outbreak of the 1962 war (Mohan 2006).  
Instead, the discourse tends to victimize India. India is, for instance, represented as a “‘reluc-
tant nuclear power’” that was “compelled” to go for nuclear weapons because of a deeply 
flawed and discriminatory non-proliferation order that turned a blind eye to China’s support 
of the Pakistani nuclear-weapons programme (Subrahmanyam 2009). Instead of abandoning 
the notion of Indian Exceptionalism after India’s nuclear tests and launching – what some 
Indian policy analysts (see Mohan 2004, Kapur 2006) have called – a ‘normalization’ of In-
dia’s foreign and security policies, Indian policy-makers have not given up their nuclear am-
biguity and the nuclear weapons programme was framed through the myth of Indian Excep-
tionalism as “a unique voluntary restraint of 24 years” and a continuation of India’s principled 
nuclear policy (MEA 1998-99: 73, see also Dixit 1998c, Singh [Jasw.] 1998, Vajpayee [1998] 
2000: 17). Accordingly, by conducting nuclear weapons tests, India spoke truth to power and 
was, like Gandhi during the independence struggle, not intimidated by a powerful opposition 
and negative consequences.  
 
“Following the Indian nuclear tests, many people in this country and abroad have questioned whether 
declaring itself a nuclear weapon state befits a country which claims to have gained its freedom through 
a non-violent struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. […] Gandhiji successfully used non-
violence in its offensive mode to compel the British to quit India and thereby changed the status 
quo. […] Gandhiji believed that non-violence will triumph over violence and the atom bomb could not 
crush the human spirit. He also urged that injustice should be resisted at all costs. Given these parame-
ters, those who admire Gandhiji and his approach must reason and reach a conclusion on the ethics of 
the Indian nuclear arsenal” (Subrahmanyam 1998a). 
 
The notion of Indian Exceptionalism, which prescribes a principled and truthful policy, im-
plies that India is inclined to justify almost all of its actions with a magniloquent moral prin-
ciple in order to demonstrate the correctness of the Indian position, while exposing the incor-
rectness of India’s opponents. In doing so, Indian policy-makers seek to establish at least par-
ity, if not superiority, with these opponents. Speaking on the topic of nuclear proliferation in 
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Asia at a panel discussion in the United States, the Indian diplomat T.P. Sreenivasan (1999), 
for instance, defended India’s nuclear tests by saying that: 
 
“The backdrop to any discussion on Nuclear Proliferation in Asia and the United States must consist of 
the following objective factors: (i) The only continent which has been subjected to a nuclear attack is 
Asia. (ii) The US is the only country to have ever used nuclear weapons. (iii) The victim of the attack 
did not possess nuclear weapons. (iv) The US did not have a no-first use or no-use against non-nuclear 
weapons state doctrine.” 
 
In this sense, the myth of Indian Exceptionalism is an attempt to obscure the apparent hypoc-
risy in India’s nuclear policy: India has been taken the moral high ground for several decades 
and criticized the established nuclear powers, but ultimately wanted to join the nuclear club 
too. It justified its actions as a protest against the ‘nuclear apartheid’ in the international sys-
tem and continued to deploy the language of morality, but at the same time does not want that 
other countries follow India’s example and also contest the discriminatory nuclear order by 
becoming nuclear weapons states.  
This exposes a tension in the Post-Nehruvian discourse that has two dimensions: first, the 
tension between mimicking and resisting the great powers in the international system. While 
Indian policy-makers regularly deplore the hegemonistic and bullying attitudes of the great 
powers which for example seek exclusive spheres of influence or prescribe which countries 
are allowed to have nuclear weapons, India regularly resorts to the same hegemonistic behav-
iour. Apart from India’s de facto entry into the global nuclear order through the Indo-U.S. 
nuclear agreement, India, for instance, seeks to insulate South Asia and the Indian Ocean 
from external interference and implicitly denies its smaller neighbours their full external sov-
ereignty by expecting that they should be sensitive to India’s concerns and have closer rela-
tions with India than with China which is portrayed as an external or “distant country” (Metha 
2007) despite the fact that China has direct borders with almost all South Asian countries. 
Second, India regularly invokes and stresses the principles of equality and equity when it 
seeks to overcome its exclusion or discrimination (e.g. nuclear order), and the principle of 
proportionality and discrimination when it seeks to maintain its privileges (e.g. climate 
change and trade).       
 
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the Post-Nehruvian discourse that gradually emerged from the 
dislocation of the erstwhile hegemonic Nehruvian discourse and successfully transformed this 
discourse by reinterpreting and adapting it to the changed ‘structural’ circumstances of the 
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post-cold war world. The Nehruvian discourse was thus not overthrown and replaced by a 
counter-hegemonic discourse but changed and modified largely within its own discursive pa-
rameters. The chapter illuminated how the nodal point of the discourse shifted from non-
alignment to multi-alignment which emphasize India’s re-engagement of the world and a 
multi-directional foreign policy that seeks to build stable and mutually beneficial relations 
with all major players in the international system, while avoiding a one-sided tilt in India’s 
foreign policy and maintaining the independence of India’s decision-making and its strategic 
autonomy.  
The chapter elaborated the social, political and fantasmatic logics underpinning the Post-
Nehruvian discourse. By looking into the social logics, we could carve out what the discourse 
takes to be the ‘reality’ of world order. It was shown that the discourse articulates the social 
logics of state sovereignty, enlightened self-interest, non-violence, non-discrimination and 
international unity in diversity as the building blocks of world order. The investigation of the 
political logics invoked by the Post-Nehruvian discourse shed light on the temporal and spa-
tial-political ‘others’ that serve as reference points for the articulations of meanings and iden-
tities in the discourse. While the temporal ‘others’ are embodied by ‘Western’ colonialism 
and the cold war, the spatial-political ‘others’ are Pakistan and China. By examining the fan-
tasmatic logics of the discourse, we could illuminate why specific practices or discourses 
‘grip’ subjects in the sense that they desire or enjoy identifying with the discourse and its sub-
ject positions. Hence, the ideological fantasies and myths underpinning the discourse were 
exposed and discussed, namely the narratives of ‘Indian Greatness’ and ‘Indian Exceptional-
ism’. The chapter has shown that major events in India’s foreign policy (such as the nuclear 
tests in 1998) and its understanding of world order can be understood and explained as an 
interplay of these different logics which can thus serve as interpretative framework for analys-
ing India’s post-cold war foreign policy.     
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7. Hyper-nationalist Discourse: Making India Strong 
 
The hegemonic Post-Nehruvian discourse is contested by the Hyper-nationalist discourse. As 
the main counter-hegemonic discourse in India, the Hyper-nationalist discourse emerged and 
developed parallel to the mainstream Nehruvian discourse and gained in importance after the 
end of the cold war and the dislocation of the Nehruvian discourse which was no longer able 
to serve as a source of identification for many political actors. From this dislocatory moment, 
as was shown in chapter 6, the Post-Nehruvian discourse gradually emerged. Though the Hy-
per-nationalist discourse did not manage to gain discursive hegemony in the moment of dislo-
cation, it contributed to the transformation of the Nehruvian discourse and left its mark on the 
transformed hegemonic discourse.  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse consists of two overlapping sub-discourses, the Hindu na-
tionalist (Hindutva) discourse and the ultrarealist discourse, which converge in the social 
logic of national strength (shakti). The discourse is invoked and propagated by members of 
the Sangh Parivar – the family of Hindu nationalist organizations61 which include, inter alia, 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party as the political 
wing of the movement –, (former) military and intelligence personnel such as Bharat Verma, 
Gurmeet Kanwal, Ajit Doval, Raja Menon or G.D. Bakshi, some members of the Indian For-
eign Service among them the prominent retired diplomats Kanwal Sibal, Satish Chandra and 
G. Parthasarathy and government advisors such as the policy analysts Brahma Chellaney and 
Bharat Karnad, who both served in the National Security Advisory Board during the BJP-led 
National Democratic Alliance Government. As the Hyper-nationalist discourse consists of 
two sub-discourses and only constitutes a counter-hegemonic discourse, which has (so far) 
not generated a broad and inclusive hegemonic project and thus remains a rudimentary and 
fragmented discourse, there exist not only differences and tensions within the discourse, but 
its proponents have also been regularly drawing on the hegemonic (Post-)Nehruvian discourse, 
i.e. the discourse re-articulates or re-affirms in various ways the social, political and fantas-
matic logics of the hegemonic discourse, while, at the same time, seeking to distinguish itself 
from the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse. 
The Hyper-nationalist discourse represents India’s foreign policy as overly idealistic and 
moralistic, deploring a lack of strategic thought, a nonchalant dealing with the country’s na-
tional security and a disregard of military power. It is an inherently conservative discourse 
characterized by a more pessimistic worldview, a desire to preserve or recollect past traditions 
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 See for an overview of the Sangh Parivar: Jaffrelot 2005. 
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and an aspiration to build a strong, uniform nation-state. The Hindutva sub-discourse, which 
represents the core of the Hyper-nationalist discourse, originated in movements for religious 
revival and reform in the 19
th 
century that emerged in a response to colonialism, Islam and 
Christianity. It is centred around the concept of Hindutva (‘Hindu-ness’)62, a culturally and 
ethnically defined nationalism that seeks to (re-)construct a Hindu nation (rashtra) based on a 
common culture (sanskriti), bloodline (jaiti) and geographical belonging to the Indian father-
land (pitrabhoomi) (Jaffrelot 2007: 5/15; Corbridge/Harriss/Jeffrey 2013: 179-180). Accord-
ingly, Hindutva is the unifying force for the creation and maintenance of India’s national 
identity and a stable, strong and wealthy nation-state that can play a supreme role in the inter-
national system.  
The discourse of ultrarealism, by contrast, is largely a phenomenon of the post-cold war era. 
Its proponents can be found in India’s armed forces, intelligence apparatus and the strategic 
community in general. The discourse articulates a particular variant of IR realism that repre-
sents world politics as an amoral, recurrent cycle of violence and power competition and re-
gards the accumulation of supreme military power as the highest objective of states. While it 
embraces modern ‘Western’ modes of statecraft, technology and science and resembles the 
offensive realism articulated in IR
63
, the discourse, at the same time, recalls – like the Hindu 
nationalist discourse – the glory and power of the Indian civilization in the Vedic age and 
regards the ancient Hindu thought as the foundation of India’s strategic culture and grand 
strategy in the contemporary international system (see Singh [Jasw.] 1999; Karnad 2002a, 
2014, Parthasarathy 2003, Prakash 2009). Likewise, both sub-discourses are united in their 
aspiration to create a powerful, uniform nation-state that deals from a position of strength 
with internal and external enemies. While the ultrarealist discourse, however, places greater 
emphasis on military power, the Hindu nationalist discourse, though conceding the impor-
tance of the material foundation of state power, ultimately attaches greater importance to the 
cultural dimension of state power and regards a strong national will and unity embodied by 
Hindutva as the fundamental source of power. Hindutva thus serves as the privileged signifier 
around which a chain of equivalence is constructed. Though sharing the concern for a strong 
national will and unity, proponents of the ultrarealist sub-discourse, in turn, do not necessarily 
or fully endorse the Hindutva ‘agenda’ as the right path to achieve this objective. 
                                                 
62
 The term Hindutva was coined by the Hindu nationalist ideologist V.D. Savarkar (1922) in his treaty Hindutva: 
Who is a Hindu?, which was the first systematic account of the Hindu nationalist ideology and served as a foun-
dational text for the Hindu nationalist movement in India. For Savarkar, the term Hindutva should designate that 
Hinduism is the cultural foundation of India.  
63
 A prominent proponent of this realist school of thought is John J. Mearsheimer who elaborated the main ele-
ments of offensive realism in his work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001).  
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This chapter argues that the Hyper-nationalist discourse has so far not been able to forge a 
comprehensive alternative hegemonic project that could challenge the mainstream foreign 
policy discourse in India. The fact that the Hyper-nationalist discourse did not achieve discur-
sive hegemony is illustrated by an analysis of the foreign policy of the BJP-led NDA Gov-
ernment under Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee in particular. Though the BJP harshly criticized 
India’s foreign policy and promised substantial changes before coming to power in 1998, it 
rather substantiated and accelerated the transformation of India’s dislocated hegemonic dis-
course than radically changing the direction or parameters of India’s foreign policy. These 
nuanced changes included the accentuation of India’s great power ambitions, a re-calibration 
of relations with key states such as the United States and attempts to reform India’s national 
security apparatus (e.g. establishment of the National Security Council and National Security 
Advisory Boards). In other words, the BJP-led NDA government occasionally invoked the 
Hyper-nationalist discourse and could incorporate some of its elements in the disrupted 
hegemonic discourse, thereby contributing not only to its successful transformation but also 
shaping to a certain extent policy decisions such as India’s nuclear tests in 1998. However, 
the Hyper-nationalist discourse could not sediment and thus key BJP policy-makers fell back 
on the logics of the hegemonic (Post-)Nehruvian discourse such as non-discrimination and 
non-violence. 
In contrast to assertions of BJP politicians that “[t]he Vajpayee era of 1998 to 2004 witnessed 
a very substantial transformation of Indian foreign policy”, whereby “the pursuit of outdated 
ideologies had given way to the pursuit of national interest” and “India had moved from ideal-
ism to pragmatism” (Arora 2006: 19), also found in parts of the literature that speak of a fun-
damental shift towards an assertive ‘realism’ and ‘realpolitik’ under the BJP rule (see Kapur 
2006; Vanaik 2007), this chapter shows that the BJP-led government was still gripped by the 
Nehruvian discourse and did not fully contest it, but rather sought to modify and adapt it to 
the new ‘structural context’. In other words, the foreign policy under BJP rule was an updated 
Nehruvian foreign policy. This duality of continuity and change under the BJP-led govern-
ment has been pointed out by several authors, but has never been fully explicated (see Chaulia 
2002, Muni/Mohan 2004, Chiriyankandath/Wyatt 2005, Sridharan 2006, Ogden 2010, 2014b). 
This study shows that the Hyper-nationalist discourse, on which the BJP occasionally draws, 
has so far not articulated a broad, inclusive and distinctive hegemonic project, but is charac-
terized by inherent contradictions and tensions which impede its efficacy in the struggle for 
discursive hegemony. In addition, the discourse re-produces in many respects the logics of the 
(Post-)Nehruvian discourse.     
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In the first part of this chapter, national strength as the nodal point and main social logic of 
the Hyper-nationalist discourse is discussed. The second part explicates the temporal and spa-
tial-political ‘others’ of the discourse. The Hyper-nationalist discourse is constituted largely 
by the same temporal and spatial-political ‘others’ as the Post-Nehruvian discourse, but the 
colonial ‘other’ includes here also the Muslim rulers over the Indian Subcontinent and the 
relationship with the two spatial-political ‘others’ (Pakistan and China) displays a higher de-
gree of antagonism. Likewise, a variation of the fantasmatic logics of the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course, ‘Indian Greatness’ and ‘Indian Exceptionalism’, also underpins the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse. These two narratives are discussed in the third part of the chapter.  
 
 
7.1 Social Logic: National Strength (Shakti)   
The Hyper-nationalist discourse laments that India suffers from “an absence of strategic cul-
ture, lack of commitment to territory and a somewhat naive and idealistic approach to the 
country’s security” (Singh [Jasw.] 1999: 106). Accordingly, India failed to develop a tradition 
of strategic thought and understanding of state power. It has not elaborated a national security 
strategy and proper system of defence planning, has no settled borders, and the armed forces 
are largely excluded from the decision-making processes. The cause for this state of affairs is, 
according to the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the prevalence of a ‘pacifist’ and ‘moralist’ 
mind-set resulting primarily from the influence of Jainism, Buddhism and Gandhianism in 
India and partially re-affirmed by Nehru’s foreign and security policies after India’s inde-
pendence (Verma [B.] 1998; Menon 2000: 23/38; Prakash 2005: 2/5; Nehra 2010; Singh 
[Jasw.] 2013: 8-9). As the retired General V.P. Malik (2010) notes:  
 
“we had acquired, and accepted, an image of being an accommodative and a forgiving society, full of 
piety and ahimsa: one, which believed more in God-given destiny than making our own destiny. Out of 
spirituality, pacifism and nonviolence, many of our 20th century political leaders conjured up the idea 
of a morally superior India, professing peace and harmony, in a world where nations indulge in cut-
throat competition for their national interests. We talked of Vasudeva Kudumbakam, when India itself 
could not live like a family. In foreign relations, our leaders professed, and practiced, morally superior 
value-based politics, but which does not reflect the international realism.” 
 
As a result, India did not acquire the necessary military capabilities to defend its national in-
terests, shied away from using power and military force effectively and could not realize its 
great power ambitions in the international system. Instead, India became a “soft state” with a 
defensive, defeatist and reactionary approach to national security threats and, therefore, fell 
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victim to foreign subjugation and aggressions, in which it lost parts of its territory to China 
and Pakistan (Chellaney 1999a: 189; Karnad 2005: 95-95; Advani 2008b: 611). 
As the Hyper-nationalist discourse suggests that India faces the most dangerous security envi-
ronment of all states in the international system, this negligence of strategic thinking and 
planning as well as India’s defence preparedness has fatal consequences for India’s national 
integrity and interests. India is surrounded by two hostile and aligned nuclear weapons states, 
China and Pakistan, with whom it has unsettled borders and fought wars, in a region charac-
terized by endemic violence, political and social turmoil, fragile statehood and the growing 
power of Islamist fundamentalism. India is not only a major target for Islamic terrorists who 
try to islamize the entire Indian subcontinent, but also pushed to the margins by a rising and 
assertive China that seeks to dominate Asia (Karnad 2008a: 5; Doval 2010; Verma [B.] 2012; 
Sibal 2013a; Kanwal 2014). Instead of devising a national security strategy and acquiring the 
necessary military and non-military means to deal with these fundamental challenges effec-
tively, India’s response to (potential or actual) threats to its national security has remained 
amateurish, indecisive and passive (RSS 2003; Jaitley 2012; Parthasarathy 2013; Singh [Jasw.] 
2013: 1/9).  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse represents world politics as an inherently competitive and 
conflictive arena where strength and power decide about the fate of nations. The struggle for 
influence and power runs not only between states, but also between civilizations and can al-
ways turn violent. As Brahma Chellaney (1999b: 558) points out: 
 
“Global politics in the state-centred, power-driven international system clearly works to the advantage 
of the powerful. We would all like to live in a world in which unilateral resort to force by any state is 
unthinkable and untenable. But the reality is that power and force are at the core of international rela-
tions – and will remain so. The underlying principles of international relations are that power respects 
power, and that power pursues more power. The powerful states set the international rules and ensure 
compliance by the weaker nations” 
 
For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the international order is thus characterized by a rela-
tively strict hierarchy that, similar to the Hindu caste system, ranks states on the basis of their 
material as well as non-material capabilities and allocates them specific rights and responsi-
bilities in this order. After the end of the cold war and a short period of U.S. unipolarity, the 
international order is now believed to be gradually shifting towards an Asian-centric multipo-
lar order (Mishra [2000] 2005: 17; Kanwal 1999: 1713f.; Advani 2006: 1/15; Singh [Jasw.] 
2006: 274ff.; Parthasarathy 2007c; Chandra 2011a). The proponents of the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse are convinced that India is destined to become a great power and central pillar of 
this order, provided that it has a clear strategic vision and accumulates comprehensive na-
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tional power (Karnad 2002a: xii/xvii; Verma [B.] 2009: 13; Doval 2010; Singh/Gera/Dewan 
2013: 16f./235). Deploring that “India is yet to find a place and a role commensurate with its 
size, population, strategic location and its potential in various fields in the new world order”, 
the BJP noted in its 1996 election manifesto, “India’s national objective must be to become 
one of the most powerful nations in the world” (BJP [1996] 2000: 64-65). In particular, India 
must come to terms with the ‘geopolitical realities’ of the international system and question 
old “shibboleths” such as non-alignment or non-violence, which have become ‘empty man-
tras’ in the post-Nehru period, and adopt a foreign policy driven by ‘realpolitik’ and ‘pragma-
tism’ (Mishra [2000] 2005: 18), whereby, as the former defence minister and BJP politician 
K.C. Pant (2006: 85) notes, “the enhancement of national power is the strategic objective of 
nation States” and not the promotion of certain values. Criticizing the ‘moralism’ in India’s 
foreign policy, Jaswant Singh (1999: 42-43) noted:  
 
“This ‘moral aspect’ was in essence a confusion […] It is a search for the ‘moral’ in the realm of inter-
national affairs, a reconciliation then of that ‘moral’ with the demonstrated reality of the conduct of na-
tions in pursuit of their respective national goals and interests. It is a confusion that arises from not dif-
ferentiating between individual human morality and ethics, and the reality of national interests. […] 
Always being ‘troubled’ by the individual ‘moral aspect’ resulted in serious long-term consequences, 
for India and its successive generations, in four more specific areas of critical importance: Tibet, Sino-
Indian relations; Indo-Pak standoff relations as exemplified by Jammu & Kashmir; and the nuclear ar-
mament question.” 
 
The discourse contends that India still struggles with the fact that international relations are 
driven by power, violence and the pursuit of narrow national interests rather than lofty ideals 
and morality. More concerned about upholding certain moral ideals and India’s moral reputa-
tion in the world, Indian policy-makers, as the discourse asserts, tend to be very uncomfort-
able with power and disregard the use of force as an instrument of state policy believing in a 
flawed understanding of the relationship between the ends and means in international politics 
(Menon 2000: 23f.; Malik 2010: 2; Karnad 2014: 214). This prevents not only the effective 
defence of India’s national interests and security, but has also led to “a besieged psyche and 
psychology of victimhood” that results from the belief that India’s opponents adhere to the 
same principles to which India subscribes and the moral outrage after India has been once 
again outmanoeuvred by them (Nehra 2010). Similarly, the Hyper-nationalist discourse, and 
the ultrarealist sub-discourse in particular, cautions about privileging India’s alleged ‘soft 
power’ over its ‘hard power’ and believing that India, as the authors of the report Non-
alignment 2.0 suggest, can lead by ‘the power of its example’. This belief in India’s ‘soft 
power’ “displays a disquieting naiveté” by ignoring the fact that “comprehensive national 
power rather than example is what counts for in the real world” (Chandra 2012) and that is no 
186 
 
coincidence that the concept originated in the country with the greatest hard power in the 
world: the United States (Karnad 2012a).
64
 As the former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal 
(2013b) points out:    
 
“Bollywood, which is loved by the Pakistani public, hasn’t reduced Pakistan’s hostility towards India, 
just as the fondness of some here for Pakistani plays and affection for sufi music does not change nega-
tive thinking about Pakistan in India. Our secularism and pluralism is hardly viewed with admiration in 
the Islamic world, where the more conservative regimes actually see secularism as a form of heresy and 
minorities are denied equal status in law. Our other cultural attributes, however attractive, haven’t per-
suaded countries to be on India’s side against dictatorships and military regimes that inflict violence or 
make territorial demands on us. Across the world people can love Indian food and enjoy Indian art 
forms, but that does not lessen political differences on key bilateral or international issues, just as the 
popularity of Chinese food in India does not alter our thinking about Chinese claims on Arunachal 
Pradesh or its strategic alliance with Pakistan.” 
 
Despite its critique of the Nehruvian foreign policy, the Hyper-nationalist discourse does not 
really question or contest the utility of non-alignment during the cold war and its continuing 
relevance for India’s contemporary foreign policy, but the way how it was put into practice 
and became a mantra, an end in itself, instead of a mean to promote India’s national interests 
and great power ambitions (cf. BJP 2000, Kanwal 2000a, Karnad 2002a, Singh [Jasw.] 2006, 
Parthasarathy 2007a). In other words, the Hyper-nationalist discourse has not sought to estab-
lish an alternative and inclusive nodal point, but rather to promote a different understanding 
of non-alignment. The Hyper-nationalist discourse thus embraced and supported the shift 
from non-alignment to multi-alignment in the transformation process of the hegemonic dis-
course. For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, multi-alignment implies strategic autonomy and a 
multi-directional foreign policy backed by the accumulation of national strength. As Brahma 
Chellaney (2010b: 154) describes this ongoing shift:  
 
“India has now come of age. It is displaying greater realism in its economic and foreign policies and 
moving gradually from doctrinaire nonalignment to geopolitical pragmatism. It has come to recognize 
that it can wield international power only through the accretion of its own economic and military 
strength. India will increasingly be aligned with the West economically. But politically it has multiple 
options, and there is no reason for it to put all its strategic eggs in one basket. It can advance its interests 
by forging issue-based partnerships with different players to create more strategic space for itself. That 
means it can progress from being nonaligned to being multialigned while preserving nonalignment’s 
kernel – strategic and policy-making autonomy”.  
 
The shift from non-alignment to multi-alignment has been promoted by proponents of the 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse and informed the foreign policies of the NDA 
and UPA Government which sought to forge – as far as possible – mutually beneficial rela-
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 Though the Hindu nationalist sub-discourse shares to a certain extent this critique of emphasizing India’s soft 
power over its hard power, it ultimately, as we will see, regards cultural power as the main source of Indian 
might and influence in the international system.   
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tions with all major powers. In contrast to the Post-Nehruvian discourse, however, the Hyper-
nationalist discourse points out that national strength is the pre-condition for genuine strategic 
autonomy, since only a strong and powerful country that possesses the military-industrial ca-
pabilities to defend itself is really autonomous (Pant 2006: 91f.; Sibal 2011; Singh/Gera/  
Dewan 2013: 224).
65
 In an inherently competitive international system, where all countries 
are driven by their narrow self-interests, India cannot rely on other states, not even on so-
called strategic partners such as the United States, when it comes to its national security and 
interests (Karnad 2002b, 2014; Vijay 2008: 74f.; Doval 2010; Sibal 2013b; Chellaney 2014).  
The social logic of national strength thus suggests India has no interest or reason to join an 
alliance and become a subordinate state of any great power, but must acquire comprehensive, 
autonomous defence capabilities. This does not mean, however, that India should not seek 
strategic alignments to advance its national interests. In fact, the Hyper-nationalist discourse 
criticized India’s strategic tilt towards the USSR during the cold war and demanded a more 
balanced relationship with both superpowers (BJP [1981] 2000: 5-6). Activating the Hyper-
nationalist discourse, the BJP actively furthered, for instance, the transformation of Indo-U.S. 
relations after coming to power in 1998. BJP leaders even talked of India and the United 
States as “natural allies” (Vajpayee 2000b; Singh [Jasw.] 2006). However, they did not seek a 
formal alliance, but a strategic partnership on ‘equal footing’ that may not compromise In-
dia’s strategic autonomy (Mishra 2007; BJP 2008). “What must be at the core of our under-
standing is that ‘strategic partnership’”, as the BJP (2005) noted, “is ordinarily between two 
equals. Any ‘lock-in’ with US strategic relations or accepting an asymmetrical relationship is 
not ‘strategic partnership’, it would be capitulation”.  
The resistance of proponents of the Hyper-nationalist discourse against the Indo-U.S. nuclear 
agreement was also formulated through the social logic of national strength. It was criticized 
that the nuclear deal imposes direct or indirect restraints on India’s nuclear weapons pro-
gramme and thus harms its strategic autonomy by restricting the size of the programme and 
the possibility to conduct further nuclear tests, while the political costs of the agreement lie in 
the U.S.’ expectations regarding India’s positioning on certain international issues such as 
Iran’s nuclear programme and thus potential infringements of its decision-making autonomy, 
making India into a ‘subordinate power’ and undermining its great power ambitions (Advani 
2007; Karnad 2007; BJP 2008; Sood 2008; Doval/Chandra 2011).  
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 In this sense, India, as the Hyper-nationalist discourse points out, was not a truly non-aligned country under 
Nehru’s leadership, because the Indian Government, for instance, had to turn to the United States and Great 
Britain and beg for military support during the 1962 China war. This demonstrated once more the absence of 
strategic thought under Nehru’s leadership who had not thought through the strategic implications of non-
alignment (Singh [Jasw.] 2013: 60ff.).     
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Nuclear weapons as symbols of national awakening, resurgence and unity 
In a world where nation-states and civilizations engage in ruthless competition for their na-
tional and cultural interests, violence is a permanent feature and the most powerful states/    
civilizations assert their will, India, as the Hyper-nationalist discourse demands, must become 
militarily strong to stand its ground (Vijay 2009: 9). “For any nation to establish its influence 
in the world”, as the BJP president Rajnath Singh (2008) pointed out, “it requires to become a 
military superpower”. The discourse deplores the state of India’s defence preparedness, poor 
strategic planning, very slow defence acquisition and procurement processes, and low defence 
expenditures which reflect a general negligence of the country’s national security by various 
governments (Singh [Jasw.] 1999; Oberoi 2008; Doval 2012; Jaitley 2012; Anand 2013; 
Singh [P.] 2013; Kanwal 2014). As the BJP noted in its 1998 election manifesto: “The fre-
netic pace of military expansion and modernization by some of our neighbours and the grow-
ing pressure and power of foreign navies in the Indian Ocean compel us to take the state of 
our defence preparedness very seriously” (BJP 1998). Apart from increasing India’s defence 
budget, the party promised to “[r]e-evaluate the country's nuclear policy and exercise the op-
tion to induct nuclear weapons” and “[i]ncrease the radius of power projection” (BJP 1998).  
Nuclear weapons epitomize national strength in the Hyper-nationalist discourse (Chellaney 
1999a: 146ff./199; Verma [B.] 2001; Karnad 2002a). They have taken the form of a synecdo-
che, a figure of style that Laclau (2014: 86ff.), taking recourse to the deconstructivist Paul de 
Man, uses in order to account for the way how discourses produce meanings and seek to he-
gemonize the discursive field. A synecdoche oscillates between metaphor and metonymy and 
expresses that a term for a particular thing symbolizes the whole of something. In this sense, 
nuclear weapons are not merely weapons, but an epitome for India’s national awakening, re-
surgence and unity. Accordingly, the series of nuclear tests under the name ‘Operation Shakti 
(strength)’ in May 1998 symbolize for the BJP leader L.K. Advani (2006: 69) the beginning 
of “India’s emergence on the global horizon as a major power player” that pursues a self-
confident and assertive foreign policy by “placing national security concerns above all other 
considerations and refusing to buckle down under pressure”66 (BJP 2000 [1998]: 71). This 
tendency to bend under the pressure of the great powers and world public opinion “arises as 
much out of ignorance of our rightful place and role in world affairs as also from a loss of 
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 This is a hint at previous Indian governments that shied away from conducting the nuclear tests due to interna-
tional pressure and the fear of economic sanctions. Accordingly, the BJP presents itself as a truly nationalist and 
principled party that has courage and keeps its promises on issues on vital importance to India’s national security 
(see Advani 2005).    
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national self-confidence and resolve. A nation as large and capable as ourselves must make its 
impact felt on the world arena” (BJP 1998). 
The nuclear tests must be seen in this context as an attempt to make India internally and ex-
ternally strong. As Atal Vajpayee (1998a) noted after the nuclear tests, “the greatest meaning 
of the tests is that they have given India shakti, they have given India strength, they have 
given India self-confidence.” According to L.K. Advani (2005): “To make India ‘Shaktishali 
(strong), Samruddha (prosperous) and Swabhimani (self-confident)’ has been the motto of the 
BJP since its inception. We have always believed that equipping India with a nuclear weapons 
deterrent is a key pre-requisite for making India strong”.  
Externally, the nuclear tests should substantiate India’s status a great power and force the 
world to accept India’s ‘rightful place’ in world politics. As the Sarkaryavah (general secre-
tary) of the RSS, H.V. Seshadri (1998) noted after the nuclear tests, “all the world has got a 
loud and clear message that India can no more be treated as second or third rate nation now”. 
Internally, the nuclear tests should not only unite the people behind the counter-hegemonic 
project of the Hyper-nationalist discourse and increase the self-confidence in India’s 
achievements, capabilities and potentials: “Operation Shakti […] has made India stronger 
than ever before, more self-confident than ever before, and given her higher global standing 
than ever before. […] Operation Shakti has, thus not only given India security, but has also 
unleashed the energies of the hundred crore children of Bharat Mata to work harder, and work 
with pride, for their motherland” (BJP Today 2000: 26).  
The nuclear tests were thus framed by the Hyper-nationalist discourse as a mean to install a 
strong sense of unity, assertiveness and muscularity in the Indian society and make India into 
a uniform nation-state that has a strong national will, social cohesion and the military where-
withals to stand tall and powerful in the comity of nations (Verma [B.] 2009; Doval 2010; 
Karnad 2012b). As the BJP leader L.K. Advani (2008b: 611) notes, “national will is not only 
an intangible component of national power, but by far the most vital. All the other determin-
able ingredients of power fail to achieve desired results in the absence of this crucial element. 
India should build the collective will of its billion-strong population and counter all efforts to 
erode and weaken it.” For the Hindu nationalist sub-discourse in particular, this requires the 
existence of a strong, unifying and appealing national culture (see BJP 2004; Singh [Jasw.] 
2006: 87ff.; Singh [R.] 2006), which is embodied by Hindutva and should be further strength-
ened by the nuclear tests   
The 1998 nuclear tests have often been represented in the literature as a turning-point in In-
dia’s foreign and security policy, marking a shift from idealism to realpolitik. Several schol-
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ars, drawing on realist IR theory, argued that (real and perceived) security threats, emanating 
from China and Pakistan in particular, and a realpolitik-driven awareness for the importance 
of military power in the international system played a crucial role in the decision to nuclearize 
(cf. Ganguly 1999; Mohan 2004; Kapur 2006; Sridharan 2006). Others highlight the BJP’s 
Hindu nationalist ideology and see India’s nuclearization in 1998 as “emblematic of a new 
kind of aggressive and belligerent Indian nationalism” that seeks to establish a strong, milita-
ristic nation-state (Vanaik 2007: 381; see also Bajpai 2009, Das 2009). The BJP itself has 
repeatedly claimed that the decision for overt nuclearization was driven by national security 
imperatives and a recognition that pragmatic realpolitik should guide Indian foreign and secu-
rity policies (see Vajpayee 1998a; Singh [Jasw.] 1999; BJP 2000; Mishra [2000] 2005; Arora 
2006; Sinha [2002] 2007). In the context of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the BJP-led NDA 
Government also drew on the Hyper-nationalist discourse and its representation of Pakistan 
and China as a collaborative threat to India. Prior to the tests, defence minister George Fer-
nandes (1998) stated that China is India’s “potential threat number one” and that “[i]t is no 
secret that China is helping Pakistan militarily […] there is the threat of Chinese encirclement 
of India”. Likewise, L.K. Advani (2006: 23) refers to the Sino-Pakistani threat in its justifica-
tions for the nuclear tests:  
 
“the BJP had always felt that India should develop its nuclear capabilities, essentially as a deterrent, to 
meet its security requirements. India was sandwiched between two nuclear states China and Pakistan, 
the former with an ambitious programme and resources to acquire military primacy not only in the re-
gion but also far behind it and the latter a covert and devious nuclear programme. Their working in tan-
dem seriously compounded the problem and India could not imperil its vital security interests to placate 
international opinion. Though the stated position of China remained that its nuclear cooperation with 
Pakistan was only for peaceful purposes, the ground realities were quite different and India was in no 
doubt about their common programme of strategic containment of India”.  
 
Though invoking the Hyper-nationalist discourse and declaring India a nuclear weapons state, 
the BJP-led NDA government was still gripped by the dislocated hegemonic Nehruvian dis-
course and its nuclear ambiguity. As a result, the government did not replace, as hoped by the 
Indian ultrarealists in particular, the policy of strategic restraint with hard realpolitik and ma-
terialize a key demand of the Hyper-nationalist discourse. This hope has soon faded away in 
the post-shakti period, because “after declaring itself a nuclear-weapons state, India has hesi-
tated to take the preliminary steps to fully integrate nuclear weapons into its defence structure 
and make its deterrent operational in a military sense” (Chellaney 1999a: 189). According to 
Raja Menon (2000: 241), a former rear admiral in the Indian Navy: 
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“[t]here is prevalent in India the view that deterrence is created once the scientific community produces 
nuclear weapon prototypes. […] The implication is that behind the technical capability implicit in the 
production of the weapon prototypes lies larger concurrent technological capabilities. The deterree is 
then supposed to assume that he may be struck by nuclear weapons, of a kind not yet advertised, and 
thus deterrence is established. Such is the belief of many in India who have risen to high positions in 
government and academia, but who have not read deterrent theory.” 
 
Instead of making India’s nuclear weapons capability operational and thus making India into 
a true nuclear-weapons power in the first place, the Vajpayee Government, as the former 
Chief of Naval Staff Arun Prakash (2008a) laments, “voluntarily and gratuitously declared a 
‘moratorium on testing’ and offered a ‘no first use’ guarantee within days of the 1998 tests, 
without consulting a single military person”. These self-imposed restrictions on India’s nu-
clear weapons programme are of particular concern for proponents of the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse, since the conducted nuclear tests have not sufficiently demonstrated India’s ther-
monuclear capability. As Bharat Karnad (2008b: 338) points out, “India is an incomplete nu-
clear weapon state. The 1998 tests proved that. While the fission, tritium-boosted fission and 
low-yield weapons designs worked satisfactory, the thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb – 
which is the decisive armament in any advanced arsenal – needed reconfiguration and re-
testing. But the A.B. Vajpayee’s voluntary test moratorium prevented that.” In addition, the 
government rushed into talks with the United States after the tests and thus accepted further 
restrictions on India’s nuclear weapons programme (Chellaney 1999a: 202). 
For Bharat Karnad and others, the 1998 nuclear tests thus resemble the 1974 ‘peaceful nuclear 
explosion’ under prime minister Indira Gandhi who also shied away from a full-fledged 
weaponization and left the military out of the picture. This suggests that the  
 
“‘nationalistic’ Bharatiya Janata Party really does not understand or appreciate the politico-military util-
ity of an advanced megaton yield thermonuclear force or the gains from genuine ‘strategic autonomy’ – 
which concept it has talked about without seemingly understanding it – and is satisfied with only a 
symbolic nuclear force. And, furthermore, that the decision to test in May 1998 was mere nuclear token-
ism with no conviction behind it to pull India into the top rung of countries” (Karnad 2002b). 
 
This discursive representation of Pokhran-II raises doubts that the decision to test was driven 
primarily by ‘national security imperatives’ and ‘strategic considerations’ or marks a shift 
towards a belligerent and militaristic foreign policy (and could thus be seen as the successful 
activation of the Hyper-nationalist discourse). To begin with, the decision to test was made by 
a very few senior BJP politicians and the RSS leader and nuclear physicist Rajendra Singh 
(Corbridge 1999: 241; Perkovich 1999: 404/408ff.) without conducting, as promised in the 
BJP election manifesto, a “Strategic Defence Review” that was supposed “to study and ana-
lyse the security environment and make appropriate recommendations to cover all aspects of 
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defence requirements and organization” (BJP [1998] 2000: 69-70). A key concern of the Hy-
per-nationalist discourse in general, and the ultrarealist sub-discourse in particular, has been 
the total lack of a tradition of strategic thought and planning and the exclusion of the military 
from decision-making processes in India (see Chellaney 1999b; Singh [Jasw.] 1999; Kanwal 
2000a, Malik 2010; Chandra 2011; Prakash 2012b; Anand 2013). Instead of ‘correcting’ these 
strategic deficiencies and to wait for the formation of the new National Security Council, 
which was supposed to conduct the comprehensive strategic defence review, or consult mili-
tary leaders, the BJP leadership largely continued the ad-hoc policy-making style of previous 
Indian governments and made the decision to test within a few weeks after assuming office.   
After conducting the nuclear tests, the BJP-led government did relatively little to integrate the 
nuclear force with the military and make the deterrent operational. In the aftermath of the tests, 
the absence of a clear strategy and military expertise became also apparent in the govern-
ment’s contradictory statements regarding India’s nuclear posturing. If the nuclear tests were 
really driven by national security concerns, the government would have taken immediate 
steps to establish the strategic command and control structures and acquire delivery mecha-
nisms for making India’s nuclear deterrent operational. Instead, there remain – until today – 
some doubts among international observers and retired Indian military officials about the 
credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent (see Karnad 2008a: 69ff./93ff.; Prakash 2009; 
Cohen/Dasgupta 2010: 120ff.; Kanwal 2012; Koithara 2012). 
This is not to suggest that the BJP has taken no steps to operationalize India’s nuclear deter-
rent and to induct a ‘strategic culture’ into India’s foreign and security decision-making. The 
BJP-led NDA government established, for instance, a National Security Council (NSC) in 
November 1998 “to advise Government on all issues of national security and in establishment 
of a credible nuclear deterrence” (NDA 1999). Adjunct to the NSC, the National Security 
Advisory Board was created to provide the government with external expertise and strategic 
inputs. The NSAB under the chairmanship of K. Subrahmanyam published a draft nuclear 
doctrine for India in August 1999. In addition, the government appointed the Kargil Review 
Committee in 1999 to investigate India’s response to Pakistan’s invasion and published a 
Group of Minister Report on National Security (2001) that reviewed India’s entire national 
security system, assessed the security environment and made recommendations for a more 
effective and integrated approach to the country’s security challenges. Following the recom-
mendations of the report, the government created two new offices, a Chief of Defence Staff 
and a Defence Intelligence Agency in order to enhance the coordination and defence planning 
between the Army, Navy and Air Force. In practice, however, all these reforms and initiatives 
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had, as scholars, policy-makers and military officials conclude (see Chaulia 2002, Shankar 
2008, Pant 2009a, Cohen/Dasgupta 2010, Bakshi 2011, Prakash 2009, Anand 2013, Kanwal 
2013), only little effects on India’s foreign and security policy-making. While the NSC and 
the NSAB are inadequately equipped and side-lined in the decision-making process, the Chief 
of Defence Staff has not been implemented until today due to intra-services rivalries and re-
sistance from the Ministry of Defence. Finally, the BJP-led NDA government has neither 
published a national security strategy nor formally adopted a nuclear doctrine. As Jaswant 
Singh, who assumed office with the publically announced objective to make India’s foreign 
and security policy more strategically oriented, concedes:  
 
“there remain some paradoxes. The principal one is the absence of a formally adopted nuclear doctrine 
by India. Post the Kargil review, a strategic command has been established but other than that first pro-
nouncement by Prime Minister Vajpayee, no other doctrine has been enunciated. The National Security 
Council did deliberate upon this subject and produced a paper
67
, but this was not formally discussed by 
the government of the day. It does not, therefore, have the stamp of any authority, and remains a mere 
discussion paper” (Singh [Jasw.] 2013: 171).  
 
Hence, instead of using the newly established institutions and fully integrating them into the 
decision-making process, the BJP-led government rather relied on the established institutions 
such as the Cabinet Committee on Defence and, like previous governments, shied away from 
formalizing any strategy or doctrine. The continuity in India’s nuclear policy becomes also 
apparent in the fact that BJP leaders persistently invoked social logics of the (Post-)Nehruvian 
discourse such as non-discrimination and non-violence in the aftermath of the nuclear tests. 
As was shown in chapter 6, the BJP-led government represented the nuclear tests, above all, 
as a reaction to the “nuclear apartheid” in the international system and thus drew on a long 
established theme of India’s mainstream foreign policy discourse. Reiterating India’s com-
mitment to non-violence, the government exercised strategic restraint by showing no urgency 
to make India’s nuclear deterrent operational and announcing a ‘moratorium on testing’ and a 
‘no first use guarantee’. Running through all government statements after the tests was, more-
over, a reference to India’s continued striving for global nuclear disarmament, which was also 
incorporated into the draft nuclear doctrine of the National Security Advisory Board.  
The harsh intra-discursive critique of the BJP’s nuclear policy by proponents of the Hyper-
nationalist discourse does not only show that we can hardly speak of a shift to a ‘realist’ or 
‘militarized’ foreign policy under the BJP-led NDA government and a successful institution-
alization of the counter-hegemonic Hyper-nationalist discourse in India, but also indicates 
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 This paper was based on the deliberations of the National Security Advisory Board and its draft nuclear doc-
trine.  
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how a ‘realist’ or ‘militarized’ foreign policy would look like. Such a policy would require a 
fully operational and large nuclear force with at least 350 warheads and delivery systems that 
can target all nuclear weapons states, including the United States. This more assertive and 
maximalist nuclear policy is based on the conviction that India must resist all restrictions to 
its nuclear weapons programme (e.g. through bilateral and multilateral arms control or test 
ban agreements) and conduct further nuclear tests (as well as ballistic missile tests) until it has 
proven the reliability and survivability of its (thermo-)nuclear capability and has the reach to 
strike every nuclear weapons state in the world. In addition, India cannot rely on a de-alerted, 
de-mated nuclear deterrent, but must have a deployed nuclear force and a fully functional nu-
clear command and control system (Karnad 2002a: xvi/xviii; Karnad 2008a: 88ff.; Shankar 
2008; Chellaney 2009b).
68
  
Moreover, military power, including nuclear weapons, must be acquired and used strategi-
cally to protect the country’s national security and advance its national interests, i.e. India 
needs a clear strategic vision and the political will to use these military capabilities in order to 
promote its national security, interests and great power ambitions. Therefore, India’s military 
doctrine and force structure needs to shift from the defence of territory to the defence of its 
national interests in Asia and beyond. This requires a massive military build-up and moderni-
zation giving India substantial power projection and network-centric warfare capabilities. In-
dia’s long-term strategic objective must be to become the dominant power in Asia and to de-
fend its ‘natural sphere of influence’ that ranges from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia to the 
Strait of Malacca (Verma [B.] 2009; Karnad 2012b; Shankar 2008a; Bakshi 2011: 17ff.). As 
the realist strategic thinker Bharat Karnad (2005: 62) deplored shortly after the end of the 
BJP’s tenure, “India is almost entirely out of the picture and wherever else it may be ‘emerg-
ing’, it is not doing so in the military sphere. […] India’s national security budget of some 
$20 billon is one-twentieth that of the US, and one-third that of China’s annual defence ex-
penditure”.  
At the same time, the harsh critique of the BJP’s nuclear policy articulated by the Hyper-
nationalist discourse also points to divergences within the discourse that run between the 
Hindu nationalist and the ultrarealist sub-discourses. Though both discourses seek to build a 
strong and powerful India, the ultrarealist sub-discourse emphasizes the importance of mili-
tary power and its strategic use to further India’s interests, whereas the Hindu nationalist dis-
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 This is also critique of the minimum deterrence concept propagated by the influential Nehruvian ‘realist’ and 
strong advocate of India’s nuclearization, K. Subrahmanyam, who maintained that it takes very little to deter 
adversaries so that India needs neither a large nuclear arsenal and a thermonuclear capability nor a deployed 
nuclear force (Karnad 2007). 
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course tends to attach greater importance to the symbolic power of military capabilities such 
as aircraft carriers or nuclear weapons. Conceding the “indispensability of military power” in 
world politics, the BJP president Rajnath Singh (2008), for instance, points out that 
“[m]ilitary might can establish one’s awe but cannot ensure one’s respect, affection and one-
ness” and is thus insufficient for making India into a strong global power. This requires, by 
contrast, as the Hindu nationalists assert, the existence of a strong, unifying and appealing 
national culture (BJP 2004; Singh [Jasw.] 2006: 87ff.; Singh [R.] 2006a). 
 
Peace through strength: dealing with threats to India’s national security  
For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, national strength is the precondition for dealing with se-
curity threats effectively, because “history is not made by weak nations. It is only the strong 
who can forge peace” (Thakre 1999: 5). In contrast to the Post-Nehruvian discourse, the Hy-
per-nationalist discourse has a more military- and state-centric concept of national security. 
Though the discourse acknowledges non-traditional security challenges such as climate 
change, energy or health (Singh [Jasw.] 1999: 237f.; Sibal 2013b), it argues that India faces a 
fundamentally different security environment than ‘Western’ states which propagate this 
‘new’ common security agenda. Apart from the challenge of economic development, India’s 
“physical security is seriously under threat not only by hostile state actors but also non-state 
actors inspired by violent religious ideologies that receive state support. India’s security di-
lemmas are particularly acute. It is facing two hostile powers on its frontiers, Pakistan and 
China, and both cooperate with each other to threaten its security. With both countries India 
has outstanding border problems, with unsettled, undemarcated or disputed borders” (Sibal 
2011a).  
Unless India upholds a high level of defence preparedness and accepts the reality of violence 
in world politics, Pakistan and China will continue their inimical policies and seek a military 
solution of the border disputes. “India remains a soft target”, as the retired Brigadier Amar 
Cheema (2014) notes, “because she has invariably taken a re-active approach, and the effect 
gets compounded since the articulation of her strategic outlook is not only defensive, but paci-
fist by nature.” As the RSS leader and BJP National General Secretary, Ram Madhav Vara-
nasi (2013), points out: “Bharat has historically practised the principle of world peace. How-
ever, it should not forget the dictum that ‘to be prepared for war is the best way of ensuring 
peace’”. Attacking the pacifist mind-set of India’s political establishment, Bharat Verma 
(2013) warns: “Violence unleashed upon a nation can only be met by developing the capabil-
ity to counter the violence. In the twenty-first century, unless societies with deep-rooted be-
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liefs in non-violence and pacifism secure themselves with a grid of violence provided by a 
lean and mean military machine, their survival as a nation-state will be in question.” 
Therefore, India must react to shifts in the military balance-of-power and be willing to use its 
hard power capabilities strategically. According to the retired Major General and deputy di-
rector of the Hindu nationalist Vivekananda International Foundation, G.D. Bakshi (2011: 
17), “India’s declining defence capability in the nineties was undoubtedly one of the factors 
that prompted Pakistan’s intrusion in Kargil.” Therefore, India must counter Pakistan’s and 
China’s growing conventional and nuclear military capabilities in order to prevent aggres-
sions in the future. “The irony is that Pakistan”, as Vinay Shankar (2008) notes, “is one fifth 
our size. In every measure of national power it is way below us. Currently, it is struggling for 
survival. Yet it has not abandoned its plans to take Kashmir and keep us destabilised. The 
reasons are obvious. It believes that we neither have the capability nor the will to do anything 
in retaliation. […] Unless Pakistan sees in India a punitive capability, it will not abandon sup-
port to militancy and terrorism. We must understand this.” Likewise the BJP politician Gen-
eral Tejpal Singh Rawat points out with respect to the military build-up of Pakistan and 
China: “The more power our adversaries accumulate, the more provocative and aggressive 
their posture will be to humiliate us. Our efforts should be to offset or neutralise such power 
imbalances by building our defence capabilities and allocating adequate Budget. India being 
often termed as a ‘Soft State’ stems from our weaknesses and lack of developing matching 
capabilities” (Lok Sabha Debates 2008: 415). 
Against this backdrop, it is vital that India deals with its adversaries from a position of 
strength. “Enduring peace can come only if the nation is strong and has the required capabili-
ties to deter aggression” (Chellaney 1999b: 594). “Talking from a posture of strength”, as 
Kanwal Sibal (2010) explains, “makes sense as a strategy as the adversary knows that other, 
harder options are available to the other side if a genuine opportunity to resolve differences 
through dialogue is spurned.” This applies, in particular, to India’s most immediate security 
threat: Pakistan. Instead of trying to appease Pakistan in the naive hope that cooperation and 
dialogue can change Pakistan’s intrinsic anti-Indian and belligerent mind-set, India needs to 
adopt a pro-active and assertive policy to counter its multi-pronged strategy to destabilize 
India and annex Kashmir (Sood 2007; Chandra 2013a; Parthasarathy 2013b). 
Such a policy would take advantage of India’s superior economic resources and change the 
military balance-of-power in India’s favour, providing India with potential strategic leverage 
to deter Pakistan from any anti-Indian moves. This requires, however, the existence of a 
credible threat to use force and the willingness to take the war into Pakistani territory through 
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air strikes, massive artillery shelling and ‘hot pursuit’ attacks. As long as India, as the Kagril 
war in 1999 and the Operation Parakram in 2002 have demonstrated, shies away from cross-
ing the Line of Control and conducting counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan-controlled 
Kashmir, Pakistan will not end its hostile and destructive policies. By adopting a more offen-
sive military strategy that tests Pakistan’s defence preparedness and creates strategic uncer-
tainty, India, by contrast, would be able to put coercive pressure on Pakistan and raise the 
costs for its military adventurism and support of cross-border terrorism (Kanwal 2000a: 
1619f.; Chellaney 2009c; Verma [B.] 2009: 47). This coercive pressure could be further ag-
gravated, if India exploits Pakistan’s various internal vulnerabilities and covertly supports 
separatist forces particularly in Baluchistan (Karnad 2011; Chandra 2013a). While most pro-
ponents of the Hyper-nationalist discourse see this policy as a strategic instrument to contain 
the Pakistani threat and enforce a change in Pakistan’s policy, the more radical wing of the 
Hindu nationalists and some former military officials see it as a strategic blueprint to break up 
Pakistan and eliminate this threat to India once for all (see Verma [B.] 2008b; Singh [A.] 
2014).  
Given Pakistan’s repeated aggressions against India and its aiding of the bloody insurgency in 
Kashmir starting in the 1980s, the oppositional BJP declared that a nuclear-armed Pakistan 
poses “[t]he gravest threat to the security of India” (BJP 2000 [1992]: 35-36), and propagated 
a more assertive policy towards Pakistan: “it is clear that Pakistan is doing everything in its 
power to destabilize India. Its policy of creating instability and unrest in India through its 
military intelligence network is nothing short of an inimical act”. Therefore, “the time has 
come for India to issue a firm warning to Pakistan that if it does not stop exporting terrorism 
to this country, India would perfectly within the limits of its rights in international law if it 
launches a strike against those who actively train the terrorists and send them across the bor-
der with view to undermine India’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity” (BJP 1995: 3-
5). Coming to power in 1998 with the pledge to bring an end to this “policy of hostile inter-
ference in our internal affairs” and affirm “India’s sovereignty over the whole of Jammu and 
Kashmir, including the areas under foreign occupations” (BJP 2000 [1998]: 68), the BJP 
seemed to have embraced the Hyper-nationalist discourse’s demand for a more vigorous and 
belligerent Pakistan policy. In fact, directly after the nuclear tests, the BJP leader and home 
minister L.K. Advani declared that “Islamabad should realise the change in the geo-strategic 
situation in the region […] and roll back its anti-India policy” (quoted in The Economic 
Times 1998a) and that India will “take pre-emptive measures to counter militancy” in Paki-
stan-occupied Kashmir (quoted in The Economic Times 1998b). This and other statements by 
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BJP politicians appeared to signify a radical shift in India’s Pakistan policy and an end of stra-
tegic restraint, thereby indicating an activation of the Hyper-nationalist discourse. 
However, in the framing of the Hyper-nationalist discourse the Vajpayee government ulti-
mately adopted, like other Indian governments, a “conciliatory approach towards Pakistan” 
that “seemed based less on a cold power calculus and more on inchoate hopes and sentimen-
talism” (Sibal 2014a). Instead of dealing with Pakistan from a position of strength and pursu-
ing a coherent strategy with the objective to bring an end to Pakistani aggressions, as Brahma 
Chellaney (2013a) notes, Vajpayee, in his naive “quest to make peace with that implacable 
enemy”, treated the process of engagement with Pakistan as an end in itself and “executed 
more policy U-turns than probably any other prime minister since independence”, thereby 
replacing “institutionalized policymaking” with an ad-hoc, personality-driven style of deci-
sion making. This leads Chellaney (2007) to the conclusion that “Vajpayee’s foreign policy 
was in reality an updated, post-Cold War version of Nehruvian diplomacy”69.  
After the nuclear tests and the belligerent rhetoric, the Vajpayee government launched a peace 
initiative. Vajpayee undertook the historical Lahore bus ride to Pakistan to meet his counter-
part Nawaz Sharif in February 1999 and was the first Indian prime minister who visited the 
neighbouring country since Jawaharlal Nehru. Believing in the possibility of peaceful change, 
Vajpayee underscored that India and Pakistan share a common history, culture and destiny 
and should thus live and prosper together as friendly neighbours (Vajpayee [1999] 2004: 97). 
The Lahore visit was Vajpayee’s first peace initiative and attempt to establish a composite 
dialogue process that should include consultations on cross-border terrorism, the nuclear issue 
and Kashmir.   
In spite of the intrusion of Pakistani soldiers and militants into the Indian-controlled part of 
Kashmir a few months after the Lahore visit and the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament 
on 13 December 2001, the Vajpayee government soon resumed the peace talks with Pakistan 
and did not deviate from India’s strategic restraint. Criticizing India’s strategic restraint in the 
wake of the Kargil crisis, Brahma Chellaney (1999b: 537) notes: “Kargil emerged as a na-
tional embarrassment, because India first failed to anticipate that Pakistan would open a new 
front and then was slow to understand the gravity and extent of the encroachment when it 
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As Chellaney (2007) explicates: “Nehru and Vajpayee mistook casuistry and word games for statecraft 
[…]. Both valued speech as a substitute for action or camouflage to concession. Vajpayee’s fascination with 
telling the world about the ‘greatness’ of Indian culture was his rendering of Nehru’s moralistic lectures to the 
mighty and powerful. Like Nehru, he was so enthralled by his own illusions and desire for international goodwill 
that he could not deal with ill will from India’s implacable adversaries. Even in war, Vajpayee declined […] to 
take the fighting to the aggressor’s territory, battling the enemy on the enemy’s terms and relying on the United 
States to midwife a ‘victory’ in Kargil.” 
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came to light. The Vajpayee government fell victim to its own rhetoric on the bus diplomacy 
with Pakistan, getting betrayed not by a friend but an archenemy – something unusual in the 
annals of history”. This failure to anticipate and counter threats results, according to Chel-
laney, from a century old “battered-victim syndrome” that constricts a forward-looking, stra-
tegic policy, leading him to the conclusion: “Vajpayee’s admission before Indian troops at 
Kargil that he extended his ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan but got betrayed was reminiscent 
of Nehru’s 1962 confession about how he had been stabbed in the back by China” (Chellaney 
1999b: 581). 
Though the international community blamed Pakistan for the war and the Indian government 
could stage India as a responsible power committed to peace and restraint, the Hyper-
nationalist discourse criticized the government for being “excessively cautious” (Oberoi 2005: 
101) and argued that “not crossing the LoC gave a very wrong signal”, because it conveyed to 
the Pakistani generals the message that India has accepted the LoC de facto as international 
border and will not punish any Pakistani military misadventure (Bakshi 2009: 46-47). For the 
radical wing of the BJP and the Hindu nationalist movement in general, Kargil was a (missed) 
opportunity to recapture Kashmir and teach Pakistan a lesson. As Seshadri Chari (1999), edi-
tor of the RSS newspaper The Organiser, resents: “It is not the Line of Control alone that 
Pakistan has crossed. The barbaric state has crossed all limits of morality, decency and ethics. 
[…] They have provoked us beyond all tolerable limits forcing us to throw the Pakistani army 
regulars and terrorists out of our territory. […] The action that has begun in Kargil can end 
only in Kashmir”.  
Though the Kargil intrusion was seen by the NDA Government as “a betrayal of trust which 
has done great damage to the Lahore process” (Indian Embassy 1999), Vajpayee soon gave 
the peace dialogue with Pakistan another chance and overrode intra-governmental criticism.    
Threatening to leave the NDA coalition, a leader of the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena party 
taunted: “by bending over backwards to please Pakistan, the BJP has outsmarted even the 
Congress, but Vajpayee's ambition to be India's second Nehru will cost us dearly in the next 
elections” (quoted in Times of India 2001b). Likewise, the Vajpayee government also exer-
cised strategic restraint after the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001. The gov-
ernment accused the terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba und Jaish-e-Mohammed, both known 
for their links with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for the attack (BJP 2001a). 
Hardliners inside and outside the government demanded ‘hot pursuit’ actions against terrorists 
in Pakistan (see Kamath 2002; Karnad 2002a; Verma [B.] 2009). As the BJP’s parliamentary 
spokesperson Vjiay Kumar Malhotra asserted: “If the terrorist attack in Parliament yesterday 
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is sending the message that India is a soft state, we certainly want the government to take to 
hot pursuit so that their camps in PoK can be destroyed. That will teach them a lesson and 
also underscore that the government's might cannot be challenged in so defiant a fashion” 
(quoted in rediff 2001).  
A few days after the terrorist attack, the Indian government launched Operation Parakram, 
which was, according to government officials, part of India’s “coercive diplomacy” to 
threaten Pakistan with the use of force unless it complies with India’s demands to extradite 
terrorist leaders, destroy terrorist training camps on its territory and end cross-border terror-
ism (Singh [Jasw.] 2006: 266). Parakram constituted the largest and longest military mobiliza-
tion in India’s history with the deployment of 500,000 troops on the LoC. However, the gov-
ernment ultimately decided against a retaliatory attack on Pakistan and the crisis de-escalated 
into a long stand-off between Indian and Pakistani soldiers along the LoC. Despite the contin-
ued cross-border infiltration, the Indian government ultimately began withdrawing the troops 
from the LoC in November 2002. Once more, the BJP-led government exercised strategic 
restraint and did not launch an attack against insurgent camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. 
As the retired General Vinay Shankar (2005) laments: 
 
“When Kargil happened, again, we were content settling for a draw, despite the grave provocation and 
considerable international support. After the terrorist attack on the Parliament in Delhi, there was the 
faint possibility that India had eventually found its national will. For a short while during the massive 
military mobilisation for Parakrama, there were some of us who felt that at last our threshold of toler-
ance had been crossed. But the pacifists prevailed and the troops returned to barracks without firing a 
single shot”. 
 
According to the Hyper-nationalist discourse, this failure to mount a credible retaliation will 
have long-term strategic implications for India: “When India pulled its troops back after stay-
ing nearly one year at the brink”, as the retired Air Chief Marshal and NSAB-member S. 
Krishnaswamy (2007) notes, “Pakistan took the credit of having deterred India from taking a 
drastic step”. In other words, Pakistan now knew that India – even under the rule of the more 
nationalistic and ‘belligerent’ BJP – shies away from crossing the LoC and retaliating the 
Pakistan-backed jihad terrorism. 
To sum up, the nuclear tests and the Pakistan policy under the BJP-led NDA government are 
often cited in the literature (see Mohan 2004, Kapur 2006, Sridharan 2006, Vanaik 2007) as 
the main examples for a shift towards greater ‘realism’ or even ‘militarism’ and ‘belligerence’ 
in India’s foreign policy. This would indicate the successful activation and institutionalization 
of the counter-hegemonic Hyper-nationalist discourse. This section, by contrast, has shown 
that the Hyper-nationalist discourse indeed shortly surfaced during the BJP’s tenure, but could 
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not sediment. This was illustrated by looking at the way how the Hyper-nationalist discourse 
itself framed the policies of the Vajpayee government and harshly criticized them as a con-
tinuation of the ‘conciliatory’, ‘idealistic’ and strategically restrained approach that has in-
formed India’s foreign policy since Nehru.          
 
 
7.2 Political Logics: A Uniform and Muscular National Identity  
Political logics, as we have seen, capture the formation and constitution of a discourse by ex-
amining the way a discourse articulates different social demands and interests as equivalent 
through drawing political boundaries between the ‘self’ and a common ‘other’. In this process, 
a national identity is created in opposition to a shared negativity that blocks the full realiza-
tion of the self’s identity, but, at the same time, is the necessary precondition for this very 
identity. Like the Post-Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist discourse invokes colonial-
ism as a temporal ‘other’, and Pakistan and China as spatial-political ‘others’. For the Hyper-
nationalist discourse, however, the colonial ‘other’ does not only signify the British colonial 
rule over India, but also the rule of Muslim kingdoms over the Indian Subcontinent beginning 
with the Delhi Sultanate in the 13
th
 century. While the large Muslim population in India repre-
sents the internal ‘other’, Pakistan as Islamic state embodies the external ‘other’. The dis-
course thus casts Muslims as foreign intruders which could ‘subjugate’ India, because Indians 
were disunited and weak. Therefore, the Hyper-nationalist discourse seeks, in contrast to the 
(Post-)Nehruvian discourse, to forge a uniform and muscular national identity to build a 
united and powerful nation-state. This sub-chapter begins with a discussion of colonialism as 
temporal ‘other’ before attention shifts to the spatial-political ‘others’ Pakistan and China.   
 
7.2.1 Colonial ‘Others’: The Encounter with the Islamic and Western-Christian Civiliza-
tions 
As in the case of the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse, the colonial subjugation serves for the Hy-
per-nationalist discourse as the most important source for the articulation of an Indian na-
tional identity. The colonial encounter has not only generated strong feelings of humiliation, 
victimhood and being under threat by external forces that seek to weaken and disrupt India, 
but also, and even more importantly, brought about a common consciousness among Indians 
that allowed for the constructing an Indian nationalism. European colonialism imparted Indian 
elites with the concepts of civilization and nationalism, but also raised awareness for India’s 
backwardness that made it prone to fall under foreign rule, and a desire to mimic modern 
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‘Western’ statecraft, technology and science in order to overcome this backwardness or ‘lack’ 
and develop India into a modern and independent nation-state. For forging a common national 
identity and overcoming British colonial rule, the Hyper-nationalist discourse, which emerged 
during the colonial era, sought to reinvigorate and unite the Hindu community by re-
collecting the glorious past of the Hindu nation/civilization and casting not only the British 
but, in particular, the Muslims as foreign ‘others’ which invaded and colonized the Indian 
Subcontinent.  
Against this background, the discourse understands India’s anti-colonial struggle as the liber-
alization, purification and revival of the Hindu nation after centuries of foreign subjugation, 
looting and humiliation beginning with the Islamic Delhi Sultanate in the 13
th
 century to the 
British/European domination of India from the 18
th
 century onwards. “India, a rich and an-
cient society known for its tolerance and resilience”, as Brahma Chellaney (1999b: 542) notes, 
“was plundered, raped and overrun by a slew of foreign invaders for almost eight centuries 
before winning independence from Britain in 1947. The British, like the other foreign invad-
ers before them, came to India because of its wealth, but thanks to colonial rule, India remains 
a ‘Third World nation’”. Accordingly, India could fall prey to foreign invasions and colonial-
ism, which marked the ultimate decline of the ancient Hindu rashtra and civilization, because 
it was confronted with a religiously and ethnically united enemy, while the Indians/Hindus 
were weak, disunited and split in various sects and along ethnic, caste, regional and linguist 
lines. In other words, the encounter with the Islamic civilization and the ‘Western’-Christian 
civilization, mainly through British colonialism, posed a civilizational threat to India (Apte 
2002; Doval 2012; Punj 2013). “Indian history”, as N.S. Rajaram (2001) thus writes in the 
The Organiser, “lies concealed in two layers of colonization – the first Islamic and the second 
European Christian”. As Tarun Vijay (2008: 15/60) notes:  
 
“since last several centuries, invaders have been attacking the Hindu society, their temples, libraries, 
ashrams, universities and their right to live the way their accepted values demand or instruct, making 
them the most persecuted people […] One must not forget on this planet earth that it is only India where 
Hindus can at least dream and aspire to be free to grow and enjoy an unobstructed life guaranteeing se-
curity to their Dharma and culture after centuries of excruciatingly horrible subjugation, much of that 
was under the alien religious flags and barbaric motives. Muslims and Christians may be having any 
number of countries, which guarantees their religious growth as the majority demands, but Hindus have 
only one nation.” 
 
Hence, the foreign others not only threatened to deprive the Hindus of their sacred land, but 
also to subvert the Hindu society by undermining its civilizational heritage through the de-
struction of Hindu holy sites and converting Hindus into Muslims or Christians, respectively 
(Mishra 1998). Thus, freeing India from the colonial yoke had to require acknowledging and 
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asserting India’s genuine and natural identity as a Hindu nation. As the Hindu nationalist ide-
ologist and sarsanghchalak of the RSS, M.S. Golwalkar (1939: 55) wrote towards the end of 
India’s independence struggle:  
 
“As a matter of fact we have in Hindusthan a triangular fight, we, Hindus, at war at once with the Mos-
lems on the one hand and Britain on the other. The Moslems are not misled. They take themselves to be 
the conquering invaders and grasp for power. In our selfdeception, we go on seceding more and more, 
in hopes of ‘Nationalising’ the foreigners and succeed merely in increasing their all-devouring appetite. 
The consequence, for us, is that we go more and more astray and lose sight of our cherished goal of Na-
tional regeneration.” 
 
The Hyper-nationalist discourse thus seeks to create a chain of equivalence and thus link to-
gether dissimilar subjects, demands and interests by drawing a political frontier between Hin-
dus and non-Hindus. In other words, the discourse tries to generate a common and distinctive 
Hindu identity for India by uniting different – already constituted – ethnic, caste, class, reli-
gious sectarian and regional identities under the privileged signifier Hindu/Hinduism by plac-
ing it into opposition to Muslims and Christians which constitute antagonistic ‘others’ that 
block the fullness or realization of India’s ‘true’ identity. While Muslims are represented as 
the original invaders and oppressors of India, the ‘Western’-Christian civilization continued 
the foreign subjugation of India. As a counter-hegemonic discourse, the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse thus seeks to subvert the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse and its identity articulation 
through the logic of difference that (re)constructs political frontiers by breaking up chains of 
equivalence and exposing the plurality and differences between the entities/elements that con-
stitute the ‘Indian nation’.  
While the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse articulates a secular nationalism and seeks to preserve 
the territorial integrity of India by, in principle, including all different religious and ethnic 
groups into its definition of the Indian nation and thus conceding their contribution to the In-
dian civilization, the Hyper-nationalist discourse articulates either implicitly or explicitly an 
exclusive, majoritarian nationalism. The concept of Hindutva, propagated by the Hindu na-
tionalists, represents the more explicit variant of this nationalism. It is based on an exclusive 
Hindu identity whereby, as the creator of Hindutva, V.D. Savarkar (1938: 146), pointed out, 
only those that see India both as their fatherland (pitribhu) and holy land (punyabhu) are full 
members of the national community.
70
 Accordingly, the Hindu nationalists seek to assert that 
Hindu-ness and the majority community embody the essence of the Indian nation and identity, 
while the religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians, whose religions originate out-
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 Jainists, Buddhists and Sikhs, whose religions originated on the Indian subcontinent and are closely inter-
twined with Hinduism, are therefore included in this nationalism.   
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side of the sacred land and are thus ‘un-Indian’, are suspected to have different loyalties (e.g. 
Mecca or Rome) and can only be part of the Indian nation if they embrace Hindutva as the 
cultural bond that holds India together. As the BJP leader Advani (2008b: 864) points out, 
“[this] sense of ‘Indianness’ has unified India’s diverse religious, ethnic, linguistic and caste 
groups for thousands of years. Since the word ‘Indian’ itself is of recent vintage, this unifying 
principle is Hindu-ness or Hindutva, the name given to a broad-minded, tolerant, pluralistic 
and inclusive tradition. If India is de-Hinduised, there will be no India left anymore” (Advani 
2008: 864). Hence, Hinduism assumes the role of a synecdoche (see Laclau 2014: 86ff.) in the 
Hindu nationalist sub-discourse in the sense that Hinduism symbolizes India as a whole. For 
creating a long and stable chain of equivalence, the discourse thus substitutes and equates 
India with Hinduism – India becomes Hindustan.            
The colonial ‘others’ symbolize – what Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 125) call – antagonist ‘oth-
ers’ that prevent India from attaining its true identity and epitomize India’s long subjugation. 
As descendants of the colonial ‘others’, Muslims and Christians are implicitly represented by 
the discourse as ‘foreign’ others that block – through their presence in the rightful homeland 
of the Hindus – the completion of India’s ‘true’ identity and thus threaten to undermine the 
Indian nationhood.  
Religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians are, however, not formally excluded 
from the Indian nation by the discourse, but their inclusion presupposes their assimilation and 
full integration into the Indian ‘national mainstream’, i.e. the recognition of Hinduism as the 
cultural and political essence of India. As the BJP writes in its 1998 manifesto, Hindutva as a 
cultural nationalism embodies a common cultural heritage and system of beliefs, values, cus-
toms and experiences, that holds India together as “one nation” and “one people” (BJP 1998: 
4). It is, in other words, the accommodative nature of the Hinduist culture that unites India 
and enables the co-existence of the all different communities in India and is the hallmark of 
Indian nationalism: ‘unity in diversity’ (Singh [R.] 2009; BJP 2014: 10). Hindutva is thus “[a] 
firm belief in the ideal that a truly rich and diverse nation like India is optimally united when 
its people give precedence to their identity as ‘Indians before everything else’” (BJP 2014).71 
Since India is equated with Hindu-ness, this implies the privileging of the Hindu community 
and the subjugation of all other communities under the majority community. Hence, Hindutva 
symbolizes national unity and unity is strength in the Hindu nationalist discourse.  
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 Against this backdrop, the Hindu nationalists oppose all those demands and policies that privilege regional, 
religious, ethnic or linguist identities at the expense of the larger national identity of Indian-ness and thus divide 
the Indian nation (e.g. special status of Kashmir in the Indian constitution, a special civic code for Muslims and 
religion or caste-based reservations in education and employment). 
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The ultrarealist sub-discourse articulates the more implicit variant of this exclusive, majori-
tarian nationalism. It highlights the need for a uniform national identity as the precondition 
for building and maintaining a united, powerful and independent nation-state, since sub-
national identities encourage divisive tendencies and are exploited by foreign actors to 
weaken India. Commenting on the popular notion of “[u]nity in diversity”, Bharat Verma 
(2009: 39/310) notes: “The Indian tragedy is that this slogan since 1947 has only harped on 
the aspect concerning diversity, encouraging divisive tendencies from Kashmir to Kanyaku-
mari! For aspirations towards building a modern nation-state, the buzz word has to be integra-
tion and not disintegration […] There can never be unity in diversity. Unity requires a fair 
amount of uniformity”. Likewise, the authors of a study on “comprehensive national power” 
for India, argue: “The reasons for not exercising effective power are internal instability, struc-
tural weakness, and multi-religious and multi-ethnic historically. Our democracy has enabled 
us to deal with these factors in our society. But we should not believe that diversity is our 
strength. This is the line we have to take if we have to face that we are diverse country” 
(Singh/Gera/Dewan 2013: 113).  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse thus articulates the fear that India’s diversity and various 
socio-political fault-lines prevent India from adopting an integrative and determined approach 
towards national security threats and that external forces could exploit this lack of national 
unity and will (Verma 2007; Sibal 2008a; Doval 2010, Chandra 2011c). Rejecting the notion 
“that nation-building is a morality tale”, Bharat Karnad (2012c) notes on India’s Kashmir 
policy:  
 
“as history shows, nations are sewn together, often from disparate parts, by craft, graft, and bloodletting. 
It is dirty, usually violent business in which peoples who would otherwise have remained separate were 
dragged kicking and screaming into the national fold, and no nonsense about it. Again, ask the Ameri-
can Indians who, because they resisted, were exterminated. By reinforcing the notion of their distinct-
ness, Article 370
72
 has perennially fuelled discontent and insurgency, stoked dreams of independence in 
Kashmir, ill-served India, and should be done away with. It is best that the Kashmiris be told that once 
however in, there’s no out.” 
 
By upholding their religious identities and remaining outside the ‘Indian mainstream’, as the 
Hyper-nationalist discourse fears, Muslims and Christians – like the other ethnic or linguist 
minorities – prevent the development of a strong, uniform nation-state and promote the cen-
trifugal forces within Indian society which can be exploited by external actors (Verma [B.] 
2009: 39-40). Some even actively seek to subvert India’s national identity be it through the 
conversions of Hindus to Islam and Christianity, terrorist attacks by Islamist fundamentalists, 
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claiming historical sites of Hinduism or the support of separatist movements in Kashmir and 
the Northeast (The Organizer 2000; Paliwal 2003: 11/21ff.). As the RSS notes, “a person born 
in India forgets his ancestors and becomes a part of aggressors after his conversion […] the 
frequent partitions of India prove that the regions where Hindus are reduced to minority start 
agitating for separation. A united Hindu society is the only way to an integrated India” (RSS 
n.a.: 7-8).   
Accordingly, the growing number of Muslims and Christians in some Indian states such as 
Assam, Nagaland or West Bengal caused by illegal immigration from Bangladesh and con-
versions constitutes for the Hyper-nationalist discourse a “Demographic Aggression” (Singh 
[R.] 2006a) that changes the religious composition of India and poses a national security chal-
lenge by creating areas where Hindus are a minority and anti-Indian activities can flourish. As 
the BJP politician Varun Gandhi called upon Hindus in a controversial election speech in 
Uttar Pradesh: “Go to your villages and give the call that all Hindus must unite to save this 
area from becoming Pakistan”, promising that the BJP “will cut the throat of the [derogatory 
Hindi reference to a Muslim] after the elections” (quoted in The Indian Express 2009).  
This statement also points to the way how the Hyper-nationalist discourse links the religious 
minorities to external ‘forces’ ranging from Pakistan and Islamist terrorist networks to ‘West-
ern’ state or non-state actors that threaten to undermine India’s cultural and national integrity. 
Accordingly, Pakistan and Islamist terror groups seek the secession of Kashmir from the In-
dian Union or even seek to islamize the entire Indian Subcontinent. “This wave of Jehadi ter-
rorism”, as the RSS (2008) points out, “is home-grown with active funding, training and shel-
tering being made available from within the country while the enemy across our borders is 
providing necessary ideological and logistic support”. For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, 
India, as a democracy with the third largest Muslim population in the world and surrounded 
by two Islamic states, is one of the main targets and potential breeding grounds for the global 
jehad (Shourie 1997; Apte 2002; Advani 2006: 54ff.; Doval 2011a; Punj 2013). As Brahma 
Chellaney (2006) notes: “India is under siege from the forces of terror” that seek India’s 
“death by a thousand cuts. […] Nowhere is India's frailty more apparent than on internal secu-
rity, which historically has been its Achilles heel […] [with] [t]he jihadists having ethnically 
cleansed much of Indian Kashmir of its Hindu minority”. 
The exclusive and monolithic imagination of national identity, which informs both the Hindu 
nationalist and ultrarealist sub-discourses, thus represents difference and diversity as a threat 
to national unity and seeks to curtail this difference and diversity through an overarching, 
homogenous and assimilative cultural framework. This conviction is for the Hyper-nationalist 
207 
 
discourse the quintessence of India’s history. Because Indians/Hindus were divided, India 
could be invaded and subjugated. Because the Hindu majority failed to assert its authority 
towards the Muslims, the Indian nation was partitioned after it had overcome British colonial 
rule. In other words, India can only become and remain a strong and united nation-state, if all 
heterogeneous elements are excluded and centrifugal tendencies within Indian society are 
oppressed. This requires, as the early Hindu nationalist Savrarkar demanded, to “Hinduise all 
politics and militarise Hinduism” (Savarkar 1949: 302) by transforming Hindus into a “mar-
tial race” that can resist and confront internal and external aggressors and overcome the de-
cline of the once strong, united and powerful Hindu nation. This means, in particular, to over-
come the effeminacy of Indian/Hindu culture, which reflects, for instance, in Gandhi’s teach-
ings of non-violence (ahimsa) or the privileging of superstitious beliefs over material facts 
and reason – a concern that has remained at the centre of the Hyper-nationalist discourse until 
today (see Karnad 2002a; Verma [B.] 2009; Singh [Jasw.] 2013; Nehra 2010). Against this 
backdrop, the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, which destroyed the dream of a 
revival of the great Hindu rashtra, were attributed to this emasculation of Hinduism and the 
Indian National Congress’ attempt to appease Muslims instead of asserting India’s Hindu 
identity. Describing the thinking of Hindu nationalists around India’s independence, L.K. Ad-
vani (2006: 5-6) notes:  
 
“They vehemently opposed the doctrine that assertion of traditional India’s cultural and civilizational 
reality was obscurantist and will accentuate disintegrative social fault lines. On the contrary, they felt 
that only they could cement these artificially created fault lines and lay the foundation of a strong and 
resurgent India. Taking a much deeper and broader view of nation building, they felt that a modern In-
dia could not be built without protecting and strengthening the traditional India. Securing and strength-
ening this twin India, one representing its body and the other is soul, one defining its tangible form and 
the other is vital life force, were mutually complementary, and should constitute fundamental doctrines 
of our national security.” 
 
Though often claiming to return to or recollect the thought and practices of the ‘traditional 
India’, the Hyper-nationalist discourse, in fact, as we will see in greater detail in the discus-
sion of the fantasmatic logics, is shaped by the colonial encounter with the British and the 
‘Western’ civilization that imparted the early proponents of the discourse with European na-
tionalism and the importance of rationality, realism, utilitarianism, positivism, pragmatism 
and scientific temper for creating a modern and independent Indian nation-state (Devare 2009: 
156-157; Wolf 2009: 93ff.). For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, British colonial rule marked 
the continuation of India’s millennial-old colonial subjugation and served as a crucial source 
to unite Indians/Hindus. While the discourse acknowledges that British colonial rule ‘freed’ 
India from centuries of Muslim rule and brought India a more defined territory and a common 
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administration, civil service, currency, law, and foreign and defence policy, thereby overcom-
ing India’s stagnancy and backwardness and inducing material progress (Verma [B.] 1998a; 
Singh [Jasw.] 1999: 10/18), the colonial rulers also repressed and discriminated the Indian 
people, plundered their resources, converted Hindus into Christians, undermined India’s na-
tional and cultural consciousness and played an important role in the partition of India, which 
vitiated the aspirations to (re-)create a great and undivided Indian nation (Gandhi 2006, 
Shourie 2009, Lal 2011, Advani 2013). 
While mimicking modern ‘Western’ discourses of statecraft, technology, economic develop-
ment and science, the Hyper-nationalist discourse has always sought to distinguish India from 
the thought and practices of the former colonial oppressors and demanded that India may not 
merely follow the ‘Western’ path to modern nationhood, but should re-collect the glorious 
past of the ancient Hindu civilization which already contains the necessary ingredients for – a 
distinctive Indian and superior – modernity. Similar to the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse, the 
Hyper-nationalist discourse thus displays a certain post-colonial ambiguity towards the ‘West’. 
It is, however, less the ‘West’ as a spatial-political ‘other’, but (neo-)colonial and (neo-)    
imperialist practices attributed to ‘Western’ state and non-state actors, in particular the United 
States, and fear of a ‘Westernization’ of Indian society, which could undermine India’s Hindu 
identity, that underlie this ambiguity and reflect in the interplay of the logics of equivalence 
and difference. The Hyper-nationalist discourse thus simultaneously emulates and differenti-
ates itself from the ‘West’. On the one hand, the discourse has mimicked ‘Western’ discourses 
to transform India into a modern and prosperous nation-state and seeks recognition by the 
‘West’. For instance, it has sought to incorporate India into the global discourse on the ‘war 
on terror’ as a beacon of democracy and tolerance that is the antipode to the extremist, theo-
cratic and aggressive forces of radical Islam and, therefore, a natural partner of the ‘West’ 
(see Singh [Jasw.] 2006: 170ff.; Verma 2009: 15). On the other hand, the discourse also 
draws a political frontier between India and the ‘West’ by representing India as a great and 
ancient civilization, whose tolerance, morality and spiritual achievements contrast with the 
overly materialistic, rationalist and expansionist ‘West’. Though the discourse articulates In-
dia’s identity in opposition to the ‘West’, it is not anti-western – what the discourse desires “is 
recognition of […] India by the Western powers, but a recognition through assertion of cul-
tural difference and assertion of India’s sovereignty and self-determination” (Hansen 1999: 
12).  
For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the ‘Western’ inclination towards expansionism and im-
perialism has not ceased with the end of colonialism, but is said to continue to shape the poli-
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cies of ‘Western’ societies and states, in particular of the United States as the dominant power 
in the world. Against this backdrop, the Hyper-nationalist discourse often associates U.S. for-
eign policy with (neo-)colonial practices. Though the Hyper-nationalist discourse has already 
during the cold war called for a recalibration of Indo-U.S. relations and criticized the one-
sided tilt towards the Soviet Union as a deviance from true non-alignment (BJP [1981] 2000: 
5-6), it displays a deep ambiguity towards the U.S. and the ‘West’ in general – an ambiguity 
that is particularly prominent in the more radical wing of the Sangh Parivar. Deploring the 
“US expansionism”, the RSS activist Radha Rajan (2006) for instance argues: “The US is 
seeking to conquer the world for the sake of the American Creed. This is the core of all 
American foreign policy. It is a predatory lust for power that is devoid of moral authority and 
powered only by military might. The American state’s ruthless ambition to subjugate the rest 
of the world makes it the classic asuravijayi [demoniac conqueror]”. And the BJP ([1991] 
2000: 30/51) notes after the end of the cold war:  
 
“The international situation to-day is also characterized by the emergence of one Super alliance, the 
Euro-American Alliance, which now includes the Soviet Union among its partners. By its very domi-
nance, it is all pervasive in its influence on international economy, polity, defence and culture. Most 
countries find it difficult to escape from its influence so as to maintain their independence and separate 
identity […] The attempt to impose a new world order based on the military and economic strength has 
vitiated the international atmosphere. The political and economic domination sought by some affluent 
countries reminds us of the colonial and imperialist era prevalent before the Second World War.” 
 
According to Ajit Doval (2011a), this inclination towards expansionism and imperialism is 
intrinsic to monolithic religions such as Christianity or Islam in which “violence was ap-
proved to achieve, mutually intertwined, politico-religious objectives”, whereas “oriental re-
ligions, like Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism etc., even when at their zenith, with no major re-
ligions to compete, did not opt for political conquests or holy wars to expand their empires or 
propagate their religions”. For Doval, “[c]olonial imperialism was a manifestation of this 
phenomenon so was defining new jurisprudence formulated to regulate the world order, in-
cluding rules of war and peace, trade and commerce, international relations and human rights. 
Christian West, the dominant player, crafted these rules which sub served their interests. This 
constituted a challenge to others- either to change or to confront. Those unwilling to comply 
constituted challenge to the West.”  
For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the contemporary world order thus represents in many 
ways a continuation of imperialist practices and benefits the interests of the former imperialist 
powers that try to impose their will and interests on developing countries such as India. De-
ploring “Geopolitics behind humanitarian cover” (Chellaney 2011) and the way how “the 
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strongest economic and military entity in the world, the United States of America has begun 
to betray imperial yearnings” (Karnad 2002a: xi) and selectively uses human rights abuses, 
the absence of democratic norms or nuclear proliferation as rationales for intervening jointly 
or singly into the internal affairs of states in the Global ‘South’, the Hyper-nationalist dis-
course argues that a country like India, which is still in the process of nation-building and 
confronted with insurgencies, secessionist movements and domestic unrest, is exposed to in-
ternational pressure by ‘Western’ states and NGOs or may even fall pray to external interfer-
ences (ibid.: xiv). 
The fear of international pressure, influence and interferences has increased in the context of 
the globalization discourse and India’s economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. It was 
during this time that the Hyper-nationalist discourse and its concept of Hindutva gained in 
importance by providing a source of identification in an age of apparently increased complex-
ity and substantial socio-economic transformations that are challenging traditional ways of 
being and belonging. The globalization discourse, while also encompassing many opportuni-
ties and benefits, is linked to global economic competition, foreign direct investments and 
global capital flows, job losses, transnational terrorism and mass migration or Americaniza-
tion and Westernization. The apparent globalization of all social spheres of life alters notions 
of time and space and generates threats and challenges without borders that can be felt but not 
effectively dealt with locally. This exposure to processes of globalization and modernization 
create feelings of vulnerability, insecurity and social alienation (Kinnval 2006: 4ff.). 
The Hyper-nationalist discourse, and in particular the Hindutva sub-discourse, takes up fears, 
articulated in the globalization discourse, of foreign influence and a (re-)colonization of India 
that threaten to undermine India’s national identity and culture and are used to forge a chain 
of equivalence. Globalization and Westernization thus serve as ‘shared negativity’ to link to-
gether different subjects, interests and demands into the discourse. As the BJP president Ra-
jnath Singh (2006b) notes: “New concepts and lifestyles are taking roots in the Indian society 
posing a challenge to our cultural values in the same manner foreign companies and products 
had increased their presence in the country in the wake of globalisation and liberalization in 
recent times”. Nevertheless, the discourse in its totality is not an anti-globalization, anti-
Western or anti-modern discourse, but rather promises to protect the Indian national identity 
and its culture in an age of rapid socio-economic changes and to make India into a powerful, 
prosperous and modern nation-state. In other words, the discourse presents itself as a part of 
and not as an antipode to globalization and the ongoing transformations within Indian society 
by claiming to have the necessary means, namely order, spiritual clarity and wisdom, security, 
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discipline and collective strength embodied by Hindutva, that India needs to take advantage of 
globalization and successfully pursue the path of modernization without losing its traditional 
culture and values. Recognizing the need for embracing globalization and economic liberali-
zation, the discourse thus seeks to harmonize these two objectives and bridge the internal di-
vide between pro- and anti-globalization forces within society by invoking the concept of 
swadeshi (self-reliance) and re-brand it as economic nationalism which is said to constitute an 
innate Indian development model and the middle path between liberal market economy and 
communist planned economy, thereby promising to protect India from the negative effects of 
both development models and to follow indigenous rather than foreign economic theories 
(BJP 2004; Advani 2009; Singh [R.] 2009b).  
To sum up, the Muslim and European-Christian colonial ‘other’ symbolize in the Hyper-
nationalist discourse antagonistic ‘others’ that block the realization of India’s true identity and 
underscore the importance of national unity and strength that can only be realized if India 
becomes a uniform nation-state that assimilates and forces minorities (and other national dis-
senters) into the Indian mainstream. While a uniform pan-Indian identity must thus be empha-
sized and strengthened, sub-national identities must be weakened. The past invasions and co-
lonial subjugation of India are a testimony for what happens, if India is disunited. Though the 
era of colonialism is over, India’s national identity is still threatened by the Muslim and Euro-
pean-Christian colonial ‘other’ through Islamic fundamentalism, globalization and Westerni-
zation or missionary work.             
 
 
7.2.2 Spatial-political ‘Others’: Pakistan and China  
Having discussed the way how the Hyper-nationalist discourse articulates colonialism as tem-
poral ‘other’, we will now shed light on the spatial-political ‘others’, Pakistan and China, and 
how they shape the construction of meanings and identities in the discourse.   
 
Pakistan 
For the hyper-nationalist discourse, Pakistan is the external symbol of India’s colonial subju-
gation and the traumatic and bloody partition of the Indian nation in 1947. By denying their 
cultural and religious heritage and siding with the British colonial power, who pursued a di-
vide-and-rule policy to disintegrate Indian society and safeguard its power, the Indian Mus-
lims under the leadership of the Muslim League betrayed their motherland and bear the main 
blame for dividing the Indian nation (Advani 2008: 9/524; Vijay 2008: 15). Criticizing the 
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leader of the Muslim League and Pakistan’s state founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah for claiming 
that Hindus and Muslims constitute two different nations, Jaswant Singh (2013: 18) notes, 
“the basic and structural fault in Jinnah’s notion remains a rejection of his origins; of being an 
Indian, having been shaped by the soil of India, tampered in the heat of the Indian experience. 
Muslims in India were, and are, no doubt subscribers to a different faith but that is all; they 
were not of any different stock or aliens. Even Jinnah’s followers were willingly Indian, in 
every conceivable manner, for so long as they ruled over parts of India”. Similarly, L.K. Ad-
vani (2008: 54/168) pointed out the flawed and artificial nature of the Pakistani nation-state:    
 
“The flaw in the Muslim League’s demand was further aggravated by its aggression and obstinacy in at-
taining this demand. […] The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was the outcome of an aggressive, hare-
charged movement inspired by his falsehood – namely, that the Hindus and Muslims of undivided India 
constituted two distinct nations and hence Muslims needed a separate homeland. But, apart from carry-
ing the burden of this misrepresentation, Pakistan was also an embarrassing advertisement of geo-
graphical absurdity. West and East Pakistan were physically separated by a distance of over 1,200 miles, 
with India sandwiched in between. World history presented no such example of an artificial nation ex-
cept if it was the colony of some imperial power.” 
 
For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the Pakistani state and its hostile policy towards India 
represent a continuation of the century-old Muslim aggressions. As Anand K. Verma (2011), 
former chief of the foreign intelligence Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), notes:    
 
“The idea of Pakistan survives on the premise of enmity towards India. This premise came into exis-
tence well before Pakistan became a reality. Some in Pakistan believe that the country started incubat-
ing the moment the first Muslim stepped on the soil of the subcontinent. That belief originates from the 
conviction that the Islamic civilisation cannot intermingle with another civilisation because it always 
seeks to conquer and subjugate. That is how Islam has spread all across the world from a tiny enclave in 
the desert of Arabia, destroying frontiers, borders, kingdoms, empires, traditions, cultures and civilisa-
tions. Jinnahs concept of Pakistan was not based on any theological attachment. He simply wanted a ter-
ritory where Muslims would not be outnumbered by non Muslims. The Muslim rulers of India could not 
overwhelm the indigenous culture. Therefore, the Islamic and non Islamic communities lived their lives 
in a milieu of uneasy coexistence. The British arrived on the scene and could make no impact on the 
prevailing realities. […] Ever since, Pakistan has wallowed in its hate for India. Therefore, from day 
one, its leadership has been looking for ways and means to diminish India and to destroy it, if possible.”  
 
For the BJP politician Balbir Punj (2013), the Pakistani nation-state is founded on a religious 
ideology that “interprets the world in terms of religious obligations of the faithful versus the 
infidel […] This macabre thought-process entered the Indian sub-continent with Muhammad 
bin Qasim from Saudi Arabia ransacking the Hindu kingdom of Punjab and Sind in 712 AD. 
He wrote to the ‘kings of Hind’ to surrender and accept Islam. Indians were given two options 
– submit to Islam peacefully or deal with the consequences. This tradition has since continued 
unabated”. As today’s manifestation of this ideology, Pakistan, as the discourse argues, is an 
intrinsically hostile and aggressive state. Its policies towards India are conditioned by a deep-
rooted antipathy, rivalry, and hatred that stem from Pakistan’s Islamic roots and the ‘idea’ of 
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Pakistan based on the ‘Two-Nation-Theory’. This religious ideology places India and Paki-
stan in an insuperable antagonistic relationship and rules out a peaceful co-existence between 
both countries (Sood 2007; Chandra 2013; Malik 2013; Parthasarathy 2013b). As antagonist 
‘other’, Pakistan blocks the realization and completeness of India’s identity. At the same time, 
Pakistan is constitutive for this identity formation, since it serves as an important ‘shared 
negativity’ against which the discourse seeks to construct a chain of equivalence: Threatened 
by a ruthless, irredentist and aggressive Pakistan, India must become a strong and uniform 
nation-state that curtails the centrifugal, sub-national forces and prevents that India’s diversity 
can be exploited by Pakistan and others who seek to weaken or unravel India. This, as the 
discourse claims, can only be achieved in a culturally homogenous national framework which 
emphasizes Hindu-ness or Indian-ness instead of sub-national identities, demands and inter-
ests. Invoking Pakistan as the threatening ‘other’, the discourse thus seeks to articulate dis-
similar elements around the privileged signifier Hindu-ness/Indian-ness, thereby presenting 
them as equivalent and subverting the inherent difference that exists, for instance, between the 
various ethnic and linguist groups, religious sects, castes etc. in India.              
The antagonism has different dimensions in the Hyper-nationalist discourse: To begin with, 
the discourse does not view Pakistan as a “normal state” with its own history, culture and 
identity, but “an entity that believes it can exist only as an antithesis of India” (Sibal 2010), 
and it is this enmity towards India that holds the fragile and crisis-ridden Pakistani nation to-
gether and explains its fixation on Kashmir (Chellaney 2001; Sood 2007). As a result, “Paki-
stani territorial claims cannot be dealt with rationally as they are rooted in religion and the 
‘idea’ of Pakistan” (Sibal 2014b). Therefore, unless Pakistan overcomes the flawed ‘Two-
Nation-Theory’ and creates a positive national identity that embodies more than being anti-
Indian, there can never be a normalization of relations with India, and Pakistan will seek to 
challenge or disrupt India’s national unity whenever possible. As the Group of Ministers Re-
port on National Security (2001: 9-11), conducted by senior members of the BJP-led NDA 
government, states: 
 
“Pakistan will continue to pose a threat to India’s security in the future also. Its traditional hostility and 
single-minded aim of destabilizing India, is not focussed just on Kashmir but on a search for parity. 
This arises out of the two-nation theory, coupled with a desire to exact revenge for the 1971 humiliation 
over the separation of Bangladesh. […] Pakistan has been waging a proxy war against India since the 
1980s. Since the Kargil War and the military coup of October 12, 1999, Pakistan's support to crossbor-
der terrorism has intensified and is expected to continue in the future. The rapid growth of Islamic fun-
damentalism in Pakistan is also of serious concern to India. […] Pakistan is pursuing a multi-pronged 
strategy to destabilize India and annex J&K. Militancy is a direct consequence of the unremitting efforts 
of Pakistan’s covertagencies, particularly its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to exploit the prevailing 
discontent and destabilize the established authority by creating an anarchic situation.” 
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Not the least because of these attempts to destabilize India through this “policy of bleeding 
India by ‘inflicting thousand cuts’” (Advani 2006: 2), the Hyper-nationalist discourse frames 
Pakistan as a ‘barbaric’ and highly dangerous state, a state that tries to compensate the lack of 
a national identity through hostility towards India and a nuclear power that is on the brink of 
collapse due to its internal contradictions and the “monster” of Islamic fundamentalism that it  
has created and supported to weaken and disrupt India, but that is now increasingly turning 
against the Pakistani state and could acquire nuclear weapons, making Pakistan the first fail-
ing nuclear state (Chellaney 2001/02: 103ff.; Verma [B.] 2008). 
The Hyper-nationalist discourse also views Pakistan as the antagonist ‘other’, because it has 
blocked India’s emergence as a strong, united and independent nation-state after independ-
ence. Having been cut out of the Indian body politic, Pakistan has prevented the resurgence of 
the great, undivided Indian nation that has, according to the Hyper-nationalist discourse, ex-
isted in the pre-colonial era. While many of those who (occasionally) draw on the Hyper-
nationalist discourse such as the prominent BJP leaders Atal Vajpayee (2003d), L.K. Advani 
(2008b) or Jaswant Singh (2009) have come to terms with the partition of the Indian subcon-
tinent and some rather fear the collapse of Pakistan due to its large (and radicalized) Muslim 
population which the Indian nation-state cannot absorb (Karnad 2005: 184; Sood 2009: 251-
252), there are also proponents of this discourse that seek to unravel the Pakistani state either 
to eliminate the security threat it poses to India (Verma [B.] 2008; Chandra 2013a) or to re-
unite the (ancient) Indian nation. The members of the RSS, for instance, affirm their commit-
ment to the re-unification of India and regeneration of a pure Hindu nation by conducting 
prayers in front of a map of Akhanda Bharat (undivided India, i.e. pre-Partition India includ-
ing present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) (Hansen 1996: 137). And an editorial in 
the RSS magazine Panchjanya demanded during the 1999 Kargil war:  
 
“the time has come again for India’s Bheema to tear open the breasts of these infidels and purify the 
soiled tresses of Draupadi with blood. Pakistan will not listen just like that. We have a centuries-old 
debt to settle with this mindset. It is the same demon that has been throwing a challenge at Durga since 
the time of Mahammad bin Qasim. Arise Atal Behari! Who knows if fate has destined you to be the au-
thor of the final chapter of this long story. For what have we manufactured bombs? For what have we 
exercised the nuclear option” (quoted in Frontline 2001). 
 
Today Pakistan’s destructive policies threaten to undermine India’s secular and pluralist de-
mocracy and great power ambitions in the international system. “India is singularly vulner-
able to terrorism”, as Kanwal Sibal (2008) notes, “because of its population composition, in-
ternal communal fault lines and porous borders. Then there is a hostile neighbour determined 
to use the religious card against it, both bilaterally and at the international level, to claim 
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Kashmir, impede India's ties with the Islamic world and weaken its secular democracy.” 
Kashmir figures prominently in the discourse, because it is “a Muslim majority state and reli-
gious factor will continue to play an important role in political proclivities of the people, their 
perception of Pakistan and Pakistan’s temptation to exploit religious demography to its advan-
tage” (Doval 2010). By exporting terrorism and provoking communal tensions in India, Paki-
stan ultimately seeks to disrupt the Indian Union and its secular-pluralist state model through 
all possible means, thereby proving not only the raison d'être of Pakistan’s nationhood but 
also establishing parity with the archenemy. For this purpose, Pakistan is also dragging ‘ex-
ternal powers’ such as China into the region to counter-balance India and undermine its great 
power aspirations (Sibal 2011a; Chandra 2013a). Against this backdrop, as the Hyper-
nationalist discourse maintains for forging a chain of equivalence, it is all the more important 
that India becomes a culturally homogenous nation and assimilates all dissenting sub-national 
forces into the ‘Indian mainstream’.      
Similar to the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist discourse also articulates 
India as a secular, pluralist and peaceful democracy in opposition to an authoritarian, theo-
cratic and militarized Pakistan. Accordingly, while, in India, a flourishing secular democracy 
has emerged where all different religious communities are respected and enjoy equal rights, 
Pakistan has become an Islamic state where minorities are discriminated and persecuted and 
state power lies essentially in the hands of the military (Advani 2001; Sood 2007; Chellaney 
2009). Highlighting India’s large Muslim population and that, unlike in Pakistan and other 
countries, hardly any Muslims in India have joined Islamic fundamentalist groups, L.K. Ad-
vani (2005) argues that this can be explained with “the secular, free-market, democratic con-
text of India, heavily influenced by a tradition of non-violence and Hindu tolerance”. The 
political frontier that the discourse draws between India and Pakistan should not only re-
affirm India’s democratic identity, but also India’s superiority towards Pakistan and the inher-
ent peacefulness, progressiveness and tolerance of Hinduism that is contrasted with the back-
wardness, intolerance and militancy of Islam. This political frontier also extends to the realm 
of foreign policy: India’s foreign policy, marked by strategic restraint, the advocacy of peace-
ful coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts and the absence of any hegemonistic and 
territorial ambitions, stands for the discourse in sharp contrast to Pakistan’s hawkish, irreden-
tist and aggressive policies (Singh [Jasw.] 2000; Chandra 2011d). 
For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the ‘uncivilized’ and ‘backward’ nature of Pakistan re-
flects, in particular, in the dominant role of the army in the state and its support of jihad ter-
rorism, making the Pakistani army, in the words of Satish Chandra (2013), “essentially a ji-
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hadi outfit in uniform”. Writing after an incident between Indian and Pakistani soldiers at the 
LoC, Kanwal Sibal (2013d) notes: 
  
“The Pakistanis claim that the highly ‘professional’ army would do no such thing as mutilation. But 
then, is it normal for a professional army to have ‘jihad’ in its motto, along with ‘faith’ and ‘piety’. Is it 
a professional army or a religious army of the faithful whose profession is to fight for Islam? 
As a smaller, more vulnerable country, wracked by extremism and violence, in economic distress, over-
stretched by its ambitions, militaristic in thinking, adept at cynically exploiting its geopolitical position, 
capable of extreme obduracy, animated by fear and defiance of India and attitudes distorted by its Is-
lamic vocation that makes it resort to terrorism as an instrument of state policy, Pakistan is not like us.” 
 
Underscoring, the jihad mentality of the Pakistani army, the BJP politician and retired Lt 
General N.S. Malik (2013) warns:   
 
“As per Pakistan Army thinking Jihadi Islam has been at war with Hindustan since 711 when Mohd Bin 
Qasim landed in Sind. This has continued unabated since, till it acquired new country of Pakistan, ‘Two 
Nation Theory’ is very much alive and continues to be the main drive towards hatred of India. As per 
Pak Army they are determined to continue the war to destroy Hindustan and convert it to Pakistan. 
Kashmir is the first step in that direction. It is only that India does not understand this and thus takes no 
serious action to guard itself”. 
 
Unlike the hegemonic Post-Nehruvian discourse, however, the Hyper-nationalist discourse 
argues that India’s culture of democracy, tolerance and non-violence puts it, at the same time, 
at a disadvantage towards Pakistan, where the army determines the foreign, security and de-
fence policies and pursues a ruthless realpolitik. While the discourse thus distinguishes India 
from Pakistan by invoking democracy, tolerance and even non-violence – one of the hall-
marks of the hegemonic (Post-)Nehruvian discourse –, it also implicitly envies Pakistan. Paki-
stan has something that India does not have and what the proponents of the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse deeply desire: It has a martial ethos and is a ruthless practitioner of realpolitik. 
Therefore, the discourse suggests to emulate Pakistan: India must upgrade the role of the mili-
tary in the policy-making process, become a uniform nation-state that curbs internal dissent 
with an ‘iron hand’, hinduize Indian politics or pursue a tough and reciprocal policy towards 
Pakistan (e.g. covert support of separatist movements in Pakistan) (see Verma [B.] 2009: 
39ff.; Vijay 2009: 11ff.; RSS 2011; Sibal 2011a; Karnad 2014). As Brahma Chellaney 
(1999c: 321) notes: 
 
“It has been common for many Indians to be dismissive of Pakistan. But time and again, with the sole 
exception of 1971, Pakistan has outmanouvred and outfoxed the much larger India. […] A key require-
ment of statecraft, as affirmed by ancient strategists Kautilya and Sun Tzu, is to understand one’s en-
emy well and exploit its internal divisions and weaknesses. Pakistan has done a much better job than 
India on that front and is thus able to take advantage of Indian weaknesses. The way India was caught 
with its pants down on Kargil was a national shame. Yet there was hardly any introspection in India. 
[…] If a failed state can execute a major land grab after systematically undermining Indian security for 
years, one shudders to think what a successful state would have done to India!” 
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Thus, instead of pursuing a moralpolitik in the naive and misleading conviction that there is 
no alternative to a dialogue with Pakistan, that India can change Pakistan’s inimical designs 
or that a strong and prosperous Pakistan is in India’s interest, India must like Pakistan adopt a 
realpolitik that seeks to insulate India from Pakistan’s hostile policies and to create strategic 
leverage towards Pakistan in order to enforce a change of these policies in the long run. It 
must come to terms with the reality that Pakistan is, unlike India, an authoritarian and milita-
rized country run by a ruthless leadership that does not subscribe to any codes of conduct or 
civilized behaviour in the pursuit of its interests and is doing everything in its power to dam-
age India. Appeasement, a dialogue and upholding India’s tradition of non-violence will not 
bring about a change in Pakistan’s policies but will be perceived as weakness and only en-
courage further Pakistani attacks and provocations (Chellaney 2009b; Sibal 2013d; Shukla 
2013). Instead of making unilateral concessions and showing goodwill, India must make a 
normalization of relations conditional on an actual change of Pakistan’s anti-Indian policies 
and retaliating Pakistan’s provocations. Unless Pakistan does not abandon its fixation on 
Kashmir and support of terrorists, as the Hyper-nationalist discourse asserts, India has neither 
an interest in a stable and prosperous Pakistan nor in a structured dialogue with it (Doval 
2006; Chandra 2013; Malik 2013; Sood 2013; Parthasarathy 2014). 
Against this backdrop, there is an ambiguity and tension in the Hyper-nationalist discourse 
that has also impeded its ability to overcome the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse and gain discur-
sive hegemony. The Hyper-nationalist discourse wants to overcome the equation of India with 
Pakistan and assert India’s difference and superiority towards Pakistan, not the least because 
the fixation on Pakistan undermines India’s great power aspirations and distracts India from 
what should be the true reference point for India’s foreign and security policy, namely China 
(Karnad 2012d). However, the Hyper-nationalist discourse often seeks to assert India’s differ-
ence towards Pakistan through – implicitly or explicitly – invoking democracy, tolerance, 
non-violence and moralpolitik, which re-affirm logics of the hegemonic foreign policy dis-
course and make it more difficult for the discourse to seriously challenge the Post-Nehruvian 
discourse, whereas the emulation of Pakistan runs the risk of undermining the political fron-
tier towards Pakistan and thus India’s distinctiveness. This, in turn, would ‘reduce’ India to 
Pakistan and threaten the identity of the discourse. What we find here is an interplay of the 
logics of equivalence and difference that simultaneously hold the discourse and its identity 
articulations together, but also subvert it and thus create some inherent tensions in the dis-
course. While the logic of equivalence seeks to institute a clear political frontier between In-
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dia and Pakistan, the logic of difference dissolves this chain of equivalence, since the dis-
course implies that India should emulate Pakistan, what would subvert the difference between 
India and Pakistan, thereby undermining the articulation of a distinctive and superior Indian 
identity. In short, by seeking to maintain the difference between India and Pakistan, the dis-
course undermines the successful institutionalization of its own hegemonic project.  
 
China  
In addition to Pakistan, which is closely linked to India’s colonial past, the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse articulates India’s national identity also in opposition to China which has emerged 
as a crucial reference point for India’s emergence in Asia and the world. Similar to the Post-
Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist discourse acknowledges China as an ancient civi-
lization and emerging great power and thus as a political entity that, unlike the ‘inferior other’ 
Pakistan, matches more with India’s own status in the world (Singh [Jasw.] 2000; Advani 
2008b: 670f., Sibal 2011b, Anand/Ganguly 2013). As Tarun Vijay (2008: 161-162) notes:  
 
“The two nations have emerged as major players influencing events and authoring the future course of 
global affairs like never before […] The Chinese hunger – to gain more knowledge, more military 
power, more prosperity and a decisive say in global matters – has become the most significant story of 
our times […] If the Chinese story is an inspiring one, India’s emergence on the world stage on the back 
of knowledge, technology, prosperity and stability along with an excellent record of multiparty democ-
racy, secular pluralism and a living civilization dating back over 5,000 years is an amazing tale too – 
and should be of considerable interest for the dragon land. […] [T]he world moves with the strong and 
hence the global and geopolitical situation in the neighbourhood will be deeply influenced by Sino-
India relations.” 
 
 
China is both admired and feared. While the Post-Nehruvian discourse, above all, appreciates 
China’s past achievements and recent socio-economic development, the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse, in particular, recognizes that “China understands power politics better than any 
other nation” (Menon 2000: 29). China, as Ajit Doval (2010) notes, is not only emerging “as a 
major economic power but a state that is pursuing a grand strategic plan with clock wise pre-
cision and expanding its strategic reach backed by an ambitious militarization programme”. 
China is a centralist, uniform nation-state with a strong political leadership that has a clear 
strategic vision and the absolute will and ability to implement this vision. It is a ruthless prac-
titioner of realpolitik and fully understands the utility and necessity of supreme military capa-
bilities to defend its national interests and emerge as a world power. As Jaswant Singh (2006: 
146) points out: 
 
“It is a historically established fact that China, as a state, whether communists or in its earlier versions, 
when stable is a practitioner of power. It expands through an extension of the spread of its power. This 
Chinese state has not, through history, ever demonstrated any romantic humanitarianism, it has never 
219 
 
confusedly used that notion as an instrument of state policy, as for example, Nehru had in his early deal-
ings with China.” 
 
China’s strategically-guided, territorial-minded realpolitik and will to power contrast for the 
Hyper-nationalist discourse sharply with India’s lack of a strategic culture and planning, weak 
leadership and hesitant, meek and moralist policies (Menon [N.] 2008; Singh [P.] 2013; Kar-
nad 2012d). “The Chinese unlike India’s reactive approach”, as the retired Air Marshal R.S. 
Bedi (2013) warns, “always think and plan strategies way ahead”. Comparing China’s and 
India’s strengths and weaknesses, Brahma Chellaney (2010: 20/25/197) notes:  
 
“The real advantage of China over India lies in its very opaque, tightly run system that enables the neo-
Leninists regime in Beijing to set long-term policy goals and the work quietly and resolutely to achieve 
them. […] China, quite the opposite of India, has been a practitioner of classical balance-of-power poli-
tics. […] China knows what it takes to become a great power. While growing realism in India has yet to 
overcome tradition of naïve idealism and political divisiveness, zealously erecting the building blocs of 
comprehensive national power.” 
 
In contrast to India, “China has a definite view of its place in the world – it aims at being the 
preeminent power” (Shourie 2009) and has understood that this requires comprehensive na-
tional power. As a result, China has outperformed India and is economically and militarily far 
more powerful, even though both countries were once at par. As Kanwal Sibal deplores 
(2012d: 20),  
 
“India has all the attributes to be in the same league as China, whether it is physical or demographic size, 
skills or civilizational depth. But China has outstripped India as a rising power, and the gap already ex-
isting between us will continue to grow in at least the decade and a half ahead. China is better organized, 
more purposeful in formulating policies and implementing them, and much less constrained by domes-
tic public opinion. […] Militarily, China has developed capacities that we will find difficult to match.” 
 
This development poses a severe danger to India, because, for the Hyper-nationalist discourse, 
China is an inherently expansionist and aggressive power that seeks regional supremacy in 
Asia and will not accept any peer competitors (Chellaney 1999c: 315; Thapliyal 2010). It will 
thus use its growing power capabilities to weaken India and ‘sabotage’ its rise in the interna-
tional system. China is thus framed by the Hyper-nationalist discourse as an antagonist ‘other’ 
preventing India from attaining its true identity and destiny as a great power in Asia and the 
world. The discourse thus seeks to create a chain of equivalence by instituting a political fron-
tier between India and China and presenting China as an obstacle that must be overcome be-
fore India can gain its rightful place in the world order. “After the Mughals and the British”, 
as Bharat Verma (2014) notes, “it now appears to be China’s turn to encircle, enslave and 
make India a surrogate power. Apparently, China firmly believes that two tigers cannot live 
220 
 
on the same mountain”. China is said to suffer from a “Middle Kingdom syndrome” (Kanwal 
2011: 19), which prevents it from accepting India’s aspirations in Asia and cultivates a sense 
of superiority that entitles China to defy the interests or rights of other countries (RSS 2011; 
Parthasarathy 2013a; Sibal 2012d: 29).  
According to the Hyper-nationalist discourse, China‘s hostile and belligerent behaviour be-
comes most apparent in its – largely successful – attempts to contain and encircle India. As 
the retired brigadier and former director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Gurmeet 
Kanwal (2000b), explicates:  
 
“While China professes a policy of peace and friendliness towards India, its deeds are clearly aimed at 
the strategic encirclement of India in order to marginalise India in Asia and tie it down to the Indian 
sub-continent. Concerted Chinese efforts are underway to achieve this aim. For the last several decades, 
China has been engaged in efforts to create a ring of anti-Indian influences around India through mili-
tary and economic assistance programmes to neighbouring countries, combined with complementary 
diplomacy. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have been assiduously and cleverly cultivated 
towards this end. Myanmar has been recently added to this list.” 
 
Pakistan constitutes “the core of the Chinese containment strategy against India” (Bakshi 
2010: 57). Against this backdrop, Brajesh Mishra (2011) laments: “Today it seems we have 
no place in the world order. We have two enemies on our borders and both of them are trying 
very hard to see that we keep ourselves engaged and embroiled in South Asia so that we don’t 
have any one outside”. In addition, China is said to have tried to bring Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Maldives and Myanmar in its orbit in order to undermine India’s security and influ-
ence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. China provides these countries not only with gener-
ous military and development aid, but also utilizes these relations to develop strategic ports 
and potentially military bases in India’s periphery. As the BJP comments in her 2014 election 
manifesto: “India’s traditional influence and goodwill in the South Asian neighbourhood has 
been waning as China carries forward its efforts to encircle India in its own backyard” (BJP 
2014a: 39). Similarly, Kanwal Sibal (2013d) notes, “China interferes actively in our region, 
feeding fears of Indian hegemony amongst our smaller neighbours and preventing India from 
raising its global profile by consolidating its regional base”.  
As in the case of the Pakistani ‘other’, the Hyper-nationalist discourse seeks to simultaneously 
distance India from China and emulate it. On the one hand, the discourse articulates the In-
dian democracy in opposition to China’s authoritarian rule and evokes a “strategic rivalry 
between the world’s largest autocracy and democracy” (Chellaney 2012d: 107). The discourse 
thus draws a clear political frontier between both countries by emphasizing India’s status as 
democracy that is inherently peaceful, tolerant and non-expansionist and implying that India 
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is ultimately a more superior and progressive nation and civilization. China, as the discourse 
constructs the antagonism in Sino-Indian relations, cannot accept India’s success, progress 
and emergence, since China’s “authoritarian regime” type “contradict[s] India’s multi-cultural 
democracy” (Verma [B.] 2012). On the other hand, the discourse also ‘envies’ and ‘admires’ 
the way how a strong Chinese leadership pursues strategically guided policies, a ruthless 
realpolitik that confronts external and internal dissent, and urges India to become more like 
China. Hence, India’s tradition of democracy and non-violence make it weak and put it at 
disadvantage towards an authoritarian China, but are, at the same time, what tells India and 
China apart (Karnad 2002a: xx; Menon 2008; Shourie 2009; Advani 2010; Singh/Gera/    
Dewan 2013: 17-18; Sood 2013).  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse’s articulation of the China threat is shaped by the conviction 
that “China cannot be trusted” (Parthasarathy 2012). It imputes China’s policies generally an 
anti-Indian character, resulting in allegations that China seeks to encircle, contain and weaken 
India. This presupposition can not only be traced back to the traumatic 1962 war with China 
that symbolizes China’s ‘betrayal’ of India’s goodwill and friendship (RSS 2012; Sibal 
2012d). Rather, it is represented as an inherent and enduring element of China’s strategic cul-
ture. Like India, the discourse understands China as an enduring civilizational agent that has 
certain intrinsic characteristics and a distinctive strategic culture that has persisted until today. 
The foundation of this strategic culture are Sun Tze’s treatises ‘The Art of War’ and ‘Princi-
ples of War’ written in the 6th century B.C. (Singh [Jasw.] 1999: 170; Menon [N.] 2008). As 
the retired Colonel Narender Kumar (2010) notes: 
 
“China continues to be driven by Sun Tzu’s philosophy. Sun Tzu had said: […] To subdue the enemy 
without fighting is the supreme excellence. Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without bat-
tle. […] By playing with psychological weaknesses of the opponent, by manoeuvring enemy to precari-
ous position, by inducing feeling of frustration and confusion, a strategist can get the other side to break 
down mentally before surrendering physically or psychologically. […] China is doing nothing new but 
following the ‘Art of War’ and ‘Principles of War’ laid down by Sun Tzu. It is waging war on India 
without field armies. The intent is clear – to subdue India without fighting a war.” 
 
Accordingly, China is gradually but persistently subverting the geopolitical status quo in its 
periphery, including on its border with India, and undermines its adversaries without waging a 
(formal) war. Following Sun Tze’s credo that ‘all warfare is based on deception’, China is 
ruthlessly exploiting the weaknesses of its adversaries and camouflaging offence as defence 
(Roy 2010; Chellaney 2013d). “Duplicity and deceit”, as Arun Shourie (2013: 4) warns, “is 
the essence of traditional Chinese strategic doctrine”. Against this backdrop, the growing co-
operation between India and China or the talk of friendship and partnership are intended to 
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lull India into a false sense of security and deceit it into believing that the basic parameters of 
the Sino-Indian relations have changed, while China is clandestinely following its ‘game 
plan’ to achieve uncontested regional supremacy and solve the border dispute at a time of its 
choosing. In doing so, China may also not shy away from teaching India another lesson as it 
did in 1962 and grab the rest of the disputed territory or cut off the Siliguri corridor, which 
connects the Indian heartland with the North-eastern states (Kanwal 2000a: 1620-1621; Chel-
laney 2010b; Doval 2010; Verma [B.] 2011; Singh [P.] 2013). 
Given its defeatist, pacifist attitude, internal disunity and lack of strategy, India, as the dis-
course maintains, is an easy target for China. Instead of countering China’s provocations and 
aggressions with firmness and resolve, “New Delhi’s customary see-no-evil, do-no-evil policy 
on China only played into the hands of Beijing, encouraging it to expand its strategic leverage 
against India” (Chellaney 2010b: 197). A grave strategic disadvantage towards China is, ac-
cording to the Hyper-nationalist discourse, that India does not stay united, because it has no 
strong political leadership and is no uniform nation-state. As Bharat Verma (2007b) laments:  
 
“Despite India’s pretensions of an emerging great power, its influence is shrinking -both, internally as 
well as on its external periphery. Internally, Naxalites and insurgent outfits control more than forty per-
cent of the Indian Territory. Similarly, its borders are volatile with neighbours nibbling into its territory 
as well influence. […] The external strength and posture of a nation are dependent on internal cohesion. 
Are we moving towards a cohesive society and nation? The answer is ‘no’ – the scenario is increasingly 
looking dismal. Regionalism, linguistic differences, religion and caste differences are being exacerbated 
for purposes of vote bank politics. The trend is certainly not towards integration and consolidation of 
the nation – state. The psychological fragmentation and regionalism primarily due to vote bank politics 
has resulted in overwhelming regional pressures in determining our foreign policy.” 
 
This lack of national security and cohesion can be exploited by China. The Hyper-nationalist 
articulates the fear that China, in its attempt to weaken and undermine India, seeks to dis-
member the Indian Union through the support of insurgents in India. After the 1962 war 
China has already supported the insurgency of the Nagas and Mizos, who are ethnically more 
like the Chinese, in India’s Northeast region, and the Maoist-inspired peasant insurgency of 
the Naxalites (Prasad 2009; Katoch 2010: 84-85; Doval 2011b; Kapoor 2012: 667). China is, 
in other words, a ‘fifth column’ threat, because it can rely on China-friendly dissidents in In-
dia and can thus exploit the fault-lines and cleavages within Indian society. These ‘dissidents’ 
cannot only be found among insurgents, but also within India’s political class and civil soci-
ety, in particular among communists. According to the retired Maj. Gen. Pushpendra Singh 
(2013): “China sympathisers in India in the government, media and academia, support Bei-
jing’s moves like CPM’s support to China in 1962!” Likewise, Bharat Verma (2014) deplores 
that Beijing has repeatedly “unleashed its lobby in India”:  
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“India will need robust minds and not pacifists, who lose the battle in their minds even before it begins, 
to work out a counter plan against China and China-Pakistan combine to foil their attempts to illegally 
occupy our territory with an aim to dismember India. It will require a strong national leadership and in-
duction of military thinking in the foreign office. The propaganda by the pacifists and the Chinese lobby, 
that since we are militarily not prepared, we need to concede our territory and self-respect, is not true. 
Nation’s have won with much less with the backing of firm resolve and strong generals, both political 
and military.” 
 
The Chinese ‘other’ thus serves as a crucial reference point for articulating meanings and 
identities in the Hyper-nationalist discourse. India must become a strong and uniform nation-
state that is driven by strategy and realpolitik, because it is confronted with a strong, strategi-
cally minded and uniform enemy that is a ruthless practitioner of realpolitik and will exploit 
India’s vulnerabilities and fault-lines. As the BJP politician Arun Shourie (2009) notes, “our 
over-riding objective must to forge a strong India. […] It is certainly not enough to be 
stronger than we were yesterday. We have to be stronger than are those who are out to harm 
us. […] We must benchmark ourselves against the strongest rival who is likely to seek to 
hobble and harm us – in our case, and in our neighbourhood, that is China”. By evoking the 
China threat, the discourse seeks to construct a chain of equivalence and overcome India’s 
internal difference and weakness. By using China as a benchmark for India, the discourse, 
however, undermines, as in the case of the Pakistani ‘other’, the construction of chain of 
equivalence, because it would largely erase what makes up India’s identity.   
 
 
7.3 Fantasmatic Logics: Indian Greatness and Exceptionalism  
Having discussed the social and political logics articulated in the Hyper-nationalist discourse, 
we will now shift attention to the fantasmatic logics and thus examine the ideological narra-
tives and myths that underpin the discourse and can explain why actors identify with the dis-
course, i.e. why they take the content of the social logic of national strength and the political 
frontiers articulated by the discourse to be real. Fantasmatic narratives and myths are invoked 
by political subjects to “cover over” the contradictions and ruptures of a discourse and defend 
it against the discursive exterior that is always threatening to dislocate the discourse (Laclau 
1990: 60ff.). By investigating the fantasmatic logics underpinning a discourse, we seek to 
deconstruct these myths and narratives and expose these contradictions and ruptures. Like the 
Post-Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist discourse draws on and thus re-affirms the 
two mythical narratives of Indian Greatness and Indian Exceptionalism. This reflects the 
hegemonic status of the Post-Nehruvian discourse and its successful creation of a collective 
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foundational imaginary that represents India as a pre-colonial political and cultural agent that 
has always been the symbol of peaceful co-existence, non-violence, tolerance, spiritual clarity 
and moral sincerity. However, the Hyper-nationalist discourse fashions these two interrelated 
narratives, as we will see, in a slightly different way and this has implications for the way 
how the discourse orders the world. 
 
7.3.1. Indian Greatness  
The narrative of Indian Greatness revolves around the theme that India embodies an ancient, 
great civilization and nation. Like the Post-Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist dis-
course is informed by the fiction that the contemporary India symbolizes the political continu-
ity of a nation and civilization that has existed as a cultural/political agent for several millen-
nia. As the BJP (2014: 1) notes in its election manifesto: 
 
“India is the most ancient civilization of the world and has always been looked upon by the world as a 
land of wealth and wisdom. India has been credited to have developed, apart from philosophy and 
mathematics, science and technology of a very high order, which had attracted scholars from all over 
the world. […] India's contribution to the march of civilization goes back to several thousand years be-
fore the Christian era.[…] India was respected for its flourishing economy, trade, commerce and culture. 
It had an international outreach from Korea to Arabia, from Bamiyan to Borobudur and beyond. Before 
the advent of Britishers, Indian goods were internationally recognized for their quality and craftsman-
ship. India had a much bigger role and presence in industry and manufacturing than any nation in 
Europe or Asia. […] Indian prosperity held the world in thrall. It was this wealth which attracted the 
foreigners - from Alexander to the Britishers. Historical records establish the level of progress and 
prosperity attained by India before the advent of the Europeans.” 
 
 
Given this long and rich civilizational heritage, coupled with today India’s size, population, 
resources and geopolitical location, the Hyper-nationalist discourse is convinced of India’s 
innate greatness and that it possesses all the attributes for becoming a great power in the in-
ternational system (Verma [B.] 2001; Karnad 2002a: xvii; Singh [R.] 2008; Vijay 2009: 36; 
Doval 2010). As Kanwal Sibal (2013b: 6) notes: “We are among the biggest countries demog-
raphically and geographically; we are endowed with considerable natural and human re-
sources; our industrial and technological base is sizable; we are a nuclear weapon state with 
impressive space capabilities; we are an old civilisation. A country with these attributes can-
not but play an important role, not only regionally, but also globally.” Like the Post-
Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist discourse thus also believes in India’s civiliza-
tional greatness and its entitlement to be a great power, but attaches greater importance to the 
materialist base of state power and argues that India must become a uniform nation-state.  
The civilizational narrative on which both the Post-Nehruvian and the Hyper-nationalist dis-
course draw expresses nostalgia for India’s Hindu past. While this nostalgia is more implicit 
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in the Post-Nehruvian discourse which acknowledges the contributions of Islam (and the 
Muslim rulers), Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism and Christians to the Indian civilization, the Hy-
per-nationalist discourse maintains that India is fundamentally a Hindu civilization. In par-
ticular for the Hindu nationalist sub-discourse, Hindu-ness is the cultural essence of India, the 
unifying principle that has bounded together India’s diverse religious, ethnic, linguist and 
caste groups for several millennia. Hence, the Hindu civilization is the foundation for the In-
dian nationhood. Accordingly, Hindutva has been the unifying factor in the creation of the 
ancient Hindu rashtra, the world’s first and most highly developed nation. This Hindu rashtra 
encompassed a natural geography (the territory between the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean), 
a common history, a common race (the Hindu race), a distinctive system of beliefs, practices 
and values, and a common language (Sanskrit). Modern India, as the narrative goes, is thus 
not a normal nation-state but a civilizational state that embodies an ageless cultural, ethical 
and spiritual unity (Singh [Jasw.] 2013: 2ff.; Advani 2008b: 864; Singh [R.] 2009; Varanasi 
2013).  
Both sub-discourses which constitute the Hyper-nationalist discourse turn to India’s pre-
colonial past (before the advent of Muslim rule over the Indian Subcontinent) and seek to re-
vive the glory and power of the ancient Indian civilization and nation. This desire to re-collect 
India’s glorious pre-colonial past and thus re-assert India’s true national identity and destiny 
presupposes that there has always been a national or cultural consciousness among Indians 
and India has always existed as a cultural and political agent in world politics.  
In fact, however, it was the very absence of a collective consciousness or identity among the 
Hindus/Indians that motivated early Hindu nationalists such as V.D. Savarkar to construct the 
ideological fantasy of Hindutva as a constitutive concept for the formation of a common iden-
tity, a guiding principle to organize and mobilize the Hindus in order to create a homogenous 
political community which rises up against British colonial rule and enables the erection of a 
mighty, independent nation-state. Like every ideology, it is based on a set of narratives and 
myths that create a desire among actors to identify with a discourse and provide the founda-
tion for collective political action. As an inherently conservative discourse, it provides an ac-
count of the existing social and political situation, which is contrasted with a mythical, glori-
fied past, when India is said to have experienced a long period of cultural and spiritual purity 
and flourishing, economic affluence and political and military strength. The present is thus 
represented as a massive decline towards this glorious past. In addition, it puts forward a 
model of a desired future that promises not only a revival of this glorious past, but an even 
superior future state-of-affairs characterized by material and spiritual strength and order – a 
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fictional narrative that ‘grips’ subjects because it promises the modernization of a society 
without compromising its basic values and traditions.  
Finally, the ideology explains how political change and this ideal state-of-affairs can and 
should be achieved. For this, the discourse, as we have seen in the last section, draws particu-
lar political frontiers between the ‘self’ and a set of ‘others’ that block the realization of the 
self’s true identity and have ‘caused’ India’s current feeble condition and must thus be over-
come. This requires, as the Hyper-nationalist discourse asserts through the social logic of na-
tional strength, that India must generate a strong national will and become a uniform nation-
state as well as overcome its tradition of excessive tolerance and non-violence which has led 
to the disunity and weakness of India. It has not only deprived Hindus/Indians of the ability to 
confront their enemies, but has also prevented a clear demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
and thus the emergence of a strong national identity. This explains why, for the Hyper-
nationalist discourse, “national will is not only an intangible component of national power, 
but by far the most vital” (Advani 2008b: 611) and why a strong, uniform national culture “is 
the very foundation of any nation” and for the “emergence of India as a potent economic and 
military power on the global scene” (Singh [R.] 2006a).  
While the Hyper-nationalist discourse claims that it merely seeks to restore India’s true na-
tional identity and re-collect India’s ancient wisdom that already contains almost all elements 
of modernity, it ultimately articulates a chauvinist majoritarian nationalism that wants to sup-
press or eliminate internal diversity and dissent (e.g. signs of non-Hinduness in India) in order 
to build, on the a basis of a culturally and ethnically pure community, a uniform, powerful 
and modern nation-state. However, the ageless, strong and pure Hindu/Indian nation, which 
the discourse seeks to revive and represents as the ancient foundation for the modern Indian 
nationalism, is a myth. As was noted in chapter 6, nations and nationalisms generally evolve 
around myths that construct an origin, a period of (fictional) purity, unity or glory that serves 
as the enduring foundation of the society and must be recovered. The myth obscures that na-
tions are inherently fluid and contentious entities, “‘imaginary’ constructions” that only exist 
if and as long as people imagine themselves as members of a community and have a common 
national consciousness that must be constantly reproduced through various rituals (Laclau 
1994: 140/210). Hence, the myth of an ageless, strong and pure Hindu/Indian nation does nei-
ther capture the true state-of-affairs in ancient India nor did it grow out of an authentic Indian 
culture, but is a modern invention that gradually emerged in the context of India’s encounters 
with Muslims and Europeans/Christians which served as significant ‘others’ against which an 
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Indian or Hindu identity could be discursively formed and through which a common national 
or religious consciousness came-into-being in India in the first place.  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse negates the constitutive role of the ‘other’ for this identity 
formation and the way how it uses the modern concepts of nationalism and civilization, which 
Indian elites were imparted during European colonialism, to construct an Indian nationalism 
and to prove that India constitutes a nation. Therefor, early Hindu nationalists, like their secu-
lar-nationalist counterparts, drew on the notion of India as a civilization, which was initially 
articulated by the Euro-centric, orientalist discourse in the colonial period, to underscore the 
oneness and unity of India. As we have seen in chapter 6, the Euro-centric, orientalist dis-
course constructed the Indian civilization – in what Derrida refers to as a logo-centric proce-
dure – along the lines of the ‘Western’ civilization by understanding, evaluating and creating 
the ‘other’ against the background of one’s own image and privileging written texts over spo-
ken words. The discourse constructed a single Hinduism as a religious civilization that origi-
nated in the Aryan-Vedic high culture and was bound together by a common language (San-
skrit), a body of assumedly relatively coherent ancient texts (the Vedas), shared rituals and 
norms, and a shared sacred geography (Hansen 1999: 65-66). This discursive construction of 
Hinduism, as the subaltern studies (see Spivak 1988) have pointed out, privileged and he-
gemonized the elitist Brahmanic high culture, thereby disempowering India’s subaltern cul-
tures and reducing India’s cultural and religious diversity into a uniform framework. At the 
same time, the Euro-centric, orientalist discourse characterized the Indian civilization in a 
romanticist, spiritual and mythical way by placing it in opposition to the rationality, material-
ism, utilitarianism and realism of ‘Western’ modernity. This romanticist, spiritual and mythi-
cal India was both admired but also seen as the reason for the decline and backwardness of 
the Indian civilization (Hoeber Rudolph 2009: 140ff.). 
It was in this context, the Hyper-nationalist discourse emerged and formulated a cultural na-
tionalism for constructing an Indian national identity and overcoming British colonial rule.
73
 
The articulation of the Indian civilization as a Hindu civilization is based on an essentialized 
and cultural stereotypical understanding of civilizations that treats civilizations as culturally 
homogenous entities and attributes the highest importance to religion in the delineation of 
different civilizations. This notion of civilization, which can be traced back to the works of 
racist cultural realists such as Charles Henry Pearson, B.L. Putnam and Lothrop Stoddard and 
                                                 
73
 Highlighting the fictional character of the narrative of the ancient Hindu civilization/nation is not to suggest 
that India does not possess the attributes of a civilization/nation or that the Indian civilization or nationalism are 
merely a product of European colonialism. Rather, it means to question the notion of an essentialized, ageless 
and pure Hindu civilization/nation and to point out the non-necessary nature of this national narrative.  
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more recently Samuel Huntington who coined the ‘clash of civilization’ thesis, negates the 
various interlinkages, commonalities and interactions between civilizations and their inher-
ently pluralist, impure and hybrid character (Hobson 2012: 279ff.). It reduces civilizations not 
only to some ‘cultural essentials’ of religion, bloodline and a set of other basic practices, but 
also represents other civilizations as threatening and cultural fault-lines within a civilization 
as dangerous – a danger that can only be mitigated through the hegemony of a strong, uniform 
culture.  
Unsurprisingly, the Hyper-nationalist discourse in India has either implicitly or explicitly em-
braced this reasoning and frequently refers to Samuel Huntington (see BJP [1998] 2000: 66; 
Menon 2000: 29; Advani 2008b: 863-864; Menon/Kumar 2010: 44) to underscore: first, that 
India, as the concept of Hindutva claims, has always been and will remain fundamentally 
Hindu in a national and civilizational sense and must, therefore, assert its Hindu identity; sec-
ond, that the Indian civilization is in a continuous struggle with other civilizations, in particu-
lar with the Islamic and the Sinic civilization, because these civilizations are said to have cer-
tain intrinsic characteristics and enduring ‘cultural essentials’ that make them a threat. For 
instance, while the Islamic civilization is said to be prone to religious intolerance and expan-
sionism, the Chinese are, as we have seen, represented and essentialized as highly strategi-
cally-minded, power-driven and sly – driven by a strategic culture that has been based on de-
ceit since the times of Sun Tze. Accordingly, while Chinese leaders smile, shake hands and 
talk of a friendship with India, they are plotting to disrupt and weaken India to achieve re-
gional dominance.  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse applies the same essentialized and cultural stereotypical un-
derstanding of civilizations to India by depicting the Indian civilization as inherently tolerant 
and peaceful, but also as weak, defeatist and disunited. The discourse creates thus a reduction-
ist, deterministic and static account of world politics: Since ancient times, civiliza-
tions/nations have been struggling for power and influence and only those who have the will 
to power and are able defend themselves will survive. Therefore, India must return to the an-
cient Vedic texts and Kautilya’s Arthashastra which have captured this ‘truism’ already more 
than 2300 years ago and provide clear strategic guidelines for contemporary India. Hence, the 
Hyper-nationalist discourse turns to India’s glorious past before it fell prey to foreign inva-
sions and domination and identifies a “Hindu hyperrealist strategic thought originating in the 
Vedas – the four great books and repositories of the wisdom of the Indic civilization” as the 
remedy for overcoming India’s strategic culture deficit, moralistic foreign policy and its lack 
of will to power (Karnad 2014: 202). According to Karnad (2002a: xxv/64), these classical 
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texts represent “an aggressive ultra-realist religion and culture” and “conceptualize a Hindu 
machtpolitik that is at once intolerant of any opposition, driven to realise the goal of suprem-
acy for the nation and State by means fair and foul, and is breathtaking in its amorality”. 
Similarly, Arun Prakash (2009) notes:  
 
“If we go back far enough in our history we find that ancient Vedic literature was the medium for con-
veying politico-military strategies and the options available to a strategic leader for conducting affairs 
of State, including diplomacy and war. Around the 4th century BCE, we find a masterly treatise focus-
ing on not just economic policy but also statecraft and military strategy. This was the Arthashastra; writ-
ten for the guidance of kings and rulers, by Kautilya the Prime Minister of the great Mauriyan Empire. 
As a guide for strategic leaders, the Arthashastra is a remarkable document rooted in realistic or practi-
cal considerations, or realpolitik, as opposed to idealistic notions. […] There is a theory that in the early 
part of the first millennium BCE, India’s socio-cultural milieu underwent progressive transformation by 
movements, which propagated spiritualism, asceticism and ahimsa or non-violence. […] India, thus, 
stagnated intellectually, and consequently lost strategic focus; a situation, which prevails till today. 
Ironically, a direct result of this was a long era of domination by foreign invaders, which further eroded 
our self-respect and engendered a deep sense of diffidence and timidity.” 
 
 
Thus, Hinduism and the pre-colonial past are seen as the foundation and context for devising 
India’s contemporary strategic thought and practices (Singh [Jasw.] 1999: 4-5), whereas the 
neglect of the ‘Hindu machtpolitik’ resulted in the domination of India by foreign invaders 
who hardly made any contribution to India’s strategic culture but even contributed to its fur-
ther decline. As Kanwal Sibal (2013e) notes,  
 
“the Muslim conquerors ruled large parts of India for centuries. Just as the Hindu princes showed little 
strategic sense in dealing with the Muslim invaders, the Afghans could not strategically ward off the 
Mughal threat. The Muslim rulers failed to properly assess the European sea-borne threat. The way the 
rulers of that period allowed an English trading company to steadily conquer large swathes of Indian 
territory speaks volumes about the lack of any strategic culture in the India of that period. Independent 
India could imbibe virtually nothing in terms of strategic culture from centuries of Muslim rule” 
 
The Hyper-nationalist discourse regularly invokes Kautilya’s Arthashastra to make sense of 
India’s international relations (see Chellaney 1999b: 530; Arora 2006: 281; Bakshi 2011: 23; 
Singh [A.K.] 2011, Gandhi 2013; Singh/Gera/Dewan 2013: 236). As the BJP (1995: 1), for 
instance, explained in its ‘Foreign Policy Agenda for the Future’: “‘Power is the only means 
to ensure friendly relations with other nations’, says Kautilya in his ARTHASHASTRA. This 
fundamental precept must guide Bharatiya Janata Party in its foreign policy”. Likewise, Ex-
ternal Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha (2002a) noted:   
 
“Those who decry the absence of a tradition of strategic thought in India would do well to go through a 
2300 year old Indian treatise called Arthashastra. Its author, Kautilya, probably ancient India's greatest 
strategic thinker, had enunciated six forms of state policy called the Circle of States. He declared that 
peace, war, neutrality, show of force, alliance and making peace with one and waging war with another 
are the six forms of state policy. A close examination would indicate that nothing much has really 
changed over the last 2000 years and that inter-state relations are still based very much on the six fold 
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policy enunciated by Kautilya. We live in an era of strategic uncertainties where conflict between na-
tions is still a fact of life.” 
 
The discourse’s references to the Arthashastra or other ancient texts and the conviction that 
India’s foreign policy is or should be driven by anything that was written by Kautilya or in the 
Vedas is part of and re-affirms the fantasmatic narrative of India as an eternal political and 
cultural entity that was united and powerful, when it followed its true and pure Hindu ethos 
and pursued a ‘Hindu realpolitik’, which is not only the original foundation of India’s strate-
gic culture, but also of the realist tradition of thought in international relations in general. 
Hence, the demand for pursing a policy of realpolitik and balance of power is not a call for 
following foreign concepts and theories brought by the European colonizers, but can be repre-
sented as a purification of India through hinduization and a return to the ancient Indian civili-
zation which already contains all elements of modernity. “The study of Kautilya's Arthashas-
tra”, as G. Parthasarathy (2003) thus notes, “is more important for our students of diplomacy 
and military-strategic issues than the works of Clausewitz and Metternich. Nations lose their 
independence, self-confidence and self- respect not by importing foreign technology, goods 
and services, but by mortgaging their minds to foreign doctrines and concepts”. In other 
words, India’s pathway to greatness is already enshrined in India’s ancient wisdom and civili-
zational excellence, but this traditional knowledge has largely been forgotten in contemporary 
India.  
The construction of a pure Hindu civilization and culture negates or ignores the various exter-
nal influences that shaped the emergence and development of the Indian civilization and na-
tionalism. Like every other civilization and nationalism in the world, the Indian civilization 
and nationalism are discursive formations shaped by persistent contestations and contradic-
tions generated from within and from without. In other words, the peaceful and violent en-
counters with ‘strangers’ (‘others’) have been constitutive for the gradual formation of the 
notion of an Indian civilization and nationalism by brining various kinds of knowledge, peo-
ple, values and practices to the Indian Subcontinent and, even more importantly, by creating 
among the Indians/Hindus a sense of themselves as members of a distinct culture, religion or 
nation, which always requires that there is an ‘other’ against which one can define oneself. 
The Aryan-Vedic high culture which is commonly regarded as the origin and golden age of 
the Indian civilization was, for instance, not an indigenous creation, but is closely linked to 
the entry of the Aryans on the Indian Subcontinent. The Aryans are said to have laid the foun-
dation for Hinduism and its distinctive social order of hierarchical stratification. While the 
Hindu nationalists assert that the Aryans were the original inhabitants of India and thus in-
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digenous to India, it is a widely accepted historical fact that the Aryans were a Central Asian 
tribe who either invaded or settled down in the northern part of the Indian Subcontinent. The 
mythos of the indigenous Aryans is of fundamental significance to the Hindu nationalists be-
cause they are predominantly the descendants of the Aryans and thus need to separate them-
selves from other ‘foreign’ invaders such as the Arabs and Europeans, not the least to put 
themselves on par with the Dravidians (the original inhabitants of South India) and other in-
digenous peoples who claim to be the original residents of India (Commuri 2010: 60; Don-
inger 2010: 24f./89ff.).   
This invention of an ethnic and religious golden age going back to the Vedic era, when India 
as a pure Hindu civilizational state is said to have experienced a time period of materialist, 
spiritual and cultural flourishing and strength, is the cornerstone of the Hyper-nationalist dis-
course, because it proves to its proponents not only India’s innate greatness, but also its na-
tionhood status. As the Hindu nationalist leader M.S. Golwalkar (1939: 94) noted during In-
dia’s independence struggle: 
 
“Here is our vast country, Hindusthan, the land of the Hindus, their home country, hereditary territory, a 
definite geographical unity, delimited naturally by the sublime Himalayas on the North and the limitless 
ocean on the other three sides, an ideal piece of land, deserving in every respect to be called a Country, 
fulfilling all that the word should imply in the Nation idea. Living in this Country since pre-historic 
times, is the ancient Race – the Hindu Race, united together by common traditions, by memories of 
common, glory and disaster, by similar historical* political, social, religious and other experiences, liv-
ing and evolving, under the same influences, a common culture, a common mother language, common 
customs, common aspirations. This great Hindu Race professes its illustrious Hindu Religion, the only 
Religion in the world worthy of being so denominated.” 
 
While the Hyper-nationalist discourse celebrates India’s glorious ancient (Hindu) past and 
represents India as an ageless nation, it is fundamentally a modernist discourse that appropri-
ates a modern understanding of nationalism based on 19
th
 Century European nationalisms and 
uses it to construct a Hindu nation and its history by searching – mainly through the prism of 
the Euro-centric, orientalist discourse – in India’s past for the necessary elements of this 
Hindu nation (e.g. bounded territory, race, culture), which could serve as building blocs for a 
modern Indian nation-state after independence and substantiate the state’s cultural unity and 
sovereignty (Chatterjee 1995: 126; Devare 2009).  
The main problem with this narrative is that it assumes a cultural or national consciousness 
among Hindus/Indians in the pre-colonial era. However, there is very little historical evidence 
that Hindus/Indians saw themselves as a collective group and the attacks of ‘foreign’ invaders 
as an attack against this collective body. In other words, the consciousness of being a Hindu 
or Indian as a part of a religious, cultural or national community and thus as a marker of a 
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self-identity was absent in ancient India, which was splintered into different castes, religious 
sects, regions, linguist groups, tribes and other affiliations that served as the main sources of 
identification. In particular, it was extremely uncommon that people in ancient India defined 
themselves by allegiances to a religion, not the least given the extreme diversity of religious 
beliefs, faiths, values and rituals. This, as we have seen in chapter 6, began to change only 
with the entry of ‘other’ religions on the Indian Subcontinent. “Notions of Hinduism as a uni-
fied religion, Hindu culture as a distinct cultural zone, and ‘Hindu’ as a well-bounded cultural 
category”, as Thomas Blom Hansen (1999: 65) thus points out, “are largely products of schol-
arly and administrative interventions by orientalist scholars, missionaries, and colonial ad-
ministrations in the Indian subcontinent since the seventeenth century.” 
Similarly, as we have seen in chapter 6, there existed no enduring Indian political entity on 
the Indian Subcontinent in pre-modern times. While the Hyper-nationalist discourse ascribes 
to the geo-cultural space of the Indian Subcontinent a kind of continuous agency – the status 
of an Indian political entity – by treating the greater empires as ‘agents’ or ‘representatives’ of 
the Indian nation and, at other times, the smaller kingdoms and princedoms as a collection of 
states of an Indian nation and suggesting that these different entities interacted as an Indian 
actor with the outside world through commerce, trade or diplomacy (see Karnad 2002a; Ad-
vani 2008: 665; Malik 2010), there is little historical evidence that there existed much efforts 
toward or feelings of Indian political unity.  
Against this backdrop, it is problematic to use, as the Hyper-nationalist discourse does, In-
dia’s cultural unity, which is said to have survived even several thousand years of ‘foreign’ 
rule, as the proof for the existence of an Indian nationalism or an age-less Indian nation: the 
alleged cultural unity of India, i.e. the belief in Hinduism as a unified religion, a distinct 
Hindu/Indian cultural zone and the Indian Subcontinent as a well-bounded geo-cultural or 
national space are modern phenomena. Again, this is not to suggest that this space had no 
distinctive and sophisticated cultural and social traits. On the contrary, it surely did and these 
basic cultural and social patterns are to a great extent still recognizable in contemporary India. 
However, these cultural and social traits were – and are to a certain extent still – characterized 
by an extensive diversity and did not give rise to a common national or religious conscious-
ness in the pre-colonial period. Nations are no objective entities whose existence can simply 
derived from a bounded geography or distinct cultural commonalities, but imagined entities 
that are, as all objects of ideology, sustained by an identification with a common national 
community and thus only come into being if people believe in it and have a common national 
consciousness that must be constantly reproduced through various symbolic practices. 
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This fictional ideology of ‘Indian Greatness’ based on a pre-modern cultural nationalism, 
which represents India as an ageless national and civilizational entity with a pure culture, is 
the prerequisite for the formation of the Hyper-nationalist discourse. It explains why the dis-
course articulates the social logic of national strength and political logics that define and af-
firm a Hindu/Indian ‘self’ in opposition to a set of temporal and spatial-political ‘others’ (Co-
lonialism, Pakistan and China). For instance, the discursive representation of China as an ex-
pansionist power that seeks to encircle and contain India in South Asia is influenced by the 
way how the discourse articulates the notion of the Indian Subcontinent as a confined geo-
political and civilizational space with India as a the natural hegemon in its centre and Tibet as 
a buffer between the Indian and Chinese civilizations. As a result, the Chinese inroads into 
South Asia are represented as an intrusion into India’s natural sphere of influence that was 
once the Akhand Bharat (undivided India) (Shourie 2009; Vijay 2009: 210ff.; Singh [Jasw.] 
2013: 10/41ff; Karnad 2014: 220). The fictional ideology of ‘Indian Greatness’ is also the 
foundation for the prominent narrative that the strong and powerful Indian civilization/nation 
declined and fall prey to several ‘foreign’ invasions and conquests because the Hindus/Indians 
were (1) disunited, (2) acquired – mainly from Buddhism, Jainism and later Gandhianism – a 
defensive, pacifist, defeatist and forgiving mind-set and thus lost their ability to generate 
power and the willingness to use it, and (3) were confronted with strong and unified enemies 
that exploited the divisions and fault-lines within Indian society. Therefore, as the Hyper-
nationalist discourse concludes, India must become a strong, uniform and powerful nation-
state that contains a culturally and ethnically pure political community which is willing and 
capable of defending the nation against external aggressions and thus to uphold its rightful 
place in a competitive international system. 
 
7.3.2 Indian Exceptionalism  
The mythical narrative of ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ is closely interlinked with the narrative of 
‘Indian Greatness’. Similar to the Post-Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist discourse 
underscores the uniqueness and exceptional attributes of India and the special role it plays in 
world politics. It asserts that the Indian nation-state emerged from the world’s most ancient, 
highly developed civilization, which had a substantial influence on the world, and is today the 
world’s largest democracy and the living proof for the peaceful co-existence of different reli-
gious, ethnical and linguist communities. The Indian experience and the wisdom of the Indian 
civilization are believed to have universal significance and could pave the way for global 
peace and justice. The ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ in the world, however, results, as the Hindutva 
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sub-discourse asserts in particular, exclusively from India’s Hindu ethos. Accordingly, a 
peaceful and just global order can only emerge if the world adopts the Hindu way of life and 
India, as the embodiment of the Hindu civilization, becomes a central pillar in this order. At 
the same time, the Hyper-nationalist discourse endows the notion of an ‘Indian Exceptional-
ism’ also with a negative meaning by invoking the myth that India is exceptional in its disre-
gard of national security, strategy and defence and the only state pursuing an ‘idealist’ and 
‘pacifist’ foreign policy in an inherently ‘realist’ world. Articulated by the ultrarealist sub-
discourse in particular, this notion of an ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ holds that India’s has all the 
necessary attributes to play a pre-eminent role in global politics and is the only country that 
can counter the rise of an expansionist and hegemonistic China in Asia, provided that India 
overcomes its ‘idealism’ and pursues a ‘realist’ grand strategy backed by supreme military 
capabilities.  
As noted in chapter 6, narratives of exceptionalism play a significant role in any nation and 
emanate from the absence of a final or universal ground for articulating meanings and identi-
ties. The myth of exceptionalism seeks to conceal or fill this emptiness by attributing the na-
tion some intrinsic essences, thereby enabling a discourse to forge a chain of equivalence 
which integrates dissimilar elements into a common national community and makes it possi-
ble that several actors identify with this national community. Due to the lack of any stable 
foundations and essences, every nation is in constant need of reproducing itself and thus of 
recreating the myths it is founded upon. Hence, myths are constitutive of national identities, 
since they symbolize the seemingly immaculate chain of equivalence around which the na-
tional community was originally institutionalized (Laclau 1990: 141/144).  
The fantasy of ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ revolves around the theme that India as an ancient and 
great civilization has not only been exceptional with respect to the level of progress and its 
outstanding achievements in the fields of philosophy, science, literature, art, technology and 
trade, but also offers the unique example of a great civilization that has never invaded other 
countries and built an ‘Indian Empire’. Though it was once the world’s most developed and 
powerful civilization whose influence spread across Asia and beyond, India, as the discourse 
maintains, has, unlike other civilizations, never sought to dominate or exploit other peoples 
but made its influence and power felt only through the benign expansion of its cultural, reli-
gious, scientific and technological wisdom. Accordingly, the worldwide civilizational reach 
of India was the outcome of the spiritual superiority and benevolence of Hinduism (BJP 1998: 
1; Chellaney 1999a: 152; Pant 2006: 95; Advani 2008: 665f.; Vijay 2009b; Doval 2011a; 
Ganguly 2012). An early proponent of this view was Swami Vivekananda who played a 
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foundational role for the emergence of Hindu nationalism in India and continues to be a cru-
cial reference point for contemporary Hindu nationalists. As Vivekananda noted in his speech 
at the Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893: “I am proud to belong to a religion which 
has taught the world both tolerance and universal acceptance. […] I am proud to belong to a 
nation which has sheltered the persecuted and the refugees of all religions and all nations of 
the earth” (quoted in Vijay 2008: 42). 
Highlighting these exceptional virtues of Hinduism, BJP president Rajnath Singh (2013) said:  
 
“Hindutva is a way of life due to which all the religions in the world exist. […] India is the only country 
in the world where not only all the religions but all their sects are found. […] Due to this way of life In-
dia is the only country in the known history of the world which has never carried out invasions on other 
countries and tried to include them in India. India is the only country in the world which never went for 
invasion. It is the way of life which does not inspire a person to conquer the world but to conquer the 
heart of the people.” 
 
The Hindu way of life has thus enshrined that India has always practiced tolerance, non-
aggression and peaceful coexistence in its internal and external affairs. The notion of Hindu-
ism’s spiritual superiority and benevolence is based on a particular construction of the Indian 
civilization through the prism of the Eurocentric orientalist discourse. The Indian nationalists, 
in particular, took notice of the great spiritual qualities attributed to classical Hinduism and 
sought to integrate these qualities, which are believed to distinguish India from the ‘material-
ist’ and ‘rational’ West, into their project of nationalist and spiritual renewal and re-
awakening. This notion of India as an ageless civilization and “the most ennobling experience 
in spiritual co-existence”, where “[f]rom ancient times almost all religions practiced in differ-
ent parts of the world, have existed peacefully in India and will continue to do so” (BJP 2014: 
1), is based on a set of myths. 
As we have seen in Chapter 6, the ancient as well as the modern India has, like almost every 
other civilization or state, experienced periods of extreme violence but also of relative peace 
and creative assimilation. While non-violence has indeed become a cultural ideal for Hin-
dus/Indians and has been extensively debated in ancient and modern India, it does not reflect 
an actual condition of non-violence but emerged from the very reality of pervasive violence 
and the desire to overcome it. Ironically, the Hindu nationalists in particular are often blamed 
for sparking communal violence and its more militant outfits have committed acts of extreme 
violence such as the Gujarat riots in 2002, where a militant Hindu mob killed up to 2,000 
Muslims, set fire to their houses and shops, raped Muslim women and burned Muslim chil-
dren alive without the state government run by the BJP taking decisive action to prevent the 
violence (Jaffrelot 2011: 376ff). That the Hyper-nationalist discourse, and in particular the 
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Hindutva sub-discourse, notwithstanding, articulates and re-affirms the notion of In-
dia/Hinduism as non-violent and tolerant exposes the operating of a particular fantasy, namely 
that Hindus are essentially tolerant and peaceful and could never do any evil, simply because 
they are Hindus (see Organiser 2000; Singh [Jasw.] 2001; Singh [R.] 2008; Vijay 2008: 
42/65f.; Chandra 2011a). It is this sedimented myth that has gripped the subjects of the dis-
course. Accordingly, whenever Hindus resort to violence, this is represented as an anomaly 
and a response to a conspiracy, injustice or aggression committed by non-Hindus (see Va-
jpayee 2003d; Advani 2008: 751ff.). 
This myth also underpins the assertion that India has always practiced non-violence, tolerance 
and peaceful co-existence in its external relations and thus never invaded or colonized any 
other countries. It presupposes that India has always existed as some kind of political or cul-
tural agent in the world. As we have seen, however, the awareness that Indians/Hindus consti-
tute a religious, cultural or political community is a modern phenomenon that emerged in the 
18
th
 century. The Indian Subcontinent was originally split into several autonomous kingdoms 
and did not constitute a unified political entity – the very short phases of greater political 
unity were hardly attempts to create a common nation or union but brought about by the im-
perialist expansion of one powerful dynasty. At the same time, the religion or culture which is 
today subsumed under the label of Hinduism was in ancient and medieval times a very di-
verse mixture of beliefs and practices splintered into numerous sects, thereby exacerbating its 
‘export’ to other countries. Nevertheless, the extensive cultural and religious influence that 
the Indian civilization, according to the Hyper-nationalist discourse, had in the world and that 
is visible, for instance, in Southeast Asia, where certain cultural and religious traits can be 
found which originated on the Indian Subcontinent, indicate that Indian kingdoms or religious 
sects actively sought to spread their cultural and religious practices (Commuri 2010. 49f.).  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse, like the Post-Nehruvian discourse, ‘sells’ this religious and 
cultural expansion as a benevolent sharing of wisdom: “India never went out”, as Yashwant 
Sinha (2003i) points out, “with its sword to these countries. We never went out as conquerors 
or as colonizers. We went out with our civilizational values, with our culture with our religion 
and in friendship and in amity. That is in the historical character of the Indian nation”. Ironi-
cally, this articulation, simultaneously, uses the notion of the European ‘civilizing mission’, 
which underlay European colonialism and India fiercely resisted, to make sense of ancient 
India’s engagement with the world but also seeks to distance India from these very practices 
by highlighting the benign and peaceful character of this engagement. However, it is not clear 
whether the recipients of the Indian wisdom also saw this spread of Indian/Hindu cultural and 
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religious practices in benign terms or rather as a threat to their own religious and cultural tra-
ditions in the same way as contemporary Hindu nationalists, for instance, fear the Western 
‘cultural imperialism’ which reflects in the spread of ‘Western’ brands, lifestyles or Christian 
missionary work in India.   
From the spiritual superiority and benevolence allegedly inherent in the Indian civilization, 
the Hyper-nationalist discourse derives a universal aspiration. It is the conviction that the In-
dian civilization has primarily through the power and wisdom of Hindu thought, spirituality 
and culture made a fundamental contribution to the development of human civilization as a 
whole by articulating for the first time the ‘modern’ notion of universalism and a common 
humanity that paved the way for the United Nations or human rights. According to the Hyper-
nationalist discourse, this notion can be traced back to the ancient Indian concept of ‘vasud-
haiva kutumbakam’ (‘the whole world is one family’) which can be found in the Atharva 
Veda dating back to 3000 B.C. and embodies the enduring commitment of India and Hindu-
ism to tolerance, pluralism and peaceful co-existence (BJP 1998: 1; Vijay 2008: 7/10).
74
 It is 
the foundation of India’s accommodative and composite culture that has ensured not only that 
different religious, ethnic and linguist communities have lived together in peace, harmony and 
unity in India for several millennia, but also that India and Hinduism have never tried to 
spread their beliefs, values and practices by force (Vajpayee 2003d; Singh [Jasw.] 2006: 
86ff.). For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the Hindu way of life thus holds universal signifi-
cance and shows the way how peace, harmony and justice, or ‘unity in diversity’, can be es-
tablished between nations and religions. Underscoring the global relevance of Hindutva, the 
RSS senior leader B.R. Idate (1996) noted:  
 
“It has been our firm faith that the only solution for all the ills not only of this country but of the whole 
of mankind lies rooted in the Hindu philosophy. […] This belief in the ultimate victory of Hindu 
thought is based not on blind faith but on a deep inner awareness that Hindu philosophy is based on 
laws which are not just Hindu laws but universal laws applicable to all. This philosophy is called Hindu 
philosophy only because these laws were discovered by ancient Hindu sages. In reality, this philosophy 
is a Universal philosophy.” 
 
Accordingly, the solution for overcoming the seemingly endless ideological, geopolitical and 
civilizational struggles and divisions in the world lies in the global spread and adoption of the 
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As we have seen, the Post-Nehruvian discourse also draws on the notion of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ to artic-
ulate the social logic of ‘international unity in diversity’ which is believed to be the foundation for India’s unique 
role and significance in the world. This commonality can be attributed to the fact that both the (Post-)Nehruvian 
and the Hyper-nationalist discourses invoke a particular construction of the Indian civilization that represents 
India as an assimilative, highly spiritual, tolerant and non-violent civilization. While the Post-Nehruvian dis-
course concedes the ‘foreign’ invaders and the minorities in India a contribution to the emergence and evolution 
of this civilizational ethos, the Hindutva sub-discourse derives it exclusively from India’s Hinduist heritage and 
asserts that it has preceded the arrival of non-Hindus in India.  
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Hindu way of life and the re-emergence of India at the world stage (Vijay 2009: 3-6). As the 
embodiment of these ideals, India is entitled to play a supreme role in the international system 
that is in accordance with its greatness and exceptional virtues. Summarizing the guidelines 
for its foreign policy, the BJP (2014: 40) noted in its election manifesto:  
 
“We will build a strong, self-reliant and self-confident India, regaining its rightful place in the comity of 
nations. In this, we will be firstly guided by our centuries old tradition of ‘वसुधैवकुटुम्बकम’् [‘the whole 
world is one family’]. At the same time, our foreign policy will be based on best National interests. We 
will create a web of allies to mutually further our interests. We will leverage all our resources and peo-
ple to play a greater role on the international high table.  […] There is a need to integrate our soft power 
avenues into our external interchange, particularly, harnessing and focusing on the spiritual, cultural and 
philosophical dimensions of it. India has always played a major role in world affairs, offering a lot to 
the World. This has been its tradition since time immemorial. The magnetic power of India has always 
been in its ancient wisdom and heritage, elucidating principles like harmony and equity.” 
 
Similarly, highlighting the indispensable role of India in the international system and that 
“Truth, Peace and Non-violence form the central tenets of the ‘Idea of India’”, Narendra Modi 
(2014) points out: 
 
“The ‘Idea of India’ in fact does not let this ethos of brotherhood and friendship be limited by India’s 
boundaries as well, espousing the principle of ‘वसुधैवकुटुम्बकम’् – or the whole world being one single 
family. The 21st century once again beckons India to its role of being the guiding light to the world. The 
‘Idea of India’ demands the actualization of Swami Vivekananda’s dream of ‘जगदगुरुभारत’ [‘India as 
the master of the world’]. Of a confident and sure India, engaging with the global community on its own 
terms and principles. […] Let us devote ourselves to the cause of nation building with the mantra of 
‘India First’! Let us together build a nation that once again redefines the story of mankind!” 
 
The Hyper-nationalist discourse, particularly the Hindutva sub-discourse, thus embraces and 
re-affirms key logics of the hegemonic Post-Nehruvian discourse such as ‘non-violence’ and 
‘international unity in diversity’ and the underlying fantasmatic narrative of an ‘Indian Excep-
tionalism’. The discourse, however, also seeks to distinguish itself from the (Post-)Nehruvian 
discourse by highlighting the allegedly Hinduist foundation of these logics and the importance 
of national strength for regaining India’s rightful place in the comity of nations and creating a 
‘Hindu’ world order. Contrary to what the notions of ‘the whole world is one family’ and 
peaceful co-existence might suggest, this order does not stipulate equality for all but is based 
on a relatively strict hierarchy that ranks states on the basis of their material, cultural and 
spiritual capabilities and allocates them specific rights and responsibilities. While India, as an 
ancient and great civilizational-state, is naturally a key pillar in this order with pre-eminent 
rights and responsibilities, the other states are, like the non-Hindu minorities in India, ex-
pected to recognize the grandeur of India and Hindutva as the framework for the realization of 
pluralism, peace and justice. However, India cannot, as the discourse points out, only base its 
239 
 
demands and aspirations on some lofty ideals but must also attain “military supremacy” to 
enhance its role in global affairs because “[t]he world respects the powerful and a confident 
nation” (Vijay 2009: 9). “Peaceful co-existence of all countries in the world”, as the RSS 
(2003) states, “has been the basic cultural characteristic of Bharat. We are aware that only a 
strong and vibrant Bharat could sustain its unique position in the world. The ABKM
75
 is of 
the opinion that Bharat's emergence as a nuclear power has enhanced its prestige. Yet, present 
global situation demands that Bharat become stronger and more powerful”. 
Though the Hyper-nationalist discourse shows a greater determination to transform India into 
a “military superpower” (Singh [R.] 2008) than the Post-Nehruvian discourse, it remains am-
biguous about the use of military power to implement its vision of an Indo-centric world order. 
While the ultrarealist sub-discourse is more inclined to use or threaten with the use of force, 
the Hindutva sub-discourse hardly seeks to assert a ‘Hindu’ world order with India in its cen-
tre by military force. Rather, the discourse, as we have seen, regards military power primarily 
as status symbols to upheave India into the great power club and believes that the moral and 
spiritual wisdom and superiority of the Hindu way of life will lead to its global diffusion 
(Singh [R.] 2013). This symbolism can be attributed to the way how the Hindutva sub-
discourse draws on an articulation of India as a spiritual and non-materialistic entity that 
places it in opposition to the overly rational and materialistic ‘West’. India’s and Hinduism’s 
main contributions to the world order lie thus primarily in the spiritual realm that provides an 
alternative to the destructive tendencies of ‘Western’ modernity and its materialism. Under-
scoring the ancient wisdom and superiority of the Indian civilization, The Organiser (1998) 
for instance noted in an editorial right after India’s nuclear tests in May 1998: “India has a 
culture for non-use of force, for peace. The West is yet to evolve this kind of culture.” And 
BJP president Nitin Gadaki (2010) noted:   
 
“The global domination by the West – particularly by the United States of America – is rapidly becom-
ing a thing of the past. […] Western countries are waking up to the unsustainability of high-cost, waste-
ful and excessively consumerist lifestyles – not to speak of the unsustainable levels of military spending 
to maintain their global hegemony. […] No major problem affecting the world – climate change, global 
economic slowdown, restructuring of the global financial architecture, or how to tackle the scourge of 
international terrorism – can now being discussed without seeking India’s participation and coopera-
tion.” 
 
Though the Hyper-nationalist discourse frames the ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ generally in a 
positive way and regards it as India’s main contribution to the world order, it also highlights 
the downside of this exceptionalism, namely that India is also exceptional in its disregard of 
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 The ABKM (Akhil Bhartiya Karyakarini Mandal) is the executive council of the RSS.  
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national security, strategy and defence. This fantasy is, in particular, articulated by the ultrare-
alist sub-discourse and maintains that (almost) all states in the international system pursue a 
foreign policy that is driven by the imperatives of realpolitik and the balance-of-power, while 
India adheres to ‘idealism’ and ‘moralism’ in its foreign policy despite having the most dan-
gerous security environment of all states in the international system (Chellaney 1999a: 145ff.; 
Karnad 2014a: 200ff.). As Bharat Verma (2014), for example, noted: “China never overlooks 
the primary objective of building military muscle. Frankly, no other country does except In-
dia”. This articulation of India as a timid ‘lamb-state’ in a world full of ruthless ‘wolves’ is a 
sedimented myth that is taken to be true without questioning. Based on a crude understanding 
of the realist school in IR, it merely assumes that all states are only driven by their national 
interests (as defined by realism) and have no moral concerns, strive for military power or have 
elaborated national security strategies and are thus never taken by surprise. That there are am-
ple examples for countries that, for instance, did not build a ‘military muscle’ despite having 
far greater economic capabilities than India (e.g. Germany and Japan after the end of the cold 
war) or were taken by surprise when attacked despite having national security strategies (e.g. 
the United States by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the 9/11 terrorist attack) does 
not concern the proponents of the discourse.  
Likewise, they seem to ignore that the Indian ‘lamb state’ has not only the third largest armed 
forces in the world and belongs to a very small group of countries which possesses nuclear 
weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers, but also did not shy away from 
projecting military power, for example, to disrupt Pakistan in 1971, to prevent extra-regional 
interference in the Sri Lanka conflict or in more recent years through its naval engagement in 
Indo-Pacific region. By representing India’s foreign policy as excessively moralistic and ide-
alistic, the ultrarealist sub-discourse has thus contributed to the further sedimentation of the 
myth of ‘Indian Exceptionalism’. Ironically, the proponents of the ultrarealist discourse have, 
at the same time, even embraced the positive connotation of an ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ and 
are thus gripped by the myth that India is the symbol of non-violence, tolerance and peaceful 
co-existence. As Brahma Chellaney (2009a) notes for instance, “India – the world’s most-
assimilative civilization – can now truly play the role of a bridge between the East and the 
West, including a link between the competing demands of the developed and developing 
worlds”.  
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7.4 Summary  
The Hyper-nationalist discourse represents the international system as an inherently competi-
tive and conflictive arena characterized by geopolitical, civilizational and ideological strug-
gles – a state-of-affairs that can, if at all, be mitigated or overcome through Hindutva’s uni-
versal wisdom and message of compassion, spiritual peace and tolerance for other viewpoints 
and the rise of India on the global horizon. Though India fulfils all the necessary materialist 
and non-materialist prerequisites for becoming a great power and was once the world’s most 
powerful, prosperous and advanced civilization before it fell prey to colonialism, it could not 
re-gain its past status after its independence and has largely been marginalized in the world 
order, because it pursued ‘idealistic’ and ‘moralistic’ foreign and security policies and ne-
glected the crucial importance of building a powerful and uniform nation-state that deals from 
a position of strength and a clear strategic vision with internal and external enemies.  
Reversing this trend and making India strong is the main objective of the Hyper-nationalist 
discourse. While the ultrarealist sub-discourse emphasizes military power, the Hindu national-
ist sub-discourse, though conceding the importance of the material foundation of state power, 
ultimately attaches greater importance to the cultural dimension of state power and regards a 
strong national will and unity embodied by the concept of Hindutva as the fundamental source 
of power. However, it would be a mistake to treat the ‘Indian realism’ and Hindu nationalism, 
as several scholars did (see Cohen 2002, Sagar 2009, Bajpai 2014), as two distinctive ‘world-
views’ or ‘schools of thought’ mainly on the basis that the latter is driven by culture and ide-
ology, while the former is not. As we have seen, both sub-discourses turn to the glory and 
power of the Indian civilization in the Vedic age and regard the ancient Hindu thought as the 
main source for India’s strategic culture and grand strategy in the contemporary international 
system. And both discourses are shaped by a conservative-nationalist ideological fantasy, 
which finds expression in a more pessimistic worldview, a desire to preserve or recollect past 
traditions and an aspiration to build a strong, uniform nation-state. 
The chapter has argued that the Hyper-nationalist discourse has so far failed to construct a 
broad, inclusive and coherent hegemonic project and to gain discursive hegemony, even 
though it shaped the transformation of the dislocated Nehruvian foreign policy discourse (e.g. 
accentuation of India’s great power ambitions, the shift from non-alignment to multi-
alignment and the re-calibration of relations with key states such as the United States). By 
analysing the foreign policy of the BJP, which is the main political force that draws on and 
invokes the Hyper-nationalist discourse and promised substantial changes in India’s foreign 
and security policies before coming to power in 1998, the chapter could show when and how 
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the discourse shortly surfaced in India’s foreign policy, but could not sediment and replace 
the Nehruvian discourse.  
The chapter could expose some of the inherent tensions, or even the schizophrenic nature of 
the Hyper-nationalist discourse which also impedes its ability to gain discursive hegemony: 
The Hyper-nationalist discourse criticizes Islam and Christianity for being monolithic, but 
aspires to create a monolithic Hinduism. It glorifies India’s religious, linguist and ethnic di-
versity and unique virtues, but seeks to repress this very diversity and make India a traditional 
nation-state. It casts Pakistan and China as inherently aggressive and ruthless states, but wants 
to endow India with the same qualities. It cherishes India’s democracy and despises the au-
thoritarian, repressive rule of these two regimes, but wishes to crush internal dissent in India 
with an ‘iron fist’. It criticizes China and the United States for their ‘hegemonistic designs’, 
but claims South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region as India’s natural sphere of influence. It 
deplores other countries’ ‘unsustainable levels of military spending’, but seeks to make India 
a military superpower. It upholds tolerance and non-violence as the hallmarks of the In-
dian/Hindu civilization, but also sees these traits as the main reason for its weakness. It seeks 
to induct rationality, realism and strategic thought into India’s foreign and security policies, 
but invokes superstitious beliefs and the naive conviction that the solution to all of India’s 
current problems can be found in the ancient Vedic texts and Kautilya’s Arthashastra.              
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8. Conclusion  
 
This study examined the world order concepts in India’s foreign policy discourse. It shed light 
on the way how competing discourses endow world order with meaning and seek to fixate 
India’s identity within this order. It was argued that foreign policy and world order have been 
crucial sites for the (re-)production of India’s identity by drawing a political frontier between 
the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and placing India into a system of differences that constitutes ‘what 
India is’. At the same time, the study showed how India’s foreign policy discourses seek to 
defuse this difference by articulating a particular representation of political order as universal 
and defining India as an exceptional agent in the world that has demonstrated how diversity 
and difference can be managed peacefully and thus how a peaceful, just and stable world or-
der could be achieved.  
Drawing on the poststructuralist discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe and their various followers, the study understood discourse as the ontological horizon 
in the sense of being coterminous with social reality. Discourses are relational and differential 
systems of signification that confer meaning to the social world. This meaning-generating is 
conferred primarily, but not only through language which becomes thus the point of departure 
for studying the construction of meaning. Discourses are contingent constructions in the sense 
that meanings and identities of social elements can always be constructed in different ways. 
The elements, which we encounter in the social world, have thus no pre-given and fixed es-
sence or characteristics, but acquire their meanings and identities only through their relation 
and difference to other elements. Given the absence of any stable foundations and the exclu-
sion of certain other options, discourses can fix meanings and identities only partially and are 
both dependent on and vulnerable to a ‘discursive exterior’ that threatens to dislocate the ar-
ticulations of meaning, but is also the precondition for discursive articulations in the first 
place. This discursive, anti-essentialist ontology transcends the artificial dichotomies between 
the ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ or ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ prevalent in the mainstream IR 
theories by understanding both realms as constituted by discourse in the sense that the rele-
vance, potentials and constraints of ideas and material capabilities are both the product of re-
lational and differential systems of signification that confer meaning to them in the first place. 
The rejection of the thought/reality dichotomy does not imply that a material world does not 
exist, but that we cannot conceptualize or access this material reality outside of our attempts 
to make sense of it. 
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Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist re-conceptualization of hegemony allows to understand 
hegemony as a discursive struggle for the fixation of particular meanings or a particular 
meaning system and to comprehend the emergence, constitution, institutionalization and 
transformation of social orders. The main objective of discourse analysis is to apprehend the 
processes of fixing meanings and to elaborate how certain fixations of meaning could prevail 
as the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ understanding of the world and thus achieve a hegemonic status. 
Accordingly, this study examined what meaning competing discourses in India confer to 
world order and if a particular discourse has become a hegemonic articulation. For compre-
hending this struggle for discourse hegemony and identity formation, the study additionally 
incorporated insights of postcolonialism, above all the concepts of hybridity and mimicry, 
which can shed light on the way how the colonial encounter shaped the identities of both the 
colonizers and colonized and generated hybrid identities that transcend the confines of one 
socio-cultural space. This overarching ontological framework was put into practice by draw-
ing on the logics-approach devised by Jason Glynos and David Howarth. Their distinction of 
social, political and fantasmatic logics allows us to grasp what world order means and implies 
in a discourse (social dimension), how these understandings of world order are constituted, 
contested and changed (political dimension) and why actors are gripped by a (hegemonic) 
discourse and thus take it to be ‘real’, ‘desirable’ or ‘natural’ (fantasmatic dimension).     
The background of this study have been the discourses of ‘global power shifts’ and ‘post-
Western’ IR. While the discourse of ‘global power shifts’ argues that we are currently wit-
nessing a fundamental transformation in world politics through the rise of ‘new’ powers that 
challenge the structure of the international system and its underlying ‘Western’-liberal order, 
the discourse of ‘post-Western’ IR attacks the discipline of international relations for its paro-
chialism and ethnocentrism and demands to ‘re-write’ the discipline by decentring the ‘West’ 
and moving to a ‘post-Western’ IR. This study has merged and re-conceptualized both phe-
nomena as an expression of the dislocation of the ‘Western’ discursive hegemony in world 
politics. The ‘Western’ discursive hegemony implies that the ‘West’ as a particular historical 
subject (with particular interests, demands and experiences etc.) is upheaved to a position 
from where it can assert a particular representation of world politics as having universal sig-
nificance and thus symbolizing ‘reality’. In this sense, the ‘West’ hegemonically controls the 
signifier world order and could thus partially fill the void of a universality with a particularity. 
In the process of dislocation, the particularity of this order and its inherent contradictions and 
exclusions are exposed, because the hegemonic discourse is increasingly struggling to fix 
meanings and reproduce a dominant horizon or frame of intelligibility. What is subsumed 
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under the labels of ‘global power shifts’ and ‘post-Western IR’ has thus been understood in 
this study as a shift of representational power that challenges ‘Western’ (discursive) hegemo-
ny in the political and academic domain. This shift in representational power enables ‘new’ 
agents to assert particular representations of the world as universal and thus to fix a different 
meaning to the signifier world order. 
Against this backdrop, this study investigated how foreign policy discourses in India, which is 
constituted by the discourse of ‘global power shifts’ as one of the key agents of this transfor-
mation and thus in the debate and struggle over world order, conceptualize world order and 
India’s role in it. In doing so, this study went beyond the theoretically very thin literature on 
‘global power shifts’, which is dominated by realist IR theory or a combination of realism and 
liberalism, and offered a different reading of the formation and implications of what is under-
stood as a fundamental transformation in contemporary global politics. In addition, the study 
provided the first comprehensive, theoretically guided analysis of Indian world order concepts. 
It intervened into the debate about Indian thinking on international relations (see Bajpai 2003, 
2014; Sagar 2009; Ollapally/Rajagopalan 2012) by introducing a novel theoretical framework 
to analyse India’s foreign policy thinking and practices and overcome the ‘material-
ist’/‘ideational’ dichotomy that informs and constrains these studies. At the same time, it 
questioned the empirical results of the existing studies and their delineation of – what these 
studies frame as – India’s ‘strategic visions’,  ‘worldviews’ or ‘schools of thought’.  
All these studies argue that a ‘liberal’ or ‘pragmatic’ worldview has emerged as a powerful, or 
even the most influential, school of thought in India’s foreign policy debate. However, there 
is no political party in India that has fully embraced this ‘worldview’ and its main proponents 
are almost exclusively located outside the political establishment. This argument corresponds 
to a certain extent with a common assertion found in contemporary studies on Indian foreign 
policy which argue that India has shifted from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ or ‘moralism’ to a for-
eign policy driven by ‘pragmatism’ or ‘realism’ in the post-cold war era. 
This study also took the end of the cold war as a point of departure, but provided a different 
reading of the apparent changes, ruptures and continuities in India’s contemporary foreign 
policy. In contrast to the widespread claim that India’s foreign policy has moved from Nehru-
vian ‘idealism’ to ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’, it re-conceptualized the so-called turning point 
in India’s foreign policy after the end of the cold war as a dislocation of the hegemonic 
Nehruvian discourse. This disruption symbolized an Indian ‘identity crisis’ and a (intensified) 
struggle for discursive hegemony. A dislocatory moment disrupts not only the existent discur-
sive order, but also constituted a failed structural identity in the sense that actors can no 
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longer (entirely) identify with the subject positions provided by the discourse, throwing their 
identities into a crisis and prompting them to act in order to re-construct subject positions and 
thus the interpretative framework through which the transformation and the ‘new context’76 
can be understood. Post-Nehruvianism, as this study argued, gradually emerged from this 
dislocatory moment in India’s foreign policy discourse and successfully transformed the tradi-
tional Nehruvian discourse by reinterpreting and adapting it to the changed structural circum-
stances of the post-cold war world. In other words, the erstwhile hegemonic discourse was not 
replaced by another discourse (such as the Hyper-nationalist discourse), but changed and 
modified largely within its own discursive parameters.  
Against this backdrop, what is framed by contemporary studies on India’s post-cold war for-
eign policy as a shift from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ to ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’ is here under-
stood as the successful modification and adaptation of a hegemonic discourse. Post-
Nehruvianism draws on and re-affirms but also goes beyond and partially contests the Nehru-
vian foreign policy discourse. This duality also allowed us to understand and explicate the 
apparent ruptures, changes and continuities in India’s contemporary foreign policy discourse. 
The Post-Nehruvian discourse indeed recurrently articulates a greater ‘realism’ or ‘pragma-
tism’ as cornerstones of India’s ‘new’ outlook to the world in order to signify the transforma-
tion of the hegemonic project. This, however, does not mean that India has simply shifted 
from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ to ‘realism’ and ‘pragmatism’ or that India’s contemporary foreign 
policy can be adequately understood or explained with realist IR theory. ‘Realism’ and 
‘pragmatism’ are, by contrast, empty signifiers in the discourse, because they suggest a ‘ra-
tional’, ‘balanced’ and ‘practical’ foreign policy, but whose exact meaning remains rather 
nebulous whereby they can unite different social forces in the hegemonic project. What is 
considered ‘realistic’, ‘pragmatic’ or ‘common sense’ at a given point of time is always the 
product of a successful hegemonic articulation. In other words, in the course of the transfor-
mation of the hegemonic discourse, it was re-defined what it means to pursue a ‘pragmatic’ or 
‘realistic’ foreign policy. But this has neither made India’s foreign policy more ‘pragmatic’ or 
‘realistic’, as the scathing critique of the counter-hegemonic Hyper-nationalist discourse on 
India’s contemporary foreign policy has illustrated, nor implies that India has simply given up 
its ‘moral’ or ‘ideological’ concerns. In fact, by looking into major events in India’s post-cold 
war foreign policy discourse such as the nuclear tests in 1998 or the U.S.-Indo nuclear agree-
ment, we could carve out to what extent parameters of the Nehruvian discourse such as for-
                                                 
76
 As was argued throughout this study, this ‘new structural context’ is no ‘objective’ condition, but endowed 
with meaning and thus (re-)produced through discourse(s). The significance of what cannot be (fully) symbol-
ized by an existent discourse is exactly what is at stake in moments of dislocation.   
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eign policy autonomy, non-violence or moral leadership claims still shape India’s foreign pol-
icy discourse.      
Post-Nehruvianism, however, has also moved away from the ‘traditional’ Nehruvian dis-
course in two respects: first, it incorporated the globalization discourse and recognizes the 
need for opening and liberalizing India’s economy. Though the rather socialist, state-directed 
economic policy has largely been given up, the discourse still displays elements of the ‘tradi-
tional’ Nehruvian discourse such as self-reliance (swadeshi) and thus a certain ambivalence 
with regard to India’s response to the so-called ‘imperatives’ of globalization and the exact 
direction of India’s economic policy. Second, the Non-Aligned Movement has lost its central 
role in India’s foreign policy and is today rather seen as one political grouping among many. 
Third and crucially, non-alignment, the original nodal point of the Nehruvian discourse, was 
re-interpreted and re-fashioned as multi-alignment in the Post-Nehruvian discourse. It means 
that India pursues a multidirectional foreign policy and seeks to establish good, stable and 
mutually beneficial relations with all key actors, while avoiding strategic entanglements and 
one-sided dependencies which could impede and thus threaten the deep-seated desire and de-
mand for the autonomy and independence of India’s decision making. 
The Post-Nehruvian discourse is based on five interrelated social logics which signify the 
main pillars or elements of world order: state sovereignty, enlightened self-interest, non-
violence, non-discrimination and international unity in diversity. The political logics capture 
the formation and institutionalization of the hegemonic discourse and the meanings and iden-
tities it has articulated. The Post-Nehruvian discourse invokes a set of ‘others’ that serve as 
‘shared negativities’ for constructing a chain of equivalence: the temporal ‘others’ embodied 
by ‘Western’ colonialism and the cold war and the spatial-political ‘others’ represented by 
Pakistan and China. The fantasmatic logics, which capture the ideological and mythical di-
mension of the Post-Nehruvian discourse, are the narratives of ‘Indian Greatness’ and ‘Indian 
Exceptionalism’. These two narratives constitute a collective foundational imaginary that 
frame India not only as the symbol of tolerance, non-violence, pluralism and moral righteous-
ness, but also as an enduring, pre-colonial unity and agent in the world. As social imaginaries, 
they have managed to ‘cover over’ the contradictions and ruptures of the discourse and incor-
porate a wide range of social interests and demands, thereby becoming the horizon that ren-
ders the social world intelligible.  
The hegemonic (Post-)Nehruvian discourse is contested by the Hyper-nationalist discourse. 
As the main counter-hegemonic discourse in India, the Hyper-nationalist discourse emerged 
and developed parallel to the mainstream Nehruvian discourse and gained in importance in 
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the moment of the dislocation of the Nehruvian discourse. Though the Hyper-nationalist dis-
course did not manage to gain discursive hegemony in this dislocatory moment, it contributed 
to the transformation of the Nehruvian discourse and left its mark on the transformed hege-
monic discourse. It consists of two overlapping sub-discourses, the Hindutva and ultrarealist 
discourses, which converge in the social logic of national strength (shakti). The Hyper-
nationalist discourse represents India’s foreign policy as overly idealistic and moralistic, de-
ploring a lack of strategic thought, a nonchalant dealing with the country’s national security 
and a disregard of power. The discourse recalls the glory and power of the Indian civilization 
in the Vedic age and seeks to recover the “Hindu machtpolitik” (Karnad 2002a) that is laid 
down in the ancient Hindu texts. For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, it is essential that India 
becomes a powerful and uniform nation-state that deals from a position of strength with inter-
nal and external enemies. While the ultrarealist discourse, however, places greater emphasis 
on military power, the Hindu nationalist discourse, though conceding the importance of the 
material foundation of state power, ultimately attaches greater importance to the cultural di-
mension of state power, i.e. a strong national will, awareness and unity realized by the asser-
tion of a uniform culture (Hindutva).   
The study argued that the Hyper-nationalist discourse has so far not been able to erect an in-
clusive alternative hegemonic project that could contest the mainstream foreign policy dis-
course in India. This can be attributed, inter alia, to the lack of an alternative nodal point 
around which a hegemonic discourse could be organized. Instead of directly challenging non-
alignment, the nodal point of the Nehruvian discourse, the Hyper-nationalist discourse has 
merely sought to fix a different meaning to non-alignment by demanding a more balanced 
relationship with the great powers combined with the accumulation of national strength to 
bolster India’s strategic autonomy. In this sense, the Hyper-nationalist contributed to the 
transformation of the dislocated Nehruvian discourse and the shift from traditional non-
alignment to multi-alignment. The Hyper-nationalist discourse also articulates largely the 
same temporal and spatial-political ‘others’ as the (Post-)Nehruvian discourse, but the colo-
nial ‘other’ include here also the Muslim rulers over the Indian Subcontinent and the relation-
ship with the two spatial-political ‘others’ (Pakistan and China) is characterized by a higher 
degree of antagonism. Similarly, a variation of the mythical narratives of ‘Indian Greatness’ 
and ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ underpins the Hyper-nationalist discourse. Both the Post-
Nehruvian and the Hyper-nationalist discourse are gripped by the myth that India is an ancient 
and enduring cultural and political agent and the epitome of tolerance, pluralism and non-
violence in the world. While this nostalgia for India’s pre-colonial (Hindu) past is more im-
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plicit in the Post-Nehruvian discourse and the discourse acknowledges, for example, the con-
tributions of Islam and the Muslim rulers or Buddhism to the Indian civilization and its main 
traits, the Hyper-nationalist discourse, in particular the Hindu nationalist sub-discourse, as-
serts that India is fundamentally a Hindu civilization. Accordingly, Hindu-ness is the cultural 
essence of India and the reason for India’s tolerant, pluralist and non-violent ethos. Not the 
least because this alleged cultural essence and distinctiveness is also India’s biggest weak-
ness, the Hyper-nationalist discourse has not been able to gain discursive hegemony.       
 
Limitations and Future Research   
An interesting point of departure for future research could be to study the resilience of the 
Post-Nehruvian discourse under the Modi government and thus to examine whether the dis-
course was further institutionalized, modified or challenged under this government. Apart 
from analysing India’s foreign policy discourse beyond this study’s period of investigation, 
future research could look in greater detail into the formation and evolution of India’s com-
peting foreign policy discourses in the pre- and post-independence periods and thus address 
one of the shortcomings of this study: While this study claimed that the Nehruvian discourse 
has been the hegemonic foreign policy discourse in India between independence and the end 
of the cold war, it has not carried out a proper discourse analysis to prove this argument and 
shed light on how this discourse was formed and institutionalized in detail. Such an analysis 
would have gone beyond the scope of this study, but could generate important insights into 
the formation and evolution of the discourse and its constitution of India’s identity in the 
world. The claim that Nehruvianism constituted the hegemonic discourse in India was in this 
study based on the dominant narrative of Indian foreign policy that we find in the literature. 
This narrative was taken as a point of departure in the present study and re-framed through the 
theoretical prism of poststructuralist discourse theory. In doing so, this study could provide 
some tentative insights into the emergence, constitution and evolution of the Nehruvian dis-
course, but no comprehensive discussion of the discourse. Likewise, the emergence, constitu-
tion and evolution of the counter-hegemonic Hyper-nationalist discourse, whose origins can 
be traced back to the colonial period, could be investigated in greater detail.   
Moreover, it would be of interest to investigate, in greater detail, the interplay of the different 
social, political and fantasmatic logics identified in this study in concrete policy processes or 
areas to illuminate, for instance, how these logics have shaped the formulation and implemen-
tation of these policies or influenced India’s positioning in international negotiations. Though 
this study has looked into some policy areas and explicated India’s behaviour through the 
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grammar of the respective logic, it has not carried out an extensive ‘case study’ and could 
thus only briefly illustrate the workings of these logics and the way how they have informed 
India’s foreign policy practices.  
Another shortcoming of this study concerns the scope of discourses and textual material that 
was analysed. This study only examined the hegemonic and the main counter-hegemonic dis-
course in India. It neglected other counter-hegemonic discourses such as the communist dis-
course. This was justified with the relative marginalization of these discourses in the field of 
discursivity and thus in the struggle for discursive hegemony. An analysis of these discourses, 
however, would complement an account of India’s world order concepts and provide a differ-
ent reading of the world order and India’s role in it. Likewise, broadening the analysis beyond 
the ‘political’ discourse to public, media and academic discourses would be of value. Though 
this study has at least incorporated texts by government advisers, it has not studied how inter-
national relations is framed in India’s academic discourse. Similarly, future research could 
examine how world order is represented and thus made meaningful in religious and philoso-
phical texts in India. 
Despite these shortcomings, this study has provided a novel theoretical framework to under-
stand and explain how a country that is located outside the ‘Western’ core conceptualizes 
world order by drawing on Indian textual sources and investigating how these texts make the 
world meaningful. By going beyond the standard theoretical narratives of Indian foreign pol-
icy, which draw predominantly on mainstream IR theories, this study sought to develop a 
theoretical framework that allows us to illuminate the apparent changes, continuities, ruptures, 
contradictions and unique features of India’s foreign policy in a more comprehensive way. In 
doing so, this study has tried to address what India’s National Security Adviser Shivshankar 
Menon (2013b) described as the main challenge and shortcoming of the discipline of interna-
tional relations in India and beyond:        
 
“The dominant discourse in IR studies, journalism and the world as a whole today is a Western metro-
politan one. […] India’s non-alignment, chosen levels of engagement, the balance between multilateral-
ism and bilateralism, and the demands we place upon our negotiators are all unique. Which brings me to 
the last issue that I would like to raise. If India’s practice and style of foreign policy is so recognisably 
and so uniquely Indian why is there not an Indian theory to explain it?” 
 
 
This study hopes to have offered a theoretical framework which can help to explain these for-
eign policy practices and critically reflect upon assertions that these practices are inherently 
unique or exceptional by studying the underpinning political and fantasmatic logics that have 
made these practices possible in the first place.  
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German Summary / Deutsche Zusammenfassung  
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Weltordnungsmodelle im außenpolitischen Diskurs 
Indiens und wie diese die indische Außenpolitik seit Ende des Kalten Krieges geprägt haben. 
Ausgangspunkt der Arbeit ist ein starkes – im Diskurs der internationalen Beziehungen (IB) 
artikuliertes – Bewusstsein für globale Machtverschiebungen im internationalen System. War 
der IB-Diskurs nach Ende des Kalten Krieges noch geprägt von der weitverbreiteten Über-
zeugung, dass der ideologische und geopolitische Konkurrenzkampf zwischen den Groß-
mächten vorbei sei und der Triumph der liberalen Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft allmählich 
zur Herausbildung eines liberalen Global Governance Systems und Frieden, Stabilität und 
Kooperation führen würde
77
, wird heute von einer tiefen Krise oder gar dem Ende der west-
lich-liberalen Weltordnung gesprochen (vgl. Jacques 2009, Sørensen 2011, Morgan 2013, 
Acharya 2014b, Stuenkel 2016). Die wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Schwer-
punktverschiebungen von West nach Ost werden oftmals als eine der Hauptursachen dieser 
Krise ausgemacht. Während demnach sogenannte aufstrebende Mächte wie China, Indien und 
Russland mit neuem Selbstbewusstsein und stetig wachsenden Machtressourcen auf der 
Weltbühne auftreten, haben die USA und ihre westlichen Partner nach den militärischen In-
terventionen in Afghanistan und Irak sowie der jüngsten Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise ihre 
globale Führungsrolle zunehmend verloren. Die Machtverschiebungen im internationalen 
System werden daher als Herausforderung oder gar Bedrohung für die gegenwärtig westlich-
dominierte Weltordnung und ihre Werte wie Rechtstaatlichkeit, Menschenrechte oder Demo-
kratie angesehen (vgl. Cox 2007, Kupchan 2012, Layne 2012). 
Gleichzeitig gibt es heute ein gestiegenes Bewusstsein für die möglichen Auswirkungen die-
ser Machtverschiebungen auf die Ebene der Wissens- und Theorieproduktion in dem Sinne, 
dass die Entwicklung und Natur der existierenden Theorien und Konzepte der Disziplin der 
internationalen Beziehungen auch ein Ergebnis der existierenden Machtverteilung im interna-
tionalen System sind, d.h. die gegenwärtigen IB-Theorien und Konzepte spiegeln überwie-
gend ‚westliche‘ Erfahrungen, Bedingungen, Werte und Interessen wider. Dies hat der Diszip-
lin den Vorwurf eines ‚westlichen‘ Zentrismus eingebracht und Forderungen nach einer stär-
keren Berücksichtigung nicht-‚westlicher‘ Ideen, Erfahrungen und Theorien laut werden las-
sen (vgl. Tickner 2003, Nayak/Selbin 2010, Lizée 2011, Shilliam 2011, Hobson 2012, 
Tickner/Blaney 2012). 
                                                 
77
 Die wohl prominenteste Artikulation dieser Überzeugung stammt von Francis Fukuyama (1992), der die These 
des ‚Endes der Geschichte‘ prägte.   
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Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in dieser Arbeit das Phänomen, welches allgemeinhin unter 
dem Begriff ‚globale Machtverschiebungen‘ subsumiert wird, aus der theoretischen Perspek-
tive der poststrukturalistischen Diskurstheorie und des Postkolonialismus beleuchtet und neu 
konzeptualisiert als eine Verschiebung von Repräsentationsmacht, welche die ‚westli-
che‘ (diskursive) Hegemonie im politischen und wissenschaftlichen Diskurs der internationa-
len Beziehungen untergräbt und herausfordert. Wenn wir globale Machtverschiebungen und 
Weltordnung als diskursive Phänomene verstehen, erkennen wir an, dass es Diskurse sind, 
welche die Eigenschaften oder Effekte dieser Phänomene überhaupt erst materialisieren, in-
dem sie ihnen eine bestimmte Bedeutung verleihen und einen bestimmen Bedeutungshorizont 
schaffen. Demzufolge symbolisieren die globalen Machtverschiebungen einen hegemonialen 
Kampf um die Fixierung von Bedeutungen, indem sie existierende Identitäten ins Wanken 
bringen (oder dislozieren), Widersprüche oder Spannungen in den vorherrschenden Weltord-
nungsentwürfen aufdecken und ‚neuen‘ Akteuren die Möglichkeit geben, partikulare Reprä-
sentationen der Welt als universell darzustellen.  
Dies ruft die Frage hervor welche Perspektive auf die Weltpolitik jene Staaten haben, welche 
als Träger der globalen Machtverschiebungen angesehen werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit hat 
daher, die dominanten Weltordnungsmodelle im außenpolitischen Diskurs Indiens rekonstru-
iert und untersucht, wie diese interpretativen Bezugssysteme die indische Außenpolitik nach 
Ende des Kalten Krieges gestaltet haben: Wie konzipiert der außenpolitische Diskurs Welt-
ordnung und Indiens Rolle in dieser Ordnung? Welche unterschiedlichen Weltordnungskon-
zepte lassen sich im Diskurs identifizieren und was ist ihr politischer und ideologischer Hin-
tergrund? Hat ein bestimmtes Weltordnungsmodell einen hegemonialen Status erreicht im 
Diskurs und gegebenenfalls wie konnte diese diskursive Dominanz erreicht werden?   
Indien wird heute weithin als aufstrebende Macht und wichtiger Akteur in Asien und dem 
globalen System angesehen (vgl. Cohen 2001, Mohan 2004, Pant 2008, Ogden 2014). Es 
herrscht jedoch wenig Einigkeit darüber, welche Gestaltungs- und Ordnungsvorstellungen 
Indien in der internationalen Politik hat. So wird Indien wegen seiner demokratischen Regie-
rungsform oft als natürlicher Partner der USA und des Westens im Allgemeinen gesehen (vgl. 
Burns 2007, Zakaria 2008, Fontaine/Kilman 2013); andererseits wird aber auch Indiens Stre-
ben nach außenpolitischer Autonomie betont (vgl. Mattoo 2005, Sikri 2009, Narang/Staniland 
2012, Khilnani et al. 2012) und auf Indiens Rolle in sogenannten anti-hegemonialen Koalitio-
nen wie etwa der Blockfreienbewegung oder der BRICS-Gruppe (Brasilien-Russland-Indien-
China-Südafrika) verwiesen (vgl. Koshy 2006, Narlikar 2006, Dubey 2013), welche die vor-
herrschende Ungleichheit, Ungerechtigkeit und den ‚westlichen‘ Imperialismus in der Welt-
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politik anprangern und Indien oftmals in Konflikt mit dem USA und der Europäischen Union 
in internationalen Organisationen bringen. Den politischen EntscheidungsträgerInnen Indiens 
wird überdies nachgesagt, in moralpolitischen Kategorien zu denken und sich nicht mit den 
Realitäten der internationalen Politik zu arrangieren (vgl. Pant 2008), aber gleichzeitig zählt 
Indien zu den größten Militärmächten der Welt mit einer stetig wachsenden konventionellen 
und nuklearen Streitmacht. In diesem Zusammenhang werden der indischen Außenpolitik 
oftmals auch eine allgemeine Konzeptlosigkeit und das Fehlen einer Grand Strategy unter-
stellt (vgl. Mazumdar 2011, Metha 2009, Pant 2009). 
Vorliegende Untersuchungen (vgl. Bajpai 2003, 2014, Sagar 2009, Ollapally/Rajagopalan 
2012), die sich mit dem indischen Denken zu den internationalen Beziehungen beschäftigt 
haben, identifizieren zahlreiche, unterschiedliche Weltbilder, Weltordnungskonzeptionen, 
strategische Visionen oder Denkschulen, angefangen bei ‚Gandhianismus‘ und ‚Moralis-
mus‘ über ‚Nehruvianismus‘ und ‚Neoliberalismus‘ zu Hindutva und Hyperrealismus. Ob-
gleich diese Studien wichtige Erkenntnisse liefern, tendieren sie doch dazu, Indiens außenpo-
litisches Denken auf einer sehr allgemeinen Ebene zu untersuchen, ohne dabei einen elabo-
rierten theoretischen und analytischen Rahmen für die vorgebachten Argumente zu liefern. 
Kanti Bajpai, dessen Untersuchungen zu Indiens strategischer Kultur oft zitiert werden, er-
klärt beispielsweise nicht, wie er zu der Schlussfolgerung gekommen ist, dass es drei domi-
nante strategische Denkschulen in Indien gibt – ‚Nehruvianismus‘‚ ‚Neoliberalismus‘ und 
‚Hyperrealismus‘ – welche die indische Außenpolitik anleiten. Folglich wissen wir weder was 
eigentlich überhaupt eine dominante Denkschule ausmacht noch wie oder warum diese Do-
minanz erreicht werden konnte. Wie auch Rahul Sagar, greift Bajpai zudem vor allem auf 
klassische Texte von Nehru, Gandhi und der hindunationalistischen Denker Savarkar und 
Golwalkar für seine Argumentation zurück, ohne jedoch nachzuweisen, dass dieses klassische 
Denken die politischen EntscheidungsträgerInnen von heute überhaupt beeinflusst (etwa 
durch eine Analyse indischer Parlamentsdebatten oder durch Interviews mit Entscheidungs-
trägerInnen). Daher erscheinen die Denkschulen, die von Bajpai und Sagar skizziert werden, 
eher statisch und berücksichtigen nicht die Möglichkeit evolutionären Wandels.  
Problematisch ist auch die mitunter unbedachte Verschmelzung von Ideen und politischer 
Praxis: Bajpais Versuch, einen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen Kultur und politischer 
Praxis herzustellen, indem er einfach nach Überschneidungen zwischen ideellen, in öffentli-
chen Debatten geäußerten Präferenzen und konkreten außenpolitischen Entscheidungen sucht, 
bleibt tautologisch, zumal hier Kultur (verstanden als ein Ensemble von Ideen) als Quelle 
sowie Ausdruck von politischen Strukturen und Entscheidungen verstanden wird. Sagar hin-
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gegen argumentiert, dass diese unterschiedlichen Visionen einfach “represent ideas about po-
litics that wax and wane with circumstances” (Sagar 2009: 802), d.h. sie spiegeln schlicht die 
Rahmenbedingungen und Veränderungen im politischen, wirtschaftlichen und strategischen 
Umfeld wider. Diese eindimensionale Sichtweise ignoriert, dass die ‚materielle‘ und ‚ideel-
le‘ Dimension eng miteinander verflochten sind und – wie in dieser Arbeit gezeigt wurde – 
nur über Diskurse überhaupt erst bestimmte Bedeutungen erlangen.  
Überdies tendieren alle Studien zu Indiens außenpolitischem Denken dazu, einen größeren 
Schwerpunkt auf Indiens strategische Community zu legen, d.h. WissenschaftlerInnen, Jour-
nalistInnen und in Ruhestand getretene RegierungsmitarbeiterInnen oder Militärangehörige, 
als auf Indiens tatsächliche EntscheidungsträgerInnen. Dies suggeriert, dass die AutorInnen 
annehmen, dass die strategische Community einen erheblichen Einfluss auf außenpolitische 
Entscheidungsprozesse hat. Gleichwohl hat die Forschung zu dieser Thematik gezeigt, dass 
dieser Einfluss tatsächlich sehr begrenzt ist – eine Einschätzung, die auch viele Entschei-
dungsträgerInnen teilen (vgl. Markey 2009, Mohan 2009, Sikri 2009, Chatterjee-Miller 2014, 
Mattoo/Medcalf 2015). Indem sie die strategische Community gegenüber den Entscheidungs-
trägerInnen privilegieren, entwerfen diese Studien ein eher verzerrtes Bild des außenpoliti-
schen Denkens in Indien. Zum Beispiel argumentieren Bajpai, Sagar und Ollapally/ 
Rajagopalan alle, dass ein ‚liberales‘ Weltbild, welches durch eine ‚pragmatische‘ Sichtweise 
auf die internationalen Beziehungen gekennzeichnet sei, zu einer mächtigen, wenn gar nicht 
einflussreichsten, Denkschule in Indiens außenpolitischer Debatte avanciert sei. Interessan-
terweise gibt es jedoch keine politische Partei in Indien, die dieses Weltbild vollständig unter-
stützt und seine wichtigsten VetreterInnen sind fast ausnahmslos außerhalb des politischen 
Establishments angesiedelt. Dies entspricht in gewisser Weise einer häufig in der Literatur zur 
gegenwärtigen indischen Außenpolitik geäußerten Behauptung, dass Indien vom 
‚nehruvianischen Idealismus‘ zu einer Außenpolitik im Zeichen des ‚Realismus‘ oder ‚Prag-
matismus‘ gewechselt sei (vgl. Mohan 2004, Kapur 2006, Ganguly/Pardesi 2009, Ganguly 
2010, Malone 2012). Gleichwohl liefern diese Studien weder eine theoretisch angeleitete Er-
örterung dieser sehr breiten und unspezifischen Termini noch untersuchen sie ihre konkrete 
Bedeutung im indischen Kontext.  
Die vorliegende Arbeit hat versucht, diese Unzulänglichkeiten zu überwinden und eine diffe-
renzierte Darstellung zu Indiens außenpolitischem Denken und außenpolitischer Praxis seit 
Ende des Kalten Krieges zu liefern. Hierfür wurde ein diskursanalytischer Ansatz gewählt, 
welcher untersucht wie Strukturen, Akteure, Prozesse und Themenfelder der globalen Politik 
mit Bedeutung versehen werden und so überhaupt erst produziert werden: Erstens, anstatt die 
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universelle Anwendbarkeit und Validität ‚westlicher‘ Konzepte und Theorien a priori voraus-
zusetzen, untersucht diese Studie wie indische EntscheidungsträgerInnen die Welt und zentra-
le IB-Konzepte wie etwa Macht, Weltordnung oder Frieden über Diskurse ordnen und Sinn 
verleihen. Im Unterschied zu vielen Untersuchungen hat diese Studie somit nicht einfach In-
diens Positionierung zu globalen Themen und Fragen hinsichtlich der Befolgung ‚westli-
cher‘ Normen beleuchtet, sondern Indiens Rolle als potenzielle Gestaltungsmacht untersucht, 
welche möglicherweise andere Normen und Ideen formuliert und propagiert. Zweitens hat die 
vorliegende Studie nicht einfach deskriptiv geschildert, wie Indiens EntscheidungsträgerInnen 
die Welt ordnen, sondern auch erklärt wie und warum bestimmte Weltordnungsmodelle sich 
herausbilden und dominant werden konnten.  
Drittens, das Verstehen von Außenpolitik, Weltordnung und globalen Machtverschiebungen 
als diskursive Phänomene hat es uns erlaubt, die künstliche Abgrenzung zwischen der ‚mate-
riellen‘ und ‚ideellen‘ Dimension der internationalen Beziehungen, wie sie in realistischen, 
liberalen und konstruktivistischen Untersuchungen zu finden ist, zu überwinden. Anstatt etwa 
zwischen ideellen Präferenzen und außenpolitischen Praktiken zu unterscheiden, hat diese 
Studie sowohl das ‚materielle‘ als auch das ‚ideelle‘ als diskursiv konstruiert verstanden, d.h. 
weder materielle Erscheinungen (z.B. militärische Macht) noch ideelle Erscheinungen (z.B. 
Ideen, Normen und Identitäten) können außerhalb diskursiver Bedeutungssysteme verstanden 
werden. Dies ermöglicht es uns nicht nur das Verhältnis zwischen dem Diskurs der globalen 
Machtverschiebungen und der Debatte um den ‚westlichen‘ Zentrismus der IB-Disziplin 
nachzuvollziehen, sondern auch wie Weltordnungen überhaupt erst entstehen und welche Im-
plikationen der machtpolitische Aufstieg ‚neuer‘ Mächte für die Weltordnung im 21. Jahr-
hundert hat.  
Viertens hat die vorliegende Arbeit eine neuartige Lesart indischer Außenpolitik vorgelegt, 
welche die weitverbreitete Behauptung, dass die indische Außenpolitik sich vom 
nehruvianischen ‚Idealismus‘ in Richtung ‚Realismus‘ oder ‚Pragmatismus‘ verschoben hätte, 
kritisch hinterfragt und aufzeigt, dass die Veränderungen und Kontinuitäten in der indischen 
Außenpolitik seit Ende des Kalten Krieges besser vor dem Hintergrund eines intensivierten 
Kampfes um diskursive Hegemonie verstanden werden können. Dieser diskursive Kampf  ist 
verknüpft mit der Zerrüttung (oder Dislokation) des zuvor hegemonialen Nehruvianischen 
Diskurses. Die Dislokation konstituierte eine indische Identitätskrise und die graduelle Trans-
formation des hegemonialen Diskurses zum Post-Nehruvianischen Diskurs. In anderen Wor-
ten, die Veränderungen in Indiens Außenpolitik in der jüngeren Vergangenheit haben weitest-
gehend im Rahmen des hegemonialen Nehruvianischen Diskurses stattgefunden, welcher In-
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diens Außenpolitik nach der Unabhängigkeit maßgeblich prägte und erfolgreich neu interpre-
tiert und an den ‚neuen strukturellen Kontext‘78 adaptiert wurde und damit auch gegen den 
hyper-nationalistischen Diskurs – dem einflussreichsten gegenhegemonialen Diskurs in Indi-
en – verteidigt wurde.  
 
Diskurs, Hegemonie und Postkolonialismus  
Für die Untersuchung der indischen Weltordnungskonzepte hat die vorliegende Arbeit ‚Welt-
ordnung‘, ‚Außenpolitik‘ und damit verknüpfte Konzepte wie ‚staatliche Souveränität‘ oder 
‚Sicherheit‘ nicht als gegenebene Entitäten, sondern als diskursive Formationen behandelt. 
Den theoretischen Rahmen dieser Arbeit bilden die poststrukturalistische Diskurstheorie, auch 
bekannt als Essex School of Discourse Theory, und der Postkolonialismus. Demzufolge ist die 
vorliegende Arbeit einer diskursiven, anti-essentialistischen Ontologie verschrieben und ver-
steht die soziale Realität als diskursiv konstruiert, d.h. die Objekte und Subjekte in der sozia-
len Welt haben keine vorgegebenen, festen Bedeutungen oder Identitäten. Die von Ernesto 
Laclau und Chantal Mouffe entwickelte poststrukturalistische Diskurstheorie versteht Diskur-
se als die “structured totality of articulatory practices”, welche die Bedeutungen und Identitä-
ten von Subjekten und Objekten konstituiert. Eine Artikulation “establishes a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” 
(Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 105). Diskurse sind mithin relationale und differenziale Bedeutungs-
systeme, in denen kontingente Elemente (z.B. Interessen und Forderungen) miteinander ver-
knüpft und modifiziert werden, so dass sie eine (neue) Bedeutung erhalten. Diese Artikulatio-
nen finden im Feld der Diskursivität statt, was den theoretischen Horizont bildet, in dem Ob-
jekte konstituiert werden können. In diesem Sinne sind alle Objekte diskursive Objekte, da 
ihre Bedeutung und Identität erst im relationalen und differenzialen Signifikanzsystem konsti-
tuiert wird, indem ein Objekt seine Bedeutung dadurch erhält, das es in eine negative Bezie-
hung zu einem anderen Objekt gestellt wird (Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 3). 
Diese diskursive, anti-essentialistische Ontologie impliziert nicht, dass die soziale Realität 
einfach auf Sprache reduziert werden könnte oder materielle Faktoren keine Relevanz hätten. 
Es bedeutet vielmehr, dass wir keinen direkten, ungefilterten Zugang zu dieser Realität haben, 
sondern nur über Diskurse, die dieser Welt für uns Bedeutung verleihen, d.h. die Realität ist 
kein einfach gegebener Referenzpunkt gegen den wir beispielsweise unsere Theorien oder 
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 Wie in der Studie deutlich wurde, ist dieser ‚neue strukturelle Kontext‘ keine ‚objektive‘ Bedingung, sondern 
mit Bedeutung versehen und damit (re)produziert durch Diskurse.   
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Konzepte testen könnten. In diesem Sinne erlangen auch materielle Ressourcen (z.B. militäri-
sche Macht) ihre Bedeutung und Relevanz erst durch Diskurse (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 105ff.). 
Der Kern der Diskurstheorie ist Laclau und Mouffes poststrukturalistische Neuformulierung 
des Konzepts der Hegemonie. Im Unterschied zu den materialistischen und deterministischen 
Hegemonie-Modellen realistischer, liberal oder marxistischer Ansätze
79
, wird Hegemonie hier 
als diskursiver Kampf um die Fixierung von bestimmten Bedeutungen oder Bedeutungssys-
temen verstanden. Konkurrierende Diskurse stehen für unterschiedliche Repräsentationen und 
Verständnisse sozialer Wirklichkeit. Das Hauptziel einer Diskursanalyse ist es, den Prozess 
der Bedeutungsfixierung nachzuvollziehen und herauszufinden, wie sich bestimmte Bedeu-
tungsfixierungen oder -systeme als ‚natürliche‘ oder ‚normale‘ Verständnisse der Welt durch-
setzen und somit einen hegemonialen Status erreichen konnten (Jørgensen/Phillips 2002: 37). 
Wenn eine bestimmte Partikularität (von Subjekten, Interessen oder Forderungen) als univer-
sell dargestellt wird in dem Sinne, dass sich die gleiche ‘Realität’ in den Praktiken aller rele-
vanten Akteure widerspiegelt, dann können wir von einer hegemonialen Konstellation spre-
chen (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 127ff.; Nabers 2015: 142-143). Hegemonie ist hier somit nicht 
gleichzusetzen mit der Dominanz eines bestimmten Staates oder Gruppe von Staaten, sondern 
der Hegemonie eines Diskurses, welcher eine partikulare Repräsentation sozialer Wirklichkeit 
und partikulare Subjekte (durch die Generierung von hierarchischen Subjektpositionen) auf 
einen hegemonialen und somit scheinbar universellen Status hievt. 
Der Postkolonialismus (vgl. Gandhi 1998, Chakrabarty 2000, Shilliam 2011, Seth 2013a) 
kann zusätzliche Einsichten in diese hegemoniale Operation liefern und Aufschluss darüber 
geben, wie sich die ‚westliche‘ diskursive Hegemonie in der Welt herausbilden konnte. Die 
postkoloniale Theorie untersucht vor dem Hintergrund des Kolonialismus und Imperialismus 
den Zusammenhang zwischen geokulturellen Räumen, Wissenssystemen und der Wissens-
produktion, und kritisiert den Eurozentrismus in Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften, vor allem 
die parochiale Annahme, dass ‚westliches‘ Wissen überlegen, fortschrittlich und universell 
anwendbar sei. Durch das Schaffen von Bewusstsein für die Ko-Konstituierung des 
‚Selbst‘ (Kolonisator) und dem ‚Anderen‘ (Kolonialisierte) und wie das ‚Selbst‘ einzig da-
durch privilegiert wird, indem es seine Abhängigkeit vom unterdrückten ‚Anderen‘ leugnet, 
kann der Postkolonialismus Aufschluss darüber geben, wie das koloniale Aufeinandertreffen 
die Identitäten der Kolonisatoren und Kolonialisierte geprägt hat. Dies wird durch die postko-
lonialen Konzepte der Hybridität und des Mimicry (Bhabha 1994) erfasst, welche uns helfen 
können zu verstehen, wie postkoloniale Gesellschaften wie etwa Indien die Diskurse der frü-
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heren Unterdrücker sowohl übernommen und reproduziert haben, aber auch falsch angewen-
det, umgedeutet und pervertiert haben, wodurch sie die (post-)koloniale Herrschaft angefoch-
ten und untergraben und neue – hybride – Identitäten geschaffen haben, welche die Grenzen 
eines bestimmten sozio-kulturellen Raumes transzendieren.  
 
Quellen und Zeitrahmen der Untersuchung  
Der Datensatz der Untersuchung besteht aus Regierungs- und Parteidokumenten, Reden, 
Statements und anderweitigen Publikationen indischer PolitikerInnen, DiplomatInnen, Mili-
tärs und GeheimdienstmitarbeiterInnen sowie Parlamentsdebatten. Zudem wurden Reden und 
Veröffentlichungen von RegeirungsberaterInnen in die Diskursanalyse aufgenommen. Im 
Ganzen hat die Studie ca. 11.000 Dokumente berücksichtigt.  
Der Untersuchungszeitraum der Arbeit beginnt mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und endet 
im Frühjahr 2014, wenn die Kongress-geführte Koalitionsregierung von der hindu-
nationalistischen Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) abgelöst wurde. Dieser Zeitraum bietet sich 
an, da in dieser Studie Indien als einer der Träger der globalen Machtverschiebungen im in-
ternationalen System und damit eine der Gestaltungsmächte in der Weltordnung untersucht 
werden soll. Der Diskurs der globalen Machtverschiebungen, welcher Indien als aufstrebende 
Macht und damit privilegierten Akteur im Ausfechten einer neuen Weltordnung konstituiert, 
ist in diesem Zeitraum entstanden. Zudem wird das Ende des Kalten Krieges in der Literatur 
als eine Zäsur in der indischen Außenpolitik und einer Hinwendung zum außenpolitischen 
‚Realismus‘ oder ‚Pragmatismus‘ eingestuft. Eines der Ziele dieser Arbeit war es, diese Lesart 
indischer Außenpolitik kritisch zu hinterfragen und eine nuancierte Darstellung der indischen 
Außenpolitik seit Ende des Kalten Krieges vorzulegen. 
 
Argumentationsgang der Arbeit und Überblick über die Kapitel  
Im Anschluss an die Einleitung werden im 2. Kapitel der Arbeit Discourse, Hegemony and 
Postcoloniality die ontologischen Annahmen der Arbeit dargestellt. Das Kapitel diskutiert die 
zentralen Einsichten und Konzepte der poststrukturalistischen Diskurstheorie. Im Besonderen 
werden die unterschiedlichen Stufen und Dimensionen des Kampfes um diskursive Hegemo-
nie erläutert und wie und warum ein bestimmter Diskurs einen hegemonialen Status erreichen 
und wieder verlieren kann. Zudem wird aufgezeigt, wie die postkoloniale Theorie und ihre 
Konzepte der Hybridität und des Mimicry sich komplementär in die poststrukturalistischen 
Diskurstheorie einfügen lassen und wichtige Erkenntnisse über die Formation, Herausforde-
rung und Transformation hegemonialer Diskurse liefern können. 
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Das 3. Kapitel der Arbeit Global Power Shifts and World Order: The Contestation of ‘Wes-
tern’ Discursive Hegemony wendet diesen theoretischen Rahmen auf die Phänomene ‚globa-
len Machtverschiebungen‘ und ‚Weltordnung‘ an. Es zeigt, dass Weltordnungen als das Er-
gebnis eines erfolgreichen Kampfes um diskursive Hegemonie verstanden werden können, 
welche es vermocht hat, eine partikulare Repräsentation der Wirklichkeit der Weltpolitik und 
partikulare Subjekte als privilegierte Akteure in der Weltpolitik als universal darzustellen, 
wodurch diese Partikularität sowie die Kontingenz aller sozialen Beziehungen verschleiert 
werden. Das Kapitel argumentiert, dass der ‚Westen‘ die diskursive Hegemonie im vorherr-
schenden Diskurs der internationalen Beziehungen erlangt hat in dem Sinne, dass der ‚Wes-
ten‘ als partikulares, historisches Subjekt mit partikularen Erfahrungen, Werten, Interessen 
usw. es geschafft hat, einer partikularen Repräsentation der Weltpolitik universelle Signifi-
kanz zu verleihen und als die ‚Realität‘ darzustellen.  Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in dem 
Kapitel das Phänomen der globalen Machtverschiebungen neu konzeptualisiert als eine Ver-
schiebung von Repräsentationsmacht, welche die ‚westliche‘ (diskursive) Hegemonie im poli-
tischen und wissenschaftlichen Diskurs der internationalen Beziehungen untergräbt und her-
ausfordert. Im Kapitel wird ein idealtypisches Modell entworfen, dass die Entwicklung und 
Implikationen dieser Verschiebung von Repräsentationsmacht beleuchten und verständlich 
machen soll. 
Das 4. Kapitel der Arbeit Studying India’s Foreign Policy Discourse: Analytical Strategy and 
Data Corpus erläutert die analytische Vorgehensweise und den Datensatz für die Untersu-
chung der Weltordnungsmodelle im außenpolitischen Diskurs Indiens. Es führt das Konzept 
der Logics of Critical Explanation ein, das von Jason Glynos und David Howarth (2007) ent-
wickelt wurde, um die poststrukturalistische Diskurstheorie in die Praxis zu übersetzen. Das 
Konzept unterscheidet zwischen sozialen, politischen und fantasmatischen Logiken, welche 
die unterschiedlichen ontologischen Dimensionen sozialer Beziehungen erfassen sollen. Sozi-
ale Logiken erfassen die sedimentierten Praktiken und Institutionen einer sozialen Ordnung 
und somit was Akteure beispielsweise als die Eckpfeiler einer Weltordnung verstehen. Politi-
sche Logiken erfassen, wie die Praktiken und Institutionen einer Ordnung geschaffen werden 
und zwar in Abgrenzung zu einem ‚Anderen‘, welcher als (negativer) Referenzpunkt für die 
Generierung von Identitäten fungiert. Fantasmatische Logiken geben Aufschluss darüber, 
warum Subjekte Diskurse für die Realität halten und sich mit diesen identifizieren, indem die 
Mythen und fiktionalen Erzählungen, welche die inhärenten Spannungen und Widersprüche 
von Diskursen verschleiern, entlarvt werden.   
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Das 5. Kapitel The Evolution and Dislocation of the Nehruvian Foreign Policy Discourse 
erörtert die Eckpunkte der indischen Außenpolitik nach der Unabhängigkeit im Jahr 1947. 
Die indische Außenpolitik wurde vor allem vom Staatsgründer Jawaharlal Nehru maßgeblich 
gestaltet. Wir können – in der Terminologie dieser Studie – von einem hegemonialen 
Nehruvianischen Diskurs sprechen, welcher die indische Außenpolitik von der Unabhängig-
keit bis zum Ende des Kalten Krieges bestimmte. Wie jedes hegemoniale Projekt ist der 
Nehruvianische Diskurs um einen Knotenpunkt organisiert, einem privilegierten und ideal-
weiser ‚leeren‘ Signifikanten, welcher auf einem allgemeinen, gesellschaftlich geteilten und 
geschätzten Konzept beruht, dessen Bedeutung nie vollständig fixiert werden kann, so dass es 
die Integration unterschiedlicher und gar gegensätzlicher Interessen, Präferenzen und Forde-
rungen erlaubt. Dieser Knotenpunkt war die Blockfreiheit (Non-alignment). Das Kapitel legt 
dar, wie der Nehruvianische Diskurs im Zuge des Endes des Kalten Krieges disloziert und 
damit zerrüttet wurde. Der Dislokationsmoment untergrub nicht nur die existierende diskursi-
ve Ordnung, sondern symboliserte auch eine Identitätskrise, insofern dass Akteure sich nicht 
mehr vollständig mit den Subjektpositionen, welche vom Diskurs bereitgestellt werden, iden-
tifizieren konnten und dazu gedrängt wurden, diese Subjektpositionen zu rekonstruieren und 
damit einen neuen Deutungsrahmen herzustellen.  
Das 6. Kapitel Post-Nehruvianism: India’s Hegemonic Foreign Policy Discourse in the Post-
Cold War Era diskutiert das Ergebnis des diskursiven Kampfes um einen neuen Deutungs-
rahmen, durch den die ‚neuen‘ Rahmenbedingungen verstanden werden können. Der Post-
Nehruvianische Diskurs hat sich graduell als Reaktion auf den Dislokationsmoment im au-
ßenpolitischen Diskurs Indiens entwickelt und den traditionellen Nehruvianischen Diskurs 
erfolgreich transformiert. Das Kapitel zeigt die Kontinuitäten und Veränderungen im hege-
monialen Diskurs auf. Etwa wie der Diskurs den Knotenpunkt von Non-alignment auf Multi-
alignment verschob. Der Schwerpunkt des Kapitels bildet eine ausführliche Diskussion der 
sozialen Logiken  des Post-Nehruvianischen Diskurses – staatliche Souveränität, das ‚aufge-
klärte‘ nationale Interesse, Gewaltlosigkeit, Nicht-Diskriminierung und Internationale Einheit 
in Viel-   falt –, den politischen Logiken, auf deren Grundlage Bedeutungen und Identitäten 
durch negative Relationen (Kolonialismus, der Kalte Krieg, Pakistan und China) geformt 
werden und die fantasmatischen Logiken – namentlich die mythischen Erzählungen Indian 
Greatness und Indian Exceptionalism.    
Das 7. Kapitel The Hyper-Nationalist Discourse: Making India Strong beleuchtet den wich-
tigsten gegenhegemonialen Diskurs in Indien. Der hyper-nationalistische Diskurs setzt sich 
aus zwei Unterdiskursen zusammen: dem hindu-nationalistischen und dem offensiv-
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realistischen Diskurs. Ihr gemeinsamer Nenner ist die soziale Logik der nationalen Stärke. 
Der hyper-nationalistische Diskurs repräsentiert Indiens Außenpolitik als übermäßig idealis-
tisch und moralistisch, wobei insbesondere die Abwesenheit strategischen Denkens, eine Ver-
nachlässigung nationaler Sicherheit und ein mangelndes Bewusstsein für Macht beklagt wer-
den. Während der offensiv-realistische Diskurs nationale Stärke vor allem mit militärischer 
Macht gleichsetzt, hat der hindu-nationalistische Diskurs ein breiteres Verständnis von natio-
naler Stärke, das auch militärische und ökonomische Macht umfasst, vor allem aber einen 
starken nationalen Willen und nationale Einheit, die durch eine homogene nationale Kultur 
geschaffen werden sollen. Das Kapitel zeigt auf, inwieweit der hyper-nationalistische Diskurs 
die Transformation des  Post-Nehruvianischen Diskurs mitgeprägt hat, letztlich jedoch einzig 
zu einer Substantiierung und Beschleunigung des Transformationsprozesses des 
Nehruvianischen Diskurses beigetragen hat anstatt selbst die diskursive Hegemonie im Mo-
ment der Dislokation zu erreichen.  
In der Schlussfolgerung werden die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse der Arbeit zusammengefasst 
und über die Stabilität und Beständigkeit des hegemonialen Post-Nehruvianischen Diskurses 
reflektiert vor dem Hintergrund der Machtübernahme der BJP-Regierung unter Narendra Mo-
di, der bei den letzten nationalen Wahlen überraschend die absolute Mehrheit erlangte. Das 
Kapitel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass der Post-Nehruvianische Diskurs über eine hohe Belast-
barkeit und Integrationskraft verfügt und daher kaum vom hyper-nationalistischen Diskurs 
verdrängt werden könnte. Eine Modifizierung des Post-Nehruvianischen Diskurses ist jedoch 
durchaus möglich.         
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